THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY 
IN  BATTLE 


BY 
ARTHUR  H.  POLLEN 


ILLUSTRATED 


Garden  City  New  York 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

1919 


COPYRIGHT,  I919,  BY 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED,  INCLUDING  THAT  OF 

TRANSLATION  INTO  FOREIGN  LANGUAGES, 

INCLUDING  THE  SCANDINAVIAN 


/J/9 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  PACK 

I.     A  Greeting.     By  Way  of  Dedication   .     .  3 

II.     A  Retrospect    . 11 

The  First  Crisis 14 

The  Second  Crisis 20 

The  Third  Crisis 22 

The  Fourth  Crisis 25 

The  New  Era 28 

III.     Sea  Fallacies:  A  Plea  for  First  Principles  33 

IV,     Some  Root  Doctrines 48 

V.     Elements  of  Sea  Force 61 

VI.     The  Actions 79 

VII.     Naval  Gunnery,  Weapons  and  Technique  93 

Fire  Control 96 

The  Torpedo  in  Battle 103 

VIII.     The  Action  that  Never  Was  Fought   .     .  108 

IX.     The  Destruction  of  jK'ofm^j^^rg .     .     .     .  119 

The  First  Attempt '  126 

Success 134 

A  Problem  in  Control 142 

X.     Capture  of  H.  I.  G.  M.  S.  Emden   ...  152 

XI.     The  Career  of  Von  Spee.     I 165 

Coronel 172 

XII.     Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands.     I: 

The  Career  of  Von  Spee  II  .     .     .     .  180 

A.  Preliminary  Movements  ....  182 

-XIII.     Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands.     II: 

B.  Action  with  the  Armoured  Cruisers  191 

V 


4311320 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTEH  PAGE 

XIV.     Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands.     Ill : 

C.  Action  with  the  Light  Cruisers     .  201 

D.  Action  with  the  Enemy  Transports  210 
XV.     Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands.     IV: 

Strategy — Tactics — Gunnery    .     .     .  213 

British  Strategy 215 

The  Tactics  of  the  Battle     .     .     .     .  219 

A  Point  in  Naval  Ethics 230 

XVI.     The  Heligoland  AfFair 232 

The  North  Sea 240 

XVII.     The  Action  Off  the  Dogger  Bank.    I   .     .  245 

XVIII.     The  Dogger  Bank.    II 251 

XIX.     The  Battle  of  Jutland: 

I.  North  Sea  Strategies 267 

XX.     The  Battle  of  Jutland  (continued): 

II.  The  Urgency  of  a  Decision  .     .     .  283 
XXI.     The  Battle  of  Jutland  {contmued): 

III.  The  Distribution  of  Forces     .     .  294 
XXII.     The  Battle  of  Jutland  {continued) : 

IV.  The  Second  Phase 307 

XXIII.  The  Battle  of  Jutland  {continued): 

V.  The  Three  Objectives      .     .     .     .  315 
The  Tactical  Plans: 

Admiral  Scheer's  Tactics  .     .     .     .  317 

Sir  David  Beatty's  Tactics   .     .     .  324 

Sir  John  Jellicoe's  Tactics     .     .     .  326 

XXIV.  The  Battle  of  Jutland  {continued) : 

VI.  The  Course  of  the  Action  .     .     .  330 

The  German  Retreat 333 

The  Night  Actions  and  the  Events 

of  June  I 335 

XXV.     Zeebriigge  and  Ostend 341 

Strategical  Object 342 

Sir  Roger  Keyes's  Tactics    ....  345 

Attack  on  the  Mole 352 

Moral  Effect 3 153 


LIST  OF  LINE  CUTS 


PAGE 


Big  guns  more  accurate  at  long  range,  because  more 

regular 94 

Big  guns  need  less  accurate  range-finding,  because 

the  danger  space  is  greater 95 

Range-finding  by  bracket 97 

The  crux  of  sea  fighting,  changes  of  course  and  speed 

produce  an  irregularly  changing  range     ...       98 

In  this  sketch  the  black  silhouette  shows  the  posi- 
tion at  the  moment  the  torpedo  is  fired;  the 
white  silhouette  the  position  the  ship  has 
reached  when  the  torpedo  meets  it 107 

Flzn  of  Sydney  znd  Emden  in  action 158 

Plan  of  the  action  between  the  British  battle-cruisers 

and  the  German  armoured  cruisers     ....     199 

Plan  of  action  between  Kent  and  Ntirnbergy  and  of 

that  between  Cornwall  and  Glasgow  and  Leipzig     207 

The  action  oflF  Heligoland  up  to  the  intervention  of 
Commodore  Goodenough's  Light  Cruiser  Squad- 
ron  235 

The  action  off  Heligoland.  The  course  of  the  battle- 
cruisers    239 

The  Dogger  Bank  Affair.  Diagram  to  illustrate  the 
character  of  the  engagement  up  to  the  disable- 
ment of  Lion 249 


Tll 


viii  LIST  OF  LINE  CUTS 

PAGE 

The  official  plan  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland.  Note 
that  the  course  of  the  Grand  Fleet  is  not  shown 
to  be  "astern"  of  the  battle-cruisers,  but  parallel 
to  their  track 295 

Position  of  the  opposing  fleets  at  3:30  P.M.    .     .     .     298 

The  first  phase;  from  Von  Hipper's   coming  into 

view,  until  his  juncture  with  Admiral  Scheer   .     301 

The  second  phase;  Beatty  engages  the  combined 
German  Fleet,  and  draws  it  toward  the  Grand 
Fleet 309 

Sketch  plan  of  the  action  from  6  p.  m.  when  the 
Grand  Fleet  prepared  to  deploy,  till  6 150  when 
Admiral  Scheer  delivered  his  first  massed  tor- 
pedo attack 332 

Jutland  Diagrams.     Third  phase  ...     at  end  of  book 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


THE    BRITISH    NAVY 
IN    BATTLE 

CHAPTER  I 

A  Greeting  by  Way  of  Dedication 

Xmas,  191 S- 
To  THE  Admirals,  Captains,  Officers  and  Men  of  the  Royal 
Navy  and  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve: 

To  the  men  of  the  merchant  service  and  the  landsmen 
who  have  volunteered  for  work  afloat: 

To  all  who  are  serving  or  fighting  for  their  country  at 
sea : 

To  all  naval  officers  who  are  serving — much  against 
their  will — on  land: 

Greetings,  good  wishes  and  gratitude  from  all  landsmen. 

We  do  not  wish  you  a  Merry  Christmas,  for  to  none  of 
us,  neither  to  you  at  sea  nor  to  us  on  land,  can  Christmas 
be  a  merry  season  now.  Nor,  amid  so  much  misery  and 
sorrow,  does  it  seem,  at  first  sight,  reasonable  to  carry  the 
conventional  phrase  further  and  wish  you  a  Happy  New 
Year.  But  happiness  is  a  different  thing  from  merriment. 
In  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word  you  are  happy  in  your 
great  task,  and  we  doubly  and  trebly  happy  in  the  security 
that  your  great  duties,  so  finely  discharged,  confer.  So, 
after  all  it  is  a  Happy  New  Year  that  we  wish  you. 

If  you  could  have  your  wish,  you  of  the  Grand  Fleet — 

3 


4  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

well,  w^;  pan  guqss  what  it  would  be.  It  is  that  the  war 
would  so  shape;  irse'lf  as  to  force  the  enemy  fleet  out,  and 
make  it  put  its  past  WQTk.and  its  once  high  hopes  to  the 
test  against  the  power  which  you  command  and  use  with 
all  the  skill  your  long  vigil  and  faithful  service  have  made 
so  singly  yours  to-day.  And  in  one  sense — and  for  your 
sakes,  because  your  glory  would  be  somehow  lessened  if  it 
did  not  happen — ^we  too  could  wish  that  this  could  happen. 
But  we  wish  it  only  because  3'ou  do.  Although  you  do  not 
grumble,  though  we  hear  no  fretful  word,  we  realize  how 
wearing  and  how  wearying  your  ceaseless  watch  must  be. 
It  is  a  watchfulness  that  could  not  be  what  it  is,  unless  you 
hoped,  and  indeed  more  than  hoped,  expected  that  the 
enemy  must  early  or  late  prove  your  readiness  to  meet 
him,  either  seeking  you,  or  letting  you  find  him,  in  a  High 
Seas  fight  of  ship  to  ship  and  man  to  man.  We,  like  you, 
look  forward  to  such  a  time  with  no  misgiving  as  to  the  re- 
sult, though,  unlike  you,  we  dread  the  price  in  noble  lives 
and  gallant  ships  that  even  an  overwhelming  victory  may 
cost. 

Your  hopes  and  expectation  for  this  dreadful,  but  glori- 
ous, end  to  all  your  work  do  not  date  from  August,  eigh- 
teen months  ago.  When  as  little  boys  you  went  to  the 
Britannia,  you  went  drawn  there  by  the  magic  of  the  sea. 
It  was  not  the  sea  that  carries  the  argosies  of  fabled  wealth; 
it  was  not  the  sea  of  yachts  and  pleasure  boats.  It  was  the 
sea  that  had  been  ruled  so  proudly  by  your  fathers  that 
drew  you.  And  you,  as  the  youngest  of  the  race,  went  to 
it  as  the  heirs  to  a  stern  and  noble  heritage.  So,  almost 
from  the  nursery  have  you  been  vowed  to  a  life  of  hardship 
and  of  self-denial,  of  peril  and  of  poverty — a  fitting  appren- 
ticeship for  those  who  were  destined  to  bear  themselves  so 
nobly  in  the  day  of  strain  and  battle.     To  the  mission  con- 


A  GREETING  BY  WAY  OF  DEDICATION     5 

fided  to  you  in  boyhood  you  have  been  true  in  youth  and 
true  in  manhood.  So  that  when  war  came  it  was  not  war 
that  surprised  you,  but  3^ou  that  surprised  war. 

When  the  war  came,  you  from  the  beginning  did  your 
work  as  simply,  as  skilfully,  and  as  easily  as  you  had  al- 
ways done  it.  Not  one  of  you  ever  met  the  enemy,  how- 
ever inferior  the  force  you  might  be  in,  but  you  fought  him 
resolutely  and  to  the  end.  Twice  and  only  twice  was  he 
engaged  to  no  purpose.  Pegasus,  disabled  and  outraged, 
fell  nobly,  and  the  valiant  Cradock  faced  overwhelming 
odds  because  duty  pointed  to  fighting.  Should  the  cer- 
tainty of  death  stand  between  him  and  that  which  England 
expects  of  every  seaman  ?  There  could  only  be  one  answer. 
In  no  other  case  has  an  enemy  ship  sought  action  with  a 
British  ship.  In  every  other  case  the  enemy  has  been 
forced  to  fight,  and  made  to  fly.  It  was  so  from  the  first. 
When  tw^o  small  cruisers  penetrated  the  waters  of  Heligo- 
land with  a  flotilla  of  destroyers,  the  enemy  kept  his  High 
Seas  Fleet,  his  fast  cruisers,  and  his  well-gunned  armoured 
ships  in  the  ignoble  safety  of  his  harbours  and  his  canal. 
He  left,  to  his  shame,  his  small  cruisers  to  fight  their  battle 
alone.  Tyrwhitt  and  Blount  might,  and  should,  have 
been  the  objects  of  overwhelming  attack.  But  the  Ger- 
mans were  not  to  be  drawn  into  battle.  The  ascendancy 
that  you  gained  in  the  first  three  weeks  of  war  you  have 
maintained  ever  since.  Three  times  under  the  cover  of 
darkness  or  of  fog,  the  greater,  faster  units  of  the  German 
force  have — in  a  frenzy  of  fearful  daring — ventured  to 
cross  or  enter  the  sea  that  once  was  known  as  the  German 
Ocean.  Three  times  they  have  known  no  alternative  but 
precipitate  flight  to  the  place  from  which  they  came. 

Not  once  has  a  single  merchant  ship  bound  for  England 
been  stopped  or  taken  by  an  enemy  ship  in  home  waters. 


6  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

But  fifty-six  out  of  eight  thousand  were  overtaken  in  dis- 
tant seas.  It  has  been  yours  to  shepherd  and  protect 
the  vast  armies  we  have  sent  out  from  England,  and  so 
completely  have  you  done  it  that  not  a  single  transport  or 
supply  ship  has  been  impeded  between  this  country  and 
France.  From  the  first  there  has  not  been,  nor  can  there 
now  ever  be,  the  slightest  threat  or  the  remotest  danger  of 
these  islands  being  invaded.  Indeed,  so  utter  and  com- 
plete has  been  your  work  that  the  phrase  "Command  of  the 
Sea"  has  a  new  meaning.  The  sea  holds  no  danger  for  us. 
Allied  to  other  great  land  powers,  we  find  ourselves  able 
and  compelled  to  become  a  great  land  power  also.  The 
army  of  four  millions  is  thus  not  the  least  of  your  creations. 

So  thorough  is  your  work  that  Britain  stands  to-day  on 
a  pinnacle  of  power  unsurpassed  by  any  nation  at  any 
time. 

Has  the  completeness  of  your  work  been  impaired  by 
the  ravages  of  the  submarine?  Its  gift  of  invisibility  has 
'seemed  to  some  so  mystic  a  thing  that  its  powers  become 
magnified.  Because  it  clearly  sometimes  might  strike  a 
deadly  blow,  it  was  thought  that  it  always  could  so  strike, 
till  madness  was  piled  upon  madness,  and  it  seemed  as  if 
the  very  laws  of  force  had  been  upset,  and  ships  and  guns 
things  obsolete  and  of  no  use.  But  you  have  always 
known — and  we  at  last  are  learning — that  this  is  idle  talk, 
and  that  as  things  were  and  as  they  are,  so  must  they  al- 
ways be;  and  that  sea-power  rests  as  it  always  has,  and  as 
it  always  will,  with  the  largest  fleet  of  the  strongest  ships, 
and  with  big  guns  well  directed  and  truly  aimed. 

It  did  not  take  you  long  to  learn  the  trick  of  the  sub- 
marine in  war,  and  had  things  been  ordered  differently, 
you  might  have  learned  much  of  what  you  know  in  the 
years  of  peace.     But  you  learned  its  tricks  so  well  that  it 


A  GREETING  BY  WAY  OF  DEDICATION     7 

has  failed  completely  tb  hurt  the  Navy  or  the  Army  which 
the  Navy  carries  over  the  sea,  and  has  found  its  only  suc- 
cess in  attacking  unarmed  merchant  ships.  These  are 
only  unarmed  because  the  people  of  Christendom  had 
never  realized  that  any  of  its  component  nations  could 
turn  to  barbarism,  piracy,  and  even  murder  in  war.  It 
would  have  been  so  easy,  had  this  utter  lapse  into  devilry 
been  expected,  to  have  armed  every  merchant  ship — and 
then  where  would  the  submarine  have  been?  But  even 
with  the  merchantmen  unarmed,  the  submarine  success 
has  been  greatly  thwarted  by  your  splendid  ingenuity  and 
resource,  your  sleepless  guard,  your  ceaseless  activity,  and 
the  buccaneers  of  a  new  brutality  have  been  made  to  pay 
a  bloody  toll. 

Take  it  for  all  in  all,  never  in  the  history  of  war  has 
organized  force  accomplished  its  purpose  at  so  small  a  cost 
in  unpreventable  loss,  or  with  such  utter  thoroughness,  or 
in  face  of  such  unanticipated  difficulties. 

It  was  inevitable  that  there  should  be  some  failures. 
Not  every  opportunity  has  been  seized,  nor  every  chance 
of  victor}'  pushed  to  the  utmost.  Who  can  doubt  that 
there  are  a  hundred  points  of  detail  in  which  your  material, 
the  methods  open  to  you,  the  plans  which  tied  you,  might 
have  been  more  ample,  better  adapted  to  their  purpose, 
more  closely  and  wisely  considered  ^  For  when  so  much 
had  changed,  the  details  of  naval  war  had  to  differ  greatly 
from  the  anticipation.  In  the  long  years  of  peace— that 
seem  so  infinitely  far  behind  us  now — you  had  for  a  gene- 
ration and  a  half  been  administered  by  a  department  almost 
entirely  civilian  in  its  spirit  and  authority.  It  was  a  con- 
trol that  had  to  make  some  errors  in  policy,  in  provision, 
in  selection.  But  your  skill  counter-balanced  bad  policy 
when  it  could;  your  resources  suppUed  the  defects  of  ma- 


8  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

terial;  too  few  of  you  were  of  anything  but  the  highest 
merit  for  many  errors  of  selection  to  be  possible. 

And  the  nation  understood  you  very  httle.  Your 
countrymen,  it  is  true,  paid  you  the  lip  service  of  admitting 
that  you  alone  stood  between  the  nation  and  defeat  if  war 
should  come.  But  war  seemed  so  unreal  and  remote  to 
them,  that  it  was  only  a  few  that  took  the  trouble  to  ask 
what  more  you  needed  for  war  than  you  already  had. 

And  you  were  so  absorbed  in  the  grinding  toil  of  your 
daily  work  to  be  articulate  in  criticism;  too  occupied  in 
trying  to  get  the  right  result  with  indifferent  means — be- 
cause the  right  means  cost  too  much  and  could  not  be 
given  to  you — to  strive  for  better  treatment;  too  wholly 
wedded  to  your  task  to  be  angry  that  your  task  was  not 
made  more  easy  for  you.  Hence  you  took  civihan  domi- 
nation, civilian  ignorance,  and  civilian  indifference  to  the 
things  that  matter,  all  for  granted,  and  submitted  to  them 
dumbly  and  humbly,  as  you  submitted  silent  and  unpro- 
testing  to  your  other  hardships;  you  were  resigned  to 
this  being  so;  and  were  resigned  without  resentment.  If, 
then,  the  plans  were  sometimes  wrong,  if  you  and  your 
force  were  at  other  times  cruelly  misused,  if  the  methods 
available  to  you  were  often  inadequate,  it  was  not  your 
fault — unless,  indeed,  it  be  a  fault  to  be  too  loyal  and  too 
proud  to  make  complaint. 

If  we  took  Httle  trouble  to  understand  you,  we  took 
still  less  to  pay  and  praise  you.  There  is  surely  no  other 
profession  in  the  world  which  combines  so  hard  a  life,  such 
great  responsibilities,  such  pitiful  remuneration.  But 
small  as  the  pay  is,  we  seize  eagerly  every  chance  to  lessen 
it.  If  we  waste  our  money,  we  do  not  waste  it  on  you. 
But  we  fully  expect  you  to  spend  your  money  in  our  ser- 
vice.    The  naval  officer's  pay  is  calculated  to  meet  his  ex- 


A  GREETING  BY  WAY  OF  DEDICATION     9 

penses  in  time  of  peace.  Now  a  very  large  proportion  of 
the  pay  of  cadets,  midshipmen,  sub-lieutenants,  and  lieu- 
tenants necessarily  goes  in  uniform  and  clothes.  The 
life  of  a  uniform  can  be  measured  by  the  sea  work  done  by 
the  wearer.  Sea  work  in  war  is — what  shall  we  say? — 
three  to  six  times  what  it  is  in  peace.  But  we  do  nothing 
to  help  young  officers  to  meet  these  very  ugly  attacks  on 
their  very  exiguous  pay.  We  do  not  even  distribute  the 
prize  money  that  the  Fleet  has  earned. 

Some  day,  when  this  war  is  won,  it  may  be  realized  that 
it  has  been  won  because  there  is  a  great  deal  more  water 
than  land  upon  the  world,  and  because  the  British  Fleet 
commands  the  use  of  all  the  water,  and  the  enemy  the  use 
of  only  a  tiny  fraction  of  all  the  land.  If  France  can  en- 
dure, and  if  Russia  can  *'  come  again  ";  if  Great  Britain  has 
the  time  to  raise  the  armies  that  will  turn  the  scale;  if  the 
Allies  can  draw  upon  the  world  for  the  metal  and  food 
that  make  victory — and  waiting  for  victory — possible; 
if  the  effort  to  shatter  European  civilization  and  to  rob 
the  Western  world  of  its  Christian  tradition  fails,  it  is  be- 
cause our  enemies  counted  upon  a  war  in  which  England 
would  not  fight.  Some  day,  then,  we  shall  see  what  we 
and  all  the  world  owe  to  you. 

We  may  then  be  tempted  to  be  generous  and  pay  you 
perhaps  a  living  wage  for  your  work,  and  not  cut  it  down 
to  a  half  or  a  third  if  there  is  no  ship  in  which  to  employ 
you.  And  if  you  lose  your  health  and  strength  in  the  na- 
tion's service,  we  may  pay  you  a  pension  proportionate  to 
the  value  of  your  work,  and  the  dangers  and  responsibili- 
ties that  you  have  shouldered,  and  to  the  strenuous,  self- 
sacrificing  lives  that  you  have  led,  for  our  sakes.  We  may 
do  more.  We  may  see  to  it  that  honours  are  given  to  you 
in  something  Uke  the  same  proportion  that  they  are  given, 


10  THE  BRITISHiNAVY  IN  BATTLE 

say,  to  civilians  and  to  the  Army.  We  may  do  more  still. 
We  may  realize  that  to  get  the  best  work  out  of  you,  you 
must  be  ordered  and  governed  and  organized  by  your- 
selves. 

But  then  again  we  may  do  nothing  of  the  kind.  We 
may  continue  to  treat  you  as  we  have  always  treated  you; 
and  if  we  do,  there  is  at  any  rate  this  bright  side  to  it. 
You  will  continue  to  serve  us  as  you  have  always  served 
us,  working  for  nothing,  content  so  you  are  allowed  to  re- 
main the  pattern  and  mirror  of  chivalry  and  knightly  ser- 
vice, and  to  wear  "the  iron  fetters"  of  duty  as  your  noblest 
decoration. 


CHAPTER  II 

A  Retrospect 

Augusti  1 91 8. 
In  looking  back  over  the  last  four  years,  the  sharpest 
outlines  in  the  retrospect  are  the  ups  and  downs  of  hopes 
and  fears.  Indeed,  so  acutely  must  everyone  bear  these 
alternations  in  mind,  that  to  remark  on  them  is  almost  to 
incur  the  guilt  of  commonplace.  For  they  illustrate  the 
tritest  of  all  the  axioms  of  war.  It  is  human  to  err — and 
every  error  has  to  be  paid  for.  If  the  greatest  general  is 
he  who  makes  the  fewest  mistakes,  then  the  making  of 
some  mistakes  must  be  common  to  all  generals.  The 
rises  and  reversals  of  fortune  on  all  the  fronts  are  of  neces- 
sity the  indices  of  right  or  wrong  strategy.  These  trans- 
formations have  been  far  more  numerous  on  land  than  at 
sea,  and  locally  have  in  many  instances  been  seemingly 
final.  Thus  to  take  a  few  of  many  examples,  Serbia,  Mon- 
tenegro, and  Russia  are  almost  completely  eliminated  as 
factors;  our  effort  in  the  Dardanelles  had  to  be  acknowl- 
edged as  a  complete  failure.  But  at  no  stage  was  any 
victory  or  defeat  of  so  overwhelming  and  wholesale  a  na- 
ture as  to  promise  an  immediate  decision.  The  retreat 
from  Mons,  Gallipoli,  Neuve  Chapelle,  Hulloch,  Kut — the 
British  Army  could  stand  all  of  these,  and  much  more. 
France  never  seemed  to  be  beaten,  whatever  the  strain. 
Even  after  the  defection  of  Russia,  a  German  victory 
seemed  impossible  on  land.  Never  once  did  either  side 
see  defeat,   immediate    and   final,   threatened.     A   right 

II 


12  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

calculation  of  all  the  forces  engaged  may  have  shown  a 
discerning  few  where  the  final  preponderance  lay.  The 
point  is  that,  despite  extraordinary  and  numerous  vicis- 
situdes, there  never  was  a  moment  when  the  land  war 
seemed  settled  once  and  for  all. 

This  has  not  been  the  case  at  sea.  The  transformations 
here  have  been  fewer;  but  they  have  been  extreme.  For 
two  and  a  half  years  the  sea-power  of  the  Allies  appeared 
both  so  overwhelmingly  estabUshed  and  so  abjectly  ac- 
cepted by  the  enemy,  that  it  seemed  incredible  that  this 
condition  could  ever  alter  materially.  Yet  between  the 
months  of  February  and  May,  1917,  the  change  was  so 
abrupt  and  so  terrific  that  for  a  period  it  seemed  as  if  the 
enemy  had  established  a  form  of  superiority  which  must, 
at  a  date  that  was  not  doubtful,  be  absolutely  fatal  to  the 
alliance.  And  again,  in  six  months'  time,  the  situation 
was  transformed,  so  that  sea-power,  on  which  the  only 
hope  of  Allied  victory  has  ever  rested  was  once  more 
assured. 

Thus,  after  the  most  anxious  year  in  our  history,  we 
came  back  to  where  we  started.  This  nation,  France, 
Italy,  and  America  no  less,  we  have  all  returned  to  that 
absolute  and  unwavering  confidence  in  the  navy  as  the 
chief  anchor  of  all  Allied  hopes.  Not  that  the  navy  had 
ever  failed  to  justify  that  confidence  in  the  past.  There 
was  no  task  to  which  any  ship  was  ever  set  that  had  not 
been  tackled  in  that  heroic  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  which  we 
have  been  taught  to  expect  from  our  officers  and  men; 
there  had  never  been  a  recorded  case  of  a  single  ship  declin- 
ing action  with  the  enemy.  There  were  scores  of  cases  in 
which  a  smaller  and  weaker  British  force  had  attacked  a 
larger  and  stronger  German.  Ships  had  been  mined, 
torpedoed,  sunk  in  battle,  and  the  men  on  board  had  gone 


A  RETROSPECT  13 

to  their  death  smiling,  calm,  and  unperturbed.  If  hero- 
ism, goodwill,  a  blind  passion  for  duty  could  have  won  the 
war,  if  devotion  and  zeal  in  training,  patient  submission 
to  discipline,  a  fiery  spirit  of  enterprise  could  have  won — 
then  we  never  should  have  had  a  single  disappointment  at 
sea.  The  traditions  of  the  past,  the  noble  character  of  the 
seamen  of  to-day — ^we  hoped  for  a  great  deal,  nor  ever  was 
our  hope  disappointed.  And  when  the  time  of  danger 
came,  when  our  tonnage  was  slipping  away  at  more 
than  six  million  tons  a  year,  so  that  it  was  literally  pos- 
sible to  calculate  how  long  the  country  could  endure 
before  surrender,  it  never  occurred  to  the  most  panic- 
stricken  to  blame  the  navy  for  our  danger.  The  nation 
saw  quite  clearly  where  the  fault  lay,  and  the  Govern- 
ment, sensitive  to  the  popular  feeling,  at  last  took  the  right 
course. 

But  it  was  a  course  that  should  have  been  taken  long 
before.  For,  though  the  purposes  for  which  sea-power 
exists  seemed  perfectly  secure  and  never  in  danger  at  all 
till  little  more  than  a  year  ago,  yet  there  had  been  a  series 
of  unaccountable  miscarriages  of  sea-power.  Battles 
were  fought  in  which  the  finest  ships  in  the  world,  armed 
with  the  best  and  heaviest  guns,  commanded  by  officers 
of  unrivalled  skill  and  resolution,  and  manned  by  officers 
and  crews  perfectly  trained,  and  acting  in  battle  with  just 
the  same  swift,  calm  exactitude  that  they  had  shown  in 
drill — and  yet  the  enemy  was  not  sunk  and  victory  was  not 
won.  Though,  seemingly,  we  possessed  overwhelming 
numbers,  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  able  to  flout  us,  first  in 
one  place  and  then  in  another,  and  we  seemed  powerless 
to  strike  back.  Almost  since  the  war  began  we  kept  run- 
ning into  disappointments  which  our  belief  in  and  knowl- 
edge of  the  navy  convinced  us  were  gratuitous  disappoint- 


14  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ments.    A  rapid  survey  of  the  chief  events  since  August, 
1914,  will  illustrate  what  I  mean. 

THE  FIRST  CRISIS     . 

The  opening  of  the  war  at  sea  was  in  every  respect 
auspicious  for  the  Allies.  By  what  looked  hke  a  happy 
accident,  the  British  Navy  had  just  been  mobilized  on  an 
unprecedented  scale.  It  was  actually  in  process  of  return- 
ing to  its  normal  establishment  when  the  international 
crisis  became  acute,  and,  by  a  dramatic  stroke,  it  was  kept 
at  war  strength  and  the  main  fleet  sent  to  its  war  stations 
before  the  British  ultimatum  was  despatched  to  BerHn. 
The  effect  was  instantaneous.  Within  a  week  transports 
were  carrying  British  troops  into  France  and  trade  was 
continuing  its  normal  course,  exactly  as  if  there  were  no 
German  Na\y  in  existence.  The  German  sea  service 
actually  went  out  of  existence.  Before  a  month  was  over 
a  small  squadron  of  battle-cruisers  raided  the  Bight  be- 
tween Heligoland  and  the  German  harbours,  sank  there 
small  cruisers  and  half-a-dozen  destroyers,  challenged  the 
High  Seas  Fleet  to  battle,  and  came  away  without  the 
enemy  having  attempted  to  use  his  capital  ships  to  defend 
his  small  craft  or  to  pick  up  the  glove  so  audaciously 
thrown  down.  The  mere  mobilization  of  the  British 
Fleet  seemed  to  have  paralyzed  the  enemy,  and  it  looked 
as  if  our  ability  to  control  sea  communications  was  not 
only  surprisingly  complete,  but  promised  to  be  enduring. 
The  nation's  confidence  in  the  Navy  had  been  absolute 
from  the  beginning,  and  it  seemed  as  if  that  confidence 
could  not  be  shaken. 

Before  another  two  months  had  passed  we  had  run  into 
one  of  those  crises  which  were  to  recur  not  once,  but  again 
and  again.     During  September  an  accumulation  of  errors 


A  RETROSPECT  15 

came  to  light.  The  enormity  of  the  political  and  naval 
blunder  which  had  allowed  Goehen  and  Breslau  to  slip 
through  our  fingers  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  so  bring 
Turkey  into  the  war  against  us,  at  last  become  patent. 
There  was  no  blockade.  There  were  the  raids  which 
Emdeii  and  Karlsruhe  were  making  on  our  trade  in  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  betw'een  the  Atlantic  and  the  Caribbean. 
The  enemy's  submarines  had  sunk  some  of  our  cruisers — 
three  in  succession  on  a  single  day  and  in  the  same  area. 
Then  rumours  gained  ground  that  the  Grand  Fleet,  driven 
from  its  anchorages  by  submarines,  was  fugitive,  hiding 
now  in  one  remote  loch,  now  In  another,  and  losing  one  of 
its  greatest  units  in  its  flight.  For  a  moment  it  looked  as 
if  the  old  warnings,  that  surface  craft  were  Impotent 
against  under-water  craft,  had  suddenly  been  proved  true. 
Von  Spee,  with  a  powerful  pair  of  armoured  cruisers,  was 
known  to  be  at  large.  As  a  final  insult,  German  battle- 
cruisers  crossed  the  North  Sea,  and  battered  and  ravaged 
the  defenceless  inhabitants  of  a  small  seaport  town  on  the 
east  coast.  Something  was  evidently  wrong.  But  no- 
body seemed  to  know  quite  what  It  was. 

The  crisis  was  met  by  a  typical  expedient.  We  are  a 
nation  of  hero-worshippers  and  proverbially  loyal  to  our 
favourites  long  after  they  have  lost  any  title  to  our  favour. 
In  the  concert-room,  in  the  cricket-field,  on  the  stage,  in 
Parliament — in  every  phase  of  life — it  is  the  old  and  tried 
friend  in  whom  we  confide,  even  If  we  have  conveniently 
to  overlook  the  fact  that  he  has  not  only  been  tried,  but 
convicted.  This  blind  loyalty  is,  perhaps,  amiable  as  a 
weakness,  and  almost  peculiar  to  this  nation.  But  we 
have  another  which  is  neither  amiable  nor  peculiar.  We 
hate  having  our  complacency  disturbed  by  being  proved 
to  be  wrong  and,  rather  than  acknowledge  our  fault,  are 


i6  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

easily  persuaded  that  the  cause  of  our  misfortune  is  some 
hidden  and  maHgn  influence.  And  so  in  October,  1914, 
the  explanation  of  things  being  wrong  at  sea  was  suddenly- 
found  to  be  quite  simple.  It  was  that  the  First  Sea  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty  was  of  German  birth.  With  the  evil  eye 
gone  the  spell  would  be  removed.  And  so  a  most  accom- 
plished officer  retired,  and  Lord  Fisher,  now  almost  a 
mythological  hero,  took  his  place. 

Within  very  few  weeks  the  scene  suffered 

.     .     .     a  sea  change. 

Into  something  rich  and  strange. 

Von  Spee  was  left  but  a  month  in  which  to  enjoy  his 
triumph  over  Cradock;  Emden  was  defeated  and  captured 
by  Sydney;  Karlsruhe  vanished  as  by  enchantment  from 
the  sea;  and  Von  Hipper's  battle-cruisers,  going  once  too 
often  near  the  British  coast,  had  been  driven  in  ignomini- 
ous flight  across  the  North  Sea  and  paid  for  their  temerity 
by  the  loss  of  Blucher.  Three  months  of  the  Fisher- 
Churchill  regime  had  seemingly  put  the  Navy  on  a  pin- 
nacle that  even  the  most  sanguine — and  the  most  ignorant 
— had  hardly  dared  to  hope  for  in  the  early  days.  The 
spectacle,  in  August,  of  the  transports  plying  between 
France  and  England,  as  securely  as  the  motor-buses  be- 
tween Fleet  Street  and  the  Fulham  Road,  had  been  a 
tremendous  proof  of  confidence  in  sea-power.  The  unac- 
cepted challenge  at  Heligoland  had  told  a  tale.  The 
British  fleet  had  indeed  seemed  unchallengeable.  But 
the  justification  of  our  confidence  was,  after  all,  based 
only  on  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  not  disputed  it.  It 
was  a  negative  triumph.  But  the  capture  of  Emden,  the 
obliteration  of  Von  Spee,  the  uncamouflaged  flight  of  Von 


A  RETROSPECT  17 

Hipper,  here  were  things  positive,  proofs  of  power  in  ac- 
tion, the  meaning  of  which  was  patent  to  the  simplest. 
No  man  in  his  senses  could  pretend  that  our  troubles  in 
October  had  not  been  attributed  to  their  right  origin,  nor 
that  the  right  remedy  for  them  had  been  found  and  ap- 
plied. 

There  was  but  one  cloud  on  the  horizon.     The  subma- 
rine— despite  the  loss  of  Hoguey  Cressy,  Ahoukir,  Hawk, 
Hermes^  and  Niger,  and  the  disturbing  rumours  that  the 
fleet's  bases  were  insecure — had  been  a  failure  as  an  agent 
for  the  attrition  of  our  main  sea  forces.     The  loss  of  For- 
midahle,  that  clouded  the  opening  of  the  year,  had  not 
restored  its  prestige.     But  Von  Tirpitz  had  made  an  omi- 
nous threat.     The  submarine  might  have  failed   against 
naval  ships.     It  certainly  would  not  fail,  he  said,  against 
trading  ships.     He  gave  the  world  fair  warning  that  at 
the  right  moment  an  under-water  blockade  of  the  British 
Isles  would  be  proclaimed;  then  woe  to  all  belligerents  or 
neutrals  that  ventured  into  those  death-doomed  waters. 
The  naval  writers  were  not  very  greatly  alarmed.     For 
four  months,  after  all,  trading  ships — turned  into  trans- 
ports— had  used  the  narrow  waters  of  the  Channel  as  if  the 
submarines  were  no  threat  at  all.     Yet,  on  pre-war  reason- 
ing, it  was  precisely  in  narrow  waters  crowded  with  traffic 
that  under-water  war  should  have  been  of  greatest  eflPect. 
These  transports  and  these  narrow  waters  were  the  ideal 
victims  and  the  ideal  field,  and  coast  and  harbour  defence 
and  the  prevention  of  invasion,  by  common  consent,  the 
obvious  and  indeed  the  supreme  functions  the  submarine 
would  be  called  upon  to  discharge.     From  a  military  point 
of  view  the  landing  of  British  troops  in  France  was  but 
the  first  stage  towards  an  invasion  of  Germany  and,  from 
a  naval  point  of  view,  it  looked  as  if  to  defend  the  French 


;i8  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE., 

ports  from  being  entered  by  British  ships  was  just  as 
clearly  the  first  objective  of  the  German  submarine  as  the 
defence  of  any  German  port.  Now  six  months  of  war  had 
shown  that,  if  they  had  tried  to  stop  the  transports,  the 
submarines  had  been  thwarted.  Means  and  methods  had 
evidently  been  found  of  preventing  their  attack  or  parry- 
ing it  when  made.  Was  it  not  obvious  that  it  could  be  no 
more  than  a  question  of  extending  these  methods  to  mer- 
chant shipping  at  large  to  turn  the  greater  threat  to  futil- 
ity ?  It  was  this  reasoning  that,  in  January  and  February, 
made  it  easy  for  the  writers  to  stem  any  tendency  of  the 
public  to  panic,  and  when,  towards  the  end  of  February, 
the  First  Lord  addressed  Parliament  on  the  subject,  and 
dealt  with  the  conscienceless  threat  of  piracy  with  a  placid 
and  defiant  confidence,  all  were  justified  in  thinking  that 
the  naval  critics  had  been  right. 

And  so  the  beginning  of  the  submarine  campaign, 
though  somewhat  disconcerting,  caused  no  wide  alarm.  An 
initial  success  was  expected.  It  would  take  time  to  build 
the  destroyers  and  the  convoying  craft  on  the  scale  that 
was  called  for,  and  so  to  organize  the  trade  that  the  attack 
must  be  narrowed  to  protected  focal  points.  And  as  ab- 
solute secrecy  was  maintained,  both  as  to  our  actual  de- 
fensive methods  and  as  to  our  preparations  for  the  future, 
there  was  neither  the  occasion  nor  the  material  for  ques- 
tioning whether  the  serene  contentment  of  Whitehall  was 
rightly  founded. 

Meantime,  as  we  have  seen,  success  had  justified  the 
solution  of  the  October  crisis.  The  attempt  to  probe 
deeper  and  to  get  at  the  cause  of  things  was  a  thankless 
task.  Those  who  could  see  beneath  the  surface  could  not 
fail  to  note  in  December  and  January  that,  while  an  ex- 
uberant optimism  had  become  the  mark  of  the  British 


A  RETROSPECT  19 

attitude  towards  the  war  at  sea,  a  movement  curiously 
parallel  to  it  was  going  forward  in  Germany.  The  shifts 
to  which  the  Grand  Fleet  had  been  put  by  the  defenceless 
state  of  its  harbours,  though  rigidly  excluded  from  the 
British  Press,  has  been  triumphantly  exploited  in  the  Ger- 
man. Hence,  when  the  enemy's  only  oversea  squadron 
was  annihilated  by  Sir  Doveton  Sturdee,  his  Press  re- 
sponded with  an  outcry  on  the  cowardice  of  the  British 
Fleet  that,  while  glad  to  overwhelm  an  inferior  force 
abroad,  dared  not  show  itself  in  the  North  Sea.  And,  as 
if  to  prove  the  charge,  Whitby  and  the  Hartlepools  were 
forthwith  bombarded  by  a  force  we  were  unable  to  bring 
to  action  while  returning  from  this  exploit.  The  enemy 
naval  writers  surpassed  themselves  after  this.  And  it 
looked  so  certain  that  the  German  Higher  Command 
might  itself  become  hypnotized  by  such  talk  that,  before 
the  New  Year,  it  seemed  prudent  to  note  these  phenomena 
and  warn  the  public  that  we  might  be  challenged  to  action 
after  all,  of  the  kind  of  action  the  enemy  would  dare  us  to, 
and  what  the  problems  were  that  such  an  action  would 
present.  And  in  particular  it  seemed  advisable  to  state 
explicitly  that  much  less  must  be  expected  from  naval 
guns  in  battle  than  those  had  hoped,  whose  notions  were 
founded  upon  battle  practice.  A  battle-cruiser  ma- 
noeuvring at  twenty-eight  knots — instead  of  a  canvas  screen 
towed  at  six — mines  scattered  by  a  squadron  in  retreat,  a 
line  of  retreat  that  would  draw  the  pursuers  into  minefields 
set  to  trap  them;  the  attacks  on  the  pursuing  squadrons  by 
flotillas  of  destroyers,  firing  long-range  torpedoes — these 
new  elements  would  upset,  it  was  said,  all  experiences  of 
peace  gunnery,  because  in  peace  practices  it  is  impossible 
to  provide  a  target  of  the  speed  which  enemy  ships  would 
have  in  action,  and  because  there  had  been  no  practice 


20  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

while  executing   the   manoeuvres  which   torpedo   attack 
would  make  compulsory  in  battle. 

Within  a  fortnight  the  action  of  the  Dogger  Bank  was 
fought  and  Von  Hipper's  battle-cruisers  were  subjected  to 
the  fire  of  Sir  David  Beatty's  Fleet  from  nine  o'clock  until 
twelve,  without  one  being  sunk  or  so  damaged  as  to  lose 
speed.  The  enemy's  tactics  included  attacks  by  subma- 
rine and  destroyer  which  had  imposed  the  manoeuvres  as 
anticipated — and  the  best  of  gunnery  had  failed.  But 
Bliicher  had  been  sunk;  the  enemy  had  run  away;  so  the 
warning  fell  on  deaf  ears;  the  lesson  of  the  battle  was  mis- 
read.   Optimism  reigned  supreme. 

THE  SECOND  CRISIS 

Within  a  month  a  naval  adventure  of  a  new  kind  was 
embarked  upon,  based  on  the  theory  that  if  only  you  had 
naval  guns  enough,  any  fort  against  which  they  were  di- 
rected must  be  pulverized  as  were  the  forts  of  Liege, 
Namur,  Maubeuge,  and  Antwerp.  The  simplest  com- 
prehension of  the  principles  of  naval  gunnery  would  have 
shown  the  theory  to  be  fallacious.  It  originated  in  the 
fertile  brain  of  the  lay  Chief  of  the  Admiralty,  and  though 
it  would  seem  as  if  his  naval  advisers  felt  the  theory  to  be 
wrong,  none  of  them,  in  the  absence  of  a  competent  and 
independent  gunnery  staff,  could  say  why.  And  so  the 
essentially  military  operation  of  forcing  the  passage  of  the 
Dardanelles  was  undertaken  as  if  it  were  a  purely  naval 
operation,  with  the  result  that,  just  as  naval  success  had 
never  been  conceivable,  so  now  the  failure  of  the  ships 
made  military  success  impossible  also. 

It  was  thus  we  came  to  our  second  naval  crisis.  The 
first  we  had  solved  by  putting  Lord  Fisher  into  Prince 
Louis's  place.     The  lesson  of  the  second  seemed  to  be 


A  RETROSPECT  21 

that  there  was  only  one  mistake  that  could  be  made  with 
the  navy  and  that  was  for  the  Government  to  ask  it  to  do 
anything.  Mr.  Churchill,  as  King  Stork,  had  taken  the 
initiative.  Lord  Fisher,  the  naval  superman,  had  not 
been  able  to  save  us.  It  was  clear  that  lay  interference 
with  the  navy  was  wrong — equally  clear  that  it  would  be 
wiser  to  leave  the  initiative  to  the  enemy.  And  so  a  new 
regime  began. 

But,  in  reality,  the  lessons  of  the  first  crisis  and  the 
second  crisis  were  the  same.  To  suppose  that  a  civilian 
First  Lord  is  bound  to  be  mischievous  if  he  is  energetic, 
and  certain  to  be  harmless  if,  in  administering  the  navy  as 
an  instrument  of  war,  he  is  a  cipher,  were  errors  just  as 
great  as  to  suppose  that  a  seaman  with  a  long,  loyal,  and 
brilliant  record  in  the  public  service  had  put  an  evil  en- 
chantment over  the  whole  British  Navy  because,  fifty 
years  before,  he  had  been  born  a  subject  of  a  Power  with 
which  till  now  we  had  never  been  at  war.  Things  went 
wrong  in  October,  1914,  for  precisely  the  same  reasons 
that  they  went  wrong  in  February,  March,  and  April, 
191 5.  The  German  battle-cruisers  escaped  at  Heligoland 
for  exactly  the  same  reasons  that  the  attempt  to  take  the 
Dardanelles  forts  by  naval  artillery  was  futile.  We  had 
prepared  for  war  and  gone  into  war  with  no  clear  doctrine 
as  to  what  war  meant,  because  we  lacked  the  organism 
that  could  have  produced  the  doctrine  in  peace  time,  pre- 
pared and  trained  the  Navy  to  a  common  understanding 
of  it,  and  supplied  it  with  plans  and  equipped  it  with 
means  for  their  execution.  What  was  needed  in  October, 
1914,  was  not  a  new  First  Sea  Lord,  but  a  Higher  Com- 
mand charged  only  with  the  study  of  the  principles  and 
the  direction  of  fighting. 

But  in  May,  191 5,  this  truth  was  not  recognized.     And 


22  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATT3.E 

in  the  next  year  which  passed,  all  efforts  to  make  this 
truth  understood  were  without  effect.  And  so  the  sub- 
marine campaign  went  on  till  it  spent  itself  in  October 
and  revived  again  in  the  following  March,  when  it  was 
stopped  by  the  threat  of  American  intervention.  The 
enemy,  thwarted  in  the  only  form  of  sea  activity  that  prom- 
ised him  great  results,  found  himself  suddenly  threat- 
ened on  land  and  humiliated  at  sea,  and  to  restore  his  wan- 
ing prestige,  ventured  out  with  his  forces,  was  brought  to 
battle — and  escaped  practically  unhurt. 

The  controversies  to  which  the  battle  of  Jutland  gave 
rise  will  be  in  everyone's  recollection.  Another  of  the 
many  indecisive  battles  with  which  history  is  full  had  been 
fought,  and  the  critics  estabhshed  themselves  in  two 
camps.  One  side  was  for  facing  risks  and  sinking  the 
enemy  at  any  cost.  The  other  would  have  it  that  so  long 
as  the  British  Fleet  was  unconquered  it  was  invincible, 
and  that  the  distinction  between  "invincible"  and  "victori- 
ous" could  be  neglected.  After  all,  as  Mr.  Churchill  told 
us,  while  our  fleet  was  crushing  the  life  breath  out  of  Ger- 
many, the  German  Navy  could  carry  on  no  corresponding 
attack  on  us;  and  when  the  other  camp  denounced  this 
doctrine  of  tame  defence,  he  retorted  that  victory  was  not 
unnecessary  but  that  the  torpedo  had  made  it  impossible. 

THE    THIRD    CRISIS 

Yet,  within  two  months  of  the  battle  of  Jutland,  the 
submarine  campaign  had  begun  again,  and,  at  the  time  of 
Mr.  Churchill's  rejoinder,  the  world  was  losing  shipping 
at  the  rate  of  three  million  tons  a  year!  As  there  never 
had  been  the  least  dispute  that  to  mine  the  submarine  in- 
to German  harbours  was  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  antidote, 
never  the  least  doubt  that  it  was  only  the  German  Fleet 


A  RETROSPECT  23 

that  prevented  this  operation  from  being  carried  out  it 
seemed  strange  that  an  ex-First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty- 
should  be  telling  the  world  first,  that  the  German  Fleet  in 
its  home  bases  delivered  no  attack  on  us  and  therefore 
need  not  be  defeated!  And,  secondly,  as  if  to  clinch  the 
matter  and  silence  any  doubts  as  to  the  cogency  of  his  ar- 
gument, we  were  to  make  the  best  of  it  because  victory 
was  impossible. 

This  utter  confusion  of  mind  was  typical  of  the  pubHc 
attitude.  If  a  man  who  had  been  First  Lord  at  the  most 
critical  period  of  our  history  had  understood  events  so 
little,  could  the  man  in  the  street  know  any  better? 

Once  more  the  root  principles  of  war  were  urged  on  pub- 
lic notice.  But  it  was  already  too  late.  Jutland,  whether 
a  victory,  or  something  far  less  than  a  victory,  had  at  any 
rate  left  the  public  in  the  comfortable  assurance  that  the 
ability  of  the  British  Fleet  was  virtually  unimpaired  to 
preserve  the  flow  of  provisions,  raw  material,  and  manu- 
factures into  Allied  harbours  and  to  maintain  our  military 
communications.  But  soon  after  the  third  year  of  the  war 
began,  a  change  came  over  the  scene.  The  highest  level 
that  the  submarine  campaign  had  reached  in  the  past  was 
regained,  and  then  surpassed  month  by  month.  Grad- 
ually it  came  to  be  seen  that  the  thing  might  become  crit- 
ical— and  this  though  the  campaign  was  not  ruthless.  Yet 
it  was  carried  out  on  a  larger  scale  and  with  bolder  methods 
which  the  possession  of  a  larger  fleet  of  submarines  made 
possible.  The  element  of  surprise  in  the  thing  was  not 
that  the  Germans  had  renewed  the  attempt — for  it  was 
clear  from  the  terms  of  surrender  to  America  that  they 
would  renew  it  at  their  own  time.  The  surprise  was  in 
its  success.  The  public,  still  trusting  to  the  attitude  of 
mind  induced  by  the  critics  and  by  the  authorities  in  191 5, 


24  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

had  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  two  previous  campaigns 
had  stopped  in  December,  191 5,  and  in  March,  1916,  be- 
cause of  the  efficiency  of  our  counter-measures.  The  reve- 
lation of  the  autumn  of  1916  was  that  these  counter- 
measures  had  failed. 

It  was  this  that  brought  about  the  third  naval  crisis  of 
the  war.  Once  more  the  old  wrong  remedy  was  tried. 
The  Government  and  the  public  had  learned  nothing  from 
the  revelation  that  we  had  gone  to  war  on  the  doctrine 
that  the  Fleet  need  not,  and  ought  not,  to  fight  the  enemy, 
and  were  apparently  unconcerned  at  discovering  that  it 
could  not  fight  with  success.  And  so,  still  not  realizing 
the  root  cause  of  all  our  trouble,  once  more  a  remedy  was 
sought  by  changing  the  chief  naval  adviser  to  the  Govern- 
ment. 

But  on  this  occasion  it  was  not  only  the  chief  that  was 
replaced,  as  had  happened  when  Lord  Fisher  succeeded 
Prince  Louis  of  Battenberg,  and  when  Sir  Henry  Jackson 
succeeded  Lord  Fisher.  When  Admiral  Jellicoe  came  to 
Whitehall  several  colleagues  accompanied  him  from  the 
Grand  Fleet.  There  was  nothing  approaching  to  a  com- 
plete change  of  personnel,  but  the  infusion  of  new  blood 
was  considerable.  But  this  notwithstanding,  the  menace 
from  the  submarine  grew,  when  ruthlessness  was  adopted 
as  a  method,  until  the  rate  of  loss  by  April  had  doubled, 
trebled,  and  quadrupled  that  of  the  previous  year.  All 
the  world  then  saw  that,  with  shipping  vanishing  at  the 
rate  of  more  than  a  million  tons  a  month,  the  period  dur- 
ing which  the  Allies  could  maintain  the  fight  against  the 
Central  Powers  must  be  strictly  limited. 

Thus,  without  having  lost  a  battle  at  sea — but  because 
we  had  failed  to  win  one — a  complete  reverse  in  the  naval 
situation  was  brought  about.     Instead  of  enjoying  the 


A  RETROSPECT  25 

complete  command  Mr.  Churchill  had  spoken  of,  we  were 
counting  the  months  before  surrender  might  be  inevitable. 
During  the  ten  weeks  leading  up  to  the  culminating  losses 
of  April,  a  final  effort  was  made  to  make  the  public  and  the 
Government  realize  that  failure  of  the  Admiralty  to  pro- 
tect the  sea-borne  commerce  of  a  seagirt  people  was  due 
less  to  the  Government's  reliance  on  advisers  ill-equipped 
for  their  task,  than  that  the  task  itself  was  beyond  human 
performance,  so  long  as  the  Higher  Command  of  the  Navy 
was  wrongly  constituted  for  its  task.  It  was,  of  course,  an 
old  warning  vainly  urged  on  successive  Governments  year 
after  year  in  peace  time,  and  month  after  month  during  the 
war.  Evidences  of  inadequate  preparation  of  imperfect 
plans,  of  a  wrong  theory  of  command,  of  action  founded 
on  wrong  doctrine  but  endorsed  by  authority,  had  all  been 
numerous  during  the  previous  two  and  a  half  years. 

THE   FOURTH  CRISIS 

But  where  reason  and  argument  had  been  powerless  to 
prevail,  the  logic  of  facts  gained  the  victory.  At  last,  in 
the  fourth  naval  crisis  of  the  war,  it  was  realized  that 
changes  in  personnel  at  Whitehall  were  not  sufficient,  that 
changes  of  system  were  necessary.  Before  the  end  of  May 
the  machinery  of  administration  was  reorganized  and  a 
new  Higher  Command  developed,  largely  on  the  long  re- 
sisted staff  principle. 

Thus,  after  repeated  failures — not  of  the  Fleet  but  of 
its  directing  minds  in  London — a  complete  revolution  was 
effected  in  the  command  of  the  most  important  of  all  the 
fighting  forces  in  the  war,  viz.,  the  British  Navy.  It  was 
actually  brought  about  because  criticism  had  shown  that 
the  old  regime  had  first  failed  to  anticipate  and  then  to 
thwart  a  new  kind  of  attack  on  sea  communications — 


26  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

just  as  it  had  failed  to  anticipate  the  conditions  of  surface 
war.  It  was  at  last  realized  that  two  kinds  of  naval  war 
could  go  on  together,  one  almost  independent  of  the  other. 
A  Power  might  command  the  surface  of  the  sea  against  the 
surface  force  of  an  enemy,  and  do  so  more  absolutely  than 
had  ever  happened  before,  and  yet  see  that  command 
brought,  for  its  main  purposes,  almost  to  nothing  by  a  new 
naval  force,  from  which,  though  naval  ships  could  defend 
themselves,  they  seemingly  could  not  defend  the  carrying 
and  travelling  ships,  upon  which  the  life  of  the  nation  and 
the  continuance  of  its  military  effort  on  land  depended. 
The  revolution  of  May  saved  the  situation.  At  last  the 
principle  of  convoy,  vainly  urged  on  the  old  regime,  was 
adopted,  and  within  six  months  the  rate  at  which  ships 
were  being  lost  was  practically  halved.  In  twelve  months 
it  had  been  reduced  by  sixty  per  cent. 

But  the  departure  made  in  the  summer  of  1917,  though 
radical  as  to  principle,  was  less  than  half-hearted  as  to  per- 
sons. Many  of  the  men  identified  with  all  our  previous 
failures  and  responsible  for  the  methods  and  plans  that 
have  led  to  them,  were  retained  In  full  authority.  The 
mere  adoption  of  the  staff  principle  did  indeed  bring  about 
an  effect  so  singular  and  striking  as  completely  to  transform 
all  Allied  prospects.  In  April,  defeat  seemed  to  be  a  mat- 
ter of  a  few  months  only.  By  October  it  had  become  clear 
that  the  submarine  could  not  by  itself  assure  a  German 
victory.  If  such  extraordinary  consequences  could  follow 
— exactly  as  it  was  predicted  they  must — from  a  change  in 
system  which  all  experience  of  war  had  proved  to  be  essen- 
tial, why,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  adoption  of  the  staff 
principle  so  bitterly  opposed  ^  Partly,  no  doubt,  because 
of  the  natural  conservatism  of  men  who  have  grov/n  old 
and  attained  to  high  rank  in  a  service  to  which  they  have 


A  RETROSPECT  27 

given  their  lives  in  all  devotion  and  sincerity.  The  singu- 
larity of  the  sailor's  training  and  experience  tends  to  make 
the  naval  profession  both  isolated  and  exclusive.  And 
that  its  daily  life  is  based  upon  the  strictest  discipline, 
that  gives  absolute  power  to  the  captain  of  a  ship  because 
it  is  necessary'  to  hold  him  absolutely  responsible,  inevit- 
ably grafts  upon  this  exclusiveness  a  respect  for  seniority 
which  gives  to  its  action  in  every  field  the  indisputable 
finality  bred  of  the  quarter-deck  habit.  Thus,  there  was 
no  place  in  Admiralty  organization  for  the  independent 
and  expert  work  of  junior  men,  because  no  authority  could 
attach  to  their  counsel.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  the  staff 
principle  that  special  knowledge,  sound,  impartial,  trained 
judgment,  grasp  of  principle  and  proved  powers  of  con- 
structive imagination,  are  higher  titles  to  dictatorship  in 
policy  than  the  character  and  experience  called  for  in  the 
discharge  of  executive  command.  But  to  a  service  not 
bred  to  seeing  all  questions  of  poHcy  first  investigated, 
analyzed,  and,  finally,  defined  by  a  staff  which  necessarily 
will  consist  more  of  younger  than  of  older  men,  the  sugges- 
tion that  the  higher  ranks  should  accept  the  guiding  coop- 
eration of  their  juniors  seemed  altogether  anarchical.  The 
long  resistance  to  the  establishment  of  a  Higher  Command 
based  on  rational  principles  may  be  set  down  to  these  two 
elements  of  human  psychology. 

That  successive  Governments  failed  to  break  down  this 
conservatism  must,  I  think,  be  explained  by  their  fear  of 
the  hold  which  men  of  great  professional  reputation  had 
upon  the  public  mind  and  public  affections.  It  was  riot- 
able,  for  example,  that  when  our  original  troubles  came  to 
us  at  the  first  crisis,  the  Government,  instead  of  seeking 
the  help  of  the  youngest  and  most  accomplished  of  our 
admirals  and  captains,  chose  as  chief  advisers  the  oldest 


28  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

and  least  in  touch  with  our  modern  conditions.  It  was, 
perhaps,  the  same  fear  of  public  opinion  that  delayed  the 
completion  of  the  1917  reforms  until  the  beginning  of  the 
next  year.  But,  with  all  its  defects  and  its  limitations, 
the  solution  sought  of  the  fourth  sea  crisis  had  made  the 
history  of  the  past  twelve  months  the  most  hopeful  of  any 
since  the  war  began. 

THE    NEW    ERA 

The  period  divides  itself  into  two  unequal  portions.  Be- 
tween June  and  January,  191 8,  was  seen  the  slowly  grow- 
ing mastery  of  the  submarine.  The  rate  of  loss  was  halved 
and  the  methods  by  which  this  result  was  achieved  were 
applied  as  widely  as  possible.  But  in  the  next  six  or  eight 
months  no  improvement  in  the  position  corresponding  to 
that  which  followed  in  the  first  period  was  obtained.  The 
explanation  is  simple  enough.  The  old  autocratic  regime 
had  not  understood  the  nature  of  the  new  war  any  better 
than  the  nature  of  the  old.  It  had  from  the  first,  under 
successive  chief  naval  advisers,  repudiated  convoy  as 
though  it  were  a  pestilent  heresy.  In  June,  1917,  the  very 
men  who,  as  absolutist  advisers,  had  taken  this  attitude, 
were  compelled  to  sanction  the  hated  thing  itself.  It 
yielded  exactly  the  results  claimed  for  it,  but  no  more.  It 
was  in  its  nature  so  simple  and  so  obvious  that  it  did  not 
take  long  to  get  it  into  working  order.  It  was  the  best 
form  of  defence.  But  defence  is  the  weakest  form  of  war. 
The  stronger  form,  the  offensive,  needed  planning  and 
long  preparations.  In  the  nature  of  things  these  could 
not  take  effect  either  in  six  months  or  in  twelve.  Nor  is  it 
likely  that,  while  the  old  personnel  v/as  suffered  to  remain 
at  Whitehall,  those  engaged  on  the  plans  and  charged  with 
the  preparations  for  this  were  able  to  work  with  the  expe- 


A  RETROSPECT  29 

dition  which  the  situation  called  for.  For  the  first  six 
months  after  the  revolution,  then,  little  occurred  to  prove 
its  efficiency,  except  the  fruits  of  the  policy  which  in- 
structed opinion  had  forced  on  Whitehall.  But  these,  so 
far  as  the  final  issue  of  the  war  was  concerned,  were  surely 
sufficient.  For  the  losses  by  submarines  were  brought  be- 
low the  danger  point. 

It  was  not  until  the  revolution  made  its  next  step  tor- 
ward  by  the  changes  in  personnel  announced  in  January 
that  marked  progress  was  shown  in  the  other  fields  of 
naval  war.  The  late  autumn  had  been  marked,  as  it  was 
fully  expected,  once  the  submarine  was  thwarted,  by  va- 
rious efforts  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  assert  himself  by 
other  means  at  sea.  A  Lerwick  convoy,  very  inadequately 
protected,  was  raided  by  fast  and  powerful  enemy  cruisers, 
and  many  ships  sunk  in  circumstances  of  extraordinary 
barbarity.  The  destroyers  protecting  them  sacrificed 
themselves  with  fruitless  gallantry.  There  were  ravages 
on  the  coast  as  well.  Both  things  pointed  to  salient  weak- 
nesses in  the  naval  position.  At  the  time  of  the  third 
naval  crisis  at  the  end  of  191 6,  it  had  been  pointed  out 
that  the  repeated  evidences  of  our  inability  to  hold  the 
enemy  in  the  Narrow  Seas  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  pass 
uncensured  or  unremedied.  But  the  fatal  habit  of  refus- 
ing to  recognize  that  an  old  favourite  had  failed  prevented 
any  reform  for  a  year.  It  was  not  until  Sir  Roger  Keyes 
was  appointed  to  the  Dover  Command  and  a  new  atmos- 
phere was  created  that  remarkable  departures  in  new 
policy  were  inaugurated.  This  policy  took  two  forms. 
First,  there  was  the  establishment  of  a  mine  barrage  from 
coast  to  coast  across  the  Channel,  and  simultaneously 
with  this,  North  Sea  minefields  stretching,  one  from  Nor- 
wegian territorial  waters  almost  to  the  Scottish  foreshore, 


30  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

and  another  In  the  Kattegat,  to  intercept  such  German 
U-boats  as  base  their  activities  upon  the  enemy's  Baltic 
force.  Two  great  minefields  on  such  a  scale  as  this  are 
works  of  time.  Nor  can  their  effect  upon  the  submarine 
campaign  be  expected  to  be  seen  until  they  are  very  near 
completion;  but  then  the  effect  may  possibly  be  immediate 
and  overwhelming. 

Principally  to  facilitate  the  creation  and  maintenance  of 
the  barrages,  a  second  new  departure  In  policy  was  the 
organization  of  attacks  on  the  German  bases  in  Flanders. 
Of  these  Zeebriigge  was  infinitely  the  more  Important, 
because  It  Is  from  here  that  the  deep  water  canal  runs  to 
the  docks  and  wharves  of  Bruges  some  miles  Inland.  The 
value  of  Zeebriigge,  robbed  of  the  facilities  for  equipment 
and  reparation  which  the  Bruges  docks  afford,  is  little  in- 
deed. It  is  little  more  than  an  anchorage  and  a  refuge. 
To  close  Zeebriigge  to  the  enemy  called  for  an  operation 
as  daring  and  as  intricate  as  was  ever  attempted.  Success 
depended  upon  so  many  factors,  of  which  the  right  weather 
was  the  least  certain,  that  It  was  no  wonder  that  the  ex- 
pedition started  again  and  again  without  attempting  the 
blow  It  set  out  to  strike.  Its  final  complete  success  at 
Zeebriigge  was  a  veritable  triumph  of  perfect  planning  and 
organization  and  command.  It  came  at  a  critical  moment 
In  the  campaign.  A  month  before  the  enemy,  by  his  great 
attack  at  St.  Quentin,  had  achieved  by  far  the  greatest 
land  victory  of  the  war.  He  had  followed  this  up  by  fur- 
ther attacks,  and  seemed  to  add  to  endless  resources  in  men 
a  ruthless  determination  to  employ  them  for  victory.  The 
British  and  French  were  driven  to  the  defensive.  Not  to 
be  beaten,  not  to  yield  too  much  ground,  to  exact  the  high- 
est price  for  what  was  yielded,  this  was  not  a  very  glorious 
role  when  the  triumphs  on  the  Somme  and  In  Flanders  of 


A  RETROSPECT  31 

1916  and  1917  were  remembered.  It  cannot  be  questioned 
that  the  originaHty,  the  audacity,  and  the  success  of  Vice- 
Admiral  Keyes'  attacks  on  Zeebriigge  and  Ostend,  gave 
to  all  the  Allies  just  that  encouragement  which  a  dashing 
initiative  alone  can  give.  It  broke  the  monotony  of  being 
always  passive. 

But  the  new  minefields,  the  barrages,  the  sealing  of 
Zeebriigge,  these  were  far  from  being  the  only  fruits  of  the 
changes  at  Whitehall.  A  sortie  by  Breslau  and  Goeben 
from  the  Dardanelles,  which  ended  in  the  sinking  of  a 
couple  of  German  monitors  and  the  loss  of  a  light  German 
cruiser  on  a  minefield,  directed  attention  sharply  to  the  sit- 
uation in  the  Middle  Sea.  There  was  a  manifest  peril  that 
the  Russian  Fleet  might  fall  into  German  hands  and  make 
a  junction  with  the  Austrian  Fleet  at  Pola.  Further,  the 
losses  of  the  Allies  by  submarines  in  this  sea  had  for  long 
been  unduly  heavy.  A  visit  of  the  First  Lord  to  the  Medi- 
terranean did  much  to  put  these  things  right.  First  steps 
were  taken  in  reorganizing  the  command  and,  before  the 
changes  had  advanced  very  far,  an  astounding  exploit  by 
two  ofl&cers  of  the  Italian  Navy  resulted  in  the  destruction 
of  two  Austrian  Dreadnoughts,  and  relieved  the  Allies  of 
any  grave  danger  in  this  quarter. 

Meantime,  it  had  become  known  that  a  powerful  Ameri- 
can squadron  had  joined  the  Grand  Fleet,  that  our  gallant 
and  accomplished  Allies  had  adopted  British  signals  and 
British  ways,  and  had  become  in  every  respect  perfectly 
amalgamated  with  the  force  they  had  so  greatly  strength- 
ened. And  though  little  was  said  about  it  in  the  Press,  it 
was  evident  enough  that  the  moral  of  the  Lerwick  convoy 
had  been  learned,  nor  was  there  the  least  doubt  that  the 
Grand  Fleet,  under  the  command  of  Sir  David  Beatty,  had 
become  an  instrument  of  war  infinitely  more  flexible  and 


32  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

efficient  than  It  had  ever  been.  His  plans  and  battle 
orders  took  every  contingency  into  council  so  far  as  human 
foresight  made  possible.  At  Jutland,  at  the  Dogger  Bank, 
and  in  the  Heligoland  Bight,  Admiral  Beatty  had  shown 
his  power  to  animate  a  fleet  by  his  own  fighting  spirit  and 
to  combine  a  unity  of  action  with  the  Independent  initia- 
tive of  his  admirals,  simply  because  he  had  inspired  all  of 
them  with  a  common  doctrine  of  fighting.  Under  such 
auspices  there  could  be  little  doubt  that  our  main  forces  in 
northern  waters  were  ready  for  battle  with  a  completeness 
and  an  elasticity  that  left  nothing  to  chance. 

But  if  we  are  to  look  for  the  chief  fruit  of  last  year's 
revolution,  we  shall  not  find  It  In  the  reorganized  Grand 
Fleet,  nor  In  the  new  initiative  and  aggression  In  the  Nar- 
row Seas,  for  the  ultimate  results  of  which  we  still  have  to 
wait.  If  the  enemy  despairs  both  of  victory  on  land  or  of 
such  success  as  will  give  him  a  compromise  peace,  if  he  is 
faced  by  disintegration  at  home  and,  driven  to  a  desperate 
stroke,  sends  out  his  Fleet  to  fight,  we  shall  then  see,  but 
perhaps  not  till  then,  what  the  changes  of  last  year  have 
brought  about  in  our  fighting  forces.  Meantime,  the  suc- 
cess of  the  great  reforms  can  be  measured  quite  definitely. 
In  the  months  of  May  and  June  over  half  a  million  Ameri- 
can soldiers  were  landed  in  France,  sixty  per  cent,  of  whom 
were  carried  In  British  ships.  No  one  in  his  senses  In  May 
or  June  last  year  would  have  thought  this  possible. 

Looked  at  largely,  then,  last  year's  revolution  at  White- 
hall Is  In  all  ways  the  most  astonishing  and  the  most  satis- 
factory naval  event  of  the  last  four  years.  It  Is  the  most 
satisfactory  event,  because  Its  results  have  been  so  nearly 
what  was  foretold  and  because  It  only  needs  for  the  work 
to  be  completed  for  all  the  lessons  of  the  war  to  be  rightly 
appHed. 


CHAPTER  III 

Sea  Fallacies   :  A  Plea  for  First  Principles 

What  do  we  mean  by  "sea-power"  and  "command  of  the 
sea"?  What  really  is  a  navy  and  how  does  it  gain  these 
things?  How  come  navies  into  existence?  Of  what  con- 
stituents, human  and  material,  are  they  composed  ?  How 
are  the  human  elements  taught,  trained,  commanded,  and 
led?  How  are  the  ships  grouped  and  distributed,  and  the 
weapons  fought  in  war? 

To  the  countrymen  of  Nelson,  and  to  those  of  his  great 
interpreter,  Mahan,  these  might  at  first  sight  seem  very 
superfluous  questions,  for  they,  almost  of  natural  instinct, 
should  understand  that  strange  but  overwhelming  force 
that  has  made  them.  To  the  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  to  the  Empires  that  owe  allegiance  to  the 
British  Crown,  to  the  United  States  of  America,  sea-power 
is  at  once  their  origin  and  the  fundamental  essential  of 
their  continued  free  and  independent  existence.  And  it 
is  their  predominant  races  that  have  produced  the  world's 
greatest  sea  fighters  and  sea  writers.  It  is  to  the  British 
Fleet  that  the  world  owes  its  promise  of  safety  from  Ger- 
man diabolism  bred  of  autocracy.  It  is  to  sea-power  that 
America  must  look  if  she  is  to  finish  the  work  the  Allies 
have  begun.  With  so  great  a  stake  in  the  sea,  Great 
Britain  and  America  should  have  fathomed  its  mysteries. 

But,  despite  the  fighters  and  the  writers,  the  sea  in  a 
great  measure  has  kept  its  secret  hidden.  In  every  age 
the  truth  has  been  the  possession  of  but  a  few.     Countries 

33 


34  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

for  a  time  have  followed  the  light,  and  have  then,  as  it 
were,  been  suddenly  struck  blind,  and  the  fall  of  empires 
has  followed  the  loss  of  vision.  The  world  explains  the 
British  Empire  of  to-day,  and  the  great  American  nation 
which  has  sprung  from  it,  by  a  happy  congenital  talent  for 
colonizing  waste  places,  for  self-government,  for  assimilat- 
ing and  making  friends  with  the  unprogressive  peoples,  by 
giving  them  a  better  government  than  they  had  before. 
And  certainly  without  such  gifts  the  British  races  could  not 
have  overspread  so  large  a  portion  of  the  earth.  But  the 
world  is  apt  to  forget  that  there  were  other  empires  sprung 
from  other  European  peoples — Portuguese,  French,  Span- 
ish, and  Dutch — each  at  some  time  larger  in  wealth,  area, 
or  population,  than  that  which  owed  allegiance  to  the 
British  Crown.  In  each  case  it  was  the  power  of  their 
navies  that  gave  each  country  these  great  possessions.  Of 
some  of  these  empires  only  insignificant  traces  remain  to- 
day. They  have  been  merged  in  the  British  Empire  or 
have  become  independent.  And  the  merging  or  the  free- 
ing has  always  followed  from  war  at  sea.  It  is  the  British 
sailors,  and  not  the  British  colonists,  that  have  made  the 
British  Empire.  It  is  not  because  the  settlers  in  New 
England  were  better  fighters  or  had  more  talent  for  self- 
government,  but  because  Holland  had  the  weaker  navy, 
that  the  city  which  must  shortly  be  the  greatest  in  the 
world  is  named  after  the  ancient  capital  of  Northern  Eng- 
land, and  not  after  Amsterdam.  It  was  not  England's 
half-hearted  fight  on  land,  but  her  failure  to  preserve  an 
unquestionable  command  of  the  sea  that  secured  the  ex- 
traordinary success  of  Washington  and  Hamilton's  mili- 
tary plans. 

To  all  these  truths  we  have  long  paid  lip  service.     Years 
ago  it  passed  into  a  commonplace  that  should  ever  national 


SEA  FALLACIES  35 

existence  be  threatened  by  an  outside  force,  it  would  be  on 
V  the  sea  that  we  should  have  to  rely  for  defence.  With  so 
tremendous  an  issue  at  stake,  why  was  our  knowledge  so 
vague,  why  has  our  curiosity  to  know  the  truth  been  so 
feeble?  Perhaps  it  is  that  communities  that  are  very  rich 
and  very  comfortable  are  slow  to  beheve  that  danger  can 
hang  over  them.  In  the  catechism  used  to  teach  Catholic 
children  the  elements  of  their  religion,  the  death  that 
awaits  every  mortal,  the  instant  judgment  before  the 
throne  of  God,  the  awful  alternatives,  Heaven  or  Hell, 
that  depend  on  the  issue,  are  spoken  of  as  the  "Four  Last 
Things."  Their  title  has  been  flippantly  explained  by  the 
admitted  fact  that  they  are  the  very  last  things  that  most 
people  ever  think  of.  So  has  it  been  with  America  and 
England  in  the  matter  of  war.  The  threat  seemed  too  far 
off  to  be  a  common  and  universal  concern.  It  could  be 
left  to  the  governments.  So  long  as  we  voted  all  the 
money  that  was  asked  for  officially,  we  had  done  our  share. 
And,  if  statesmen  told  us  that  our  naval  force  was  large 
enough,  and  that  it  was  in  a  state  of  high  efficiency,  and 
ready  for  war,  we  felt  no  obligation  to  ask  what  war  meant, 
in  what  efficiency  consisted,  or  how  its  existence  could  be 
either  presumed  or  proved.  We  had  no  incentive  to  mas- 
ter the  thing  for  ourselves.  We  were  not  challenged  to 
inquire  whether  in  fact  the  semblance  of  sea-power  cor- 
responded with  its  reality.  The  fact  that  it  was  on  sea- 
power  that  we  relied  for  defence  against  invasion  should, 
of  course,  have  quickened  our  vigilance.  It,  in  fact,  dead- 
ened it.  For  we  had  never  refused  a  pound  the  Admiralty 
had  asked  for.  We  took  the  sufficiency  of  the  Navy  for 
granted  and,  with  the  buffer  of  the  fleet  between  ourselves 
and  ruin,  the  threat  of  ruin  seemed  all  the  more  remote. 
A  minority,  no  doubt,  was  uneasy  and  did  inquire.     But 


36  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

they  found  their  path  crossed  by  difficulties  almost  insu- 
perable. The  literature  of  sea-power  was  based  entirely 
upon  the  history  of  the  great  sea  wars  of  a  dim  past. 
Mahan,  it  is  true,  had  so  elucidated  the  broad  doctrines  of 
sea  strategy  that  it  seemed  as  if  he  who  ran  might  read. 
But  lucid  and  convincing  as  is  his  analysis,  urbane  and 
judicial  as  is  his  style,  Mahan's  work  could  not  make  the 
bulk  of  his  readers  adepts  in  naval  doctrine.  The  fact 
seems  to  be  that  the  fabled  mysteries  of  the  sea  make 
every  truth  concerning  it  elusive,  difficult  for  any  one  but 
a  sailor  to  grasp.  The  difficulties  were  hardly  lessened  by 
Mahan's  chief  work  having  dealt  completely  with  the  past. 
The  most  important  of  the  world's  sea  wars  may  be  said 
to  begin  with  the  Armada  and  to  end  in  1815.  In  these 
two  and  one  quarter  centuries  the  implements  of  naval  war- 
fare changed  hardly  at  all.  Broadly  speaking,  from  the 
days  of  Howard  of  Effingham  to  those  of  Fulton  and  Watt, 
man  used  three-masted  ships  and  muzzle-loading  cannon. 
Hence  the  history  of  the  Great  Age  deals  very  little  with 
the  technique  of  war. 

To  the  lay  reader,  therefore,  the  study  of  sea-power, 
based  upon  these  ancient  campaigns,  seemed  not  only  the 
pursuit  of  a  subject  vague  and  elusive  in  itself,  but  one 
that  becomes  doubly  unreal  through  the  successive  revolu- 
tions of  modern  times.  It  was  like  studying  the  politics  of 
an  extinct  community  told  in  records  of  a  dead  language. 
The  incendiary  shell,  armour  to  keep  the  shell  out,  steam 
that  made  ships  completely  dirigible  in  the  sense  that  they 
could  with  great  rapidity  be  turned  to  any  chosen  course, 
these  alone  had,  by  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  com- 
pletely revolutionized  the  tactical  employment  of  sea  force. 
Steam,  which  made  a  ship  easier  to  aim  than  a  gun,  gave 
birth  to  ramming;  and  naval  thought  was  hypnotized  by 


SEA  FALLACIES  37 

this  fallacy  for  nearly  two  generations.  By  the  end  of  the 
century  the  whole  art  had  again  been  changed,  first  by  the 
development  of  the  monster  cannon,  and  next,  a  far  more 
important  invention,  the  mountings  that  made  first  light, 
and  then  heavy,  guns  so  flexible  in  use  that  they  could  be 
aimed  in  a  moderate  sea  way.  These  and  the  invention 
of  the  fish  torpedo  and  the  high  speed  boat  for  carrying  it — 
that  in  the  twihght  of  dawn  and  eve  would  make  it  prac- 
tically invisible — brought  about  fresh  changes  that  altered 
not  only  the  tactics  of  battle,  but  those  of  blockade  and 
of  many  other  naval  operations. 

But,  great  and  surprising  as  were  the  changes  and  de- 
velopments in  naval  weapons  and  the  material  in  the  last 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  they  were  completely 
eclipsed  by  the  number  and  nature  of  the  advances  made 
in  the  first  decade  and  a  half  of  the  twentieth.  If,  to  the 
ordinary  reader,  the  lessons  of  the  past  seemed  of  doubtful 
value  in  the  light  of  what  steam,  the  explosive  shell,  the 
torpedo,  and  the  heavy  gun  had  effected,  what  was  to  be 
said  in  the  light  of  the  kaleidoscope  of  novelties  sprung 
upon  the  world  after  the  latest  of  all  the  naval  wars.f*  For 
between  1906  and  1914  there  came  a  succession  of  naval 
sensations  so  startling  as  to  make  clear  and  connected 
thinking  appear  a  visionary  hope. 

First  we  heard  that  naval  guns,  that  until  1904  had  no- 
where been  fired  at  a  greater  range  than  two  miles,  were 
actually  being  used  in  practice — and  used  with  success — at 
distances  of  ten,  twelve,  and  fourteen  thousand  yards. 
It  was  not  only  that  guns  were  increasing  their  range,  they 
were  growing  monstrously  in  size  and  still  more  mon- 
strously in  the  numbers  put  into  each  individual  ship,  so 
that  the  ships  grew  faster  than  the  guns  themselves,  until 
the  capital  ship  of  to-day  is  more  than  double  the  displace- 


38  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ment  of  that  of  ten  years  ago.  And  with  size  came  speed, 
not  only  the  speed  that  would  follow  naturally  from  the  in- 
crease in  length,  but  the  further  speed  that  was  got  by 
a  more  compact  and  lighter  form  of  prime  mover.  Ten 
years  ago  the  highest  action  pace  a  fleet  of  capital  ships 
would  have  been,  perhaps,  seventeen  knots.  Now  whole 
squadrons  can  do  twenty-five  per  cent,  better.  And  with 
the  battle-cruiser  we  have  now  a  capital  ship  carrying  the 
biggest  guns  there  are,  that  can  take  them  into  action  Ht- 
erally  twice  as  fast  as  a  twelve-inch  gun  could  be  carried 
into  battle  twelve  years  ago.  Thus  with  range  increased 
out  of  all  imagination,  and  vastly  greater  speed,  the  tac- 
tics of  battle  were  obviously  in  the  melting  pot. 

But  these  were  far  from  being  the  only  revolutionary 
elements.  There  followed  in  quick  succession  a  new  tor- 
pedo that  ran  with  almost  perfect  accuracy  for  five  or  six 
miles  and  carried  an  explosive  charge  three  or  four  times 
larger  than  anything  previously  known.  It  had  seemed 
but  yesterday  that  a  mile  was  the  torpedo's  almost  outside 
range.  Then,  at  the  beginning  of  the  decade  of  which  I 
speak,  the  submarine  had  a  low  speed  on  the  surface,  and 
half  of  that  below  it,  with  a  very  limited  area  of  manoeuvre 
in  which  it  could  work.  It  seemed  little  more,  many 
thought,  than  an  ingenious  toy  capable,  perhaps,  of  an 
occasional  deadly  surprise  if  an  enemy's  fleet  should  come 
too  near  a  harbour,  but  seemingly  not  destined  to  influence 
the  grand  tactics  of  war.  But  in  an  incredibly  short  time 
the  submarine  became  a  submersible  ocean  cruiser,  with 
three  times  the  radius  of  a  pre-Dreadnought  battleship, 
with  a  far  higher  surface  speed,  and  able  to  carry  guns  of 
such  power  that  they  could  sink  a  merchant  ship  with 
half-a-dozen  rounds  at  four  miles.  In  this,  even  the  dullest 
could  see  something  more  than  a  change  in  naval  tac- 


SEA  FALLACIES  39 

tics.  Might  not  the  whole  nature  of  naval  war  be 
changed?  For  the  long  range  torpedo  that  could  be  used 
in  action,  at  a  range  equal  to  that  at  which  the  greatest 
guns  could  be  expected  to  hit;  the  submarine  that,  com- 
pletely hidden,  could  bring  the  torpedo  to  such  short 
range  that  hits  w^ould  be  a  certainty,  the  Invisible  boat 
that  could  evade  the  closest  surface  cordon  and,  almost 
undisturbed,  hunt  and  destroy  merchantmen  on  the  trade 
routes — that,  but  for  the  submarine,  would  have  been  com- 
pletely protected  by  the  command  won  by  the  predomi- 
nant fleet — wonderful  as  these  new  things  were,  they  were 
far  from  exhausting  the  new  developments  of  under-water 
war.  Great  Ingenuity  had  been  shown  not  only  in  devel- 
oping very  powerful  mines,  but  in  devising  means  of  laying 
them  by  the  fastest  ships,  so  that  not  only  could  these 
deadly  traps  be  set  by  merchantmen  disguised  as  neutrals, 
but  by  fast  cruisers  whose  speed  could  at  any  time  enable 
them  to  evade  the  patrols.  And,  finally.  It  was  equally 
obvious  that  the  submarine  could  become  a  mine  layer 
also.  There  was,  then,  literally  no  spot  In  the  ocean  that 
might  not  at  any  moment  be  mined. 

Add  to  all  this,  that  while  wireless  Introduced  an  almost 
Instant  means  of  sending  orders  to  or  getting  news  from 
such  distant  spots  that  space  was  annihilated,  airships 
and  aeroplanes — with  some,  as  many  thought,  with  a  de- 
cisive capacity  for  attacking  fleets  In  harbour — seemed  to 
make  scouting  possible  over  unthought  of  areas.  Can 
we  blame  the  landsman  who  set  himself  patiently  to  learn 
the  rudiments  of  the  naval  art  if,  after  a  painful  study  of 
the  past,  he  found  himself  so  bemused  by  the  changes  of 
the  present  as  to  wonder  if  a  single  accepted  dogma  could 
survive  the  high-explosive  bombardment  of  to-day's  in- 
ventions?    It  almost  looked  as  if  nothing  could  be  learned 


40         THE   BRITISH  NAVY  IN   BATTLE 

from  the  past  and  less,  if  possible,  be  foretold  about  the 
future.  If  the  understanding  of  sea-power  in  the  days  of 
old  had  been  the  possession  of  but  a  few,  it  seemed  that  to- 
day it  must  be  denied  to  all. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  extraordinary  mis- 
understandings were — and  are — prevalent.  Only  one 
truth  seemed  to  survive — the  supremacy  of  the  capital 
ship.  But  this,  too,  became  an  error,  because  it  excluded 
other  truths.  To  the  vast  bulk  of  laymen  the  word  "navy" 
suggested  no  more  than  a  panorama  of  great  super-Dread- 
nought battleships.  From  time  to  time  naval  reviews 
had  been  held,  and  the  illustrated  papers  had  shown  these 
great  vessels,  long  vistas  of  them,  anchored  in  perfectly 
kept  lines,  with  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  fading  away 
into  the  distance.  Both  in  the  pictures  and  in  the  descrip- 
tions all  emphasis  v/as  laid  upon  the  ships.  And  in  this 
the  current  official  naval  thought  of  the  day  was  reflected. 
If  any  one  wished  to  compare  the  British  Fleet  with  the 
German  or  the  German  with  the  American,  he  confined 
himself  to  enumerating  their  respective  totals  in  Dread- 
noughts, and  let  it  go  at  that.  His  mental  picture  of  a 
fleet  was  thus  a  perspective  of  vast  mastodons  armed  with 
guns  of  fabulous  reach  and  still  more  fabulous  power, 
gifted,  some  of  them,  with  speed  that  could  outstrip  the 
fastest  hner,  and  encased,  at  least  in  part,  in  almost  im- 
penetrable armour. 

He  would  know  generally,  of  course,  that  such  things  as 
cruisers,  destroyers,  and  submarines  not  only  existed,  but 
were  indeed  necessary.  He  would  know  vaguely  that 
cruisers  were  useful  for  cruising,  and  destroyers  for  their 
eponymous  duties — though  he  would  have  been  sorely 
puzzled  if  he  had  been  asked  to  say  exactly  what  the  cruis- 
ing was  for,  or  what  the  destroyers  were  intended  to  de- 


SEA  FALLACIES  41 

stroy.  He  would  have  heard  of  the  mystic  properties  of 
torpedoes,  and  of  mines,  and  of  certain  weird  possibilities 
that  lay  before  the  combination  of  the  torpedo  with  the 
submarine.  Similarly,  if  one  challenged  him,  he  would 
admit,  of  course,  that  guns  could  only  be  formidable  if 
they  hit,  and  that  fleets  could  only  succeed  in  battle  if  their 
officers  and  crews  were  properly  trained  and  skilfully  led. 
But  these  were  things  that  could  not  be  tabulated  or 
scheduled.  They  did  not  figure  in  Naval  Annuals,  nor  in 
Admiralty  statements.  They  were  stumbhng  blocks  to 
the  layman's  desire  to  be  satisfied — and  he  took  it  for 
granted  that  they  were  all  right,  and  was  content  to  meas- 
ure naval  strength  by  the  number  of  the  biggest  ships, 
and  so  rate  the  navies  of  the  world  by  what  they  possessed 
in  these  colossal  units  only.  Thus,  he  would  always  put 
Great  Britain  first,  and  recently  Germany  second,  with 
the  United  States,  Japan,  and  France  taking  the  third 
place  in  succession,  as  their  annual  programmes  of  con- 
struction were  announced.  And  just  as  he  thought  of 
navies  in  terms  of  battleships,  so  he  thought  of  naval  war 
in  terms  of  great  sea  battles.  A  reaction  was  inevitable. 
Four  years  have  now  passed  since  Germany  struck  her 
felon  blow  at  the  Christian  tradition  the  nations  have  been 
struggling  to  maintain — and  so  far  there  has  been  no  Tra- 
falgar. The  German  Fleet,  hidden  behind  its  defences,  is 
still  integral  and  afloat,  and  though  the  British  Fleet  has 
again  and  again  come  out,  its  battleships  have  got  into 
action  but  once,  and  then  for  a  few  minutes  only.  For 
four  years,  therefore,  the  two  greatest  battle  fleets  in  the 
world  seem  to  have  been  doing  nothing;  and  to  be  doing 
nothing  now!  And  so,  if  you  ask  the  average  layman  for 
a  broad  opinion  on  sea-power  to-day,  he  will  tell  you  that 
battle  fleets  are  useless.     For  a  year  or  more  he  has  heard 


42  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

little  of  any  work  at  sea  except  of  the  work  of  the  subma- 
rine. To  him,  therefore,  it  seemed  manifest  that  the  tor- 
pedo has  superseded  the  gun  and  the  submarine  the  battle- 
ship. His  opinions,  in  other  words,  have  swung  full  cycle. 
Was  he  right  before  and  is  he  wrong  now,  or  was  his  first 
view  an  error  and  has  he  at  last,  under  the  stern  teachings 
of  war,  attained  the  truth  ? 

He  was  wrong  then  and  he  is  wrong  now.  It  was  an 
error  to  think  of  sea-power  only  in  terms  of  battleships. 
It  is  a  still  greater  error  to  suppose  that  sea-power  can  ex- 
ist in  any  useful  form  unless  based  on  battleships  in  over- 
whelming strength.  It  is  true  that  the  German  subma- 
rines did  for  a  period  so  threaten  the  world's  shipping  as  to 
make  it  possible  that  the  overwhelming  military  resources 
of  the  Allies  might  never  be  brought  to  bear  against  the 
full  strength  of  the  German  hne  in  France.  It  is  also  true 
that  they  have  added  years  to  the  duration  of  the  war, 
millions  and  millions  to  its  cost,  and  have  brought  us  to 
straits  that  are  hard  to  bear.  They  were  truly  Germany's 
most  powerful  defence,  the  only  useful  form  of  sea  force 
for  her.  But  it  is,  nevertheless,  quite  impossible  that  the 
submarine  can  give  to  Germany  any  of  the  direct  advan- 
tages which  the  command  of  the  sea  confers. 

These  simple  truths  will  come  home  convincingly  to  us 
if  we  suppose  for  a  minute  that,  at  the  only  encounter  in 
which  the  battle  fleets  met,  it  had  been  the  German  Fleet 
that  was  victorious.  Had  Scheer  and  Von  Hipper  met 
Beatty  and  Jellicoe  in  a  fair,  well-fought-out  action,  and 
sunk  or  captured  the  greater  part  of  the  British  Fleet  so 
that  but  a  crippled  remnant  could  struggle  back  to  harbour 
— as  little  left  of  the  mighty  British  armada  as  survived  of 
Villeneuve's  and  Gravina's  forces  after  Trafalgar — would 
it  ever  have  been  necessary  for  Germany  to  have  chal- 


SEA  FALLACIES  43 

lenged  the  forbearance  of  the  world  by  reckless  and  pi- 
ratical attacks  on  peaceful  shipping?  Quite  obviously 
not.  For  with  her  battle-cruisers  patrolling  unchallenged 
in  the  Channel,  the  North  Sea,  and  the  Atlantic,  with  all 
her  destroyers  and  light  cruisers  working  under  their  pro- 
tection, no  British  merchantman  could  have  cleared  or 
entered  any  British  port,  no  neutral  could  have  passed  the 
blockading  lines.  British  submarines  might,  indeed, 
have  held  up  German  shipping — but  we  should  have  lost 
the  use  of  merchant  shipping  ourselves.  Our  armies 
would  have  been  cut  off  from  their  overseas  base,  our  fight- 
ing Allies  would  have  been  robbed  of  the  food  and  mate- 
rial now  reaching  them  from  North  and  South  America 
and  the  British  Dominions,  and  the  civil  population  of 
England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  and  Wales,  would  have  been 
threatened  by  immediate  invasion  or  by  not  very  far  dis- 
tant famine.  And  this  is  so  because  command  of  the  sea 
is  conditioned  by  a  superior  battleship  strength,  and  can 
only  be  exercised  by  surface  craft  which  cannot  be  driven 
off  the  sea. 

Let  us  look  at  this  question  again  from  another  angle. 
It  is  probable  that  Germany  possessed,  during  the  summer 
of  1917,  some  two  hundred  submarines  at  least.  She  may 
have  possessed  more.  These  submarines  were,  for  many 
months,  sinking  on  an  average  of  from  twenty  to  twenty- 
four  British  ships  a  week,  and  perhaps  rather  more  than 
half  as  many  Allied  and  neutral  ships  as  well.  It  was,  of 
course,  a  very  formidable  loss.  But  of  every  seventeen 
ships  that  went  into  the  danger  zone,  sixteen  did  actually 
escape.  How  many  would  have  escaped  if  Germany 
could  have  maintained  a  fleet  of  fifty  surface  ships — light 
cruisers,  armed  merchantmen,  swift  destroyers — in  these 
waters.^     Supposing  trade  ships  were  to  put  to  sea  and  try 


44  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

to  get  past  such  a  cordon  just  as  they  risk  passing  the  sub- 
marines, how  many  could  possibly  escape?  What  would 
be  the  toll  each  surface  ship  would  take — one  a  fortnight? 
One  a  week?     One  a  day? 

These  are  all  ridiculous  questions,  because,  could  such 
a  cordon  be  maintained,  no  ship  bound  for  Great  Britain 
would  put  to  sea  at  all.  It  would  not  be  sixteen  escaping 
to  one  captured;  the  whole  seventeen  would  so  certainly 
be  doomed  that  they  all  would  stay  in  port.  So  much  the 
war  has  certainly  taught  us.  When,  on  August  4,  1914, 
the  British  Government  declared  war  on  Germany,  the 
sailing  of  every  German  ship  the  world  over  was  then  and 
there  stopped.  A  hundred  that  were  at  sea  could  not  be 
warned  and  were  captured.  Those  that  escaped  capture 
made  German  or  neutral  ports.  But  the  order  not  to 
sail  did  not  wait  upon  results.  The  stoppage  of  the  Ger- 
man merchant  service  was  automatic  and  instantaneous. 
It  would  have  been  raving  insanity  to  have  risked  encoun- 
ter with  a  navy  that  held  the  surface  command. 

Three  months  later  the  situation  was  locally  reversed  in 
South  American  waters.  Von  Spee,  with  two  \ery  power- 
ful armoured  cruisers  and  three  light  fast  vessels,  encoun- 
tered a  very  inferior  British  force  under  Admiral  Cradock 
off  Coronel,  and  defeated  it  decisively.  Von  Spee's  vic- 
tory meant  that  in  the  Southern  Atlantic  there  was  no 
force  capable  of  opposing  him.  Instantly  every  South 
American  port  was  closed.  No  one  knew  where  Von  Spee 
might  turn  up  next.  Not  a  captain  dared  clear  for  Eng- 
land. Even  in  South  Africa  General  Botha's  hands  were 
tied.  A  section  of  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Colony 
Dutch  had  risen  in  rebellion,  and  had  made  common  cause 
with  the  Germans  in  South  West  Africa.  With  Von  Spee 
at  large  there  was  no  saying  what  help  he  would  bring  to 


SEA  FALLACIES  45 

the  enemy,  and  the  risk  that  communications  with  the 
mother  country  might  be  cut,  was  a  real  one.  For  four 
weeks  the  South  African  Government  was  paralyzed. 

Then  followed  the  most  brilliant  piece  of  sea  strategy  in 
the  war.  Two  battle-cruisers  were  sent  secretly  and  at 
top  speed  to  the  Falkland  Islands.  They  reached  Port 
Stanley  on  December  7,  and  on  the  next  morning  at  eight 
o'clock,  Von  Spee,  in  obedience  to  some  inexplicable  in- 
stinct, brought  the  whole  of  his  forces  to  attack  the  islands. 
It  was  the  most  extraordinary  coincidence  in  the  history 
of  war.  It  was  as  if  a  man  had  been  told  that  a  sixty- 
pound  salmon  had  been  seen  in  a  certain  river,  had  thrown 
a  fly  at  random,  and  had  got  a  bite  and  landed  him  with 
his  first  cast.  The  verdict  of  Coronel  was  reversed.  Four 
out  of  five  German  ships  were  sunk.  The  Dresden  es- 
caped, but  only  to  hide  herself  in  the  fjords  of  Patagonia. 
Germany's  brief  spell  of  sea  command  in  the  South  Atlan- 
tic had  ended  as  dramatically  as  it  began.  And  within 
twenty-four  hours  the  laden  ships  of  Chile  and  the  Ar- 
gentine had  put  to  sea,  the  underwriters  had  dropped 
their  premiums  to  the  pre-war  rate,  and  the  arrangements 
for  the  invasion  of  South  West  Africa  had  begun. 

Once  more  it  had  been  proved  that  the  course  of  sea 
traflic  is  governed  by  sea  command,  and  sea  command 
means  the  general  power  to  use  the  ocean  for  what  it  truly 
is,  the  highway  that  connects  all  the  ports  of  the  world  to- 
gether. To  use,  that  is  to  say,  exclusively;  to  limit  its  use 
to  the  power  possessing  that  command,  and  to  those  other 
powers  that  might  be  friendly  to  them,  or  to  neutrals  un- 
concerned with  the  war  altogether.  Never  in  history  has 
this  command  been  complete.  From  Trafalgar  to  181 5, 
the  British,  if  ever,  commanded  the  sea  adversely  against 
their  enemies.     But  they  lost  anything  from  six  hundred 


46  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATFLE 

to  one  thousand  ships  a  year,  and  it  was  never  possible  to 
stop  the  whole  of  the  enerny's  trade.  Before  submarines 
were  ever  heard  of,  then,  command  could  not  be  made 
absolute.  Strangely  enough,  steam  changed  all  this.  To- 
day the  surface  command  against  surface  force  is  virtually 
absolute.  In  August,  1914,  Germany  had  in  all  a  dozen 
armed  vessels  on  the  high  seas  prepared  to  attack  British 
shipping.  They  took  and  destroyed  fifty-six  vessels  only. 
All  but  three  were  destroyed  or  driven  to  intern  in  very 
few  months.  Save  for  a  raider  or  two — exceptions  that 
prove  the  rule — no  surface  attack  has  been  made  on  the 
Alhes'  ocean  trade  since  then.  And  there  has  been  no 
ocean  trade  in  German  bottoms  at  all.  In  a  sense,  then, 
the  submarine  has  only  restored  to  the  weaker  belligerent 
a  part — and  only  a  small  part — of  the  powers  he  possessed 
in  the  days  of  sailing  fleets.  It  gives  him  a  limited  power 
of  attack  on  his  enemy's  supply.  But,  two  cruises  of  the 
Deutschland  notwithstanding,  it  has  returned  him  none 
of  his  old  trading  power.  And,  as  the  course  of  the  sub- 
marine war  has  shown,  so  long  as  he  limits  the  attack  on 
trade  to  proportions  which  the  neutral  world  can  put  up 
with,  the  power  of  attack  is  so  restricted  as  to  be  without 
military  value.  The  attempt,  then,  to  get  a  kind  of  com- 
mand of  the  sea  by  submarine  alone  could  only  be  made 
at  the  cost  of  turning  the  whole  neutral  world  into  an  en- 
emy world.  And  from  the  German  point  of  view,  the 
tragedy  of  the  thing  is  this.  The  attempt  was  made,  the 
whole  world  has  become  hostile,  and  the  thing  has  failed. 
In  these  two  popular  fallacies — the  pre-war  error  that 
battleships  were  everything,  and  the  present  error  that 
they  are  absolutely  useless,  and  that  it  is  the  submarine 
that  reigns  at  sea — we  see,  as  it  appears  to  me,  convincing 
proofs  that  an  exposition  of  the  ABC  of  sea  fighting  would 


SEA  FALLACIES  i  47 

not  be  a  work  of  supererogation.  I  have  spoken  of  these 
fallacies  as  popular  fallacies,  but  they  are  not  limited  to 
the  unlettered,  nor  are  they  foreign  to  men  of  affairs. 
They  have,  on  the  contrary,  flourished  most  in  ministries, 
and  been  strongly  held  by  those  whose  business  it  should 
have  been  not  only  to  follow  or  express,  but  to  mould,  pub- 
lic opinion.  A  British  statesman,  afterwards  Prime  Min- 
ister, said  once  in  Parliament:  "I  believe  that  since  the 
Declaration  of  Paris,  the  fleet,  valuable  as  it  is  for  prevent- 
ing an  invasion  of  these  shores,  is  almost  valueless  for  any 
other  purpose. "  Most  strange  of  all,  the  strongest  expon- 
ents of  these  heresies  have  been  certain  naval  officers  them- 
selves. It  would  be  interesting  to  essay  to  account  for 
this,  as  it  seems  to  me  the  strangest  curiosity  of  our  times. 
Let  it  suffice  for  the  moment  to  state  that  what  up  to  a 
year  ago  was  a  dominating  faith,  is  recognized  universally 
to-day  as  a  devastating  tissue  of  errors. 

Had  the  root  principles  of  sea-power  been  properly  un- 
derstood, these  errors  never  could  have  prevailed.  For 
it  is  popular  opinion  that  is  ultimately  responsible  for  the 
kind  of  government  each  nation  has.  On  it  depends  the 
kind  of  navy  that  each  government  creates,  and  hence  the 
measure  of  safety  at  sea  that  each  nation  enjoys.  The 
tragic  history  of  the  last  four  years  shows  how  this  opinion 
can  be  misguided  into  an  almost  fatal  tolerance  of  what 
is  false. 

When  will  a  new  Mahan  arise  to  set  things  right?  The 
world  needs  a  naval  teacher. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Some  Root  Doctrines 

War  Is  a  condition  which  arises  when  the  appeal  to  reason, 
justice,  or  fear  has  failed  and  a  nation  wishes,  or  in  self- 
defence  is  compelled,  to  bring  another  to  its  will  by  force. 

Force  is  exerted  by  armies  on  land  and  naval  fleets  at 
sea.  It  is  the  primary  business  of  the  armed  force  in  each 
element  to  defeat  that  of  the  enemy  in  battle,  and  so  disin- 
tegrate and  destroy  it.  The  beaten  nation's  power  to 
fight  is  thus  brought  to  naught.  Its  resolution  to  renew 
the  attack  or  to  continue  resistance  is  broken  down.  If 
defeat  throws  it  open  to  invasion  without  power  of  stop- 
ping the  invader,  its  national  life,  internal  and  external, 
is  paralyzed  and  it  is  compelled  to  bow  to  the  will  of  the 
conqueror.  In  its  simplest  conception,  then,  war  is  a 
struggle  between  nations  in  which  the  opposing  sides  pit 
their  armed  forces  against  each  other  and  have  to  abide 
by  the  issue  of  that  combat. 

It  is  rarely,  however,  that  a  single  battle  between  armies 
has  decided  the  issue  of  a  war.  The  campaigns  of  Jena 
and  Sadowa  are  indeed  instances  in  point.  But  they  are 
in  their  way  as  exceptional  as  is  the  Boer  War — decided 
without  a  pitched  battle  being  fought  at  all.  These  may 
be  regarded  as  the  extremes.  Normally,  war  may  end 
victoriously  for  one  side  without  the  other  having  been 
deprived  of  the  means  of  continuing  even  effective  resist- 
ance. In  such  cases  it  is  some  moderation  in  the  victor's 
terms,  some  change  in  the  ambition  of  the  partially  de- 

48 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  49 

feated  side,  or,  at  least,  a  sense  that  no  adequate  results 
can  be  expected  from  further  fighting,  that  has  brought 
about  the  cessation  of  hostihties. 

But,  again,  there  are  wars  in  which  the  issues  can  admit 
of  no  compromise  at  all.  The  invasions  of  Tamerlane, 
Attila,  and  the  Mohammedan  conquerors  were  not  wars 
but  campaigns  of  extermination.  It  is  in  such  a  war  that 
we  are  engaged  to-day.  The  stake  for  every  country  is  of 
a  vital  character,  so  that  compromise  is  indistinguishable 
from  defeat,  and  defeat  must  carry  with  it  the  negation  of 
ever^'thing  which  makes  national  life  tolerable.  The  Ger- 
mans have  convinced  themselves  that  there  is  no  alter- 
native to  world  dominion  but  downfall,  and  the  civilized 
world  is  determined  that  there  shall  be  no  German  world 
dominion.  Such  a  struggle  by  its  nature  permits  of  no 
end  by  arrangement  or  negotiation.  It  must  go  forward 
until  either  one  side  or  the  other  is  either  militarily  defeated 
or  until  the  economic  strain  disintegrates  the  state.  In 
such  conditions  a  secondary  form  of  military  pressure  may 
be  of  paramount  importance. 

Now  if  we  go  back  to  our  first  definition  of  war,  as  a 
struggle  in  which  the  opposing  sides  pit  their  armed  forces 
against  each  other  and  abide  by  the  issue  of  the  combat, 
we  must  remember  that,  just  as  it  is  rare  for  a  war  to  be 
decided  by  a  single  combat,  so  is  it  rare  for  a  single  combat 
to  dissipate  and  destroy  an  army.  Ordinary  prudence 
dictates  that  there  shall  be  protected  lines  or  some  strong 
place  into  which  it  can  retreat  in  the  event  of  defeat.  And 
when  it  is  thus  compelled  to  abandon  open  fighting  and 
seek  a  position  of  natural  or  artificial  strength,  it  becomes 
the  business  of  the  stronger  to  complete  the  business  by 
destroying  and  penetrating  the  defences.  But  if  this  is 
too  costly  a  proceeding,  the  stronger  tries  to  contain  the 


50  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

*^ 

force  so  protected  and  passes  on,  if  possible,  to  investment 
and  siege.  The  simplest  case  of  this  is  the  complete  en- 
circlement and  siege  of  the  great  city  or  camp,  of  which 
the  war  of  1870  gave  two  such  striking  examples  in  Metz 
and  Paris. 

When  war  calls  out  the  whole  manhood  of  many  nations 
and  turns  them  into  fighting  forces,  it  is  obvious  that  there 
cannot  be  equality  of  force  in  all  the  theatres.  Where  either 
side  is  weaker,  it  is  compelled  locally  to  adopt  the  same 
tactics  that  a  defeated  force  adopts.  It  must,  that  is  to 
say,  go  upon  the  defensive.  It  entrenches  and  fortifies 
itself.  Thus,  as  military  operations,  the  attack  and  de- 
fence of  fortifications  may  become  general,  and  this  with- 
out either  side  being  necessarily  able  to  inflict  the  pressure 
of  siege  upon  its  opponent,  siege  being  understood  to  mean 
severing  of  communications  with  the  outside  world.  But, 
clearly,  where  siege  is  possible,  as  was  the  case  with  Metz 
and  Paris,  the  attacking  force  becomes  also  the  investing 
force.  It  can  rely  upon  the  straits  to  which  it  can  reduce 
the  besieged  to  bring  about  that  surrender  which,  ex  hy- 
pothesis would  have  been  the  result  of  the  battle  had  the 
weaker  not  declined  it. 

Battle  and  siege  are  thus  in  essence  complementary 
modes  of  war  and  all  military  action  may  roughly  be  de- 
fined as  fighting,  or  some  method  of  postponing  fighting,  or 
steps  or  preparations  towards  fighting. 

SEA  WAR 

War  at  sea  is  carried  on,  as  we  have  seen,  by  naval 
fleets.  The  immediate  object  of  a  fleet  is  to  find,  defeat, 
and  destroy  the  enemy's  fleet.  The  ultimate  or  further 
objective  which  is  gained  by  such  destruction  is  to  monopo- 
lize the  use  of  the  sea,  as  the  master  highway,  by  retaining 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  51 

freedom  for  the  passage  of  the  victor's  ships  while  denying 
such  passage  to  those  of  the  defeated.  The  power  to  in- 
sist on  this  exclusive  control  of  sea  communications  is 
called  "command  of  the  sea." 

If  the  war  is  a  purely  naval  war,  that  is,  limited  to  the 
use  of  naval  forces  and  hence  directed  solely  to  naval 
ends — as  was  the  war  between  England  and  France,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  United  States  gained  their  indepen- 
dence— the  command  of  the  sea  can  theoretically  be  won 
by  a  single  victorious  battle.  For  if  the  main  force  of  one 
side  is  destroyed,  that  belligerent  becomes  incapable  of 
questioning  the  supremacy  of  the  enemy,  and  hence  must 
limit  his  sea  action  to  sporadic  attempts  on  communica- 
tions. These  can  never  be  maintained  to  a  degree  that 
can  be  decisive,  simply  because  a  power  greater  than  can 
be  brought  to  the  attack  can  be  employed  for  their  defence. 
Success  in  such  a  war,  then,  can  simply  be  measured  in 
terms  of  trade  or  of  sea  supply;  defeat  by  the  economic  loss 
that  its  cessation  must  cause.  There  have  been  purely 
naval  wars  in  the  past  and,  could  a  combination  be  formed 
of  countries  whose  aggregate  sea-power  was  greater  than 
that  of  Great  Britain,  a  purely  naval  war  might  occur 
again.  But  it  could  only  be  brought  about  by  such  a  con- 
juncture for  the  reason  that  Great  Britain  is  the  only  coun- 
try to  which  a  purely  naval  defeat  would  mean  such  utter 
and  immediate  ruin,  that  her  surrender  to  her  sea  con- 
queror would  follow  inevitably  and  promptly.  This  is  so 
because,  whereas  almost  every  country  is  to  some  extent 
dependent  upon  sea  supplies,  Great  Britain  exists  only  in 
virtue  of  them. 

To  us,  therefore,  the  advantages  that  derive  from  pos- 
session of  command  of  the  sea  are  overwhelming;  and  our 
possession  of  it  adversely  to  any  other  country  must  be 


52  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

disadvantageous,  exactly  in  proportion  as  that  country  is 
dependent  upon  sea  supplies. 

In  a  war  which  is  both  naval  and  continental,  as  in  the 
present  war,  command  of  the  sea  means  much  more  than 
the  power  to  deny  the  gain  and  comfort  of  sea  suppHes. 
The  side  that  is  defeated  at  sea,  or  avoids  fighting  for  fear 
of  defeat,  may  lose  not  only  everything  which  can  come  to 
it  directly  or  indirectly  from  the  use  of  ships,  but  will  suffer 
^from  the  added  disadvantage  that  a  mihtary  use  can  be 
made  of  sea  communications  in  the  enemy's  possession. 
The  side  that  commands  the  sea  can  carry  on  its  ocean 
traffic,  and  supply  not  only  its  civil  population  but  its 
armies  and  its  fleets  from  abroad.  It  can  ally  itself  with 
continental  nations  and  send  its  military  forces  away  in 
ships  and  land  them  in  friendly  ports.  It  can  prevent  the 
sea  invasion  of  its  own,  of  its  allies'  territory,  and  of  its  colo- 
nial possessions.  It  can  stop  not  only  the  enemy's  own 
sea  trade,  but  all  neutral  sea  trade  that  directly  or  indirect- 
ly can  benefit  him,  so  that  he  is  cut  off  from  all  supplies, 
whether  raw  material,  food,  or  manufacture,  not  produced 
in  his  own  territories  or  in  those  with  which  he  has  land 
communications.  If  the  sea  force  of  the  side  possessing 
command  includes  means  of  engaging  stationary  defences 
with  success,  and  removing  passive  sea  defences  from  the 
approaches  to  the  enemy's  coast  and  harbours,  then  it  can 
even  beat  down  the  enemy's  coast  protection  and  invade  him 
directly.  The  nation  with  sea  command,  then,  threatens 
Its  opponents  with  attack  by  land  at  every  point  and, 
pending  its  development,  can  to  the  extent  to  which  the 
enemy  is  dependent  on  overseas  traffic  for  the  necessaries 
of  life,  or  for  the  maintenance  of  his  armies  at  full  fighting 
strength,  subject  him  to  all  the  rigour  of  siege. 

The  command  of  the  sea  which  makes  the  exercise  of 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  53 

these  menaces  possible,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  fruit  of 
victory  over  the  enemy's  armed  forces.  But  if  that  enemy 
is  weaker  and  follows  at  sea  the  course  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  an  army  inferior  on  land  must  adopt,  viz.,  declines 
battle  and  withdraws  his  fleet  behind  defences  to  postpone 
it,  he  thereby  to  a  great  extent  surrenders  the  sea  con- 
mand  to  the  stronger.  And  if  the  stronger  knows  his 
business,  he  at  once  uses  this  command  to  subject  his  op- 
ponent to  the  economic  disadvantages  set  out  above. 
Siege  by  sea,  then,  like  siege  on  land,  may  be  the  conse- 
quence of,  but  is  always  the  alternative  to,  victorious  bat- 
tle in  bringing  about  a  decision.  For  while  victorious 
battle  robs  the  defeated  nation  of  any  possibility  of  ward- 
ing off  further  attack  by  force,  siege  undermines  the  will 
and  resolution  of  the  civil  population  to  endure,  and  thus 
calls  forces  into  existence  which  will  compel  the  enemy's 
government  to  surrender. 

The  command  of  the  ocean  ways  are,  then,  of  tremen- 
dous consequences  in  war — so  great,  indeed,  that  the  con- 
trol of  sea  communications  has  often  been  put  forth  as  the 
primary  object  to  be  aimed  at  by  sea-power.  That  it  is 
the  object  of  sea-power  victoriously  used  we  have  already 
seen.  But  so  long  as  the  enemy  possesses  forces  that  act- 
ually disturb  the  tranquil  enjoyment  of  sea  communica- 
tions, command  is  certainly  qualified,  and  if  he  have  in 
reserve  unused  and  unimpaired  forces  for  attacking  and 
defeating  the  fleet  which  secures  command,  the  command 
of  the  sea  cannot  be  said  to  be  unconditionally  possessed. 
Consequently,  if  destruction  of  the  enemy's  armed  forces 
is  a  necessary  condition  to  real — because  indisputable — 
sea  command,  it  is  for  victorious  battle  and  for  nothing 
else  that  fleets  exist. 

These  propositions  are  not  only  obviously  true;  they 


54  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

seem  to  be  truly  obvious.  But  in  recent  history  we  have 
witnessed  the  curious  spectacle  that  an  inversion  of  the 
order  of  these  two  statements  did  actually  create  two  dif- 
ferent and  opposed  schools  of  naval  thought.  The  first 
school  saw  in  victory  the  first  and  constant  preoccupation 
of  the  fleet.  It  concerned  itself,  therefore,  chiefly  with 
the  essentials  to  victory,  and  as  victory  can  only  come 
from  fighting,  it  was  at  the  elements  of  fighting  that  it 
worked.  It  sought  to  find  the  most  perfect  methods  of 
using  weapons,  because  it  realized  that  it  was  only  from 
the  evolution  of  these  that  right  tactics  could  be  deduced. 
It  studied  the  campaigns  of  the  past  to  discover  the  two 
great  groups  of  doctrine  that  our  fighting  ancestors  have 
bequeathed  to  us,  the  first  dealing  with  the  science  of 
strategy,  the  second  with  the  principles  of  command. 
They  realized  that  weapons  and  the  ships  that  carry  them 
do  not  fight  themselves,  but  must  be  fought  by  men;  and 
they  wished  those  men  rightly  educated  and  trained  in 
the  subtle  and  complex  science  of  their  high  calHng.  To 
them,  in  short,  sea  war  was  an  aff^air  of  knowledge  applied 
by  men  trained  both  in  the  wisdom  and  in  the  lofty  spirit 
of  those  that  had  excelled  in  naval  war  before.  And,  faith- 
ful to  the  traditions  of  the  past,  no  less  than  eager  for  re- 
search into  all  the  undeveloped  potentialities  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  modern  progress,  they  pinned  their  faith  on  abihty 
to  force  the  enemy  to  battle,  and  to  beat  him  there  when 
battle  came. 

The  other  school  went  for  a  short  cut  to  naval  triumph. 
If  only  they  could  get  a  fleet  of  ships  so  big,  so  fabulously 
armed,  so  numerous  as  to  make  it  seem  to  the  enemy  that 
his  fleet  was  too  feeble  to  attack,  why  then  battle  would  be 
made  altogether  superfluous,  and  no  further  worry  over 
so  unlikely  a  contingency  was  necessary.     They  did  not, 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  55 

therefore,  trouble  to  inquire  either  into  the  processes 
needed  for  bringing  battle  about,  or  into  what  was  neces- 
sary for  success  when  battle  came.  They  passed  on  to  the 
contemplation  of  what  can  only  be  the  fruit  of  victory — 
as  if  victory  were  not  a  condition  precedent! 

It  was,  unfortunately,  this  group,  hypnotized  by  a  the- 
ory it  did  not  understand,  which  controlled  naval  policy 
in  Great  Britain  for  the  ten  years  preceding  the  war,  and 
for  the  first  three  and  a  half  years  of  it.  Their  error  lay, 
of  course,  in  supposing  that  a  fleet,  so  materially  strong 
and  numerous  that  its  defeat  was  unimaginable  because 
no  attack  on  it  could  be  conceived,  must — so  long  as  any 
serious  lowering  of  its  force  by  attrition  was  avoided — be 
the  military  equivalent  to  one  which  had  already  defeated 
the  enem}';  that  "invincible"  and  "victorious"  were,  in 
short,  interchangeable  terms.  So  masterful  was  this 
obsession  that  their  apologists — shutting  their  eyes  to  the 
obvious  and  appalling  consequences  of  this  creed  in  action 
— two  years  after  the  event,  still  regarded  the  only  encoun- 
ter between  the  main  fleets  in  this  war  as  a  great  victory, 
because  the  larger,  by  avoiding  the  risk  of  close  contact 
with  the  lesser,  came  out  of  the  conflict  with  forces  as  sub- 
stantially superior  to  the  enemy's  as  they  were  before  the 
opportunity  of  a  decisive  battle^had  been  off'ered. 

The  group  in  question  had,  indeed,  become  possessed 
of  one  truth.  It  was  simply  that  preponderant  force  is  a 
vital  element.  But  by  holding  it  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  truths  they  were  blinded  not  only  to  the  crucial 
business  of  studying  the  intellectual  and  technical  essen- 
tials to  fighting,  but  even  to  the  orthodox  meaning  of  the 
communication  theory  of  sea  war,  on  which  they  had  so 
eagerly,  but  ignorantly,  seized.  For  the  true  doctrine  is, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  just  this,  that  when  an  enemy  re- 


56  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

fuses  battle,  the  stronger  navy's  sole  remaining  offensive 
is  to  cut  him  off  from  communication  with  the  sea.  It 
must  do  this,  as  we  have  seen,  to  restrict  his  supplies,  to 
weaken  his  armed  forces,  to  strike  at  his  prosperity  and 
the  comfort  of  his  civil  population,  and  thus  obtain  that 
partial  paralysis  of  his  national  Hfe,  the  completion  of 
which  can  only  be  got  by  a  victory  that  disarms  him.  And 
these  things,  which  are  the  results  of  blockade,  are  also 
the  intended  results.  But  they  are  not  intended  for  their 
own  sake  only,  nor,  primarily,  to  make  the  enemy  surren- 
der to  avoid  them.  They  are  inllicted  to  force  the  enemy 
to  the  battle  which  he  has  refused,  because  it  is  only  by 
battle  that  he  can  relieve  himself  from  them.  A  stringent 
blockade,  then,  is  the  primary  means  of  inducing  a  fleet 
action,  and  hence  we  see  that  siege,  while  truly  the  only 
alternative  to  battle,  is  something  much  more. 

Indeed,  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that,  viewed  in  its 
right  relation  to  the  true  theory  of  war — a  state  of  things 
in  which  a  conflict  of  wills  between  nations  is  settled  by  a 
conflict  of  their  armed  forces — it  is  almost  the  primary 
object  of  siege  to  bring  this  conflict  about  and  so  to  hasten 
the  issue.  From  the  definition  the  aim  of  war  is  the  en- 
emy's defeat  and  not  merely  his  surrender.  And  battle 
is  necessary  to  defeat. 

The  failure  to  realize  this  elementary  truth  was  the 
cause  of  much  more  than  an  omission  to  fathom  the  tech- 
nique of  fighting,  the  fruits  of  which  we  shall  find,  when  we 
come  to  the  consideration  of  the  naval  actions  of  the  last 
three  years  and  note  the  curious  result  of  the  Jutland  de- 
ployment and  the  inconclusive  character  of  so  many  of  the 
artillery  encounters  which  have  occurred,  and  the  extraor- 
dinary prolongation  of  those  which  were  not  inconclu- 
sive.    It  brought  about  what  is,  at  first  sight,  something 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  57 

even  more  astonishing,  viz.,  an  actual  indisposition  by 
those  in  control  of  the  British  Navy,  to  adopt,  when  the 
enemy  refused  battle,  the  only  course  that  could  compel 
him  to  it,  though  it  was  actually  the  first  article  of  their 
creed  to  gain  the  power  to  do  this  very  thing. 

Great  Britain  went  to  war  at  midnight  August  4,  1914. 
The  Grand  Fleet  went  to  its  war  stations.  The  High 
Seas  Fleet  withdrew  to  the  security  of  the  Kiel  Canal. 
Within  a  day  no  enemy  trading  ships  dared  put  to  sea. 
V/ithin  a  week,  transports  were  carrying  a  British  army 
to  France.  Our  merchantmen  continued  their  sea  trading 
almost  as  if  nothing  had  happened.  But,  though  the  Ger- 
man flag  vanished  from  the  seas,  neutral  vessels  were 
free  to  use  the  German  ports  until  the  following  March, 
and  for  another  six  months  the  enemy  was  free  to  import, 
in  almost  any  quantities  that  he  Hked,  certain  forms  of 
food,  cotton,  fats,  and  many  of  the  ores  and  chemicals 
which  were  the  indispensable  raw  material  of  the  propel- 
lants  and  explosives  vitally  necessary  to  him  in  a  prolonged 
war. 

By  permitting  this,  we  showed  that  our  policy,  in  other 
words,  was  not  to  attack  but  to  wait  attack,  and  then  not 
to  do  anything  to  compel  the  enemy  to  attack.  Our  sea 
statesmen  had  not  indoctrinated  the  civil  government 
with  a  clearly  defined  policy  that  it  was  prepared  to  enforce 
at  the  opening  of  hostilities.  Yet  in  a  matter  of  this  kind 
it  was  exactly  at  the  opening  of  hostilities  that  a  stringent 
blockade,  accompanied  by  a  generous  rationing  of  sea 
supplies  to  the  neutrals  bordering  on  Germany,  could  have 
been  proclaimed  and  enforced  with  the  least  friction.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  Germany's  declaration  of  war  was  so  en- 
tirely unprovoked  and  sudden,  and  her  first  measure  of 
war,  the  invasion  of  Belgium — when  her  soldiery  became 


58  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

V 

at  once  outrageous — combined  the  world  over  to  create  a 
neutral  opinion  strongly  in  favour  of  the  Allies.  Next, 
the  fact  that  Great  Britain's  participation  in  the  war  was 
both  professedly  and  actually  in  loyalty  to  the  identical 
obligation  to  Belgium  which  Germany  had  violated,  pre- 
disposed America,  for  the  first  time  since  the  colonies  pro- 
claimed their  independence,  to  an  active  sympathy  with 
the  British  ideal,  perhaps  because  for  the  first  time  that 
ideal  appeared  to  them  to  be  one  that  was  purely  chival- 
rous. It  was  then  everything  that  the  psychological 
moment  should  have  been  seized.  Nor  could  it  have  been 
difficult  to  see  that,  if  the  opportunity  was  allowed  to  slip 
by,  the  mere  fact  that  a  half  measure — to  wit,  the  suspense 
of  German  shipping — had  been  enforced,  must  lead  to  a 
new  condition,  namely,  a  hugely  magnified  trade  through 
the  neutral  ports.  This  trade,  it  is  true,  was  nominally 
confined  to  goods  that  were  not  contraband  of  war.  But 
contraband  is  an  elastic  term,  and,  to  make  things  worse, 
the  British  Government  proclaimed  its  intention — so 
little  had  war-trained  thought  prepared  its  policy — of 
accepting  the  provisions  of  the  unexecuted  Declaration 
of  London  as  defining  what  contraband  was  to  be.  This 
gave  the  enemy  the  Hberty  to  import  materials  indispen- 
sable to  his  manufacture  of  munitions  and  of  armament, 
was  one  of  which  full  advantage  was  taken.  It  was  bad 
enough  that  cotton,  indispensable  ores,  the  raw  materials 
of  glycerine  as  well  as  the  finished  product,  were  poured 
into  the  laboratories,  the  factories,  and  the  arsenals  of 
Germany  without  stint  or  limit.  It  was,  if  possible,  worse 
that  this  traffic  created  gigantic  exporting  interests  in 
America  which,  once  vested,  made  the  restriction  of  them 
wear  the  appearance  of  an  intolerable  hardship  when, 
many  months  too  late,  more  stringent  measures  were 


SOME  ROOT  DOCTRINES  59 

taken.  So  powerful  Indeed  had  these  interests  become, 
that  the  real  and  rigid  blockade  which,  under  the  doctrines 
of  the  "continuous  voyage"  and  the  "ultimate  destination'* 
would  from  the  first  have  been  fully  consonant  with  inter- 
national law,  was  actually  never  attempted  at  all  until 
the  United  States  themselves  became  belligerents. 

For  fourteen  months,  then,  we  witnessed  a  state  of 
things  so  paradoxical  as  to  be  without  parallel  in  history. 
It  was  our  professed  creed  that  the  fleet  existed  to  seize 
and  control  sea  communications.  The  enemy  conceded 
us  this  control  and,  so  far  from  using  it  to  straiten  him  so 
relentlessly  that  he  would  have  no  choice  but  to  fight  for 
relief  from  it,  we  actually  permitted  him  to  draw,  through 
sources  absolutely  under  our  control,  for  essentials  in  the 
form  of  overseas  supplies  that  he  needed  in  a  war  which  all 
the  world  realized  must  now  be  a  prolonged  one.  The 
traditional  naval  policy  of  the  country  was  thus  not  re- 
flected in  the  action  of  the  country's  government,  because 
that  policy  had  no  representation  in  the  Navy's  counsels. 
There  is,  perhaps,  no  single  heresy  for  which  so  high  and 
disastrous  a  price  has  been  paid. 

It  would  appear,  then,  that  our  pre-war  naval  policy 
did  not  contemplate  that  immediate  and  stringent  sea 
pressure  that  would  compel  the  enemy  to  action,  nor  yet 
the  closest  and  most  vigilant  kind  of  watch  that  would 
have  brought  him  to  action  in  the  promptest  and  most 
fatal  manner  when  circumstances  compelled  him  to  come 
out.  Nor  is  it  diflficult  to  see  why  this  was  so.  To  profess 
the  communication  theory  of  sea  war  without  realizing 
that  the  control  of  communications  is  the  result  of  victory, 
that  is,  setting  up  a  consequence  as  an  aim  while  ignoring 
its  cause,  inevitably  led  to  the  inverted  error,  an  unwill- 
ingness so  to  employ  the  control  of  communications,  when 


6o  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

the  enemy  ceded  them  without  victory,  as  to  force  the 
enemy  into  battle  as  the  only  hope  of  escaping  an  intoler- 
able condition.  Not  having  contemplated  and  prepared 
for  battle  as  the  first  aim  of  naval  policy,  they  left  an  in- 
stinctive disinclination  to  force  on  an  affair  which  they 
suddenly  realized  would  be  as  critical  as  it  was  certainly 
unanticipated.  It  is  this  which  explains  possibly  the 
greatest  paradox  in  history,  viz.,  that  Germany  proclaimed 
a  strict  blockade  of  Great  Britain  before  Great  Britain 
proclaimed  such  a  blockade  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER  V 

Elements  of  Sea  Force 

Having  established  the  truth  that  the  primary  purpose 
of  a  navy  is  to  fight  and  its  immediate  object  victory,  we 
must  next  pass  on  to  ask  of  what  it  is  that  naval  force  con- 
sists and  by  what  processes  it  fights  and  wins.  All  fight- 
ing is  done  by  men  using  weapons.  At  sea  the  men  and 
weapons  have  to  be  carried  in  ships.  The  ships  and  weap- 
ons have  to  be  designed  and  selected,  and  the  men  have  to 
be  converted  from  ignorance  into  accomplished  fighting 
units.  Finally,  the  ships  and  the  weapons  must  be  em- 
ployed in  accordance  with  certain  methods  and  in  obedi- 
ence to  certain  dynamic  laws — the  technique,  the  tactics, 
and  the  strategy  of  war.  It  may  simplify  the  subject  to 
summarize  the  elements  of  naval  force  as  follows.  It  may 
be  said  to  consist: 

1.  Of  the  main  weapon-bearing  ships  built  for  fighting 
fleet  actions. 

2.  Of  smaller  armed  ships  of  many  kinds  necessary  for 
the  right  use  of  the  main  fighting  ships  and  for  the  sub- 
sidiary operations  leading  up  to,  or  fol  owing  from,  fleet 
actions. 

3.  Of  means  other  than  ships — aircraft,  m  nes,  and  the 
like — for  entrapping  and  injuring  the  main  fleets  and 
cruisers  of  the  enemy,  for  defending  and  attacking  bases, 
and  for  making  certain  sea  areas  dangerous  or  impassable 
to  the  enemy's  forces. 

4.  Of  the  personnel  to  man,  fight,  and  command  the 

61 


62  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ships  and  to  direct  the  operations  of  the  separate  squad- 
rons and  fleets  at  sea;  and 

5.  Of  that  higher  central  command  on  shore  that,  by 
designing  and  selecting  the  material,  by  training  the  of- 
ficers and  men,  creates  sea  force;  that  discovers  the  right 
method  of  using  weapons;  that  elucidates  the  tactics  that 
follow  from  such  use;  that  develops  the  strategy  which  the 
strength  and  situation  of  rival  forces  makes  best;  that  as 
a  preparation  for  war,  keeps  the  whole  force  ready  in  all 
particulars;  that  in  war,  directs  it  to  the  greatest  advant- 
age. 

To  get  the  best  naval  force  it  is  clear,  then,  that  you  want 

(a)  Ships  whose  tactical  properties  are  superior  to  those 
which  the  enemy  possesses,  and  you  want  more  of  them. 

(b)  Weapons  delivering  a  more  devastating  blow,  that 
can  reach  to  longer  ranges,  and  can  be  employed  withhigher 
rapidity. 

(c)  Methods  of  employing  both  the  ships  and  the  weap- 
ons that  will  assure  to  them  the  utmost  scope  of  efficiency 
so  as  to  strike  at  the  enemy — if  possible — before  the  enemy 
can  strike,  and  will  keep  them  in  use  when  conditions  of 
movement,  light,  and  weather  have  become  too  difficult 
for  the  enemy  to  overcome. 

(d)  A  personnel  of  higher  moral,  better  discipline,  and 
greater  skill. 

(e)  A  staff  of  officers  to  train  and  command  this  person- 
nel, adept  in  all  the  craft  of  fighting,  instinct  with  the 
loftiest  patriotism,  and  masters  of  the  art  of  leadership. 

(/)  A  supreme  command,  not  only  equally  conversant 
both  with  the  doctrine  that  can  be  gathered  from  a  study 
of  the  past  and  with  the  resources  that  modern  scientific 
and  industrial  development  place  at  the  disposal  of  the 
fighting  men,  but  consciously  cultivating  what  may  be 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  63 

called  a  prophetic  imagination,  by  which  alone  future  de- 
velopments can  be  anticipated,  and  guided  throughout, 
and  always,  by  regard  to  the  public  interest  only. 

The  factors  that  enter  are  first,  material;  secondly,  men; 
and,  thirdly,  the  intellectual,  spiritual,  and  moral  activi- 
ties necessary  for  shaping  and  turning  the  first  two  to 
their  purpose. 

Looked  at  largely,  the  elements  have  been  enumerated 
above  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  importance.  For, 
clearly,  the  qualities  of  the  ship  are  much  less  important 
than  the  qualities  of  the  weapons  that  she  carries.  A 
slow,  unarmoured  battleship,  carrying  accurate,  quick- 
firing,  long-range  guns,  is  a  better  fleet  unit  than  a  fast, 
perfectly  protected  ship  with  weapons  unhkely  to  hit,  be- 
cause ill-made,  poorly  mounted,  or  badly  ammunitioned. 
And  the  power  and  range  of  the  weapons  are  less  import- 
ant than  the  science  and  methods  with  which  they  are  em- 
ployed. An  old  12-inch  gun  that  can  be  used  with  con- 
stant effect  at  12,000  yards  when  the  change  of  range  is 
high,  the  target  often  obscured  by  smoke,  and  the  firing 
ship  constantly  under  helm,  is  an  infinitely  more  effective 
weapon  than  a  new  15-inch  that,  in  spite  of  a  legend 
range  of  20,000  yards,  cannot  be  made  to  hit  in  action 
conditions.  And  it  is  from  right  method  that  are  derived 
right  tactics  by  which,  in  turn,  the  decisive  massing  of 
ships  in  action  is  obtained.  Again,  the  best  of  ships' 
weapons  and  methods  must  be  absolutely  useless  unless 
the  discipline,  moral,  and  skill  of  those  who  use  them  are 
equal  to  the  strain  of  fighting.  Again,  it  is  highly  improb- 
able that  you  will  have  good  discipline  and  skill  unless  you 
have  good  leaders,  for  the  excellent  reason  that  it  is  the 
officers  who  make  the  men;  certainly,  if  they  exist  in  spite 
of  there  not  being  good  leaders,  weak  or  heartless  leader- 


64  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ship  can  throw  them  altogether  away.  The  Revolution 
robbed  the  French  Navy  of  nearly  all  its  trained  officers 
— and,  though  possessed  of  better  ships  and  courageous 
crews,  that  navy  never  fought  with  real  effect  in  the  Great 
War  of  from  1792  to  181 5.  Again,  however  excellent 
your  ships,  weapons,  and  methods,  your  moral  and  your 
courage,  unskilful  command  at  sea  and  ignorance  of  the 
true  principles  of  tactics  may  rob  you  of  victory.  And, 
lastly,  unless  those  who  are  responsible  for  the  creation  of 
the  material  and  the  training  of  human  force,  and  for  the 
chief  command  and  general  strategy  before  and  during 
war,  are  equal  to  their  task  unless  they  keep  in  close  and 
real  touch  with  the  active  service,  not  only  is  it  almost 
impossible  that  a  force  of  very  high  efficiency  can  exist, 
but  quite  impossible  that  a  right  direction  can  be  given  to 
it  in  war. 

The  reader  will  very  likely  detect  in  the  foregoing  cate- 
gory of  precedence  a  trite  maxim  of  Napoleon's  elaborated 
into  a  series  of  sonorous,  if  illustrative,  commonplaces. 
But  this  is  a  matter  in  which,  even  at  the  cost  of  being 
hackneyed,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  certain  points 
should  be  clearly  established.  First,  looking  at  the  whole 
subject  of  sea  force  as  a  problem  in  dynamics,  it  should 
be  constantly  before  our  eyes  that  a  navy  is  so  highly  com- 
plex an  affair  that  it  can  only  act  rightly  when  all  the 
elements  of  which  it  is  composed  are  employed  in  accord 
with  the  principles  peculiar  to  each,  and  are  combined  so 
that  each  takes  its  due  place  in  relation  to  the  rest.  It  is, 
for  example,  quite  conceivable  that  you  might  have  a  fleet 
or  a  flotilla  equipped  with  the  best  material,  its  personnel 
instructed  and  expert  in  the  best  methods,  commanded 
in  detail  and  directed  by  the  chief  command  according 
to  the  soundest  principles  of  tactics  and  strategy,  and  yet 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  65 

that  such  a  unit  might  fail  in  winning  its  legitimate  pur- 
pose, simply  because  of  some  failure  to  base  its  operations 
on  correct  data.  The  omission  to  provide  all  the  means 
for  obtaining  intelligence  that  science  and  experience  sug- 
gest, or,  having  employed  them  and  got  the  raw  material, 
an  inability  to  interpret  and  transmit  it  rightly  and 
promptly  to  the  officer  in  command,  might  send  a  fleet 
upon  its  mission  either  to  the  wrong  place  or  at  the  wrong 
time,  or  with  the  wrong  dispositions.  In  considering 
naval  science,  then,  it  is,  so  to  speak,  axiomatic  to  recog- 
nize that,  as  its  extent  and  variety  are  almost  infinite, 
the  task  of  elucidating  and  teaching  its  principles  and 
their  application,  so  that  every  person  making  up  the  or- 
ganism which  is  to  set  the  science  into  action  shall  act  in 
the  Hght  of  true  doctrine,  requires  an  intellectual  eff'ort 
of  incalculable  magnitude,  just  because  the  dynamic  laws 
governing  each  element  are  extraordinarily  obscure,  and 
because  the  number  of  elements  is  so  extraordinarily 
great.  To  be  part  perfect,  then,  may  vitiate  the  whole 
effort. 

But  if  a  whole  science  must  be  explored  and  its  principles 
universally  inculcated,  it  would  seem  as  if  a  wholly  unten- 
able ideal  was  being  put  forward.  But  there  is  no  escape 
from  this  ideal.  For  the  laws  of  science  are  ruthless. 
Just  as  "the  wages  of  sin  is  death,"  so  is  failure  the  fruit  of 
false  doctrine.  And  the  cruelty  of  the  things  lies  in  this, 
that  what  seems  an  almost  infinitesimal  infidelity  may 
bring  a  large  and  noble  effort,  greatly  conceived  and  gal- 
lantly executed,  to  disaster. 

The  scale  of  the  task  prescribes  the  scale  of  the  instru- 
ments for  its  discharge.  It  was  clearly  beyond  the  scope 
of  a  single  individual  as  chief  professional  adviser  to  the 
Admiralty,  I  will  not  say  to  solve,  but  even  to  keep  account 


(,G  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

of,  all  the  intricate  problems  which  require  investigation. 
Indeed,  for  many  years  before  the  war  it  was  fully  realized 
that  only  a  properly  organized  war  staff  could  even  make 
a  beginning  from  which  a  right  understanding  of  naval 
war  in  modern  conditions  could  derive.  The  neces- 
sity for  this  had  constantly  been  urged  upon  succes- 
sive governments.  The  matter  came  to  a  head  when,  in 
1909,  the  Cabinet  appointed  a  committee  from  its  own 
members  to  consider  Lord  Charles  Beresford's  very  grave 
statements  as  to  the  condition  of  the  Navy.  This  commit- 
tee never  published  the  evidence  by  which  Lord  Charles 
and  his  associates  tried  to  establish  their  case.  But  in 
the  course  of  a  brief  report  which  was  pubhshed  they  said 
that  they  had  been  impressed  "with  the  difference  of 
opinion  amongst  officers  of  high  rank  and  professional 
attainments  regarding  important  principles  of  naval 
strategy  and  tactics,  and  they  look  forward  with  much 
confidence  to  the  further  development  of  a  naval  war  staff, 
from  which  naval  members  of  the  Board  and  flag  officers 
and  their  staffs  at  sea  may  be  expected  to  derive  common 
benefit.'*  Observe,  that  the  most  experienced  officers  of  the 
day  differed  with  regard  to  important  principles  of  tactics! 
The  technical  officers  of  the  navy  knew  that  this  absence 
of  doctrine  "among  officers  of  high  rank  and  professional 
attainments"  arose  very  largely  out  of  a  total  want  of  exact 
data  as  to  the  precise  effect  our  weapons  could  be  expected 
to  have  upon  the  enemy,  and  the  effect  the  enemy's  weap- 
ons could  be  expected  to  have  upon  us.  If  there  was  no 
agreement  as  to  how  to  use  weapons  there  could  be  no 
agreement  as  to  their  value  and,  without  such  agreement, 
any  common  doctrine  of  tactics  must  be  impossible.  And 
with  tactics  in  the  melting-pot,  strategy  must  be  pure 
guesswork. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  67 

The  1909  committee  had  hoped  that  an  extended  war 
staff  would  bring  order  out  of  chaos.  But  by  191 1  there 
had  still  been  nothing  done  to  realize  its  pious  aspirations. 
When  Mr.  Churchill  took  office,  then,  in  the  autumn  of 
that  year,  he  had  the  conclusions  of  the  Beresford  Com- 
mittee to  guide  him  as  to  the  state  of  strategy  and  tactics 
and  a  state  of  things  in  the  matter  of  guns,  torpedoes,  and 
mines,  no  less  than  the  manifest  trend  of  active  naval 
thought,  to  show  where  the  beginnings  of  reform  must  be 
made. 

Mr.  Churchill  became  First  Lord  in  circumstances 
which  were  very  unexpected,  and  his  first  public  announce- 
ment raised  hope  to  the  highest  point.  For,  over  the 
date  of  New  Year's  Day,  1912,  there  was  published  by 
the  First  Lord  a  Memorandum  which  contained  a  passage 
on  which  every  optimist  fastened.  This  document  defined 
the  root  need  of  naval  force  with  masterly  precision. 
Coming  so  soon,  expressed  with  such  clarity  and  convic- 
tion, it  seemed  to  be  not  so  much  a  collection  of  eloquent 
and  thoughtful  sentences  logically  compacted,  but  a  pro- 
fession of  intentions  that  must  definitely  turn  the  current 
of  naval  life  into  the  only  channel  that  could  assure  right 
progress.  Mr.  Churchill,  in  short,  had  quite  evidently 
grasped  the  fundamental  truth  that  the  whole  structure 
of  naval  war  was  based  upon  the  mastery  of  weapons  and, 
as  evidently.  Intended  the  pursuit  of  this  mastery  to  be 
the  watchword  of  his  administration.  His  actual  words 
were  as  follows : 

"Unit  efficiency — that  Is  to  say,  the  Individual  fighting 
power  of  each  vessel — Is  in  the  sea  service  for  considerable 
periods  entirely  independent  of  all  external  arrangements 
and  unit  efficiency  at  sea,  far  more  so  than  on  land,  is  the 
prime  and  final  factor  zvithout  which  the  combinations  of 


68  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

strategy  and  tactics  are  only  the  preliminaries  oj  defeat, 
but  with  which  even  faulty  dispositions  can  be  swiftly 
and  decisively  retrieved." 

At  last,  then,  the  man  and  the  moment  had  come  to- 
gether. To  the  new  First  Lord  had  been  given  the  vision 
that  the  moment  called  for.  At  last,  the  consistent,  con- 
certed, co-ordinated  effort  would  be  made  which,  proceed- 
ing by  investigation,  analysis,  reason,  and  experiment, 
would  lead  us  to  the  root  truths  of  one  weapon  after  an- 
other. When  the  conditions  of  action  were  analyzed  and 
the  problems  they  propounded  isolated,  a  measure  of  our 
capacity  to  deal  with  them  would  be  afforded,  and  not 
only  would  the  points  of  our  incapacity  be  made  clear, 
but  the  reasons  for  that  incapacity  and  the  character  of 
the  measures  needed  for  the  remedy  would  be  automati- 
cally shown  by  the  analysis.  For  the  first  condition  for 
solving  any  problem  is  its  accurate,  scientific,  and  ex- 
haustive statement.  And,  if  the  statement  is  sufficiently 
full,  it  almost  carries  the  solution  with  it.  Let  the  prob- 
lems of  the  gun,  torpedo,  mine,  and  submarine  once  be 
set  out  in  full,  and  the  principles  on  which  we  should  pro- 
ceed to  get  the  utmost  out  of  them  in  attack,  and  the  ut- 
most against  similar  efforts  by  the  enemy  in  defence, 
would  become  very  clear  indeed.  In  short,  when  all  avail- 
able knowledge  was  put  before  those  capable  of  appreciat- 
ing it,  weighing  it,  and  drawing  from  it  right  deductions, 
progress  in  a  right  direction  would  be  assured  because, 
for  the  first  time,  it  would  be  estabhshed  on  a  scientific 
foundation. 

Nor,  indeed,  was  this  all.  For  no  such  inquisition  could 
be  made  in  fundamentals  without  the  work  being  reflected 
in  every  other  department  of  naval  activity.  In  place  of 
uninstructed  conjecture,  we  should  have,  as  a  basis  of 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  69 

naval  thought  and  plan,  the  reasoned  conclusions  of  expert 
knowledge. 

There  was  the  more  reason  for  this  optimistic  view  be- 
cause Mr.  Churchill's  Memorandum  went  on  to  indicate 
the  machinery  by  which  alone  right  methods  can  invari- 
ably, because  together  impartially  and  impersonally,  be 
discovered.  For  the  particular  occasion  of  the  Memoran- 
dum was  the  establishment  of  a  new  and  extended  war 
staff  for  which,  since  1904,  we  had  all  been  waiting.  This, 
the  First  Lord  explained,  must  have  four  carefully  differ- 
entiated but  very  important  tasks. 

It  was  first,  the  Memorandum  said,  **to  be  the  means  of 
preparing  and  training  officers  for  dealing  with  the  ex- 
tended problems  that  await  them  in  stations  of  high  re- 
sponsibihty. "  Its  second  function  was  to  sift,  develop, 
and  apply  the  results  of  history  and  experience,  and  to  pre- 
serve them  "as  a  general  stock  of  reasoned  opinion  avail- 
able as  an  aid  and  as  a  guide  for  all  who  are  called  upon 
to  determine  in  peace  or  war  the  naval  policy  of  the  coun- 
try."  Its  third  function  was  the  exhibition  of  the  vast 
superiority  which  a  well-selected  committee  of  experts 
possesses  over  even  the  most  brilliant  expert  working  by 
himself.  The  Staff"  was  to  be  a  "brain  far  more  compre- 
hensive than  of  any  single  man,  however  gifted,  and  tire- 
less and  unceasing  in  its  action,  applied  continuously  to 
the  scientific  study  of  naval  strategy  and  preparation." 
Finally,  this  Staff,  carefully  selected  from  the  most  prom- 
ising officers,  whose  work  would  train  them  for  the  highest 
command,  making  all  history  and  experience  the  prov- 
ince from  which  to  draw  the  raw  material  of  its  doctrines, 
engaged  tirelessly  and  unceasingly  in  applying  this  doc- 
trine to  the  guidance  of  the  civilian  authorities  by  defining 
the  requirements  of  our  war  preparation  and  war  strategy, 


70  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

was  also  to  be  the  executive  department  through  which 
the  higher  command  would  issue  its  authoritative  orders. 
*'It  is  to  be  an  instrument  capable  of  formulating  any 
decision  which  has  been  taken,  or  may  be  taken,  by  the 
executive,  in  terms  of  precise  and  exhaustive  detail." 

To  those  hopefully  disposed  this  departure,  then, 
seemed  beyond  words  momentous.  For  thirty  years, 
whatever  disagreement  there  may  have  been  in  the  navy, 
there  was  absolute  unanimity  as  to  the  need  of  a  staff  for 
the  study  of  war  and  the  formulation  of  campaign  plans. 
So  long  as  weapons  in  use  could  be  mastered  by  the  person- 
nel of  the  ships  without  dependence  on  methods  of  fire 
control  and  so  forth  extraneously  supplied,  this  was  indeed 
the  navy's  chief  and  overmastering  need.  Had  such  a 
staff  existed  even  sixteen  years  ago,  it  is  quite  inconceiv- 
able that  we  could  imperceptibly  have  drifted  into  depen- 
dence on  extraneous  methods  for  the  right  use  of  weapons, 
without  the  staff  responsible  for  preparation  for  war, 
bringing  the  fact  of  this  dependence  to  the  notice  of  its 
chief.  And,  the  principle  once  recognized  that  staff  or- 
ganization is  the  only  road  to  infalHbility,  the  institution 
of  an  additional  staff  for  the  study  of  so  vital  a  matter 
must  inevitably  have  followed.  The  existence  of  one 
competent,  impartial,  and  impersonal  expert  body  would 
automatically  have  resulted  in  the  creation  of  another. 
But  actually  when  this  new  staff  was  so  resoundingly 
established  at  the  beginning  of  191 2,  some  amongst  the 
optimists  began  to  wonder  whether  there  might  not  be  a 
fly  in  the  ointment  of  their  content.  It  was  pointed  out 
that  to  create  a  staff  for  dealing  *'with  the  combinations 
of  strategy  and  tactics"  before  any  machinery  existed  for 
elucidating  the  essentials  of  "unit  efficiency"  did  most 
certainly  have  the  air  of  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  71 

But  to  doubt  that  this  machinery  would  follow  seemed 
too  absurd  in  face  of  the  tremendous  emphasis  that  Mr. 
Churchill  had  laid  upon  its  necessity.  If,  without  unit 
efficiency,  "the  combinations  of  strategy  and  tactics  were 
only  the  preliminaries  of  defeat,"  whereas  if  it  existed  a 
position  in  which  tactics  had  failed,  "could  be  retrieved 
with  swiftness  and  decision,"  it  was  manifestly  unthink- 
able that  such  efficiency  could  be  left  to  chance,  or  assumed 
to  exist  on  the  ipse  dixit  of  any  official.  Obviously  the 
First  Lord,  having  put  his  hand  to  the  minor  and  second- 
ary matter,  would  not  delay  action  at  least  as  drastic  in 
the  major  primary. 

The  institution  of  the  War  Staff,  then,  was  watched 
with  sympathetic  interest  in  the  full  expectation,  not  only 
that  it  must  lead  to  great  results,  but  that  it  must  be  fol- 
lowed— as,  of  course,  it  should  have  been  preceded — by 
one  for  fathoming  all  the  potentialities  of  the  means  em- 
ployed in  the  attack  and  defence  of  fleets. 

But  the  War  Staff  was  never  put  into  the  position  to 
discharge  the  functions  which  the  1909  committee  had 
designated  as  its  main  purpose.  So  far  from  being  an 
authority  equipped  for  the  exhaustive  study  of  war  and 
how  to  prepare  for  it,  the  whole  apparatus  of  fighting  was 
carefully  excluded  from  its  purview.  It  had  no  connection 
with  the  departments  administering  gunnery,  torpedoes, 
submarines,  aircraft,  or  mines.  As  to  some  of  these  activ- 
ities, there  were  as  a  fact  no  departments  solely  charged 
with  their  control  before  the  War  Staff  was  instituted. 
They  were  not  entrusted  to  the  War  Staff.  And  no  new 
staffs  were  created!  If  the  strategical  vagueness,  to 
which  the  Beresford  Committee  had  borne  witness  in 
1909,  arose  largely,  as  many  supposed,  from  the  uncer- 
tain state  of  naval  technique,  then,  so  far  as  the  War 


72  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Staff  was  concerned,  this  vagueness  had  to  continue — for 
technique  was  not  their  concern. 

The  consequences  were  demonstrated  in  many  striking 
ways  as  the  war  progressed.  But  not  the  least  curious  re- 
sult was  the  confusion  that  arose  as  to  the  offensive  and 
defensive  aspects  of  naval  strategy  and  preparation.  In 
the  debate  on  the  Naval  Estimates  of  1916  a  violent  attack 
on  Admiralty  policy  by  Mr.  Churchill  left  Mr.  Balfour 
with  no  alternative  but  to  break  the  brutal  truth  to  us 
that,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  we  had  not  a  single  subma- 
rine-proof harbour  on  the  East  Coast.  Reflect  for  a  min- 
ute what  this  means.  In  the  years  which  have  elapsed 
since  Lord  Fisher  came  to  the  Admiralty  as  First  Sea 
Lord,  two  altogether  revolutionary  changes  have  been  made 
in  naval  war. 

1.  Until  1904  the  12-inch  guns  of  our  battleships  were 
weapons  that  no  one  would  have  thought  of  using  beyond 
the  range  of  4,000  yards.  The  identical  guns  have  been 
used  in  this  war  at  11,000,  12,000,  and  13,000  yards.  The 
advance  in  range  owes  nothing  to  improvements  in  the 
gun.  It  has  been  brought  about  by  improvements  in 
sights,  in  range-finders,  and  in  the  organization  called 
fire  control. 

2.  Again,  in  1904  the  submarine,  or  submersible  torpedo- 
carrying  boat,  had  indeed  been  proved  to  be  a  practical 
instrument  for  war,  but  was  still  in  its  infancy.  By  1907, 
when  Captain  Murray  Sueter  wrote  his  well-known  work 
on  the  subject,  it  had  become  obvious  that  the  tactics 
of  battle,  no  less  than  the  defence  of  fleets,  stood  to  be 
completely  changed  by  its  actual  and  probable  develop- 
ments. 

Now  every  new  engine  of  war — and  as  a  long-range 
weapon  the  modern  gun  is  such — creates  a  double  problem. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  73 

There  is  the  art  of  using  it  in  attack;  there  is  the  art  of 
countering  it  when  it  is  in  the  enemy's  hands.  With 
every  new  development,  then,  the  Navy  has  to  learn  a  new 
offensive  and  a  new  defensive.  In  the  matter  of  guns, 
there  is  but  one  defensive  that  can  be  perfectly  successful. 
It  is  to  develop  a  method  of  using  them  so  rapid,  so  in- 
sistent, and  so  accurate  that  the  enemy's  guns  will  be  out 
of  action  before  they  can  be  employed  against  us.  Failing 
this  there  is  a  secondary  defensive,  viz.,  to  protect  ships 
by  armour.  Finally,  you  may  keep  out  of  range  of  the 
enemy's  guns  by  turning  or  running  away.  The  adoption 
of  armour  calls  for  no  perfection  either  of  tactical  organi- 
zation or  technical  practice.  It  is  a  matter  which  can  be 
left  to  the  metallurgists,  engineers,  and  constructors.  The 
purely  naval  poHcy,  then,  would  have  been  either  to  de- 
velop the  use  of  guns  offensively,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
must  also  be  the  best  defence,  or  with  a  purely  defensive 
idea,  solely  to  enjoin  the  tactic  that  will  avoid  the  risks 
inseparable  from  coming  under  the  enemy's  fire.  To  the 
country  that  was  completing  nearly  two  battleships  to 
any  other  country's  one,  that  aspired  to  command  the  sea, 
that  hoped  to  be  able  to  blow  any  enemy  fleet  out  of  the 
water  if  it  got  the  chance,  it  would  seem  obvious  that 
there  could  be  only  one  gunnery  policy;  to  wit,  push  the 
offensive  to  the  highest  possible  extent. 

Again,  the  distinguishing  feature  of  submarines  is  their 
capacity  to  approach  the  strongest  of  vessels  unseen  and 
then,  in  waters  superficially  under  hostile  command,  to 
strike  with  the  most  deadly  of  all  weapons.  As  they 
gained  in  speed  and  radius  of  action,  it  became  obvious 
that  wherever  a  fleet  might  be — whether  at  sea  or  in  har- 
bour— it  must,  unless  it  were  protected  by  effective  pas- 
sive defences  while  in  harbour,  and  by  numerous  mobile 


74  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

guards  when  at  sea,  be  exposed  to  this  insidious  and,  if 
successful,  deadly  form  of  attack. 

The  basic  supposition  of  British  naval  policy  has  been 
to  maintain  a  fleet  sufificiently  powerful  to  drive  all  en- 
emy's craft  within  his  harbours  and  defences.  The  prop- 
osition has  only  to  be  stated  for  it  to  be  clear  that  the 
navy  could  not  have  expected,  except  in  rare  circumstances, 
to  have  any  targets  for  its  submarines,  whereas  it  was  as 
certain  as  any  future  thing  could  be,  that  every  British 
ship  would  be  a  constant  target  for  the  enemy's  subma- 
rines. British  policy  in  regard  to  submarine  war  should, 
then,  have  been  mainly,  if,  indeed,  not  wholly,  defensive. 

Thus,  if  there  was  one  form  of  ofensive  imperatively 
imposed  on  us,  it  was  that  of  naval  artillery;  and  if  there 
was  one  form  of  defensive  not  less  imperatively  incumbent, 
it  was  the  provision  of  adequate  protection  against  sub- 
marines. 

It  is  now,  of  course,  common  knowledge  that  it  was  ex- 
actly in  these  two  particulars  that  Admiralty  policy  from 
1904-1914  was  either  discontinuous,  vacillating,  and 
self-contradictory,  or  simply  non-existent.  So  far  as  it 
cultivated  anything,  it  was  a  defensive  tactic  for  the  gun 
and  offensive  tactics  for  the  submarine!  On  the  latter 
point  let  the  non-provision  of  a  safe  anchorage  on  the 
Northeast  coast  stand  for  the  whole.  If  you  pick  up  a 
Navy  List  for  any  month  in  any  year  prior  to  August, 
1914,  you  will  look  in  vain  for  any  department  of  White- 
hall, any  establishment  at  a  principal  port,  any  appoint- 
ment of  flag  officer  or  captain,  to  prove  that  there  was  at 
any  time  an  individual  or  a  committee  charged  with  the 
vital  problem  of  protecting  the  British  Fleet  against  enemy 
submarines  when  war  broke  out.  The  necessity  had  in- 
deed been  realized.     It  was  set  out  by  Captain  Sueter  in 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  75 

1907.  It  had  been  urged  on  the  Board  of  Admiralty. 
But  no  action  was  taken. 

This,  of  course,  was  bad  enough.  The  case  of  gunnery 
was  worse,  for  if  you  compare  the  Navy  List  of  August, 
1914,  with  that  of  the  corresponding  month  of  the  year 
that  Mr.  Churchill  took  office,  you  will  find  that  it  was  to 
his  administration  that  we  owe  the  abolition  of  the  only 
officer  and  department  in  the  navy  competent  to  advise  or 
direct  methods  of  gunnery  adequate  for  war.  From  1908 
to  191 3  the  Inspectorship  of  Target  Practice  had  been 
effective  in  giving  shape,  and  to  some  extent,  a  voice,  to 
the  alarm,  anxiety,  and  indignation  of  the  navy  at  the 
manner  in  which  gunnery  administration  boxed  the  com- 
pass of  conflicting  poHcies.  With  the  suppression  of  the 
office  there  came  administrative  peace — and  technical 
chaos. 

Why  were  not  these  problems,  each  and  all  of  them, 
thoroughly  investigated  and  their  solutions  discovered 
before  war  began .'' 

Mr.  Churchill  supplies  us  with  the  answer.  He  closes 
his  article  in  the  London  Magazine  of  September,  1916, 
with  a  protest  against  naval  operations  being  more  criti- 
cally and  even  captiously  judged  than  miHtary  operations, 
l^hey  are  so  judged,  he  tells  us,  because  of  the  apparent 
simplicity  of  a  naval  battle,  and  the  obvious  character  of 
any  disaster  that  happens  to  any  unit  of  a  fleet.  Regi- 
ments may  be  thrown  away  upon  land  and  no  one  be  any 
the  wiser,  but  to  lose  a  ship  is  an  event  about  which  there 
can  be  no  dispute.  It  is  regarded  as  a  disaster,  and  at 
once  somebody,  it  is  assumed,  must  be  to  blame.  This 
is  hard  measure  on  the  seaman.  Surely,  an  admiral,  he 
tells  us,  has  a  greater  claim  upon  the  generosity  of  his 
countrymen    than    a    general.     ''His    warfare  is   almost 


76  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

entirely  novel.  Scarcely  one  had  ever  had  any  experience 
of  sea  fighting.  All  had  to  learn  the  strange  new,  un- 
measured, and,  in  times  of  peace,  largely  immeasurable 
conditions.'' 

Now  this  is  really  a  very  striking  admission.  Whence 
arose  this  theory  that  naval  warfare  consisted  of  un- 
fathomable mysteries?  Perhaps  the  explanation  is  as 
follows :  Popular  interest  in  the  navy  was  first  thoroughly 
aroused  by  Mr.  Stead's  Pall  Mall  articles  in  the  middle 
eighties.  It  is  from  the  controversies  that  he  aroused 
that  Brassey's  and  the  other  annual  naval  publications 
emerged.  For  twent}^  years  newspaper  interest  in  ship- 
building programmes,  design,  and  so  forth,  advanced  in 
a  crescendo  of  intensity.  The  many  and  startHng  de- 
partures in  naval  policy  that  characterized  Lord  Fisher's 
tenure  of  the  first  professional  place  on  the  Board  of 
Admiralty,  brought  this  interest  to  a  cHmax.  There  was 
a  controversial  demand  for  more  costly  programmes 
involving  political  and  journalistic  opposition,  which  in 
turn  provoked  greater  vigour  in  those  that  advocated 
them.  Thus  the  whole  of  naval  policy  had  to  be  com- 
mended to  popular — and  civihan — judgment.  And  it 
followed  that  the  advocates  of  expansion  had  to  employ 
arguments  that  civilians  could  understand.  They  very 
soon  perceived  that  success  lay  along  the  line  of  sensa- 
tionaHsm.  Larger  and  faster  ships,  heavier  and  longer 
range  guns  carrying  bigger  and  more  devastating  shells, 
faster  and  more  terrifying  torpedoes,  those  new  craft  of 
weird  mystery,  the  submarines — all  these  things  in  turn 
and  for  considerable  periods  were  urged  upon  the  public 
and  the  statesmen  in  terms  of  awe  and  wonder.  But  the 
Augurs,  instead  of  winking  behind  the  veil,  came  finally 
to  be  hypnotized  by  their  own  wonder  talk.     Who  can- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  FORCE  77 

not  remember  that  ever-recurring  phrase,  *'the  untold 
possibiHties"  of  the  new  engines  of  war?  They  got  to  be 
so  convinced  on  this  subject  that  they  made  no  effort  to 
find  out  precisely  what  the  possibilities  were,  and  Mr. 
Churchill's  phrase  that  I  have  just  quoted,  *'the  strange 
new,  unmeasured,  and  largely  immeasurable  conditions," 
exactly  summed  up  the  frame  of  mind  of  those  who  were 
responsible  for  naval  policy  up  to  and  including  Mr, 
Churchill's  time.  If  all  these  problems  were  insoluble, 
if  the  conditions  were  immeasurable,  if  the  possibilities 
of  new  weapons  were  really  untold  and  untellable,  what 
was  the  use  of  worrying  about  experiment  and  knowledge, 
judgment  and  expertize?  It  was  this  frame  of  mind  that 
led  a  humorist  to  suggest  that  the  materialists  ought 
really  to  be  called  the  spiritualists. 

It  was  all  very  unfortunate,  because  any  rightly  organ- 
ized system  of  inquiry,  investigation,  and  experiment, 
would  have  dissipated  this  atmosphere  of  mystery  once 
and  for  all.  When  new  inventions  are  made  that  affect 
the  processes  of  industry,  it  is  not  the  men  who  go  about 
talking  of  their  "untold  possibilities,"  their  "incalculable" 
effects,  and  their  "immeasurable"  results,  that  get  the 
commercial  advantage  of  their  development.  It  is  those 
who  take  immediate  steps  to  investigate  the  limits  of 
their  action  and  the  precise  scope  of  their  operations  who 
turn  new  discoveries  to  account.  To  talk  as  if  the  per- 
formance of  guns,  torpedoes,  submarines,  and  aircraft 
were  beyond  human  calculation,  was  really  a  confession 
of  incompetence.  The  application  to  these  things  of  the 
principles  of  inquiry  universally  employed  in  other  fields 
was  always  perfectly  simple,  and  had  it  been  employed 
we  should  not  have  begun  the  war  with  wondering  what 
we  could  do,  but  knowing  precisely  what  we  ought  to  do. 


78  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BAITLE 

It  was  want  of  preparation  in  these  matters  that  was  un- 
doubtedly one  of  the  deciding  factors  in  tying  us  down 
both  to  defensive  strategy  and  to  defensive  tactics. 

Once  grasp  what  are  the  possibiUties  open  to  the 
enemy's  armed  forces;  once  realize  the  scope  the  mine 
and  torpedo  possess;  once  analyze  their  influence  both 
on  strategy  and  on  tactics,  with  the  new  problems  that 
they  create  both  for  cruising  force  and  for  naval  artillery 
in  action,  and  it  becomes  exceedingly  clear  what  it  is  that 
your  own  fleet  must  be  prepared  to  do.  Had  these  things 
been  realized  at  any  time  between  191 1  and  1914,  should 
we  have  had  our  own  naval  bases  unprotected  against 
submarine  attack?  Should  we  have  been  without  any  or- 
ganization for  using  mines  ofi'ensively  against  the  enemy? 
Still  more,  should  we  have  been  practically  without  any 
means  whatever  of  preventing  the  enemy  using  mines 
against  us?  We  should  have  had  a  fleet  composed  of 
different  units,  organized,  trained,  and  equipped  in  a 
very  different  way. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Actions 

The  naval  operations  suggested  and  described  in  the 
following  chapters  are  the  surprise  attack  that  Germany 
did  not  deliver,  the  destruction  of  Koenigsberg^  the  capture 
of  Emden,  Cradock's  heroic  self-sacrifice  off  Coronel,  the 
destruction  of  Von  Spec's  squadron  off  the  Falkland 
Islands,  the  affair  of  the  Heligoland  Bight,  the  pursuit  of 
Von  Hipper  across  the  Dogger  Bank,  the  battle  of  Jutland, 
and  finally,  the  operations  carried  out  against  Zeebrugge 
and  Ostend  in  the  fourth  year  of  the  war.  I  have  not  in 
these  chapters  followed  strict  chronological  order,  but 
have  arranged  them  so  as  to  present  the  problems  of  sea 
fighting  as  they  arise  in  a  crescendo  of  interest  and  com- 
plexity. 

Modern  war  is  fought  in  conditions  to  which  history 
offers  no  parallel.  Both  the  British  and  German  Govern- 
ments have  maintained  the  strictest  reserve  in  regard 
to  every  operation.  When  one  reads  the  despatches  it  is 
quite  obvious  to  the  least  instructed  student  of  war,  that 
their  publication  has  been  guided  by  the  consciousness 
that  within  two  or  three  days  of  issue  the  text  would  be 
in  the  enemy's  hands.  Every  atom  of  information,  then, 
that  could  be  of  the  slightest  value  to  the  Germans  has 
been  ruthlessly  excised,  with  results  to  a  great  extent 
ruinous  to  lay  comprehension  of  the  events  described. 
This  being  so,  I  wish  it  clearly  to  be  understood  that  every 
opinion  or  judgment  expressed  in  these  chapters  must 

79 


8o  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

obviously  be  subject  to  modification  and  revision  when 
further  information  becomes  available.  Generally  speak- 
ing, too,  the  plans  I  have  included  with  the  text  have  no 
pretence  whatever  to  be  authentic,  but  are  presented 
simply  as  diagrammatic  ways  of  making  the  text  in- 
telligible. No  more  can  be  claimed  for  them  than  that 
they  should  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  information 
officially  given.  The  plans  of  the  Falkland  Islands 
engagements  are  the  only  exceptions.  These  I  believe 
to  be  substantially  correct. 

In  the  destruction  of  Koemgsherg  the  main  interest 
is  the  solution  of  a  gunnery  problem  in  itself  not  very 
intricate,  if  once  the  means  of  carrying  it  out  exist  and 
the  right  method  of  procedure  is  recognized.  But  in  the 
actual  operations  the  men  on  the  spot  had  to  do  an 
immense  number  of  things  before  the  problem  could  be 
tackled  at  all,  and  in  the  solution  of  the  gunnery  problem 
they  had  to  learn  from  the  beginning  and  so  discover, 
from  their  failure  at  the  first  attempt,  the  method  which 
was  so  brilliantly  successful  on  the  second.  In  this  re- 
spect the  story  isolates  a  single  and,  as  I  have  said,  a 
simple  problem  in  gunnery  and  illustrates  what  is  meant 
by  right  technique.  Apart  from  this,  the  story  is  full  of 
human  interest  and  exhibits  the  exceptional  advantages 
which  naval  training  gives  to  those  who  have  to  ex- 
temporize methods  of  dealing  with  circumstances  and 
difficulties  without  the  guidance  of  experience. 

In  the  Sydney-Emden  engagement  we  have  a  very  good 
example  of  the  modern  single  ship  action.  Not  the  least 
of  its  points  of  interest  is  that  Sydney  seems  to  have  lost 
her  rangefinder  a  very  few  minutes  after  the  action  began. 
At  first  sight  it  would  seem  to  be  an  absolutely  disabling 
loss.     In  some  quarters  more  emphasis  has  been  laid  on 


THE  ACTIONS  8i 

the  value  of  a  good  rangefinder  to  fire  control  than  to  any 
other  element  of  that  highly  debated  branch  of  naval 
science.  But  in  this  engagement,  as  in  that  of  Koenigs- 
berg,  the  enemy  was  destroyed  by  a  ship  that  did  not  use 
a  rangefinder  at  all.  The  action  thus  not  only  shows 
the  place  which  the  observation  of  fire  takes  in  the  art 
of  sea  fighting,  but  illustrates  in  the  highest  degree  the 
value  of  long  practice  in  gunnery.  Since  1905  every 
commissioned  ship  in  the  fleet  has  worked  assiduously 
on  this  problem,  and,  whether  the  methods  in  use  have 
been  good,  bad,  or  indiff'erent,  this  practice  produced  a 
race  of  officers  extraordinarily  well  equipped  for  dealing 
with  fire  control  as  a  practical  problem.  It  is  highly 
probable,  if  the  methods  and  instruments  they  have  been 
given  have  not  always  been  of  the  best,  that  this  fact,  by 
throwing  them  on  their  own  resources,  did  much  to 
stimulate  that  singular  capacity  for  extemporization 
which  we  shall  see  illustrated  in  the  Koenigsherg  business. 
Moreover,  this  is  a  faculty  in  which  our  officers  seem  to 
excel  the  Gemans  greatly.  In  this  fight,  as  in  so  many 
others,  it  was  the  enemy  who  first  opened  fire,  and  it  was 
his  opening  salvoes  that  were  the  most  accurate.  But 
the  enemy  has  seldom  kept  this  initial  advantage,  whereas 
we  shall  generally  find  the  British  personnel  improving 
as  the  action  proceeds.  It  would  appear,  then,  that  as 
the  material  suffers  the  Germans,  who  are  most  dependent 
on  it,  have  on  the  whole  shown  less  resource  than  our  own 
officers. 

In  the  action  off  Coronel  the  heroic  self-sacrifice  of  the 
British  force  overlays  the  technical  interest.  In  one 
respect  it  is  altogether  unique,  for  it  is  the  only  action 
in  this  war  in  which  the  weaker  and  faster  squadron 
sought  action  with  one  of  incalculably  greater  fighting 


82  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

power  but  of  inferior  speed.  Neither  side  seems  to  have 
manoeuvred  in  a  way  that  would  have  added  to  the 
difficulties  of  fire  control,  but  as,  apart  from  manoeuvring, 
the  shooting  conditions  were  extraordinarily  difficult,  one 
is  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  deciding  factor  was 
less  the  great  superiority  of  the  enemy's  force,  as  measured 
by  the  weight  of  his  broadsides,  than  the  still  more  marked 
superiority  that  arose  from  his  having  a  more  modern 
and  more  homogeneous  armament. 

At  the  Falkland  Islands  the  all-big-gun  ship  appeared 
for  the  first  time  in  a  sea  action  and,  although  opposed 
by  vessels  whose  armament  was  no  match  for  such  heavy 
metal,  it  was  actually  employed  according  to  the  tactics 
officially  set  out  as  the  basis  of  the  Dreadnought  idea  in 
design;  the  tactics,  that  is  to  say,  of  keeping  away  from  an 
enemy,  so  as  to  maintain  a  range  favourable  to  the  more 
powerfully  gunned  ship.  The  battle  resolved  itself  into 
three  separate  actions,  and  it  was  on  this  principle  that  Sir 
Doveton  Sturdee  fought  the  Graf  von  Spee  and  his  two 
battle-cruisers,  and  that  the  Captain  of  the  Cornwall  en- 
gaged Leipzig.  But,  curiously  enough,  in  the  engagement 
between  Kent  and  Niirnherg  a  different  principle  is  seen 
at  work.  Captain  Allen  pursued  at  full  speed  until  he  had 
crippled  the  enemy's  engines,  and  then,  as  his  speed  fell 
off,  continued  to  close  till  he  was  able  to  silence  him  alto- 
gether at  a  range  of  3,000  yards.  Thus  on  a  single  day 
two  diametrically  opposed  tactical  doctrines  were  exem- 
plified by  officers  under  a  single  command. 

In  each  of  these  four  actions  the  tactics  of  the  gun 
escaped  complication  by  the  distractions  and  difficulties 
which  torpedo  attack  imposes  on  long-range  gunnery.  In 
our  next  action,  the  affair  off  Heligoland,  the  torpedo 
figures  largely,   because  visibility  was  limited  to  about 


THE  ACTIONS  83 

6,000  yards.  The  affair  ofF  Heligoland  cannot  be  de- 
scribed as  an  engagement.  It  was  primarily  a  reconnais- 
sance in  force  developed  into  a  series  of  skirmishes  and 
single  ship  actions,  which  began  at  seven  in  the  morning 
and  ended  at  mid-day.  Submarines,  destroyers,  cruisers 
of  several  types  and,  finally,  battle-cruisers,  were  employed 
on  the  British  side.  There  were  sharp  artillery  engage- 
ments between  destroyers,  there  were  torpedo  attacks 
made  by  destroyers  on  light  cruisers  and  by  submarines 
on  battle-cruisers.  But  they  were  not  massed  attacks 
on  ships  in  formation,  but  isolated  efforts  at  marksman- 
ship, and  they  were  all  of  them  unsuccessful.  This  failure 
of  the  torpedo  as  a  weapon  of  precision  is  of  considerable 
technical  interest.  The  light  thrown  on  gunnery  problems 
by  the  events  of  the  day  is  less  easy  to  define.  The  chief 
interest  of  this  raid  into  the  Bight  lies  in  the  strategical 
idea  which  prompted  it  and  in  its  moral  effects  on  the 
British  and  German  naval  forces.  That  Sir  David  Beatty, 
in  command  of  four  battle-cruisers,  should  coolly  have 
challenged  the  German  Fleet  to  fight  and  that  this  challenge 
was  not  accepted,  was  extremely  significant.  It  was  of 
special  value  to  our  side,  for  it  showed  the  British  Navy 
to  possess  a  naval  leader  who  knew  how  to  combine  dash 
and  caution  and  marked  by  a  talent  for  leadership  as  con- 
spicuous as  the  personal  bravery  which  had  won  him  his 
early  promotions. 

These  qualities  were  still  better  displayed  in  the  engage- 
ment off  the  Dogger  Bank.  This  action  is  remarkable  in 
several  respects.  For  the  first  time  destroyers  were  here 
employed  to  make  massed  torpedo  attacks  on  a  squadron 
of  capital  ships.  The  particular  defensive  functions  of 
such  torpedo  attacks  will  be  discussed  in  the  proper  place. 
Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  no  torpedo  hit,  but  that  the 


84  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

British  were  robbed  of  victory  by  a  chance  shot  which 
disabled  Sir  David  Beatty's  flagship,  and  deprived  the 
squadron  of  its  leader  when  bold  leadership  was  most 
needed.  Why  the  action  was  broken  off  by  Rear-Admiral 
Moore,  who  succeeded  to  the  command,  has  never  been 
explained,  and  the  unfortunate  wording  of  an  Admiralty 
comrminique  gave  the  world  for  some  time  an  impression 
that  Sir  David  Beatty — of  all  people — had  retreated  from 
the  threat  of  German  submarines. 

The  battle  of  Jutland  echpses  in  technical  interest  all 
the  other  engagements  put  together.  It  presents,  of 
course  on  a  far  larger  scale,  all  the  problems  hitherto  met 
separately.  We  are  still  far  too  imperfectly  informed  as 
to  many  of  the  incidents  of  this  battle  for  it  to  be  possible 
to  attempt  any  complete  analysis  of  its  tactics,  or  to  indi- 
cate the  line  on  which  judgment  will  ultimately  declare 
itself.  We  are,  for  example,  entirely  without  information 
either  about  the  method  of  deployment  prescribed  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Grand  Fleet  at  six  o'clock, 
or  of  the  theory  on  which  the  night  attack  by  the  destroyer 
on  the  retreating  German  Fleet  was  ordered.  We  do  not 
know  how  it  was  that  a  misunderstanding^  arose  between 
the  battle-cruiser  fleet  and  the  battle  fleet  as  to  the  time 
and  place  of  junction,  nor  the  arrangements  which  resulted 
in  contact  with  the  German  Fleet  being  lost  after  the  action 
was  over.  It  is,  therefore,  only  possible  to  discuss  those 
points  on  which  light  has  been  thrown  by  the  despatch, 
and  the  principles  of  action  which  the  Commander-in- 

^  The  positions  of  the  two  fleets  at  six  o'clock  had  been  estimated  by  dead 
reckoning,  both  in  Lion  and  in  Iro7i  Duke.  The  two  reckonings  did  not  agree 
and  the  Commander-in-Chief  said  in  the  despatch  that  such  a  discrepancy 
was  inevitable.  The  word  "misunderstanding"  in  the  text  must  not  be  taken 
to  mean  that  the  calculation  in  either  fleet  was  avoidable,  still  less  repre- 
hensibly,  wrong.    - 


THE  ACTIONS  85 

Chief  has  set  out  in  various  speeches  delivered  after  he  had 
ceased  to  command  at  sea. 

In  the  engagement  off  the  Falkland  Islands,  it  will  be 
remembered  that  there  was  a  marked  contrast  between  the 
tactical  methods  followed  in  the  pursuit  of  Von  Spee  and 
those  adopted  by  Captain  Allen  in  his  pursuit  of  Nurnberg. 
In  the  battle  of  Jutland  we  shall  find  a  still  more  marked 
contrast  between  the  strategic  conceptions  of  the  two, 
leaders  of  the  British  forces. 

Admiral  Beatty  seems  to  have  acted  throughout  as  if 
the  enemy  should  be  brought  to  battle  and  destroyed,  al- 
most regardless  of  risk.  The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  seems  to  have  been  wiUing  to  engage  only 
if  he  could  do  so  without  jeopardizing  the  forces  under  his 
command.  The  one  was  bent  on  victory,  the  other  seemed 
satisfied — so  long  as  the  enemy  were  thwarted  in  any  ul- 
terior purpose — if  only  the  British  Fleet  were  saved  from 
losses. 

It  followed  from  such  very  opposite  views,  that  their 
tactical  methods  differed  also.  At  each  stage  of  the  ac- 
tion Sir  David  Beatty's  tactic  was  to  get  his  forces  into 
action  at  the  first  possible  moment  and  to  keep  them  in 
action  as  long  as  possible.  Thus  when  the  news  first 
reaches  him  that  the  enemy  is  to  the  northeast,  he  leads 
his  whole  fleet  at  top  speed  straight  for  the  Horn  Reef  to 
get  between  him  and  his  base.  And  this  he  does  without 
waiting  for  any  information  about  the  composition  of  the 
enemy's  force.  Whether  it  is  the  battle-cruiser  and  light 
forces  only,  or  the  whole  German  Fleet,  his  first  idea  is  to 
make  sure  that  he  is  in  a  position  to  engageif  he  wishes  to. 
As  it  was  at  3  :o  P.M.,  so  it  was  at  each  stage  after  he  got 
into  action.  The  reduction  of  his  squadron  by  one  third 
does  not  seem  to  have  upset  the  coolness  of  his  judgment 


86  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

or  the  firmness  of  his  determination  in  the  least  degree. 
When  he  found  himself  opposed,  no  longer  by  five  battle- 
cruisers,  but  by  sixteen  Dreadnought  battleships  as  well, 
he  reversed  the  course  of  the  fleet,  made  Evan  Thomas 
fall  in  behind  him,  and,  during  a  holding  action  for  the 
next  hour,  kept  the  Germans  under  his  guns,  risking  their 
fire,  threatening  the  head  of  their  line,  and  half-cajohng, 
half-forcing  Scheer  northward  to  where  the  British  fleets 
would  be  united.  The  moment  contact  becomes  immi- 
nent— knowing  that  the  light  might  at  any  moment  fail — 
he  forces  the  pace  and  discounts  risks  incalculably  greater 
than  at  any  time  during  the  day,  if  only  the  enormous 
striking  power  of  the  Grand  Fleet  can  be  brought  for  once 
into  action  as  a  whole.  And  so,  regardless  of  the  punish- 
ment his  fleet  had  received  earlier  in  the  day,  he  shortens 
the  range  from  14,000  yards  to  12,000  and  then  from 
12,000  to  8,000,  in  a  last  efi^ort  to  hold  the  enemy,  while 
the  Grand  Fleet  deploys  and  comes  into  action.  There 
is  no  foolhardiness  in  his  tactics,  for  the  speed  that  enables 
him  to  head  the  German  fine  is  not  only  the  best  defence 
of  his  own  squadron  against  torpedo  attack.  He  has 
made  it  almost  impossible  for  the  German  destroyers  to 
enfilade  the  Grand  Fleet,  if  only  it  deploys  at  full  speed 
on  him.  He  knows,  of  course,  that  at  8,000  yards  the 
side  armour  of  his  ships  will  not  keep  out  the  enemy's 
shells.  But  he  has  demorahzed  the  German  gunfire  by 
his  own  once  before  and,  confident  in  the  superior  coolness 
and  nerve  of  his  officers  and  crews,  he  rehes  on  this  element 
again  as  the  best  defence  of  his  squadron. 

It  is  not  till  6:50,  when  he  reahzes  that  his  whole  effort 
has  miscarried,  that  he  makes  the  entry  in  his  despatch 
which  seems  to  me  one  of  the  most  tragic  phrases  ever 
used  by  a  great  master  of  fighting.     He  had  been  baulked 


THE  ACTIONS  87 

of  victory  at  the  Dogger  Bank  by  a  chance  injury  to  his 
ship,  when  his  squadron  came  under  the  command  of  an 
Admiral  trained  in  the  tenets  of  Whitehall.  Now  on 
May  31  he  had  executed  a  master  stroke  of  tactics.  The 
armoured  cruiser,  designed  to  be  a  swift  bully  over  the 
w^eak,  he  had  used  to  confound  and  paralyze  the  strong. 
There  had  been  many  a  discussion  as  to  the  tactical  value 
of  speed  when  the  Dreadnought  type  was  first  designed, 
but  no  thinker  had  had  the  daring  to  forecast  any  such 
stroke  as  Sir  David  Beatty  planned  and  executed  off  the 
Jutland  Reefs.  But  it  was  a  stroke  struck  in  vain.  **By 
6:50  the  battle-cruisers  were  clear  of  our  leading  Battle 
Squadron,  then  bearing  about  north  northwest  three 
miles  and  I     .     .     .     reduced  to  18  knots." 

There  was  no  more  to  try  for  that  day.  When,  a  quar- 
ter of  an  hour  afterwards,  the  Grand  Fleet  starts  south, 
he  hunts  for  and  heads  the  German  hne  again.  But  it  is 
all  to  no  purpose.  Yet  he  does  not  give  up  hope.  At 
half-past  nine  darkness  makes  further  pursuit  impossible, 
but  at  any  rate  "our  strategical  position  was  such  as  to 
make  it  appear  certain  that  we  should  locate  the  enemy 
at  dayhght  under  most  favourable  circumstances.  It 
is  plain,  then,  that  he  had  a  plan  for  next  day's  battle, 
just  as  he  had  had  one  for  the  hard  and  costly  day  just 
passed.  To  the  last  the  thought  still  preoccupies  him 
that  has  been  his  guide  throughout.  The  enemy  must  be 
found  and  destroyed. 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  however,  whatever  his  anx- 
iety for  victory,  is  plainly  concerned  throughout  by  the 
enormous  responsibility  that  weighs  upon  him  as  the 
guardian  of  the  fleet  under  his  command.  Only  one  of 
the  ships  was  hit  by  gunfire  and  only  one  was  struck  by 
torpedo!     In   summing   up   the   story  of  the  day,   "the 


88  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

hardest  fighting,"  he  says,  "fell  to  the  lot  of  the  Battle 
Cruiser  Fleet  .  .  .  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  the  First 
Cruiser  Squadron,  the  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron, 
and  the  flotillas."  But  he  must  add  a  note,  that  the  units 
of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  were  less  heavily  armoured 
than  their  opponents!  The  obsession  of  the  defensive 
idea  is  obvious.  "The  enemy  constantly  turned  away 
and  opened  the  range  under  cover  of  destroyer  attacks 
and  smoke  screens."  "The  German  Fleet  appeared  to 
rely  very  much  on  torpedo  attacks,  which  were  favoured 
by  low  visibility,  and  by  the  fact  that  we  had  arrived  in 
the  position  of  a  *  following'  or  *  chasing'  fleet.  A 
large  number  of  torpedoes  were  apparently  fired,  but  only 
one  took  effect  (on  Marlborough),  and  even  in  this  case 
the  ship  was  able  to  remain  in  the  line  and  to  continue  the 
action." 

"The  enemy  opened  the  range  under  cover  of  destroyer 
attacks  .  .  .  which  were  favoured  by  the  fact  .  .  . 
that  we  had  arrived  in  the  position  of  a 'following*  .  .  , 
fleet."  Had  Admiral  Jerram's  squadron  followed  full  speed 
straight  into  the  wake  of  the  battle-cruisers,  had  the  whole 
Grand  Fleet  deployed  on  Sir  David  Beatty's  track,  the 
enemy's  business  should  have  been  finished,  for  Scheer 
never  could  have  turned  under  such  a  concentration  of  fire. 
But  the  form  of  the  deployment  created  the  situation 
that  Scheer  needed.  It  exposed  the  fleet  to  the  torpedoes. 
And  the  risk  was  not  faced.  Speaking  eight  months 
afterwards  at  the  Fishmongers'  Hall,  Admiral  Jellicoe 
explained  why.  "The  torpedo,  as  fired  from  surface 
vessels,  is  effective  certainly  up  to  10,000  yards  range, 
and  this  requires  that  a  ship  shall  keep  beyond  this  distance 
to  fight  her  guns.  As  conditions  of  visibility,  in  the  North 
Sea  particularly,  are  frequently  such  as  to  make  fighting 


THE  ACTIONS  89 

diflScult  beyond  a  range  of  10,000  yards,  and  as  modern 
fleets  are  invariably  accompanied  by  very  large  numbers 
of  destroyers,  whose  main  dut}^  is  to  attack  with  torpedoes 
the  heavy  ships  of  the  enemy,  it  will  be  recognized  how 
great  becomes  the  responsibility  of  the  Admiral  in  com- 
mand of  a  fleet,  particularly  under  the  conditions  of  low 
visibility  to  w^hich  I  have  referred.  As  soon  as  destroyers 
tumble  upon  a  fleet  within  torpedo  range  the  situation 
becomes  critical  for  the  heavy  ships.'* 

At  Jutland  three  British  and  one  German  battle-cruiser 
were  sunk  by  gunfire.  At  Dogger  Bank  Lion  was  dis- 
abled by  a  chance  shot.  Ten  German  battleships  and 
one  British  were  struck  by  torpedoes  on  May  31.  One  of 
these,  one  only,  and  she  in  all  probabihty  hit  simul- 
taneously by  several,  blew  up.  The  other  nine  German 
ships  and  Marlborough  all  reached  port  in  safety.  Surely, 
if  the  situation  of  heavy  ships  is  "critical"  when  within 
torpedo  range,  their  situation  when  within  reach  of  heavy 
guns  must  be  more  critical  still.  Is  it  possible  to  dis- 
tinguish and  say  that  one  form  of  risk  is  alivays,  and  the 
other  never,  to  be  run?  Is  not  the  issue  identical  with 
that  raised  by  the  abandonment  of  the  Dogger  Bank 
pursuit — if  it  is  true  that  pursuit  was  abandoned,  as  the 
Admiralty  told  us,  on  account  of  the  presence  of  sub- 
marines? 

At  any  rate,  we  see  in  this  attitude  one  that  stands  in 
sharp  contrast  to  Sir  David  Beatty's.  He  had  faced 
torpedo  attack  in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland,  and  submarine 
attack  in  the  Dogger  Bank  affair,  and  seemingly  in  the 
early  fighting  of  May  31,  without  allowing  the  menace 
to  influence  him  to  avoid  action.  He  took  the  right 
precautions  against  it.  He  had  his  cruisers  and  flotillas 
out  as  a  screen,  but  having  done  all  that  was  humanly 


90  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

possible  to  parry  the  attack  he  then,  with  a  clear  con- 
science, went  for  victory. 

The  same  contrast  is  seen  in  the  events  of  June  i.  Sir 
John  Jellicoe  was  perfectly  willing  to  fight  if  the  Germans 
would  come  out  and  fight  on  his  conditions.  At  4:0  a.  m.  an 
enemy  ZeppeHn  flew  over  the  fleet,  so  that  its  position 
was  known  to  Scheer.  Yet  says  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  "the  enemy  made  no  sign."  His  own  pre-occupa- 
tion  is  not  to  find  the  enemy,  but  his  own  Hght  forces. 
He  thinks  it  worth  recording  that  he  hung  about  the  scene 
of  the  yesterday's  battle,  *'in  spite  of  the  .  .  .  danger 
incurred  in  waters  adjacent  to  enemy  coasts  from  sub- 
marine and  torpedo  craft."  Napoleon  speaks  bitterly 
of  his  admirals,  who  acted  as  though  they  could  win  vic- 
tory without  taking  risks. 

A  strong  case  can,  of  course,  be  made  for  the  doctrine 
on  which  Sir  John  Jellicoe  acted  on  these  two  days,  a 
doctrine  endorsed  by  the  Admiralty,  so  far  at  least  as  it 
was  shown  in  action  on  the  first  and  only  opportunity 
the  British  Fleet  was  given  of  utterly  destroying  the  enemy. 
The  defence  can  hardly  be  put  better  than  it  was  by  Mr. 
Churchill  in  his  London  Magazine  article.  Nor  am  I 
concerned  here  to  argue  the  pros  and  cons  on  a  point  on 
which  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  judgment  of 
posterity.  I  direct  attention  to  the  singular  fact  that 
the  British  Fleet  on  May  3 1  fought  as  two  separate  units 
until  six  o'clock,  and  that  the  leaders  of  the  two  sections 
were  animated  by  conflicting  theories  of  war.  One 
admiral  represents  the  fighting  fervour  of  the  fleet:  the 
other  the  caution — perhaps  the  wise  caution — of  the 
Higher  Command. 

There  is  no  getting  out  of  this  dilemma.  If  Admiral 
Jelhcoe  was  right  in  refusing  to  face  the  risks  inseparable 


THE  ACTIONS  91 

from  a  resolute  effort  to  make  the  battle  decisive,  then 
Sir  David  Beatty  must  have  been  wrong  to  have  fought 
in  a  way  which  cannot  be  intelHgently  explained  except 
on  the  basis  that  from  first  to  last  he  had  decisive  victory 
as  his  object.  If  the  tender  care  that  brought  the  Grand 
Fleet  through  the  action  with  hardly  a  man  killed  and 
only  two  ships  touched,  was  right  and  wise,  then  the 
clear  vision,  all  the  more  luminous  for  seeing  and  count- 
ing the  cost,  which  exposed  Indefatigable,  Queen  Mary,  and 
Invincible  to  destruction,  was  woefully  wrong.  Now  it 
seems  extraordinary,  if  the  strategy  of  waiting  to  fight 
till  the  Germans  attacked  was  right — if  this  was  the 
Admiralty  doctrine — that  it  was  not  communicated  to 
Sir  David  Beatty  as  well  as  to  Sir  John  Jelhcoe.  If  it  was 
axiomatic  to  avoid  the  risk  of  ships  being  destroyed,  so 
that  Admiral  Moore  was  right  to  break  oflT  the  action  at 
the  Dogger  Bank  and  Admiral  Jellicoe  right  in  letting 
the  enemy  "open  the  range  under  the  cover  of  torpedo 
attacks,"  why  was  not  Admiral  Beatty  forbidden  to 
jeopardize  his  ships,  and  Admiral  Arbuthnot  warned 
against  any  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  cruisers  or  destroyers, 
that  might  possibly  bring  him  within  range  of  the  German 
gunfire?  How  are  we  to  explain  Bingham's  attack  on 
the  head  of  the  German  hne  or  Goodenough's  reconnais- 
sance which  brought  him  under  the  salvoes  of  the  German 
guns  at  12,000  yards?  Is  the  doctrine  of  caution  and 
ship  conservation  to  apply  only  to  battleships  and  not 
to  battle-cruisers,  armoured  cruisers,  light  cruisers,  and 
destroyers?  Is  it  only  the  battle  fleet  that  is  not  to  fight 
except  when  it  risks  practically  nothing  by  doing  so? 
All  these  questions  are  forced  to  the  student's  attention 
w'hen  he  reviews  the  events  here  recorded. 

Many  defects  in  our  preparations  for  war  have  been 


92  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

attributed  to  our  lack  of  staff  machinery  in  the  years 
preceding  the  war.  The  defenceless  state  of  the  fleet's 
bases,  the  absence  of  any  policy  for  using  mines,  or  the 
means  for  carrying  one  out,  the  contrast  between  our 
pre-war  confidence  in  our  gunnery  methods  and  what  they 
have  achieved  in  action,  these  and  a  score  of  other  de- 
ficiencies have  been  attributed,  and  probably  rightly,  to 
our  failure  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  modern  war  is  so 
various  and  complicated  a  thing,  and  employs  instruments 
and  weapons  and  methods,  the  full  possibilities  of  which 
are  so  obscure  that  only  a  long  concerted  effort  could 
analyze  and  unravel  them,  that  no  organ  except  a  General 
Staff"  could  possibly  have  laid  down  the  right  doctrine  of 
war  or  ensured  the  means  of  its  application.  But  of  all 
the  evidence  of  what  we  had  lost  by  its  absence,  I  know 
of  none  more  striking  than  that  from  the  outbreak  of  war 
until  Sir  David  Beatty  took  command  of  the  whole  main 
forces  of  the  navy,  those  forces  should  have  been  divided, 
and  the  two  divisions  commanded  by  men  whose  views 
as  to  the  main  purpose  for  which  the  force  existed  were 
utterly  incompatible.  It  is  amazing  that  Whitehall 
either  never  knew  that  this  divergency  of  doctrine  existed, 
or,  knowing  it,  should  not  have  secured  that  one  or  the 
other  doctrine  should  predominate. 

No  official  despatches  descriptive  of  the  attacks  on 
Zeebriigge  and  Ostend  have  been  published.  For  these 
extraordinary  events,  then,  we  have  to  rely  upon  the 
stories  officially  given  out  by  the  Admiralty's  descriptive 
writer  and  the  interviews  which  the  officers  concerned 
were  allowed  to  give  to  diff'erent  journalists. 


CHAPTER  VII 

I.    Naval  Gunnery,  Weapons,  and  Technique 

Before  passing  to  the  actions,  It  Is  important  to  have  a 
clear  idea  of  two  things  which  these  actions  illustrate. 
The  first  is  the  nature  of  the  advantage  which  heavy  guns 
have  over  hghter  pieces.  In  each  of  these  actions  the 
side  which  had  the  largest  number  of  heavier  guns,  or 
generally  heavier  guns,  was  successful.  A  heavy  shell 
obviously  has  far  greater  effect  than  a  light  shell  when  it 
hits.  Its  advantages  in  this  respect  do  not  need  demon- 
stration. It  is  as  w^ell,  however,  to  make  it  quite  clear 
why  it  is  more  probable  that  a  heavy  shell  will  hit. 

And  next,  these  actions  illustrate  the  great  advance  in 
fire  control  which  has  been  made  in  the  last  ten  years,  and 
they  also  show,  and  I  think  convincingly,  the  limitations 
of  the  systems  in  use.  As  my  comments  on  these  actions 
will  be  particularly  directed  towards  showing  the  tactical 
developments  that  have  followed  on  the  advance  of  gun- 
nery and  towards  what  further  tactical  developments 
must  follow  from  a  greater  advance,  It  Is  essential  that  the 
nature  of  the  fire-control  problem  should  be  understood. 

The  principle  of  heavy  guns  being  superior  at  long  range 
is  exemplified  by  the  Sketches  i  and  2.  Sketch  i  repre- 
sents the  manner  In  which  a  salvo  of  guns  may  be  ex- 
pected to  spread  If  all  the  sights  are  set  to  the  same  range. 
All  guns  lose  In  range  accuracy  as  the  range  increases,  but 
light  guns  more  than  heavy.  If  six  6-inch  guns  are  fired 
at  a  target  at  12,000  yards  the  shell  will  be  apt  to  be  spread 

93 


94  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

out  as  shown  in  the  top  line.  Six  9.2's  will  fall  in  a  closer 
pattern,  as  shown  in  the  second  line,  six  12-inch  in  a  still 
smaller  space,  and  the  13.5  in  one  still  smaller.  Regarded 
simply  as  instruments  for  obtaining  a  pattern  at  a  given 
range,  heavy  guns  are,  therefore,  far  more  effective  than 
light  ones. 

But  this  is  far  from  being  the  heavy  guns'  only  advant- 
age, as  will  be  seen  from  Sketch  2.     The  heavier  the  pro- 


0 

0   0    ^      0  Q  Q     . 

0    0    ^  0  0  0 

(?oVJ/W 

W.W 

Big  guns  more  accurate  at  long  range,  because  more  regular 

jectile  is,  the  longer  it  retains  its  velocity.  The  angle  at 
which  a  shot  falls  from  any  height  depends  solely  upon 
its  forward  velocity  while  it  is  falling.  Sketch  2  shows 
the  outline  of  a  ship  broadside  on  to  the  enemy's  fire,  the 
shell  being  fired  from  the  right-hand  of  the  sketch.  A  is 
the  point  where  the  ship's  side  meets  the  water.  If  the 
gun  were  shooting  perfectly  accurately  and  was  set  to 
10,000  yards,  all  the  shots  would  hit  at  this  point.  And 
clearly  any  shot  set  at  a  range  greater  than  this,  but  one 
which  did  not  carry  the  shot  over  the  target,  would  hit 


NAVAL  GUNNERY 


95 


the  ship  somewhere  between  the  points  A  and  X.  Now 
if  a  6-inch  shot  grazes  the  point  X  and  falls  into  the  water, 
it  falls  at  the  point  B  beyond  the  ship.  But  the  angle  at 
which  it  is  falling  is  so  steep  that  the  difference  in  range 
between  the  point  A  and  the  point  B  is  only  forty  yards. 
To  hit,  then,  with  a  6-inch  gun  the  range  must  be  known 
within  forty  yards.  This  interval  is  called  the  "Danger 
Space.'* 

The  9.2  will  fall  at  a  more  gradual  angle,  and  the  shot 
grazing  on  X  will  fall  at  C,  which  is  twenty  yards  beyond 


Big   guns   need  less  accurate  range-finding,  because   the   danger   space 

is  greater 

B;  and  a  12-inch  shell,  falling  still  more  gradually,  will 
fall  at  D,  which  is  100  yards  from  A;  and  similarly  the  13.5 
at  E,  which  is  150  yards  beyond  it.  Hence,  at  any  given 
range,  far  more  accurate  knozvledge  of  range  is  necessary 
for  hitting  with  a  6-inch  gun  than  with  a  9.2,  with  a  9.2 
than  with  a  12-inch,  and  with  a  12-inch  than  with  a  13.5. 
But  we  have  seen  from  Sketch  i  that,  in  proportion  as' 
the  range  gets  long,  so  does  the  range  accuracy  of  the  gun 
decrease,  and  that  this  loss  of  accuracy  is  greater  in  small 
guns  than  in  bigger.  To  hit  with  it  at  all  a  more  perfect 
fire  control  is  necessary,  and  for  any  given  number  of 


96  THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

rounds  a  much  smaller  proportion  of  hits  will  be  made. 
The  advantage  of  the  big  gun  over  the  small,  merely  as  a 
hitting  weapon,  is  twofold,  It  does  not  require  such  ac- 
curacy in  setting  the  sight,  and  more  shots  fired  within 
these  limits  will  hit. 

FIRE  CONTROL 

If  ships  only  engaged  when  they  were  stationary  the 
range  would  not  change,  and  it  could  be  found  by  obser- 
vation without  rangefinders.  And  even  with  rangefinders 
it  can  never  be  found  at  great  distances  without  observa- 
tion. But  ships  do  not  stand  still,  and  when  they  move 
the  distance  between  them  alters  from  second  to  second. 
If  these  movements  could  be  (i)  ascertained,  (2)  integrated, 
and  (3)  the  results  impressed  upon  the  sight,  change  of 
range  would  be  eliminated,  and  we  should  have  come  back 
to  the  conditions  in  which  ships  were  stationary.  Fire 
control  is  successful  in  so  far  as  it  succeeds  in  doing  these 
three  things.  Sketches  3  and  4  show  the  process  by  which 
hits  are  secured,  when  the  conditions  are  not  complicated 
by  changes  in  the  range,  that  is,  if  these  complications 
have  been  eliminated  by  fire  control.  The  second  two 
illustrate  what  these  complications  are.  The  ships  turn 
away  from  each  other  and  then  turn  towards  each  other. 

The  rate  graph  (6)  shows  the  effect  of  these  movements 
on  the  range  and  the  rate  at  w^hich  it  is  changing  from 
moment  to  moment. 

The  process  shown  in  Sketches  3  and  4  is  called  "brack- 
eting." Two  shots  are  fired  at  a  difference  of,  sa}',  800 
yards.  Observation  shows  the  first  to  be  too  short,  the 
second  to  be  too  far.  The  difference  is  bisected  by  the 
third  shot.  This  places  the  target  in  one  of  the  halves 
of  the  bracket.     This  half  is  bisected  by  the  fourth  shot, 


NAVAL  GUNNERY  97 

placing  the  target  in  a  quarter.  If  an  eighth  of  the  bracket 
is  less  than  the  danger  space,  then  the  fifth  shot  must  hit. 
In  Sketch  5  the  ships  keep  parallel  courses  for  two  min- 
utes. The  range  does  not  change.  The  line  in  the  graph 
(6)  is,  for  these  two  minutes,  horizontal.  It  is  as  if  both 
were  stationary.  When  the  ships  turn  the  range  increases 
and  the  graph  rises.     But  the  graph  is  not  a  straight  line 


v^^o.^^^-^^ 


Qt^ 


2*53  I 

(0800  10800  lOSOO  10400  10000 


Range-finding  by  bracket 

but  a  curve.  This  shows  that  the  rate  also  is  changing. 
Each  movement  of  the  two  ships,  whether  they  keep 
steady  courses  or  turn,  alters  the  range  and  the  rate.  As 
projectiles  take  an  interval  of  time  to  travel  from  the  gun 
to  the  target,  the  range  must  h^  forecasted.  B,  then,  can- 
not engage  A  unless  he  knows  where  A  is  going  to  be.  He 
cannot  know  this  until  A  has  settled  on  a  steady  course. 
While  A  is  turning,  then  he  is  safe  from  gunfire  except 
by  a  chance  shot.  B  cannot  engage  while  he  is  himself 
turning  unless  he  can  integrate  his  own  movements  with 
A's.  It  is  this  latter  difficulty  which  largely  explains  the 
duration  of  modern  actions.  At  the  mean  range  of  each 
engagement,  with  ships  standing  still,  Sydney  could  have 


98 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


sunk  Emden  in  ten  minutes;  Inflexible  and  Invincible  could 
have  sunk  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau  in  fifteen.  But  it 
was  ninety  minutes  before  Emden  was  driven  on  the  rocks, 


X 

-- 

N 

\ 

y 

6 

/ 

y 

Minutes 

\ 

--— 

y 



1              2 

3 

4 

S               6 

7 

0 

9 

iO 

II 

12 

The  crux  of  sea  fighting,  changes  of  course  and  speed  produce  an  irregularly 
changing  range 

i8o  before  Scharnhorst  sank,  and  300  before  Gneisenau 
went  under. 

In  the  ten  years  preceding  the  war,  Admiralty  policy, 
as  shown  by  the  official  apology  for  the  Dreadnought  de- 
sign and  by  the  course  of  naval  ordnance  administration, 
had  been  governed  by  the  purely  defensive  idea  of  pro- 


NAVAL  :GUNNERY  99 

viding  ships  fast  enough  to  keep  outside  of  the  zone  of  the 
enemy's  fire,  armed  with  guns  that  outranged  him.  The 
professed  object  was  to  have  a  chance  of  hitting  your 
enemy  when  he  had  no  chance  of  hitting  you.  At  the 
Falkland  Islands  there  was  given  a  classic  example  of  the 
tactics  that  follow  from  this  conception.  On  the  assump- 
tion that  twenty-five  12-inch  gun  hits  would  suffice  to  sink 
each  of  the  enemy's  armoured  cruisers,  it  appeared  that  in 
this  engagement  the  12-inch  gun  had  attained  the  rate  of 
one  hit  per  gun  per  75  miriutes.  This  figure  may  be  con- 
trasted with  the  one  hit  per  gun  per  72  seconds  attained  by 
the  Severn  in  her  second  engagement  with  the  Koenigs- 
berg  at  the  Rufigi.  The  contrast  seems  to  show  that  it  was 
only  the  obsession  of  the  defensive  theory  that  explained 
contentment  with  methods  of  gunnery  so  extraordinarily 
ineff'ective  in  battle  conditions.  For  the  diff'erence  in  the 
rate  of  hitting  was  almost  completely  explained  by  the 
range  being  constant  at  the  Rufigi,  and  inconstant  at  the 
Falklands.  And  the  methods  of  fire  control  in  use  were 
proved  at  the  Falklands  to  be  unequal  to  finding,  and  con- 
tinuously keeping,  accurate  knowledge  of  an  inconstant 
range. 

Again  at  the  affair  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  Lion,  Tiger, 
Princess  Royal,  New  Zealand,  and  Indomitable  were  in 
action  for  many  hours  against  three  battle-cruisers  and 
an  armoured  cruiser,  and  for  perhaps  half  the  time  at 
ranges  at  which  good  hitting  is  made  at  battle  practice; 
and  although  two  of  the  enemy  battle-cruisers  were  hit 
and  seen  to  be  in  flames  they  were  able,  after  two  and  a 
half  hours'  engagement,  to  continue  their  retreat  at 
undiminished  speed,  and  only  the  armoured  cruiser,  whose 
resisting  power  to  13.5  projectiles  must  have  been  very 
feeble,  was  sunk. 


loo        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

The  lesson  of  Jutland  is  still  more  striking,  and  It  is 
possible  to  draw  the  moral  with  a  little  greater  precision 
since  it  has  been  officially  admitted  in  Germany  that 
Lutzowy  Admiral  von  Hipper's  flagship,  the  most  modem 
of  Germany's  battle-cruisers,  was  destroyed  after  being 
hit  by  only  fifteen  projectiles  from  great  guns.  It  is  not 
clear  from  the  German  statement  whether  this  means 
fifteen  13.5's  and  omits  to  reckon  12-inch  shells,  or  whether 
there  were  fifteen  hits  in  all,  some  of  the  one  nature  and 
some  of  the  other.  The  latter  is  probably  the  case;  for 
we  know  from  Sir  David  Beatty's  and  the  German  dis- 
patches that  it  was  Invmcible's  salvos  that  finally  in- 
capacitated the  ship  and  compelled  Von  Hipper  to  shift 
his  flag.  Lutzozv  was  always  at  the  head  of  the  German 
Hne  and  so  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  our  battle-cruisers » 
for  nearly  three  hours.  If  we  assume  that  she  was  hit 
by  ten  13.5's  and  five  12-inch;  if  we  further  assume  that 
the  effect  of  shells  is  proportionate  to  their  weight;  if  we 
take  the  resisting  power  of  British  battle-cruisers,  German 
battle-cruisers  (which  are  more  heavily  armoured  than 
the  British),  and  all  battleships  to  compare  as  the  figures 
2,  3,  and  4  respectively;  If  we  further  assume  that  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  did  not  come  into  effective  action  till 
the  second  phase  began,  and  went  out  of  action  at  6:30, 
and  that  the  battle  cruisers  were  in  action  for  three  hours, 
and  omit  Hood's  squadron  altogether,  we  get  the  following 
results:  Five  German  battle  cruisers  were  exposed  to 
seventy-two  hours  of  13.5  gun  fire  and  to  twenty-four 
hours  of  12-inch  gun  fire,  and  five  German  battleships 
were  exposed  to  forty-eight  15-Inch  gun  hours.  Similar- 
ly— omitting  Queen  Mary,  IndejatigaUe,  and  Invincible, 
seemingly  destroyed  by  chance  shots  and  not  overwhelmed 
by  gunfire— four  British  battle-cruisers  were  exposed  to 


NAVAL  GUNNERY  loi 

thirty-seven  12-inch  and  sixty  ii-inch  gun  hours,  and  the 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  exposed- to  one  hundred  and 
eighty  12-inch  gun  hours.  Had  b«oth  sides  been  able  to 
hit  at  the  rate  of  one  hit  per  hour-pf:T\gii%xhe.-Gp,sfrs2a\Sy 
roughly  speaking,  should  have  sunk  six  British  battle- 
cruisers,  and  the  four  ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
nearly  twice  over;  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  should  have 
sunk  four  German  battleships;  and  the  British  battle- 
cruisers  seven  German  battle-cruisers!  The  number  of 
hits  received  by  the  British  Fleet  has  not  been  published, 
but  it  is  probably  safe  to  say  that  the  Germans  could  not 
have  made  a  quarter  of  this  number  of  hits,  nor  the 
British  ships  more  than  a  third.  It  w^ould  seem,  then, 
that  at  most  we  made  one  hit  per  gun  per  three  hours  and 
the  Germans  one  hit  per  gun  per  four  hours. 

At  no  time,  throughout  such  parts  of  the  action  as  we 
are  considering,  did  the  range  exceed  14,000  yards,  and 
at  some  periods  it  was  at  12,000  and  at  others  at  8,000. 
In  battle  practice  not  only  on  the  British  Fleet  but  in  all 
fleets,  hits  at  the  rate  of  one  hit  per  gun  per  four  minutes 
at  14,000  yards  have  constantly  been  made.  How,  then, 
are  we  to  explain  the  extraordinary  difference  between 
battle  practice  and  battle  results?  In  the  former  certain 
difficulties  are  artificially  created,  and  methods  of  fire 
control  are  employed  that  can  overcome  these  difficulties 
successfully.  But  these  methods  evidently  break  down 
when  it  comes  to  the  quite  different  difficulties  that  battle 
presents.  So  far  we  are  on  indisputable  ground.  Wheth- 
er fire  control  can  be  so  improved  that  the  difficulties  of 
battle  can  be  overcome,  just  as  the  difficulties  of  battle 
practice  have  been  overcome  is  another  matter. 

The  difference  between  action  and  battle  practice 
is,  broadly  speaking,  twofold.     First,  you  may  have  to 


I02        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

fight  in  atmospheric  conditions  in  which  you  would  not 
atte;r4pt  battle  practice.  All  long-range  gunnery,  whether 
on  sea  or  on  land,  depends  for  success  upon  range-finding 
and  the  Qoervatjo;],  C)f  fire,  and  as  at  sea  the  observations 
must  be  made  from  a  point  at  which  the  gun  is  fired,  the 
correction  of  fire  becomes  impossible  if  bad  light  or  mist 
prevents  the  employment  of  observing  glasses  and  range- 
finders.  In  the  Jutland  despatch  particular  attention  was 
directed  to  the  disadvantages  we  were  under  in  the  matter 
of  range-finding  from  these  causes.  It  would  appear, 
then,  that  those  who,  for  many  years,  had  maintained  that 
the  standard  service  rangefinder  would  be  useless  in  a 
North  Sea  battle,  have  been  proved  to  be  right. 

The  second  great  difference  lies  in  the  totally  different 
problems  which  movement  creates  in  battle.  In  battle 
practice  the  only  movement  of  the  target  is  that  which  the 
towing  ship  can  give  to  it.  Its  speed  and  manoeuvring 
power  are  strictly  limited,  whereas  a  30-knot  battle-cruiser 
can  change  speed  and  direction  at  will.  The  smallest 
change  of  course  must  alter  the  range,  and  the  smallest 
miscalculation  of  speed  or  course  must  make  accurate 
forecast  of  range  impossible.  But  the  movements  of  the 
target  are  only  a  part  of  the  difficulty.  Those  that  arise 
from  the  manoeuvres  of  the  firing  ship  may  be  still  greater 
and  more  confusing.  And  so  obvious  is  this  that,  in  peace 
time,  it  used  to  be  almost  an  axiom  that  to  put  on  helm 
during  an  engagement — even  for  the  sake  of  keeping 
station — should  be  regarded  almost  as  a  crime.  But  the 
long-range  torpedo  has  long  since  made  it  clear  that  a  firing 
squadron  may  have  to  put  on  helm.  It  must  manoeuvre, 
that  is  to  say,  in  self-defence — a  thing  it  would  never  have 
to  do  in  battle  practice.  And  when  both  target  ship  and 
firing  ship  are  manoeuvring,  it  is  small  wonder  if  methods 


NAVAL  GUNNERY  103 

of  fire  control,  designed  primarily  for  steady  courses  by 
one  ship  and  low  speed  and  small  turns  by  the  other,  break 
down  altogether.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  main- 
spring of  all  defensive  naval  ideas  is  doiiht  as  to  the  success 
of  offensive  action,  and  as  the  only  offensive  action  that  a 
battleship  can  take  is  by  its  guns,  it  would  seem  as  if  those 
who  disbelieve  in  the  offensive  have  had  far  too  much 
reason  for  their  scepticism. 

THE  TORPEDO  IN  BATTLE 

It  was  the  invention  of  the  hot-air  engine  round  about 
1907  that  converted  the  torpedo  from  a  short-  to  a  long- 
range  weapon,  and  when,  a  year  or  two  later,  the  feasibil- 
ity of  running  one  of  these  with  almost  perfect  accuracy 
and  regularity  to  a  distance  of  five  miles  was  demonstrated, 
it  became  quite  obvious  that  a  new  and,  as  many  thought, 
a  decisive  element  had  been  introduced  into  naval  war, 
the  efl^ect  of  which  would  be  especially  marked  in  any  future 
fleet  actions.  Just  what  form  Its  intervention  would  take 
was  much  discussed  in  three  years,  and  the  following 
quotation  from  a  confidential  contribution  of  my  own  on 
this  discussion,  written  in  December  1912,  is  perhaps  not 
without  interest  as  indicating  the  points  then  in  debate: 

**The  tactical  employment  of  fleets  has,  of  course,  re- 
cently been  compHcated,  in  the  opinions  of  many,  by  the 
facts  that  the  range  of  torpedoes  is  more  than  doubled; 
that  their  speed  is  very  greatly  increased;  and  that  their 
efficiency  (that  is,  the  extent  to  which  they  can  be  relied 
upon  to  run  well)  has  increased  almost  as  much  as  their 
range  and  speed.  This  advance  of  the  torpedo  has  fol- 
lowed very  rapidly  on  the  development  of  the  submarine, 
and  has  led,  quite  naturally,  to  the  suggestion  that  it 
should  be  employed  on  a  considerable  scale  in  a  fleet  action 


I04         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

either  from  under-water  craft  or  by  squadrons  of  fast 
destroyers. 

"The  torpedo  menace  has  undoubtedly  confused  the 
problem  of  fleet  action  in  a  most  bewildering  manner;  but, 
with  great  respect  to  those  who  attach  the  most  import- 
ance to  this  menace,  there  are,  it  seems  to  me,  certain 
principles  that  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  estimating  its 
probable  influence. 

"There  is  a  world  of  diff'erence  between  a  weapon  that 
can  be  evaded  and  one  that  cannot.  You  can,  by  vig- 
ilance, circumvent  the  submarine  and  dodge  the  torpedo — 
at  any  rate,  in  some  cases.  You  can  never  double  to 
avoid  a  12-inch  shell.  It  may  yet  be  proved  that  not  the 
least  interesting  aspect  of  modern  naval  warfare  will  be 
that  the  torpedo  will  thus  put  seamanship  back  to  its 
pride  of  place. 

"In  any  circumstances  the  torpedo,  however  highly 
developed,  is  not  a  weapon  of  the  same  kind  as'  the  gun. 
It  seems  to  belong  to  the  same  order  of  mihtary  ideas  as 
the  cutting-out  expeditions  and  use  of  fire-ships  in  olden 
days  and  the  employment  of  mines  of  more  recent  date. 
It  is,  of  course,  an  element  in  fighting,  and  a  most  serious 
element;  a  means  of  ofi^ence  far  handier,  and  with  a  power 
of  striking  at  a  far  greater  distance  than  has  been  seen  in 
any  parallel  mode  of  war  hitherto.  And  yet  I  should  be 
inclined  to  maintain  that  it  and  its  employment  remain 
more  in  the  nature  of  a  'stratagem'  than  of  a  tactical 
weapon,  truly  so  called. 

"Mines,  torpedoes,  a  bomb  dropped  from  an  airship  or 
aeroplane — these  are  all  new  perils  of  war.  In  the  hands 
of  a  Cochrane  their  employment  might  conceivably  be 
decisive.  But  it  would  need  the  conjunction  of  an  extra- 
ordinary man  with  extraordinary  fortune. 


NAVAL  GUNNERY  105 

"Both  Japanese  and  Russians  lost  ships  by  mines  and 
torpedoes  in  1906,  and  ships  will  be  lost  in  future  wars  in 
the  same  way,  but  I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  the  essen- 
tial character  of  fleet  actions  or  of  naval  war  generally  can 
be  affected  by  them.  It  seems  indisputable  that  the 
future  must  be  with  the  means  of  offence  that  has  the 
longest  reach,  can  dehver  its  blow  with  the  greatest  rapid- 
ity, and,  above  all,  that  is  capable  of  being  employed  with 
the  most  exact  precision.  In  these  respects  the  gun  is, 
and  in  the  nature  of  things  must  remain,  unrivalled. 

"The  two  directions  in  which  fleet-fighting  seems  Hkely 
to  be  most  noticeably  affected  by  the  new  weapon  are  in 
the  formation  of  fleets  and  the  maintenance  of  steady 
courses,  and  in  making  longer  ranges  compulsory. 

"I  think  there  are  other  reasons  why  the  tactical  ideal 
set  out  above — viz.,  that  of  using  long  Hues  of  ships  on 
approximately  parallel  courses  at  equal  speed  in  the  same 
direction — will  be  questioned;  but  even  if  there  were  not, 
that  a  mobile  mine-field  can  be  made  to  traverse  the  Hne 
of  an  on-coming  squadron,  and  do  so  at  a  range  of  10,000 
yards,  and  that  ships  formed  in  line  ahead  offer  between 
five  and  six  times  more  favourable  a  target  to  perpendicu- 
lar submarine  attack  than  a  line  of  ships  abreast,  will  make 
it  certain  that  sooner  or  later  there  will  be  a  tendency  in 
favour  of  smaller  squadrons  and,  even  with  these,  of  large 
and  frequent  changes  of  course,  and  possibly  of  formation, 
so  as  to  lesson  the  torpedo  menace. 

In  other  words,  we  must  recognize  that  in  the  long-range 
torpedo  we  have  a  new  element  in  naval  battle,  that  of 
the  dejerisive  offensive.  It  is  defensive  because,  if  the 
range  of  the  torpedo  is  10,000  yards  of  absolute  run,  its 
range  is  greater  if  fired  on  the  bow  of  an  advancing  squad- 
dron  by  the  distance  that  squadron  may  travel — 3,000  to 


io6         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

4,000  yards — while  the  torpedo  is  doing  its  10,000.  A 
very  fast  battle-cruiser,  for  instance,  may  have  a  speed 
only  a  few  knots  less  than  that  of  the  under-water  weapon. 
This  means  either  keeping  out  of  gun  range  of  an  enemy 
that  is  retreating,  or  taking  the  risk  of  torpedo  attack. 
If  you  face  the  risk,  you  must  be  ready  to  manoeuvre  to 
avoid  it. 

"It  looks,  then,  as  if  long-range  gunnery  and  gunnery 
under  helm  were:  the  first,  compulsory,  and  the  second,  in- 
evitable." 


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107 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Action  That  Never  Was  Fought 

Augusty  1914. 
Take  it  for  all  in  all,  the  most  remarkable  thing  about  the 
naval  vv^ar  is  that  it  took  the  Germans  by  surprise.  They 
had  planned  the  most  perfect  thing  imaginable  in  the  way 
of  a  scheme  for  the  conquest  of  all  Europe.  It  had  but 
one  flaw.  They  left  Great  Britain  out  of  their  calcula- 
tions— left  us  out,  that  is  to  say,  not  as  ulterior  victims, 
but  as  probable  and  immediate  combatants.  We  were 
omitted  because  Germany  assumed  that  we  should  either 
be  too  rich,  too  frightened,  or  too  unready  to  fight.  So 
that,  of  all  the  contingencies  that  could  be  foreseen,  sim- 
ultaneous sea  war  with  Great  Britain  and  land  war  on  two 
frontiers,  was  the  one  for  which  almost  no  preparations 
had  been  made.  Hence  to  undo  Germany  utterly  at  sea 
proved  to  be  a  very  simple  business  indeed. 

Much  has  been  made  of  this  statesman  or  that  admiral 
having  actually  issued  the  mandate  that  kept  the  Grand 
Fleet  mobilized  and  got  it  to  its  war  stations  two  days 
before  war  was  declared.  But  there  is  here  no  field  for 
flattery  and  no  scope  for  praise,  and  the  historical  interest 
in  identifying  the  actual  agent  is  slender.  It  has  always 
been  a  part  of  the  British  defensive  theory  that  the  main 
Fleet  shall  be  ever  ready  for  instant  war  orders.  Of  the 
fact  of  its  being  the  plan,  we  need  no  further  testimony 
than  Mr.  Churchill's  first  Memorandum  after  his  eleva- 
tion to  the  control  of  British  naval  policy  and  of  the  British 

108 


ACTION  THAT  NEVER  WAS  FOUGHT     109 

Fleet.     The  thing,  therefore,  that  was  done  was  the  mere 
mechanical  discharge  of  a  standing  order. 

Once  the  Fleet  was  mobihzed  and  at  its  war  stations, 
German  sea  power  perished  off  the  outer  seas  as  effectually 
as  if  every-  surface  ship  had  been  incontinently  sunk. 
There  was  not  a  day's  delay  in  our  using  the  Channel  ex- 
actl}^  as  if  no  enemy  were  afloat.  Within  an  hour  of 
the  declaration  of  war  being  know^n,  no  German  ship 
abroad  cleared  for  a  German  port,  nor  did  any  ship  in  a 
German  port  clear  for  the  open  sea.  The  defeat  was  suf- 
fered without  a  blow  being  offered  in  defence,  and,  for 
the  purposes  of  trade  and  transport,  it  was  as  instantane- 
ous as  it  was  final. 

Nor  was  it  our  strength,  nor  sheer  terror  of  our  strength, 
that  made  the  enemy  impotent.  He  was  confounded  as 
much  by  surprise  as  he  was  by  superior  power.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  disparity  between  the  main  forces  of  the  two 
Powers  in  the  North  Sea,  though  considerable,  was  not 
such  as  to  have  made  Germany  despair  of  an  initial  vic- 
tor>' — and  that  possibly  decisive — had  she  been  free  to 
choose  her  own  method  of  making  war  on  us,  and  had  she 
chosen  her  time  wisely.  In  August  1914  three  of  our  bat- 
tle cruisers  were  in  the  Mediterranean,  one  was  in  the 
Pacific,  one  was  in  dockyard  hands.  Only  one  German 
ship  of  the  first  importance  was  absent  from  Kiel.  In 
modem  battleships  commissioned  and  at  sea,  the  German 
High  Seas  Fleet  consisted  of  at  least  two  Konigs,  five 
Kaisers,  four  Helgolands,  and  four  Westjalens.  All  ex- 
cept the  Westjalens  were  armed  with  12.2  guns — weapons 
that  fire  a  heavier  shell  than  the  British  12-inch.  The 
Westjalens  were  armed  with  ii-inch  guns.  They  could, 
then,  have  brought  into  action  a  broadside  fire  of  no 
12-inch  guns  and  40  ii-inch.    Germany  had,  besides,  four 


no        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

battle-cruisers,  less  heavily  armed  than  our  ships  of  the 
same  class,  quite  as  fast  as  our  older  battle-cruisers  and 
much  more  securely  armoured.  So  that  if  protection — as 
so  many  seem  to  think — is  the  one  essential  quality  in  a 
fighting  ship,  they  were  more  suited  to  take  their  share  in 
a  fleet  action  than  our  battle-cruisers  could  have  been 
expected  to  be. 

On  our  side  we  had  twenty  battleships  and  four  arm- 
oured cruisers.  In  modern  capital  ships,  then,  we  poss- 
essed but  twenty-four  to  nineteen — a  percentage  of  super- 
iority of  only  just  over  25  per  cent.,  and  less  than  that  for 
action  purposes  if  the  principle  alluded  to  holds  good.  It 
was  a  margin  far  lower  than  the  public  realized.  At  Jut- 
land we  lost  two  battle  cruisers  in  the  first  forty  minutes 
of  the  action.  Had  such  an  action  been  fought,  with  hke 
results,  in  August,  1914,  our  surviving  margin  would  have 
been  very  slender  indeed.  But  the  enemy  dared  not  take 
the  risk.  He  paid  high  for  his  caution.  Yet  his  infer- 
iority should  not  have  paralyzed  him.  At  Jutland  he 
faced  infinitely  greater  odds.  His  numbers  were  not  such 
as  to  make  inglorious  inactivity  compulsory  had  he  been 
resourceful,  enterprising,  and  willing  to  risk  all  in  the 
attack.  It  certainly  was  a  position  that  bristled  with 
possibiHties  for  an  enemy  v^ho,  to  resource,  courage,  and 
enterprise,  could  add  the  overpowering  advantage  of 
choosing  the  day  and  the  hour  of  attack,  and  could  strike 
without  a  moment's  warning. 

If  the  German  Government  had  realized  from  the  start 
that  in  no  war  that  threatened  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  could  we  remain  either  indifferent  or,  what  is  far 
more  important,  inactive  spectators,  then  they  would 
have  realized  something  else  as  well,  something  that  was, 
in  point  of  fact,  realized  the  moment  Germany  began  her 


ACTION  THAT  NEVER  WAS  FOUGHT  in 

self-imposed — but  now  impossible — task  of  conquering 
Europe  by  first  crushing  France  and  Russia.  She  would 
have  realized  as  then  she  did,  that  if  Great  Britain  were 
allowed  to  come  into  the  war  her  intervention  might  be 
decisive.  It  would  seemingly  have  to  be  so  for  very  obvi- 
ous reasons.  With  France  and  Russia  assured  of  the 
economic  and  financial  support  of  the  greatest  economic 
and  financial  Power  in  Europe,  Germany's  immediate 
opponents  would  have  staying  power:  time,  that  is  to  say, 
would  be  against  their  would-be  conquerors.  The  inter- 
vention of  Great  Britain,  then,  would  make  an  ultimate 
German  victory  impossible.  In  a  long  war  staying  power 
would  make  the  population  of  the  British  Empire  a  source 
from  which  armies  could  be  drawn.  Beginning  by  being 
the  greatest  sea  Power  in  the  world,  we  would  necessarily 
end  in  becoming  one  of  the  greatest  military  Powers  as 
well.  The  two  things  by  themselves  must  have  threatened 
miHtar>'  defeat  for  Germany.  Nor,  again,  was  this  all. 
For  while  sea  power,  and  the  financial  strength  which 
goes  with  sustained  trade  and  credit,  could  add  indefinitely 
to  the  fighting  capacity  and  endurance  of  Russia  and 
France,  sea  power  and  siege  were  bound,  if  resolutely 
used,  to  sap  the  fighting  power  and  endurance  of  the 
Central  Powers. 

To  the  least  prophetic  of  statesmen — just  as  to  the 
least  instructed  students  of  military  history^ — the  situation 
would  have  been  plain.  And  there  could  be  but  one  lesson 
to  be  drawn  from  it.  To  risk  everything  on  a  quick  victory 
over  France  or  Russia  was  insanity.  If  the  conquest  of 
Europe  could  not  be  undertaken  with  Great  Britain  an 
opponent,  the  alternative  was  simple.  Either  the  conquest 
of  Great  Britain  must  precede  it  or  the  conquest  of  the 
world  be  postponed  to  the  Greek  Kalends. 


112        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Was  the  conquest  of  Great  Britain  a  thing  so  unattaina- 
ble that  it  had  only  to  be  considered  to  be  discarded  as 
visionary?  No  doubt,  had  we  been  warned  and  upon 
our  guard,  ready  to  defend  ourselves  before  Germany 
was  ready  to  strike,  then  certainly  any  such  scheme  must 
have  been  doomed  to  failure.  But  I  am  not  so  sure  that 
a  successful  attack  would  have  been  beyond  the  resources 
of  those  who  planned  the  great  European  war,  had  they 
from  the  first,  grasped  the  elementary  truth  that  it  was 
necessary  to  their  larger  scheme.  For  to  win  the  conquest 
of  Europe  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  crush  Great  Britain 
finally  and  altogether.  All  that  was  required  was  to 
prevent  her  interference  for,  say,  six  months,  and  this,  it 
really  seems,  was  far  from  being  a  thing  beyond  the 
enemy's  capacity  to  achieve. 

The  essentials  of  the  attack  are  easy  enough  to  tabulate. 
First,  Germany  would  have  to  concentrate  in  the  North 
Sea  the  largest  force  of  capital  ships  that  it  was  possible 
to  equip.  Her  ovm  force  I  have  already  enumerated. 
Had  Germany  contemplated  war  on  Great  Britain  she 
would,  of  course,  not  have  sent  the  Goehen  away  to  the 
Straits.  The  nucleus  of  the  German  Fleet,  then,  would 
have  been  twenty  and  not  nineteen  ships.  To  these 
might  have  been  added  the  three  completed  Dreadnoughts 
of  the  Austrian  Fleet,  the  Virihus  Unitis,  Tegetthofy  and 
Prinz  Eugen — all  of  which  were  in  commission  in  the 
summer  of  1914.  They  would  have  contributed  a  broad- 
side fire  of  36  12-inch  guns — a  very  formidable  reinforce- 
ment— and  brought  the  enemy  fleet  to  an  almost  numerical 
equality  with  ours.  A  review  at  Kiel  would  have  been  a 
plausible  excuse  for  bringing  the  Austrian  Dreadnoughts 
into  German  waters.  Supposing  the  British  force,  then, 
to  have  been  undiminished,  the  war  might  have  opened 


ACTION  THAT  NEVER  WAS  FOUGHT     113 

with  a  bare  superiority  of  five  per  cent,  on  the  British 
side. 

But  there  is  no  reason  why  British  strength  should  not 
have  been  reduced.  Knowing  as  we  now  do,  not  the 
potentiaHties,  but  the  practical  use  that  can  be  made  of 
submarines  and  destroyers,  it  must  be  plain  to  all  that, 
had  Germany  intended  to  begin  a  world  war  with  a  blow 
at  Great  Britain,  she  might  well  have  hoped  to  have 
reduced  our  strength  to  such  a  margin  before  the  war  be- 
gan, as  to  make  it  almost  unnecessary  to  provide  against 
a  fleet  action.  Most  certainly  a  single  surprise  attack  by 
submarines  could  have  done  all  that  was  desired. 

By  a  singular  coincidence,  an  opportunity  for  such  an 
attack — an  opportunity  that  could  hardly  have  failed 
of  a  most  sinister  success — offered  itself  at  the  strategic 
moment  when  the  Central  Powers  had  already  resolved 
to  use  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  as  a  pretext  for  an 
unprovoked  attack  on  Christendom.  All  our  battleships 
of  the  first,  second,  and  third  fines,  all  our  battle-cruisers 
commissioned  and  in  home  waters,  almost  all  our  armoured 
cruisers  and  fast  fight  cruisers,  and  the  bulk  of  our  de- 
stroyers and  auxiliaries  were,  in  the  fateful  third  week  in 
July,  gathered  and  at  anchor — and  completely  un- 
protected— in  the  fairway  of  the  Solent.  There  were  to 
be  no  manoeuvres  in  191 4,  but  a  test  mobifization  instead, 
and  this  great  congregation  of  the  Fleet  was  to  be  a 
measure  of  the  Admiralty's  capacity  to  man  all  our  naval 
forces  of  any  fighting  worth.  The  fact  that  this  gathering 
was  to  take  place  on  a  certain  and  appointed  date  was 
public  property  in  the  month  of  March.  A  week  or  a 
fortnight  before  the  squadrons  steamed  one  by  one  to 
their  moorings,  a  plan  of  the  anchored  lines  was  published 
in  every  London   paper.     The  order  of  the    Fleet,  the 


114        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

identity  of  every  ship  in  its  place  in  every  line,  might  have 
been,  and  probably  were,  in  German  hands  a  week  before 
any  single  ship  was  in  her  billet.  From  Emden  to  the 
Isle  of  Wight  is  a  bare  350  miles — a  day  and  a  half's 
journey  for  a  submarine — and  in  July  191 4,  Germany 
possessed  between  twenty  and  thirty  submarines.  It 
was  a  day  and  a  half's  journey  if  it  had  been  all  made  at 
under-water  speed.  What  could  not  a  dozen  Weddigens 
and  Hersings  have  done  had  they  only  been  sent  upon 
this  fell  mission,  and  their  arrival  been  timed  for  an  hour 
before  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  July  18?  They 
surely  could  have  gone  far  beyond  wiping  out  a  margin 
of  five  big  ships,  which  was  all  the  margin  we  had  against 
the  German  Fleet  alone.  They  could,  in  the  half  light 
of  the  summer's  night,  have  slipped  five  score  torpedoes 
into  a  dozen  or  more  battleships  and  battle-cruisers. 
They  could  have  attacked  and  returned  undetected, 
leading  Great  Britain  largely  helpless  at  sea  and  quite 
unable  to  take  part  in  the  forthcoming  European  war. 
Germany  could,  of  course,  have  done  much  more  to 
complete  our  discomfiture.  A  hundred  merchant  ships, 
each  carrying  three  brace  of  4-inch  guns,  and  sent  as 
peaceful  traders  astride  the  distant  trade  routes;  the 
despatch  of  two  score  or  more  destroyers  to  the  approaches 
of  the  Channel  and  the  Western  ports,  and  all  of  them 
instructed — as  in  fact,  eight  months  afterwards,  every 
submarine  was  instructed — to  sink  every  British  liner 
and  merchantman  at  sight,  without  waiting  to  search  or 
troubling  to  save  passengers  or  crew — raids  organized 
on  this  scale  and  on  these  principles  could  have  reduced 
our  merchant  shipping  by  a  crippling  percentage  in  little 
more  than  forty-eight  hours.  The  two  things  taken  to- 
gether— the   assassination   of  the    Fleet,   the   wholesale 


ACTION  THAT  NEVER  WAS  FOUGHT     115 

murder  of  the  merchant  marine — must  certainly  have 
thrown  Great  Britain  into  a  paroxysm  of  grief  and  panic. 

What  a  moment  this  would  have  been  for  throwing  a 
raiding  force,  could  one  have  been  secretly  organized, 
upon  the  utterly  undefended,  and  now  indefensible, 
eastern  coast!  Secretly,  skilfully,  and  ruthlessly  executed 
these  three  measures  could  have  done  far  more  than  make 
it  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  take  a  hand  in  the 
defence  of  France.  They  might,  by  the  sheer  rapidity 
and  terrific  character  of  the  blows,  have  thrown  us  so 
completely  off  our  balance  as  to  make  us  unwilling, 
if  we  were  not  already  powerless,  to  make  further  efforts 
even  to  defend  ourselves.  At  least,  so  it  must  have 
appeared  to  Germany.  For  it  was  the  essence  of  the 
German  case  that  the  nation  was  too  distracted  by 
political  differences,  too  fond  of  money-making,  too 
debilitated  by  luxury  and  comfort,  too  conscious  of  its 
weak  hold  on  the  self-governing  colonies,  too  uncertain 
of  its  tenure  on  its  oversea  Imperial  possessions,  to  stand 
by  its  plighted  word.  The  nation  has  since  proved  that 
all  these  things  were  delusions.  But  it  was  no  delusion 
that  Great  Britain  would  be  very  reluctant  to  participate 
in  any  war.  And  we  need  not  have  fallen  so  low  as 
Germany  supposed  and  yet  be  utterly  discomposed  and 
incapable  of  further  effort,  had  we  indeed,  in  quick 
succession  or  simultaneously,  received  the  triple  onslaught 
that  it  was  well  within  the  enemy's  power  to  inflict. 

Even  had  these  blows  so  failed  in  the  completeness 
of  their  several  and  combined  effects  as  to  crush  us  al- 
together, had  we  recovered  and  been  able  to  strike  back, 
what  would  have  been  the  situation?  It  would  have 
taken  us  some  months  to  hunt  down  and  destroy  a  hundred 
armed   German    merchantmen.     If   100,000   or    150,000 


ii6         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

men  had  been  landed,  the  campaign  that  would  have 
ended  in  their  defeat  and  surrender  could  not  have  been 
a  very  rapid  one.  Our  re-assertion  of  the  command  of 
the  seas  might  have  had  to  wait  until  the  dockyards, 
working  day  and  night  shifts,  could  restore  the  balance 
of  naval  power.  Suppose,  then,  we  escaped  defeat; 
suppose  these  assassin  blows  had  ended  in  the  capture  or 
sinking  of  a  hundred  merchantmen  in  the  final  overthrow 
of  Germany's  sea  power — could  these  things  have  been 
any  loss  to  Germany,  if  it  had  been  the  price  of  swift  and 
complete  victory  in  Europe?  In  the  unsuccessful  attack 
on  Verdun  alone  she  threw  away  not  150,000  men  but 
three  times  that  number.  There  is  not  a  German  mer- 
chantman afloat  that  has  been  worth  sixpence  to  her 
country  since  war  was  declared,  nor  in  the  first  two  years 
of  war  did  the  German  Fleet  achieve  anything  to  counter- 
balance what  the  German  Army  lost  by  having  to  face 
the  British  as  well  as  the  French  Army  in  the  west.  The 
sacrifices,  then,  would  have  been  trivial  compared  with 
the  stake  for  which  Germany  was  playing.  If  it  had 
resulted  in  keeping  us  out  of  the  Continent  for  six  months 
only,  our  paralysis,  even  if  only  temporary,  should  have 
decided  the  issue  in  Germany's  favour. 

Greatly  as  Germany  dared  in  forcing  war  upon  a 
Europe  altogether  surprised  and  almost  altogether  un- 
ready, yet  in  point  of  fact  she  dared  just  too  little. 
Abominably  wicked  as  her  conduct  was.  It  was  not  wicked 
enough  to  win  the  justification  of  success.  If  war  v/as 
intended  to  be  inevitable  from  the  moment  the  Serbian 
ultimatum  was  sent,  the  capacity  of  Great  Britain  to 
intervene  should  have  been  dealt  with  resolutely  and 
ruthlessly  and  removed  as  a  risk  before  any  other  risk 
was  taken.     It  sobers  one  to  reflect  how  changed  the 


ACTION  THAT  NEVER  WAS  FOUGHT     117 

situation  might  have  been  had  German  foresight  been 
equal  to  the  German  want  of  scruple.  Looking  back, 
it  seems  as  if  it  was  but  a  very  little  thing  the  enemy  had 
to  do  to  ensure  the  success  of  all  his  plans. 

Had  any  one  before  the  war  sketched  out  this  pro- 
gramme as  one  which  Germany  might  adopt,  he  would 
perhaps  have  been  regarded  by  the  great  majority  of  his 
countrymen  as  a  lunatic.  But  to-day  we  can  look  at 
Germany  in  the  light  of  four  years  of  her  conduct.  And 
we  can  see  that  it  was  not  scruple  or  tenderness  of  con- 
science or  any  decent  regard  for  the  judgment  of  man- 
kind that  made  her  overlook  the  first  essential  of  success. 
We  must  attribute  it  to  quite  a  different  cause.  I  am 
quoting  from  memory,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  Sir  Fred- 
erick Pollock  has  put  the  truth  in  this  matter  into  exact 
terms.  "The  Germans  will  go  down  to  history  as  people 
who  foresaw  everything  except  what  actually  happened* 
and  calculated  everything  except  its  cost  to  themselves." 
It  is  the  supreme  example  of  the  childish  folly  that,  for 
the  next  two  years,  we  were  to  see  always  hand  in  hand 
with  diabolical  wickedness  and  cunning.  And  always 
the  folly  has  robbed  the  cunning  of  its  prey. 

In  the  edifying  tales  that  we  have  inherited  from  the 
Middle  Ages,  when  simple-minded  Christian  folk  person- 
ified the  principle  of  evil  and  attributed  all  wickedness 
to  the  instigation  of  the  Devil,  we  are  told  again  and 
again  of  men  who  bargained  with  the  Evil  One,  offering 
their  eternal  souls  in  payment  for  some  present  good — a 
grim  enough  exchange  for  a  man  to  make  who  believed 
he  had  a  soul  to  give.  But  it  is  seldom  in  these  tales 
that  the  bargain  goes  through  so  simply.  Sometimes 
it  is  the  sinner  who  scores  by  repentance  and  the  interven- 
tion of  Heaven  and  a  helpful  saint.     But  often  it  is  the 


ii8        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Devil  that  cheats  the  sinner.  The  forfeit  of  the  soul 
is  not  expHcit  in  the  bargain.  There  is  some  other 
promise,  seemingly  of  plain  intent,  but  in  truth  ambiguous, 
which  seems  to  make  it  possible  for  sin  to  go  unpunished. 
Too  late,  the  deluded  gambler  finds  the  treaty  a  "scrap 
of  paper."   The  story  of  Macbeth  is  a  case  in  point. 

Does  it  not  look  as  if  Germany  had  made  some  un- 
hallowed bargain  of  this  kind? — as  if  this  hideous  adven- 
ture was  started  on  the  faith  of  a  promise  of  success  given 
by  her  evil  genius  and  always  destined  to  be  unredeemed? 
Is  it  altogether  chance  that  there  should  have  been  this 
starthng  bhndness  to  the  most  palpable  of  the  forces  in 
the  game? — such  inexplicable  inaction  where  the  right 
action  was  so  obvious  and  so  easy? 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Destruction  of  "Koenigsberg" 

The  story  of  the  destruction  of  Koenigsherg  by  the  twin 
monitors  Severji  and  Mersey  in  the  Rufigi  Delta,  has  an 
interest  that  far  transcends  the  intrinsic  miUtary  im- 
portance of  depriving  the  enemy  of  a  cruiser  already 
useless  in  sea  war.  For  the  narrative  of  events  will 
bring  to  our  attention  at  once  the  extreme  complexity 
and  the  diversity  of  the  tasks  that  the  Royal  Navy  in 
war  is  called  upon  to  discharge.  It  is  worth  examining 
in  detail,  if  only  to  illustrate  the  novelty  of  the  operations 
which  officers,  with  no  such  previous  experience,  may  at 
any  moment  be  called  upon  to  undertake,  and  the  ex- 
traordinary combination  of  patience,  courage,  skill,  and 
energy  with  which  when  experience  at  last  comes,  it 
is  turned  to  immediate  profit.  The  incident  possesses, 
besides,  certain  technical  aspects  of  the  very  highest 
importance.  For  it  gives  in  its  simplest  form  perfect 
examples  of  how  guns  should  not  and  should  be  used 
when  engaged  in  indirect  fire,  and  by  aflPording  this 
illuminating  contrast,  is  highly  suggestive  of  the  progress 
that  may  be  made  in  naval  gunnery  when  scientific  method 
is  universally  applied.  The  incident,  then,  is  worth 
setting  out  and  examining  in  some  detail,  and  there  is 
additional  reason  for  doing  this,  in  that  the  accounts 
that  originally  appeared  were  either  altogether  inaccurate 
or  so  incomplete  as  to  be  misleading.  First,  then,  to  a 
narrative  of    the  event  itself. 

119 


I20         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Koenigsherg  was  a  light  unarmoured  cruiser  of  about 
3,400  tons  displacement,  and  was  laid  down  in  December 
1905.  She  carried  an  armament  often  4.1-inch  guns,  and 
was  protected  by  a  2-inch  armoured  deck.  The  Germans 
had  begun  the  construction  of  vessels  of  this  class  about 
seven  years  before  with  Gazelle,  which  was  followed  in  the 
next  year  by  Niobe  and  Nymfhe,  and  then  by  four  more — 
including  ^riadtie,  destroyed  by  Lion  in  the  affair  of  the 
Heligoland  Bight — which  were  laid  down  in  1900.  Two 
years  later  came  the  three  Frauenlobsy  and  the  Bremen 
class — five  in  number — succeeded  these  in  1903-4.  In 
1905  followed  Leipzig,  Danzig,  and  finally  the  ship  that 
concerns  us  to-day.  All  these  vessels  had  the  same  arm- 
ament, but  in  the  six  years  the  displacement  had  gone  up 
1,000  tons.  The  speed  had  increased  from  21 1  knots  to 
about  24,  and  the  nominal  radius  of  action  by  about  50 
per  cent.  Koenigsherg  was  succeeded  by  the  Stettins  in 
1906-7,  the  two  Dresdens  in  1907-8,  the  four  Kolhergs  in 
1908-9,  and  the  four  Breslaus  in  191 1.  Karlsruhe,  Gro- 
denz,  and  Rostock  were  the  only  three  of  the  1912-13  pro- 
grammes which  were  completed  when  the  war  began. 
The  process  of  growth,  illustrated  in  the  advance  of  Koen- 
igsherg over  Niobe,  was  maintained,  so  that  in  the  Karls- 
ruhe class  in  the  programme  of  1912,  while  the  unit  of 
armament  is  preserved,  we  find  that  the  number  of  guns 
had  grown  from  ten  to  twelve;  the  speed  had  advanced 
from  23 1  to  28  knots,  and  the  displacement  from  3,400 
to  nearly  5,000  tons.  As  we  know  now,  in  the  Battle  of 
Jutland  we  destroyed  fight  cruisers  of  a  still  later  class  in 
which,  in  addition  to  every  other  form  of  defence,  the  arm- 
ament had  been  changed  from  4.1-inch  to  6.y  guns. 

Koenigsherg,  on  the  very  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  war,  was 
seen  by  three  ships  of  the  Cape  Squadron  off  Dar-es- 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  *'KOENIGSBERG"  121 

Salaam,  the  principal  port  of  German  East  Africa.  She 
was  then  traveUing  due  north  at  top  speed,  and  was  not 
seen  or  heard  of  again  until,  a  week  later,  she  sank  the 
British  steamer  City  of  Winchester  near  the  island  of  So- 
cotra.  There  followed  three  weeks  during  which  no  news 
of  her  whereabouts  reached  us.  At  the  end  of  the  month 
it  was  known  that  she  had  returned  south  and  was  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Madagascar.  At  the  end  of  the  third 
week  in  September  she  came  upon  H.M.S.  Pegasus  off 
Zanzibar.  Pegasus  was  taken  completely  unawares  while 
she  was  cleaning  furnaces  and  boilers  and  engaged  in  gen- 
eral repairs.  It  was  not  possible  then  for  her  to  make  any- 
effective  reply  to  Koenigshergs  sudden  assault,  and  a  few 
hours  after  Koenigsherg  left  she  sank.  Some  time  be- 
tween the  end  of  September  and  the  end  of  October, 
Koenigsherg  retreated  up  one  of  the  mouths  of  the  Rufigi 
River,  and  was  discovered  near  the  entrance  on  October 
31  by  H.M.S.  Chatham.  From  then  onwards,  all  the 
mouths  of  the  river  were  blockaded  and  escape  became 
impossible.  Her  captain  seemingly  determined,  in  these 
circumstances,  to  make  the  ship  absolutely  safe.  He 
took  advantage  of  the  high  water  tides,  and  forced  his 
vessel  some  twelve  or  more  miles  up  the  river.  Here  she 
was  located  by  aeroplane  at  the  end  of  November.  Var- 
ious efforts  had  been  made  to  reach  her  by  gunfire.  It 
was  asserted  at  one  time  that  H.M.S.  Goliath  had  indeed 
destroyed  her  by  indirect  bombardment.  But  there  was 
never  any  foundation  for  supposing  the  story  to  be  true, 
and  if  in  the  course  of  any  of  these  efforts  the  ship  suffered 
any  damage,  it  became  abundantly  clear,  when  she  was 
finally  engaged  by  the  monitors,  either  that  her  armament 
had  never  been  touched,  or  that  all  injuries  had  been  made 
good. 


122        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

The  problems  which  the  existence  of  Koenigsherg  pro- 
pounded were :  first,  Was  it  a  matter  of  very  urgent  moment 
to  destroy  her?  Second,  How  could  her  destruction  be 
effected?  The  importance  of  destroying  her  was  great. 
There  was,  of  course,  no  fear  of  her  affecting  the  naval 
position  seriously  if  she  should  be  able  to  escape;  but  that 
she  could  do  some,  and  possibly  great,  damage  if  at  large, 
the  depredations  of  Emden  in  the  neighbouring  Indian 
Ocean,  and  o{  Karlsruhe  off  Pernambuco,  had  proved  very 
amply  indeed.  If  she  was  not  destroyed  then,  a  close 
blockade  would  have  to  be  rigidly  maintained,  and  it  was 
a  question  whether  the  maintenance  of  the  blockade  would 
not  involve,  in  the  end,  just  as  much  trouble  as  her  des- 
truction. Then  there  was  a  further  point.  Sooner  or 
later,  the  forces  of  Great  Britain  and  Belgium  would  cer- 
tainly have  to  undertake  the  conquest  of  German  East 
Africa.  While  Koenigsherg  could  not  be  used  as  a  unit 
for  defence,  her  crew  and  armament  might  prove  valuable 
assets  to  the  enemy.  Finally,  there  was  a  question  of 
prestige.  The  Germans  thought  that  they  had  made 
their  ship  safe.  If  the  thing  was  possible,  it  was  our  obvi- 
ous duty  to  prove  that  their  confidence  was  misplaced. 

If  the  ship  was  to  be  destroyed,  what  was  to  be  the 
method  of  her  destruction?  She  could  not  be  reached  by 
ship's  guns.  For  no  normal  warship  of  superior  power 
would  be  of  less  draught  than  Koenigsherg,  and  unless  the 
draught  were  very  materially  less,  it  would  be  quite  im- 
possible to  get  within  range,  except  by  processes  as  slow 
and  laborious  as  those  by  which  she  had  attained  her  an- 
chorage. Was  it  worth  while  attempting  a  cutting-out 
expedition  ?  It  would  not,  of  course,  be  on  the  lines  of  the 
dashing  and  gallant  adventures  so  brilliantly  drawn  for 
us  by  Captain  Marryat.     The  boats  would  proceed  under 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  123 

steam  and  would  not  be  rowed;  the}-  would  not  sally  out 
to  board  the  enemy  and  fight  his  crew  hand  to  hand,  but 
to  get  near  enough  to  start  a  torpedo  at  him,  discharged 
from  dropping  gear  in  a  picket  boat.  To  have  attempted 
this  would  have  been  to  face  a  grave  risk,  for  not 
only  might  the  several  entrances  be  mined,  but  the  boats 
clearly  would  have  to  advance  unprotected  up  a  river 
whose  banks  were  covered  with  bush  impenetrable  to  the 
eye.  The  enemy,  it  was  known,  had  not  only  considerable 
mihtary  forces  in  the  colony,  but  those  well  supplied  with 
field  artillery.  And  there  were  on  board  Koenigsherg  not 
onl}^  the  4.1-inch  guns  of  her  main  armament,  but  a  con- 
siderable battery  of  eight  or  perhaps  twelve,  3-inch  guns — 
a  weapon  amply  large  enough  to  sink  a  ship's  picket  boat, 
and  that  with  a  single  shot.  An  attack  by  boats  then  prom- 
ised no  success  at  all,  for  the  excellent  reason  that  it 
would  be  the  simplest  thing  on  earth  for  the  enemy  to 
defeat  it  long  before  the  expedition  had  reached  the  point 
from  which  it  could  strike  a  blow  at  its  prey. 

There  was  then  only  one  possible  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem. It  was  to  employ  armed  vessels  of  sufficient  gun- 
power  to  do  the  work  quickly,  and  of  shallow  enough 
draught  to  get  to  a  fighting  range  quickly.  If  the  thing 
were  not  done  quickly,  an  attack  from  the  masked  banks 
might  be  fatal.  If  the  guns  of  such  a  vessel  were  corrected 
by  observers  in  aeroplanes,  they  might  be  enabled  to  do 
the  trick.  Fortunately,  at  the  very  opening  if  the  war, 
the  Admiralty  had  purchased  from  the  builders  three 
river  monitors,  then  under  construction  in  England  for  the 
Brazilian  Government.  They  drew  but  a  few  feet.  Their 
free  board  was  low,  their  centre  structure  afforded  but  a 
small  mark;  the  two  6-inch  guns  they  carried  fore  and  aft 
were  protected  by  steel  shields.     They  had  been  employed 


124        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

with  marked  success  against  the  Germans  in  their  first  ad- 
vance to  the  coast  of  Belgium.  When  the  enemy,  having 
estabhshed  himself  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Nieuport, 
had  time  to  bring  up  and  emplace  long-range  guns  of  large 
calibre,  the  further  employment  of  these  river  monitors 
on  this,  their  first  job,  was  no  longer  possible.  For  the 
moment,  then,  they  seemed  to  be  out  of  work,  and  here 
was  an  undertaking  exactly  suited  to  their  capacity. 
It  was  not  the  sort  of  undertaking  for  which  they  had 
been  designed.  But  it  was  one  to  which,  undoubtedly 
they  could  be  adapted.  Of  the  three  monitors  Mersey 
and  Severn  were  therefore  sent  out  to  Mafia  Island,  which 
lies  just  off  the  Rufigi  Delta  and  had  been  seized  by  us 
early  in  the  proceedings. 

The  first  aeroplanes  available  proved  to  be  unequal  to 
the  task,  because  of  the  inadequacy  of  their  lifting  power. 
The  atmosphere  in  the  tropics  is  of  a  totally  different  buoy- 
ancy from  that  in  colder  latitudes,  and  a  machine  whose 
engines  enable  it  to  mount  quite  easily  to  a  height  of 
4,000  or  5,000  feet  in  Northern  Europe,  cannot,  in  Central 
Africa,  rise  more  than  a  few  hundred  feet  from  the  ground. 
New  types  of  machines,  therefore,  had  to  be  sent,  and 
these  had  to  be  tested  and  got  ready  for  work.  For  many 
weeks  then,  before  the  actual  attack  was  undertaken, 
we  must  picture  to  ourselves  the  Island  of  Mafia,  hitherto 
unoccupied  and  indeed  untouched  by  Europeans,  in  the 
process  of  conversion  into  an  effective  base  for  some  highly 
complicated  combined  operations  of  aircraft  and  sea  force. 
The  virgin  forest  had  to  be  cleared  away  and  the  ground 
levelled  for  an  aerodrome.  The  flying  men  had  to  study 
and  master  machines  of  a  type  of  w^hich  they  had  no  previ- 
ous experience.  The  monitors  had  to  have  their  guns  tested 
and  their  structural  arrangement  altered  and  strength- 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  125 

ened  to  fit  them  for  their  new  undertaking.  And  indeed 
preparing  the  monitors  was  a  serious  matter.  The  whole 
delta  of  the  Rufigi  is  covered  with  forest  and  thick  bush — 
nowhere  are  the  trees  less  than  sixty  feet  high,  and  in 
places  they  rise  to  nearly  three  times  this  height.  To 
engage  the  Koenigsherg  with  any  prospect  of  success,  five, 
six,  or  seven  miles  of  one  of  the  river  branches  would  cer- 
tainly have  to  be  traversed.  There  was,  it  is  true,  a 
choice  of  three  mouths  by  which  these  vessels  might  pro- 
ceed. But  it  would  be  almost  certain  that  the  different 
mouths  would  be  protected  by  artillery,  machine  guns, 
and  rifles,  and  highly  probable  that  one  or  all  of  them 
would  be  mined.  The  thick  bush  would  make  it  impos- 
sible for  the  monitors  to  engage  any  hidden  opponents  with 
suflScient  success  to  silence  their  fire.  And  obviously 
any  portion  of  the  bank  might  conceal,  not  only  field 
guns  and  riflemen,  but  stations  from  which  torpedoes 
could  be  released  against  them.  It  was  imperative  there- 
fore, to  protect  the  monitors  from  such  gun  fire  as  might  be 
encountered,  and  to  take  every  step  possible  to  preserve 
their  buoyancy  if  a  mine  or  torpedo  was  encountered. 

The  Trent  had  come  out  as  a  mother  ship  to  these  two 
unusual  men-of-war,  and  from  the  moment  of  their 
arrival,  she  became  an  active  arsenal  for  the  further  arm- 
ing and  protection  of  her  charges.  Many  tons  of  plating 
were  laid  over  their  vulnerable  portions — the  steering 
gear,  magazines,  navigating  bridges,  etc,  having  to  be 
specially  considered.  The  gun  shields  were  increased  in 
size,  and  every  precaution  taken  to  protect  the  gunners 
from  rifle  fire.  Where  plating  could  not  be  added,  sand- 
bags were  employed.  By  these  means  the  danger  of  the 
ship  being  incapacitated,  or  the  crew  being  disabled  by 
what  the  enemy  could  do  from  the  bank,  was  reduced 


126        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

to  a  minimum.  These  precautions  would  not,  of  course, 
have  been  a  complete  protection  against  continuous 
hitting  by  the  plunging  fire  of  Koenigshergs  artillery. 
The  more  difficult  job  was  to  protect  the  ships  against 
mines  and  torpedoes.  Their  first  and  best  protection,  of 
course,  was  their  shallow  draught.  But  it  was  not  left 
at  that;  and  most  ingenious  devices  were  employed  which 
would  have  gone  a  fair  way  to  keep  the  ships  floating 
even  had  an  under-water  mine  been  exploded  beneath 
tlie  bottom.  At  intervals,  between  these  spells  of  dock- 
yard work,  the  monitors  were  taken  out  for  practice  in 
conjunction  with  the  aeroplanes.  Mafia  Island,  which 
had  already  served  as  a  dockyard  and  aerodrome,  was 
now  once  more  to  come  in  useful  as  a  screen  between  the 
^monitors  and  the  target.  The  various  operations  neces- 
sary for  indirect  fire  were  carefully  studied.  Gun-layers, 
of  course,  cannot  aim  at  a  mark  they  cannot  see.  The 
gun,  therefore,  has  to  be  trained  and  elevated  on  informa- 
tion exteriorly  obtained,  and  some  object  within  view — 
at  exactly  the  same  height  above  the  water  as  the  gun- 
layer — has  to  be  found  on  which  he  is  to  direct  his  sight. 
The  gun  is  now  elevated  to  the  approximate  range,  a 
shot  is  fired  and  the  direction  of  the  shot  and  the  distance 
upon  the  sight  are  altered  in  accordance  with  the  correc- 
tion. At  last  a  point  of  aim  for  the  gun-layer,  and  a  sight 
elevation  and  deflection  are  found,  and  his  duty  then 
is  to  fire  away,  aiming  perhaps  at  a  twig  or  a  leaf  a  few 
hundred  yards  off",  while  the  projectile  he  discharges 
falls  upon  a  target  four,  five,  or  even  six  miles  off^. 

THE  FIRST  ATTEMPT 

At  last  all  was  ready  for  the  great  attack.     The  crew 
had  all  been  put  into  khaki,  every  fitting  had  been  cleared 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  127 

out  of  the  monitors;  they  had  shpped  off  in  the  dark  the 
night  before  and  were  anchored  when,  at  3 130  in  the 
morning,  all  was  ready.  I  will  now  let  a  participant 
continue  the  story-: 

'T  woke  up  hearing  the  chatter  of  the  seedy  boys  and 
the  voice  of  the  quartermaster  telling  someone  it  was 
3 :20.  I  hurried  along  to  my  cabin  and  was  dressed  in 
three  minutes;  khaki  shirt,  trousers,  shoes,  and  socks. 
A  servant  brought  me  a  cup  of  cocoa  and  some  biscuits, 
and  I  then  gathered  the  waterbottle  and  a  haversack  of 
sandwiches,  biscuits,  brandy  flask,  glass  phial  of  morphia, 
box  of  matches,  cigarettes,  and  made  my  way  up  to  the 
top. 

"It  was  quite  dark  in  spite  of  the  half  moon  partly 
hidden  by  clouds,  and  men  wandering  about  the  docks 
putting  the  last  touches.  It  was  impossible  to  recognize 
any  one  as  all  were  in  khaki  and  cap  and  helmet.     By 

3  :45  all  were  at  general  quarters  and  at we  weighed 

and  proceeded.  Both  motor-boats  were  towing,  one  on 
either  side  amidships.  Two  whalers  anchored  off  Komo 
Island,  and  burning  a  single  light  each,  acted  as  a  guide  to 
the  mouth.     We  soon  began  to  see  the  dim  outline  of  the 

shore  on   the   right   hand,   and   declared   he   could 

distinguish  the  mouth.     There  were  four  of  us  in  the  top. 

We    arranged    ourselves    conveniently,    and    

taking  a  side  each  to  look  out.  The  Gunnery  Lieutenant 
took  the  fore  6-inch  and  starboard  battery.  I  had  the 
after  6-inch  and  port  battery.  I  dozed  at  first  for  about 
ten  minutes,  but  as  the  island  neared  woke  up  completely. 
We  had  no  idea  what  sort  of  reception  we  should  have, 
and  speculated  about  it.  It  was  quite  cold  looking  over 
the  top.  The  land  came  nearer  and  nearer.  We  were  go- 
ing slow,  sounding  all  the  way.     On  the  starboard  side  it 


128         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BAITLE 

was  quite  visible  as  the  light  grew  stronger  and  stronger. 
Suddenly  when  we  were  well  inside  the  right  bank  we 
heard  a  shot  fired  on  the  starboard  quarter,  but  could 
not  see  the  flash.  Then  came  another,  but  only  at  the 
third  did  we  see  where  it  came  from.  It  was  a  field-gun  on 
the  right,  but  we  had  already  passed  it,  and  both  it  and 
the  pom-pom  were  turned  on  the  Mersey  astern  of  us. 

"At  least  nothing  fell  near  us.  It  was  still  not  light 
enough  for  us  to  judge  the  range,  but  as  the  alarm  had 
been  given  we  opened  fire  with  the  3-pounders,  starboard 
side,  at  the  fieldgun.  As  we  came  up  to  the  point  on  the 
port  side  I  trained  all  the  port  battery  on  the  foremost 
bearing,  and  opened  fire  as  soon  as  the  guns  would  bear. 
We  were  now  going  pretty  well  full  speed.  Some  snipers 
were  hidden  in  the  trees  and  rushes,  and  let  us  have  it  as 
we  went  past.  The  report  of  their  rifles  sounded  quite 
different  from  ours,  but  we  were  abreast  before  they 
started,  and  were  soon  past.  It  was  just  getting  light. 
We  were  inside  the  river  before  the  sun  rose,  and  went 
quite  fast  up.  It  was  just  about  dead  low  water  as  we 
entered,  neap  tide.  The  river  was  about  700  yards 
broad.  The  banks  were  well  defined  by  the  green  trees, 
mangroves  probably,  which  grew  right  down  to  the  edges. 
The  land  beyond  was  quite  flat  on  the  left,  but  about 
four  miles  to  the  right  rose  to  quite  a  good  height — 
Pemba  Hills.  Here  and  there  were  native  huts  well  back 
from  the  river;  we  could  see  them  from  the  top  though 
they  were  invisible  from  the  deck.  On  either  side  as  we 
passed  up  were  creeks  of  all  sorts  and  sizes  at  low  tides, 
more  of  them  on  the  port  side  than  on  the  starboard. 
As  we  passed,  or  rather  before,  we  turned  the  port  or 
starboard  batteries  on  them  and  swept  either  side.  The 
gun-layers  had  orders  to  fire  at  anything  that  moved  or 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "  KOENIGSBERG "  129 

looked  suspicious.     We  controlled  them  more  or  less,  and 

gave  them  the  bearings  of  the  creeks.     was  in  charge 

of  those  on  deck,  and  the  crews  themselves  fired  or  ceased 
fire  if  they  saw  anything  or  had  sunk  anything.  We 
checked  them  from  time  to  time  as  the  next  creek  opened 
up.     We  were  looking  ahead  most  of  the  time,  but  I 

believe  (from  )  we  sank  three  dhows  and  a  boat. 

Whether  they  were  harmless  or  not,  I  don't  know,  but  it 
had  to  be  done  as  a  precaution.  We  made  a  fine  noise, 
the  sharp  report  of  the  five  3-pounders  and  one  4.7  and 
the  crackle  of  the  machine  guns  (four  a  side)  must  have 
been  heard  for  miles.  The  Hyacinth,  the  tugs,  the  Tre7it, 
the  Wey?noiith,  and  other  odd  craft  were  demonstrating 
at  the  other  mouths  of  the  Rufigi,  and  we  could  hear  the 
deep  boom  of  their  6-inch  now  and  then.  I  believe,  too, 
that  there  was  a  demonstration  by  coUiers,  etc.,  off  Dar-es- 
Salaam  at  the  same  time. 

"I  had  thought  that  the  entry  would  be  the  worst  part, 
but  it  was  not  much.  A  few  bullets  got  us  and  marked 
the  plates  or  went  through  the  hammocks  but  no  one  was 
hit,  and  as  our  noise  completely  drowned  the  report  of 
their  rifles  I  doubt  if  many  knew  we  were  being  sniped. 
The  forecastle  hands  knew  all  about  it  later  on.  As  they 
hauled  in  the  anchor  or  let  it  go  they  nipped  behind  any 
shelter  there  was,  and  could  hear  the  bullets  zip-zip  into 
the  sandbags.  The  Mersey  astern  was  blazing  away  into 
the  banks  just  as  we  were.  There  was  probably  nothing 
in  most  of  the  creeks — but  we  did  not  know  it  then. 

"It  was  6:30  o'clock  by  the  time  we  reached  *our' 
island,  where  the  river  branches  into  three,  at  the  end  of 
which  we  were  to  anchor.  We  were  steering  straight  up 
the  middle  of  the  stream,  and  then  swung  slowly  round  to 
port,  dropped  the  stern  anchor,  let  out  seventy  fathoms 


I30        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

of  wire,  dropped  the  main  anchor,  went  astern,  and  then 
tightened  in  both  cables,  so  that  we  were  anchored  fast 
bow  and  stern.  As  soon  as  we  steadied  down  a  bearing 
was  taken  on  the  chart  and  the  gun  laid — about  eight 
minutes'  work.  It  was  then  found  that,  thanks  to  the 
curious  run  of  the  current,  the  fore  6-inch  would  not  bear, 
and  we  had  to  take  up  the  bow  anchor  and  let  it  go  again 
to  get  us  squarer  towards  the  Koenigsherg. 

"We  could  see  the  aeroplane  right  high  up,  and  received 
the  signal  'open  fire.'  We  were  not  quite  ready,  however. 
From  the  moment  when  we  turned  to  port  to  take  up  our 
firing  position  to  the  time  we  were  finally  ready  and  had 
laid  both  guns,  occupied  about  twenty  minutes.  The 
Koenigsherg  started  firing  at  us  five  minutes  before  we 
were  ready  to  start.  Their  first  shot  (from  one  gun  only) 
fell  on  the  island,  the  next  was  on  the  edge  of  it,  and  veiy 
soon  she  was  straddling  us.  Where  they  were  spotting 
from  I  don't  know,  but  they  must  have  been  in  a  good 
position,  and  their  spotting  was  excellent.  They  never 
lost  our  range.  The  firing  started,  and  for  the  next  two 
hours  both  sides  were  hard  at  it.  I  don't  beheve  any  ship 
has  been  in  a  hotter  place  without  being  hit.  Their 
shooting  was  extraordinarily  good.  Their  salvoes  of  fire 
at  first  dropped  lOO  short,  50  over,  20  to  the  right — then 
straddled  us — then  just  short — then  all  round  us,  and  so 
on.  We  might  have  been  hit  fifty  times — they  could 
not  have  fired  better;  but  we  were  not  hit  at  all,  though 
a  piece  of  shell  was  picked  up  on  the  forecastle. 

"The  river  was  now  a  curious  sight,  as  dead  fish  were 
coming  to  the  surface  ever3rwhere.  It  was  the  Koenigs- 
berg's  shells  bursting  in  the  water  which  did  the  damage, 
and  there  were  masses  of  them  everywhere — mostly 
small  ones. 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  *'KOENIGSBERG»  131 

"We  were  firing  all  the  time,  of  course.  I  attended 
to  the  W/T,  and  passed  the  messages  to  the  Gunnery 
Lieutenant,  who  made  the  corrections  and  passed  them 

to  the  guns.     watched  the  aeroplane  and  the  banks 

as  far  as  possible.     attended  to  the  conning  tower 

voice  pipe.  We  got  H.  T.  fairly  soon,  and  the  Koe?iigs- 
bergs  salvoes  were  now  only  four  guns.  We  heard  the 
boom;  then  before  it  had  finished  came  whizz-z-z-z  or 
plop,  plop,  plop,  plop,  as  the  shells  went  just  short  or  over. 
They  were  firing  much  more  rapidly  than  we,  and  I  should 
think  more  accurately,  but  if  I  had  been  in  the  Koenigs- 
berg  I  should,  probably,  have  thought  the  opposite!  All 
this  time  the  3-pounders  had  occasional  outbursts  as  they 
saw,  or  thought  they  saw,  something  moving.  Oc- 
casionally, too,  the  smoke  and  fumes  from  our  funnel 
drifted  across  the  top,  and  it  was  unpleasant  for  a  minute 
or  two.  We  could  see  now  where  the  Koenigsberg  was, 
and  the  smoke  from  her  funnels,  or  that  our  shells  made. 
She  was  firing  salvoes  of  four  with  great  rapidity  and 
regularity,  about  three  times  a  minute,  and  every  one  of 
them  close.  Some  made  a  splash  in  the  water  so  near 
that  you  could  have  reached  the  place  with  a  boat-hook. 

"At  7:40  (so  I  am  told,  as,  though  I  tried  I  lost  all 
count  of  time)  a  shell  hit  the  fore  6-inch  of  the  Mersey 
and  a  column  of  flame  shot  up.  Four  were  killed  and 
four  wounded.  Part  of  the  shield  was  blown  away. 
Only  one  man  remained  standing,  and  after  swaying 
about  he  fell  dead.  One  had  his  head  completely  blown 
off.  Another  was  lying  with  his  arm  torn  out  at  the 
shoulder,  and  his  body  covered  with  yellow  flames  from 
a  lyddite  charge  which  caught.  The  R.  N.  R.  Lieutenant 
in  charge  was  knocked  senseless  and  covered  with  blood, 
but  had  only  a  scratch  on  the  wrist  to  show  for  it.     The 


132        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

gun-layer  had   an  extraordinary  escape,    and   only   lost 
three  fingers.     Two  men  escaped  as  they  had  just  gone 
forward  to  weigh  the  anchor.     A  burning  charge  fell  into 
the  shell  room  below,  but  was  fortunately  got  out.     An- 
other shell  burst  in  the  motor-boat  alongside  the  Mersey 
and  sank  it.     One  burst  in  the  water  about  a  foot  from 
the  side,  and  we  thought  she  was  holed.     The  Mersey 
captain  then  wisely  moved  and  went  down  river,  taking 
up  a  position  of  i,ooo  yards  down,  by  the  right  bank 
(looking  at  the  Koenigsherg).     She  started  in  again  with 
her  after  gun,  the  other  being  disabled.     For  an  hour 
and  twenty  minutes  we  went  on,  and  the  Koe7iigshergs 
salvoes  came  steadily  and  regularly  back,  as  close  as  ever. 
It  seemed  as  if  it  could  not  go  on  much  longer.     We 
registered  four  hits,  and  the  salvoes  were  reduced  from 
four  to  three,  and  later  to  two,  and  then  to  one  gun. 
Whether  we  had  reduced  them  to  silence  or  whether  the 
Koenigsherg  s  crew  left  them  and  saved  ammunition  it 
is  impossible  to  say. 

"The  aeroplane  spotting  had  been  fair,  but  now  some- 
one else  started  in  and  made  the  signals  unintelligible. 
Then  we  got  spotting  corrections  from  two  sources — both 
differing  widely.  Finally,  the  aeroplane  made  "W.  0.'* 
(croing  home).  We  weighed  and  took  up  station  again 
by  tht  Mersey.  She  moved  to  get  out  of  our  way,  and 
when  another  aeroplane  came  we  started  it  again.  The 
replies  from  the  Koenigsherg  were  not  so  frequent,  and 
nothing  Hke  so  accurate.  It  was  as  if  they  could  not 
spot  the  fall  of  shot.  The  aeroplane  soon  disappeared, 
and  as  we  could  see  the  mast  of  the  Koenigsherg  (I  could 
only  see  one  personally)  and  a  column  of  smoke  which 
varied  in  thickness  from  time  to  time,  we  tried  to  spot 
for  ourselves.     It  was  useless  as,  though  we  saw  the  burst 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  *'KOENIGSBERG"  133 

(or  thought  we  did)  in  line  with  the  masts,  we  did  not 
know  whether  they  were  over  or  short.  Finally,  we 
moved  up  the  river  nearer,  still  keeping  on  the  right  side, 
and  set  to  work  again. 

"There  were  two  cruisers  —  Weymouth  and  Pyramusy 
I  think — at  the  mouth.  The  JVeymouth  did  a  good  deal 
of  firing  at  Pemba  Hill  and  a  native  village  close  to  us, 
where  there  might  be  spotters. 

"When  we  reached  W/T  corrections  now  they  were 
of  no  use.  Most  were  'did  not  observe  fall  of  shot,''  or 
600  short.  We  went  up  1,000,  but  still  received  the  same 
signal — whether  from  the  aeroplane  or  the  Koenigsberg, 
I  don't  know.  It  was  most  confusing.  We  crept  up  the 
scale  to  maximum  elevation.  Finally,  we  moved  up  the 
river  again,  but  put  our  nose  on  the  mud.  We  were  soon 
oflF,  and  moved  over  to  the  other  side  and  continued  firing, 
spotting  as  well  as  we  could  (but  getting  nothing  definite) 
till  four  o'clock,  when  we  packed  up  and  prepared  to 
come  out.  We  swept  the  banks  again  on  both  sides,  but 
only  at  the  entrance  was  there  opposition.  We  made 
such  a  noise  ourselves  that  we  drowned  the  report  of 
any  shots  fired  at  us.  Two  field-guns  made  good  practice 
at  us  from  the  right  bank  (looking  at  the  Koenigsberg). 
One  came  very  close  indeed  to  the  top — so  much  so  that 
we  all  turned  to  look  at  each  other,  thinking  it  must  have 
touched  somewhere.  One  burst  about  five  yards  over 
us.  Another  burst  fifteen  yards  from  the  Mersey,  and  a 
second  hit  her  sounding  boom.  We  could  see  the  white 
smoke  of  the  discharge  and  fired  lyddite,  but  the  object 
was  invisible. 

"It  was  getting  dusk  as  we  got  outside  at  full  speed. 
The  secure  was  sounded  at  about  4:45.  We  had  been  at 
general  quarters  for  thirteen  hours,  and  eleven  of  them 


134        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

had  been  under  fire.  Outside  the  other  ships  were  wait- 
ing for  us  near  Komo  Island,  and  we  went  straight  along- 
side the  Trent.  Each  ship  cheered  us  as  we  passed.  The 
Mersey  put  her  wounded  on  the  Trent,  and  then  pushed 
off  to  bury  the  dead. 

"Tuesday,  July  6,  was  the  day  of  the  first  attempt,  and 
one  of  the  worst  I  ever  had  or  am  likely  to  have.  We 
were  at  our  stations  from  3:45  a.m.  till  4:45  p.m.,  and 
eleven  hours  of  that  were  under  fire.  The  engine-room 
people  were  not  relieved  the  whole  time,  and  they  were 
down  there  the  whole  time  in  a  temperature  of  132°-! 3 5°  ! 
It  was  hot  up  in  the  top — but  child's  play  to  the  engine 
room." 

SUCCESS 

On  July  II  the  second  attack  was  made,  but  made  in  a 
very  different  manner  from  the  first.  Once  more  let  us 
allow  the  same  writer  to  complete  the  story^: 

"We  went  to  General  Quarters  at  10:40  a.m.  and  were 
inside  the  entrance  by  11:40.  How  well  we  seemed  to 
know  the  place!  I  knew  exactly  where  the  beastly  field 
guns  at  the  mouth  would  open  fire  and  exactly  when  they 
would  cease — as  we  pushed  in,  and  so  if  their  shots  went 
over  us  they  would  land  on  the  opposite  bank  among  their 
own  troops.  Very  soon  came  the  soft  whistle  of  the  shell, 
then  again  and  again — but  we  were  nearing  the  entrance 
and  they  turned  on  the  Mersey.  They  hit  her  twice, 
wounding  two  men  and  knocking  down  the  after  6-inch 
gun  crew — none  was  hurt,  however.  I  spotted  a  boat 
straight  ahead  making  across  the  river  for  dear  life — they 
may  only  have  been  natives,  but  we  fired  the  6-inch  at 
them  till  they  leapt  ashore  and  disappeared. 

"Up  the  river  we  went.     I  knew  each  creek,  and  almost 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  135 

each  tree,  and  as  before  we  blazed  into  them  just  before 
we  passed. 

**We  left  the  Mersey  at  the  place  where  we  anchored 
last  time  in  the  hope  that  she  would  draw  the  Koenigsberg  s 
fire  and  leave  us  a  free  hand.  The  Koenigsberg,  however, 
fired  one  salvo  at  her  and  then  for  the  rest  of  the  day  con- 
centrated on  us.  She  was  plugging  us  for  seventeen  min- 
utes before  we  could  return  her  fire.  The  salvoes  of  four 
were  dropping  closer  than  ever  if  possible  and  afterwards 
almost  ever>'  man  in  the  ship  found  a  bit  of  German  shell 
on  board  as  a  souvenir.  They  were  everj^'here — in  the 
sandbags,  on  the  decks,  round  the  engine  room — but  not 
a  soul  was  even  scratched! 

"We  went  on  higher  up  the  river  than  last  time  and 
finally  anchored  just  at  the  top  of  'our'  old  island.  As 
the  after  6-inch  gun's  crew  were  securing  the  stem  anchor 
two  shells  fell,  one  on  either  side,  within  three  feet  of  the 
side,  and  drenched  the  quarter-deck.  It  was  a  very  crit- 
ical time.  If  she  hit  us  we  were  probably  finished,  and 
she  came  as  near  as  possible  without  actually  touching. 
I  had  bet  5^.  that  she  would  start  with  salvoes  of  four  guns, 
and  I  won  my  bet.  They  did  not  last  long,  however,  once 
we  opened  fire.  It  was  a  near  thing,  and  had  to  end 
pretty  quickly  one  way  or  the  other.  We  had  received 
orders  that  she  must  be  destroyed,  and  the  captain,  the 
night  before,  had  told  all  hands  assembled  on  the  quarter- 
deck that  we  had  to  do  it.  We  intended  to  go  up  nearer 
and  nearer,  and  if  necessary  sight  her.  Of  course  we 
could  not  have  gone  through  it — but  there  is  no  doubt 
that  on  the  nth  it  was  either  the  monitors  or  the  Koen- 
igsberg. 

"We  had  no  sooner  anchored  and  laid  the  guns  (the 
chart  proved  to  be  one  mile  out  in  the  distance  from  us 


136        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

to  the  Koenigsherg!)  than  the  aeroplane  signalled  she  was 
ready  to  spot.  Our  first  four  salvoes,  at  about  one  minute 
interval,  were  all  signalled  as  'Did  not  observe  fall  of 
shot.'  We  came  down  400,  then  another  400  and  more 
to  the  left.  The  next  was  spotted  as  200  yards  over  and 
about  200  to  the  right.  The  next  150  short  and  100  to 
the  left.  The  necessar}^  orders  w^ere  sent  to  the  guns,  and 
at  the  seventh  salvo  we  hit  with  one  and  were  just  over 
with  the  other.  We  hit  eight  times  in  the  next  twelve 
shots!  It  was  frightfully  exciting.  The  Koenigsherg  was 
now  firing  salvoes  of  three  only.  The  aeroplane  signalled 
all  hits  were  forv\^ard,  so  we  came  a  little  left  to  get  her 
amidships.  The  machine  suddenly  signalled  'Am  hit: 
coming  down;  send  a  boat.'  And  there  she  was  about 
halfway  betw^een  us  and  the  Koenigsherg  planing  down. 
As  they  fell  they  continued  to  signal  our  shots,  for  we,  of 
course,  kept  firing.  The  aeroplane  fell  into  the  water 
about  150  yards  from  the  Mersey  and  turned  a  somersault; 
one  man  was  thrown  clear,  but  the  other  had  a  struggle 
to  get  free.  Finally  both  got  away  and  were  swimming 
for  ten  minutes  before  the  Mersey  s  motor-boat  reached 
them — beating  ours  by  a  short  head.  They  were  unin- 
jured and  as  merry  as  crickets! 

"We  kept  on  firing  steadily  the  whole  time,  as  we  knew 
we  were  hitting — about  one  salvo  a  minute.  The  Koenigs- 
herg was  now  firing  two  guns;  it  is  hard  to  be  certain,  as 
there  was  much  to  do  and  a  good  noise  going  on.  Still, 
within  seventeen  minutes  of  our  opening  fire  I  noticed 
and  logged  it  down  that  she  was  firing  two.  She  may  have 
been  reduced  to  that  before,  but  she  never  fired  more  after. 

"In  a  very  short  time  there  was  a  big  explosion  from 
the  direction  of  the  Koenigsherg,  and  from  then  on  she  was 
never  free  from  smoke — sometimes  more,  sometimes  less; 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  137 

at  one  moment  belching  out  clouds  of  black  smoke,  then 
yellow,  with  dull  explosions  from  time  to  time.  We  kept 
on  firing  regularly  ourselves,  one  salvo  to  the  minute — or 
perhaps  two  salvoes  in  three  minutes,  but  the  gun-layers 
were  told  to  keep  cool  and  make  sure  of  their  aim.  There 
was  one  enormous  explosion  which  shot  up  twice  as  high 
as  the  Koenigshergs  masts,  and  the  resulting  smoke  was 
visible  from  our  deck.     The  men  sent  up  a  huge  cheer. 

*'For  some  time  now  we  had  had  no  reply  from  the 
Koenigsherg.  At  12:53  I  fancy  she  fired  one  gun,  but  I 
was  not  certain.  She  certainly  did  not  fire  afterwards. 
As  our  guns  were  getting  hot  we  increased  the  range  from 
9,550  to  9,575,  and  later  to  9,625 — as  when  hot  the  shots 
are  apt  to  fall  short.  Fine  columns  of  smoke,  black, 
white,  and  yellow,  and  occasional  dull  reports  rewarded 
us,  but  we  were  making  no  mistake  and  kept  at  it.  The 
aeroplane  was  not  available,  and  w^e  had  no  one  to  spot 
for  us,  remember;  still  we  could  see  the  K.^s  masts  from 
our  foretop,  and  the  smoke,  etc.,  told  its  ovv^n  tale. 

"Another  aeroplane  turned  up,  and  we  now  signalled 
the  Mersey  to  pass  on  up  stream  and  open  fire  nearer. 
She  gave  us  a  great  cheer  as  she  passed. 

"We  raised  our  topmast  and  had  a  look  at  the  Koenigs- 
herg. She  was  a  fine  sight.  One  mast  was  leaning  over 
and  the  other  was  broken  at  the  maintop,  and  smoke  was 
pouring  out  of  the  mast  as  out  of  a  chimney.  The  funnels 
were  gone,  and  she  was  a  mass  of  smoke  and  flame  from 
end  to  end.  We  had  done  all  the  firing  which  had  de- 
stroyed her.  The  Mersey  only  started  afterwards.  That 
was  part  of  the  plan.  Only  one  ship  was  to  fire  at  a  time, 
and  then  there  could  be  no  possible  confusion  in  the  spotting 
corrections;  it  was  a  lesson  we  learned  on  the  Tuesday 
before  I     We  started.     The  Mersey  was  then  to  move  up 


138         THE  BRITISH  NA\T  IN  BATTLE 

past  her  and  fire  for  an  hour  and  so  on.  Fortunately  it 
\vas  not  necessary^,  and  as  it  turned  out  would  have  been 
impossible.  If  we  had  gone  on  we  should  probably  be 
there  now!  When  the  Mersey  passed  us  she  struck  a  bar 
about  i,coo  yards  higher  up,  and  after  trying  to  cross  in 
two  different  places  lOO  yards  apart,  anchored  for  firing. 
There  was  only  eight  feet  of  w^ater  on  the  bar  and  the  tide 
was  falling.  If  we  had  got  up  we  should  probably  have 
had  to  wait  twelve  hours  for  high  tide,  and  probably  the 
Germans  would  have  annoyed  us  from  the  banks! 

"The  Mersey  fired  about  twenty  salvoes  and  made 
several  hits,  and  as  the  aeroplane  had  signalled  *0.  K.' 
(target  destroyed)  we  prepared  to  leave  the  river.  Before 
we  went  the  Gunner>^  Lieutenant  and  myself  w^ent  to  the 
top  of  the  mast  to  get  a  better  view,  and  I  took  a  photo 
of  the  smoke,  resting  the  camera  on  the  ver^^  top  of  the 
topmast!  The  Captain  came  up  too,  and  there  were  the 
three  of  us  clinging  to  the  hghtning  conductor  with  one 
arm,  glasses  in  the  other,  and  our  feet  on  the  empty  oil 
drum    we    had    fixed    up    there    as    a    crow's-nest. 

"Just  as  we  were  starting  back  we  saw  some  telegraph 
poles  crossing  a  creek  behind  us.  It  was  undoubtedly 
the  communication  used  by  the  German  spotters.  We 
let  fly  with  everything  and  smashed  them  up.  A  pole  is 
not  an  easy  thing  to  hit,  and  I  expect  the  destruction  of 
those  two  cost  the  Government  about  £300  in  ammunition. 

"All  the  way  dowm  we  swept  the  banks  and  made  up 
our  minds  to  knock  out  the  field  guns  at  the  mouth  if  we 
possibly  could.  We  tried  our  best,  but  I  don't  think  we 
touched  them.  They  fired  on  us  till  we  were  out  of  range. 
They  did  not  hit — but  I  saw  one  fragment  about  six  inches 
by  one  inch  picked  up  on  the  boat  deck. 

"Two  tugs  were  waiting  over  the  bar,  and  after  giving 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  139 

us  a  cheer  took  us  on  tow  to  help  us  back  to  Trent.  The 
Weymouth,  with  the  Admiral  on  board,  came  round  and 
then  passed  us  at  speed;  all  hands  lined  the  ship  and,  led 
by  the  small  white  figure  of  the  Admiral  on  the  bridge, 
gave  us  three  splendid  cheers.  It  was  one  of  the  finest 
sights  I  have  ever  seen.  We  answered  back — and  what 
a  difference  there  was  to  our  cheers  of  Tuesday  last.  We 
made  about  three  times  the  noise,     .     .     . 

"I  went  to  the  Captain's  cabin  for  half  an  hour  to  copy 
out  the  notes  I  had  taken.  From  the  very  first  shot  we 
fired  I  kept  a  record  of  every  shot  fired  by  the  6-inch  guns, 
and  all  I  could  see  or  hear  round  about,  writing  some- 
thing every  minute,  i.e.  12:37  2  guns.  H.T.  J.M.  12.38 
2  guns.  H.T.  12:'^^^  {Koenigsberg  ^v'xng  2).  Column  of 
smoke;  aeroplane  hit  and  coming  down,  etc. 

"I  ought  to  explain  that  'J.M.,'  'B.F.,'  *F.20,' 
'G.I 5,'  'H.T.,'  and  so  on  are  signals  from  the  aero- 
planes. 'H.T.'  means  'a  hit.'  In  order  to  make  sure 
of  the  right  letters  having  passed  the  man  shouts  not 
'H.T.'  alone,  'H.  for  Harry',  T  for  Tommy,'  and  then 
there  can  be  no  confusion.  The  man  at  the  voice  pipe 
in  the  conning  tower  simply  roared  out  *H.  for  Harry, 
T.  for  Tommy,'  each  time  it  was  signalled.  Well,  when 
I  was  making  my  copy  in  his  cabin  on  the  way  back,  the 
Captain  came  in  for  a  moment.  He  leaned  his  hand 
quietly  on  my  shoulder  and  with  a  huge  sigh  said,  'If 
ever  I  live  to  have  a  son,  his  name  shall  be  Harry  Tommy!' 
I  firmly  believe  he  meant  it  too,  at  the  time!  " 

If  the  people  in  Severn  and  Mersey  had  had  a  narrow 
squeak  for  it,  not  once  but  a  dozen  times,  from  Koenigs- 
hergs  salvoes,  the  spotting  party  in  the  aeroplane  must 
have  had  just  as  exciting  a  time.  And,  as  we  have  seen 
from  the  foregoing  account,  with  them  Koenigsherg  was 


I40        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

more  fortunate.  On  July  nth  everything  was  against 
Lieutenant  Cull,  the  first  pilot  to  go  up,  and  FHght-Sub- 
Lieutenant  Arnold,  who  was  acting  as  observer.  To  begin 
with  it  was  a  cloudy  day,  and  the  machine  had  to  be  kept 
dangerously  low  if  the  observer  was  to  do  his  work.  The 
aeroplane  got  over  the  target  at  about  12:20,  while  Mersey 
was  firing  hard.  But  this  fire  of  the  Mersey  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  organized  effort  to  destroy  the  enemy.  It 
was  merely  a  blind — an  effort  to  get  the  enemy's  observer 
on  land  to  deflect  the  fire  on  that  ship  on  to  Mersey,  while 
Severn  got  ready  for  the  real  work.  The  aeroplane,  there- 
fore, paid  no  attention  to  Mersey's  fire  and  telegraphed 
no  observations.  Ten  minutes  later  Severn  opened  fire 
and  Mersey  ceased.  Mersey's  diversion  did  for  a  time 
bring  Koenigshergs  guns  in  her  direction.  But  no  sooner 
did  Severn  open  fire  than  she  got  the  full  benefit  of  Koen- 
igshergs  salvoes  of  four,  which  followed  each  other  at  in- 
tervals of  about  a  minute.  Five  minutes  after  Severn 
opened  at  12:30,  Koenigshergs  salvoes  began  to  straddle 
her.  Nine  minutes  after  Severn  opened  fire  the  aeroplane 
signalled  first  hit.  And  less  than  ten  minutes  after  that 
Lieutenant  Arnold  telegraphed  'We  are  hit;  send  boat.' 
In  point  of  fact,  it  is  probable  that  the  aeroplane's  engine 
had  been  shghtly  injured  earlier.  For,  dangerously  low 
as  the  machine  had  to  fly  at  the  beginning,  it  was  found 
impossible  to  keep  even  at  that  height,  and  as  it  got  lower 
and  slower,  it  obviously  became  an  easier  mark  for  the 
Koenigshergs  12-pounders.  At  12:46  a  terrific  bump  was 
felt  in  the  machine,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  engine 
broke  up  with  a  rattle  and  a  crash,  and  there  was  nothing 
for  it  but  to  start  shding  down.  Imagine  the  situation! 
The  machine,  between  3,000  and  4,000  feet  in  the  air, 
nearly  three  miles  from  the  monitors;  the  only  possible 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  141 

hope  of  safety  to  make  this  long  glide  and  then  to  land — 
if  the  bull  may  be  permitted — in  a  narrow  strip  of  river 
bordered  by  impenetrable  bush — the  bush  dotted  with 
lofty  trees!  If  the  machine  missed  the  river  and  hit  the 
trees,  it  was  certain  death  wherever  it  landed.  If  it  missed 
the  trees  and  hit  the  river,  there  was  palpably  no  safety 
unless  it  was  within  a  very  short  distance  of  the  monitors. 
For  nowhere  else  did  the  pilot  and  observer  stand  the 
faintest  chance  of  rescue.  A  situation  more  absolutely 
desperate  could  hardly  be  imagined. 

It  was  certainly  not  one  in  which  the  seemingly  doomed 
occupants  could  have  been  blamed  if  they  had  thought 
of  their  safety  and  of  nothing  else.  But  while  the  pilot 
was,  quite  properly,  concentrating  his  attention  on  per- 
forming as  nice  a  feat  in  flying  as  can  be  imagined,  Flight- 
Lieutenant  Arnold,  content  to  leave  this  matter  in  the 
skilled  hands  of  his  comrade,  continued  imperturbably  to 
carry  on  his  duties. 

Severn,  having  got  the  range,  naturally  continued  firing. 
FHght-Lieutenant  Arnold,  having  been  sent  up  to  observe, 
continued  observing,  and  each  shot  that  he  observed,  on 
what  must  have  seemed  his  last  glide  to  certain  death, 
was  signalled  to  the  control  parties  on  board  the  monitor. 
The  gist  of  this  was  that  six  out  of  ten  shots  were  hitting, 
and  apparently  were  hitting  steadily,  but  all  were  striking 
Koenigsberg  in  the  bows.  Arnold's  last  achievement  as 
an  observer  was  to  deflect  this  fire  amidships  and  to  the 
stern.  And  he  had  hardly  succeeded  before  the  'plane 
crashed  into  the  water  500  yards  from  the  Mersey.  Mer- 
sey had  her  motor-boat  ready  and  it  was  sent  full  speed  to 
the  rescue.  Arnold  had  no  difliculty  in  getting  himself 
free,  but  Lieutenant  Cull  was  not  so  fortunate.  In  the 
excitement  of  his  task  he  had  forgotten  to  loosen  the  straps 


142         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

that  held  his  belt  and  feet,  and  was  fairly  under  water 
before  he  realized  his  predicament.  How  he  wrenched 
himself  free  of  these  impediments  is  somewhat  difficult 
to  understand,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  his  apparel 
suffered  somewhat  severely  from  his  efforts.  When  he 
came  to  the  surface  he  found  Arnold  scrambling  about  the 
wrecked  machine  in  search  of  him,  and  both  were  got 
safely  into  the  boat.  The  machine,  smashed  and  water- 
logged in  the  river,  was  of  course  past  saving,  and  there 
was  nothing  for  it  but  to  demolish  it.  Take  it  all  in 
all,  few  prettier  pieces  of  work  in  the  air — whether  we 
look  at  the  flight  craftsmanship  of  the  thing,  or  the  prac- 
tical use  that  the  last  moments  of  flight  were  put  to — have 
yet  been  recorded. 

A    PROBLEM    IN    CONTROL 

There  are  several  features  in  these  operations  that  are 
of  great  interest.  To  begin  with,  the  destruction  of  a 
ship  by  the  indirect  fire  of  another  ship  had  not,  so  far  as 
I  know,  been  systematically  attempted  before.  There 
was  indeed  a  story  of  Queen  Elizabeth  having  sunk  a 
Turkish  transport  by  a  shot  fired  clean  over  the  Gallipoli 
peninsula.  In  the  case  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth's  victim 
the  target  was  not  only  incredibly  far  off  but  actually 
under  way.  But  this  must  be  regarded  as  amongst  the 
flukes  of  war,  if  indeed  that  may  be  called  a  fluke  when  the 
right  measure  had  been  taken  to  ensure  success.  Still, 
it  was  more  probable  that  the  attempt  might  be  made  a 
hundred  times  without  a  hit  being  made  than  that  the  first 
shot  fired  should  have  landed  straight  on  the  target.  But 
here  on  the  Rufigi  the  monitors  had  gone  up  after  making 
ample  preparations  and  after  full  practice,  to  achieve  a 
particular  object.     It  was  to  destroy  a  very  small  ship  at 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  143 

a  range  which,  for  the  gun  employed,  must  be  considered 
extraordinarily  great.  Ten  thousand  yards  is  relatively 
a  longer  range  for  a  6-inch  gun  than  is,  say,  i8,cx)0  for  a 
15-inch.  But  while  in  this  respect  the  task  proposed  was 
extraordinarily  difficult,  there  was  one  element  present 
that  would  distinguish  it  from  almost  any  other  known 
use  of  naval  guns.  In  engaging  land  forts,  both  on  the 
Belgian  coast  and  off  GaUipoli,  there  had  been  ample 
experience  with  a  stationary  target  engaged  by  a  station- 
ary ship.  But  here  the  firing  ship  was  not  only  stationary 
in  the  sense  that  it  was  moored,  but  was  practically  at 
rest  in  that  it  was  lying  in  smooth  water  v/ith  no  roll  or 
pitch  to  render  the  gun-layers'  aim  uncertain.  The  current 
did  cause  a  certain  veering,  but  not  a  sufficient  movement 
to  embarrass  laying.  But  if  in  this  respect  the  conditions 
were  easy,  they  were  extraordinarily  difficult  in  every 
other.  The  monitors,  for  instance,  were  as  much  exposed 
to  Koenigshergs  fire  as  was  Koenigsherg  to  that  of  the 
monitors,  and  whereas  Koenigsherg  s  guns  could  be  spotted 
from  a  position  on  shore  the  monitors'  fire  had  to  be 
spotted  by  aeroplane.  The  whole  of  the  operations  of 
Severn  and  Mersey  then  were  not  only  carried  out  under 
fire,  but  under  an  attack  that  on  the  second  day  as  well 
as  the  first  was  extraordinarily  persistent  and  extra- 
ordinarily accurate.  That  in  the  course  of  two  days  only 
one  of  our  ships  was  hit,  and  that  one  only  once,  must  be 
considered  a  curiosity,  for  so  good  were  the  gunnery 
arrangements  of  Koenigsherg  that  each  monitor  when 
under  fire  was  straddled  again  and  again  by  salvoes,  and 
when  not  straddled  had  the  4.2  shells  falling  in  bunches 
either  just  short  or  just  over  them.  The  explanation  of 
her  having  failed  to  get  more  hits  than  she  did,  while 
ultimately  Severn's  was  completely  effective,  does  not  lie 


144        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

in  any  Inferiority  of  skill,  but  almost  entirely  in  the  fact 
that  the  range,  if  exceptionally  great  for  a  6-inch  gun, 
was  almost  fabulous  for  a  4.2,  and  next  that  Koenigsherg 
was  a  much  larger  target  than  either  Severn  or  Mersey, 
Koenigsherg  was  probably  aground,  and  therefore  showing 
from  three  to  four  feet  more  of  her  side  than  she  would  at 
sea.  Monitors  are  a  craft  with  a  very,  very  low  free- 
board, with  a  comparatively  small  central  house  built 
up  amidships.  As  a  point-blank  target  Koenigsherg 
would  probably  be  more  than  twice  the  superficial  area 
that  either  Mersey  or  Severn  would  present.  The  contrast 
between  them  as  virtual  targets,  that  is,  the  target  that 
would  be  presented  to  the  shell  as  it  descended  from  a 
height  upon  the  ship,  would  not,  of  course,  be  so  great, 
because  the  monitors  were  each  of  them  wider  than  the 
German  cruiser,  but  even  as  a  virtual  target  the  Koenigs- 
herg was  much  more  favourable  for  the  British  guns. 
But  the  master  difficulty  of  the  situation  was  for  the 
men  on  the  spot,  without  previous  experience  of  indirect 
fire,  and  unaided  apparently  by  any  advice  from  headquart- 
ers as  to  the  result  of  service  experiments  elsewhere, 
to  extemporize  all  the  processes  for  finding  and  keeping 
the  range  of  a  target  invisible  from  the  ship.  The  two 
essential  elements  in  these  processes  were  (i)  for  the 
observer  in  the  aeroplane  to  note  where  each  shot  fell, 
and  (2)  to  i?iform  the  ship  that  fired  it  exactly  what  the 
position  of  the  impact  was,  whether  to  the  right  or  to  the 
left,  over  or  short,  and  an  approximate  measurement  in 
yards  of  its  distance  from  the  target.  No  one  of  those 
concerned  had  ever  engaged  in  any  similar  operation. 
The  aviators  had  not  only  never  carried  observers  to  spot 
naval  gunfire,  they  had  none  of  them  ever  even  flown  in 
the  tropics,  where  the  conditions  of  flight  diff'er  altogether 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  145 

from  those  in  more  temperate  zones.  The  observers  were 
even  more  new  to  the  work  than  the  aviators.  Apparently 
some  of  them  had  never  been  in  flying  machines  before. 
They  not  only  had  to  learn  the  elements  of  spotting,  they 
had  to  become  familiar  with  the  means  of  sending  com- 
munications. There  seems  at  one  time  to  have  been 
considerable  doubt  as  to  the  best  means  to  employ  for 
communication.  The  means  would  have  to  include  not 
only  a  system  of  sending  messages,  whether  by  wireless, 
by  lights  flashing  a  Morse  code  or  otherwise,  but  the 
production  of  a  code  as  w^ell.  When  these  points  were 
settled,  the  preliminary  practices  of  Mafia  Island  gave 
what  appeared  to  be  sufficient  experience  to  show  that 
right  principles  were  being  followed.  Only  when  this 
practice  had  given  satisfactory  results  was  the  first 
attempt  of  July  6th  made. 

In  the  course  of  that  day's  firing  the  observers  reported 
eight  possible  hits  during  the  first  phase  of  the  firing,  and 
none  afterwards.  Once  or  twice  smoke  was  seen  to  issue 
from  Koenigsherg  and  in  the  course  of  the  day  the  number 
of  guns  in  her  salvo  fell  from  five  to  three,  and  ultimately 
she  was  employing  only  a  single  gun.  The  monitors  had 
fired  approximately  500  rounds  to  obtain  these  hits,  and 
had  probably  double  this  number  fired  at  them.  Opinions 
differed  as  to  the  result,  but  that  some  thought  KoenigS' 
berg  had  finally  been  destroyed  is  apparent  from  the 
character  of  the  Rear-Admiral's  message  to  the  Admiralty. 
Reflection,  however,  appears  to  have  made  it  clear  that 
Koenigsherg  was  very  far  indeed  from  being  really  out  of 
action,  and  it  became  necessary  to  inquire  why  there 
should  have  been  any  uncertainty  in  the  matter.  The 
crux  of  the  position  was  this.  Fire  had  opened  at  seven 
in  the  morning  and  continued  till  nearly  half-past  four 


146        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

in  the  afternoon.  But  when  the  character  of  the  messages 
transmitted  by  the  observers  came  under  critical  examina- 
tion, it  seemed  almost  certain  that  no  hits  were  made  at 
all  after  the  first  hour.  Every  kind  of  explanation  for  so 
indecisive  and  disappointing  a  result  was  examined.  It 
was  disappointing  because  it  had  been  shown  that  it  was 
quite  practical  to  make  hits,  and  it  seemed  as  if  there 
must  be  something  wrong  if  the  hitting  could  not  be 
continued.  Every  possible  cause  of  breakdown  was  put 
under  examination.  Had  there  been  anything  wrong 
with  the  wireless  transmitters  in  the  aeroplanes?  Had 
the  receiving  gear  in  the  monitors  broken  down?  Were 
the  observers  too  inexperienced,  hasty,  or  unreliable? 
Had  the  guns  become  worn  or  too  hot?  Were  the  sights 
at  fault?  But  when  it  came  to  the  point  each  of  these 
criticisms  broke  down.  There  was  no  reason  to  distrust 
the  observers,  and  as  all  the  ships  in  the  offing  had  re- 
ceived the  messages,  the  transmitting  gear  must  have 
been  above  suspicion.  Then  the  monitors'  records  tallied 
with  the  ships'  records,  so  that  there  was  nothing  wrong 
with  the  receivers.  When  the  observers  themselves  were 
put  through  their  paces,  it  seemed  that  over  an  area  of  at 
least  half  a  mile,  say  600  yards  short  of  the  target  and  200 
over,  there  was  really  no  possibihty  of  making  mistakes 
about  where  the  shots  fell,  for  in  this  area  it  was  all  either 
open  water  or  dr>^  sand.  But  outside  of  this  compara- 
tively narrow  area  there  was  thick  bush,  and  to  an  observer 
at  the  height  of  between  3,000  and  4,000  feet  even  a  burst- 
ing shell  falling  in  a  forest  whose  trees  ran  from  between 
70  to  150  feet  high,  affords  a  very  uncertain  mark.  And 
after  8  p.m.  it  seemed  that  only  very  few  shells  fell  in  the 
belt  where  their  impact  was  visible,  and  that  sometimes, 
for  very  considerable  periods,  every  shot  seemed  to  go  into 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  147 

the  forest.  Could  the  guns  have  suddenly  become 
absolutely  unreliable?  But  tests  were  made,  and  the 
guns  proved  to  be  quite  as  accurate  as  they  were  before 
the  firing  began,  and  indeed  the  exactitude  of  the  results 
precluded  this  form  of  error  from  explaining  the  failure 
to  complete  the  business. 

At  last,  when  the  firing  times  of  the  two  ships  were 
compared  with  the  observers'  records  of  the  pitching  of 
the  shell,  the  true  explanation  leapt  into  sight.  The 
whole  show  had  broken  down  over  the  old  difficulty  of 
the  identification  of  shots.  The  people  in  the  aeroplanes 
could  not  tell  whether  a  particular  shot  had  been  fired  by 
Mersey  or  Severn,  and  as  both  ships  got  the  message, 
neither  could  tell  whose  shot  had  been  observed.  It 
followed  therefore  that  the  consequent  correction  was 
often  put  on  to  the  wrong  gun.  Thus,  for  example, 
suppose  Mersey  had  fired  a  shot  300  yards  over  the  target 
that  fell  in  bush  and  was  invisible  to  the  observers,  while 
Severn  had  fired  one  that  was  200  yards  short  and  visible. 
The  observers  w^ould  wireless  200  short,  whereupon  the 
Mersey  would  think  that  this  message  was  intended  for 
her,  and  raise  her  sight  by  this  amount.  Her  next  round, 
of  course,  would  go  still  farther  into  the  bush,  and  suppose 
this  was  visible  or  partially  visible  to  the  observer,  who 
might  perhaps  have  missed  Severn  s  next  round,  he  might 
telegraph  back  500  or  600  over,  a  correction  that  Severn 
might  take  to  herself,  and  lose  her  next  shot  in  the  bush 
short  of  the  target.  The  men  on  the  Rufigi  in  short 
discovered  for  themselves,  by  their  experiences  on  this 
first  arduous  day  against  the  Koenigsherg,  that  the  problem 
of  correcting  the  fire  of  two  separated  batteries  by  the  work 
of  a  single  observer  is  so  exceedingly  difficult  of  solution 
as  to  make  it  hardly  worth  attempting.     The  lessons  so 


148         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

painfully  brought  home  were  put  to  immediate  and 
most  successful  use.  It  was  resolved  on  ,the  second 
attempt  that  only  one  monitor  should  fire  at  a  time.  This 
was  not  of  course  the  only  experience  of  value  obtained 
in  the  first  day's  operation  for  when  all  the  results  were 
collated  and  compared,  a  pretty  exact  knowledge  of  the 
actual  range  from  the  chosen  anchorage  to  the  target  was 
obtained,  so  that  on  the  second  day  there  were  fewer 
initial  rounds  lost  before  shell  began  to  fall  in  the  immedi- 
ate surroundings  of  the  enemy,  where  the  position  of  each 
could  be  verified.  When  all  ambiguity  as  to  the  meaning 
of  corrections  was  removed,  the  process  of  finding 
the  target  and  keeping  the  range  became  exceedingly 
simple. 

As  will  be  seen  from  the  narrative,  the  serious  work  of 
the  second  day  began  when  Severn  opened  fire  about  half- 
past  twelve.  Nine  minutes  later,  after  quite  deliberate 
fire,  she  obtained  her  first  hit,  and  from  then  on  continued 
hitting  with  great  regularity.  But  before  she  had  been 
firing  ten  minutes  the  spotting  aeroplane  was  disabled 
and  came  down.  Though  the  Koenigsherg  herself  was 
invisible,  the  columns  of  lyddite  fumes  and  smoke  sent 
up  by  the  hits  could  be  seen  over  the  trees,  and  such 
columns  indicated  that  hits  were  being  made  very  fre- 
quently. Within  a  quarter  of  an  hour  of  the  first  hit, 
Koenigsherg  ceased  her  return  fire,  and  shortly  after  this 
a  huge  volume  of  smoke  of  a  totally  different  colour  from 
that  sent  up  by  lyddite  indicated  that  there  had  been  a 
great  explosion  in  the  ship.  When  the  second  aeroplane 
came  out  to  resume  the  work  of  spotting,  Mersey  took  up 
the  work  of  firing  in  Severn's  place.  Severn  had  ceased 
fire  at  1 :3  5  and  Mersey  opened  at  a  quarter  past  two.  But 
it  soon  became  clear  that  it  was  unnecessary  for  her  to 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  149 

proceed  with  the  work,  and  that  with  the  explosion  at 
1:15  the  business  of  the  Kocnigsherg  was  finished. 

What  two  ships  firing  continuously  for  eight  hours  on 
July  6th  had  failed  to  achieve,  a  single  ship  had  accom- 
plished in  probably  fifteen  minutes.  It  was  the  most 
perfect  exemplification  imaginable  of  the  difference  in 
results  that  wrong  and  right  systems  of  gunnery  produce. 
The  skill  shown  on  the  second  day  was  no  better  than  on 
the  first.  It  was  a  change  of  method  that  made  the 
difference. 

What  is  of  special  interest  is  this.  Up  to  the  year  1909 
it  appeared  quite  premature  to  discuss  methods  of  con- 
centrating the  fire  of  several  ships  on  a  single  distant 
target,  until  right  methods  had  been  discovered  for 
making  sure  of  hitting  it  with  the  guns  of  a  single  ship. 
But  by  the  winter  of  1909  there  seemed  to  be  sufficient 
experience  to  show  that  a  complete  solution  of  the  simpler 
problem  was  assured,  and  that  the  time  had  come  for 
considering  how  two  or  more  ships  could  combine  their 
armament.  The  difficulty  of  the  matter  was  soon  made 
obvious.  While  great  guns  do  not  all  shoot  exactly  alike, 
it  is  possible  to  ascertain  by  experiment  the  individual 
differences  of  all  the  guns  in  a  single  ship,  and  to  vary 
the  sight  scales  so  that,  at  all  critical  ranges,  they  should 
give  identical  results.  But  what  can  be  done  for  a  single 
battery  of  eight  or  ten  guns  cannot  be  done  by  experiment 
for  two  units  of  such  batteries.  If  then  two  ships  are  to 
be  employed  at  the  same  target,  it  was  the  very  essence 
of  the  matter  if  two  processes  were  carried  on  simultane- 
ously to  obtain  one  result,  that  each  process  should  be  so 
organized  as  to  run  as  if  the  other  were  not  going  at  all. 
Now  ships'  guns  at  sea  can  be  corrected  only  from  posi- 
tions high   up  in  the  masts.      It  therefore  became  clear 


150        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

that  if  the  firing  ship  allowed  a  fixed  interval,  say  three  or 
four  seconds,  to  elapse  after  a  sister  ship  had  fired,  before 
sending  her  own  salvo  at  the  enemy,  it  would  be  quite 
easy,  by  keeping  a  record  of  the  time  of  flight  of  the  pro- 
jectiles, to  pick  out  her  own  amongst  the  salvoes  falling 
in  rapid  succession  on  the  target,  so  that  there  should  be 
no  possibihty  of  her  mixing  up  her  own  shells  with  her 
neighbours'.  It  is  now  many  years  since  it  was  suggested 
that  gongs  driven  by  a  clockwork  device,  which  could  be 
set  to  the  time  of  flight,  would  simplify  this  method  of 
identification.  Suppose  the  time  of  flight  to  be  twelve 
seconds,  the  gong  would  be  set  to  this  interval  and  the 
clockwork  started  into  motion  simultaneously  with  the 
firing  of  the  salvo.  The  observers  watch  the  target  and 
pay  no  attention  to  any  shots  that  fall,  except  those  whose 
incidence  coincided  with  the  ringing  of  the  gong. 

The  essence  of  this  system  was  the  ear-marking,  so  to 
speak,  of  each  separate  salvo  as  it  went  away.  But  it 
was  manifestly  not  a  principle  on  which  observers  placed 
at  a  distance  from  a  ship  could  work.  If  they  were  to  do 
their  work  they  must  employ  some  totally  diff"erent  means 
of  identification.  Else  indirect  firing  could  only  be  carried 
on  by  one  ship  at  a  time. 

My  correspondence  in  1909  and  1910  shows  that  these 
principles  were  fully  grasped  by  many  gunnery  officers  in 
the  navy  in  these  years.  And  I  must  confess  I  was  ex- 
tremely astonished  when  our  proceedings  at  the  Darda- 
nelles in  March  and  February  and  April  showed  that  there 
was  no  common  practice  in  the  matter  throughout  the 
navy.  At  last,  in  the  month  of  May  191 5»  I  set  out  these 
elementary  principia  of  indirect  firing  in  Land  and  Water. 
"The  difficulty  in  correcting  the  fire  of  a  multitude  of 
ships  is,  it  may  be  added,  twofold,  because  each  salvo 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  "KOENIGSBERG"  151 

must  be  identified  as  coming  from  a  particular  ship,  and 
then  that  ship  be  informed  of  the  correction.  There  is 
apparently  no  escape  from  the  necessity  of  having  a  sepa- 
rate spotter  for  each  ship.  If  the  spotter  is  in  an  indepen- 
dent position,  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  this  double  task 
are  considerable.  And  aeroplanes  are  not  a  satisfactory 
substitute.  At  best  an  aeroplane  can  help  one  ship  only.'' 
It  will  be  observed  that  in  July  the  officers  at  the  Rufigi 
had  to  work  them  all  out  again  for  themselves! 

Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  curious  individuaUsm 
which  governs  the  organization  of  our  sea  forces.  Each 
ship,  each  squadron,  each  fleet  seems  to  come  to  the  study 
of  these  things  as  if  they  were  virgin  problems,  entirely 
unaided  by  advice  or  information  from  the  central  author- 
ities, so  that  there  is  not  only  no  uniformity  of  practice — 
in  itself  a  not  unmitigated  evil — but  what  is  really  serious, 
a  total  absence  of  uniformity  of  knowledge.  I  am  the 
last  person  in  the  world  to  suggest  that  all  naval  affairs 
should  be  regulated  in  even>^  petty  detail  from  Whitehall. 
There  are  quite  enough  forces  at  work  to  repress  freedom 
of  thought  or  restrict  liberty  to  investigate  and  experiment 
in  the  fullest  possible  way.  But  there  is  surely  the  widest 
possible  difference  between  a  restraining  tyranny  and  an 
intelligent  system  of  communicating  proved  principles 
and  the  results  of  successful  practice. 


CHAPTER  X 

Capture  of  H.I.G.M.S.  "Emden" 

On  November  ii,  1914,  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty 
issued  a  statement  which,  after  referring  to  the  self- 
internment  of  Koenigsberg  in  the  Rufigi  River,  and  the 
measures  taken  to  keep  her  there,  proceeded  as  follows: 

''Another  large  combined  operation  by  fast  cruisers, 
against  the  Emden,  has  been  for  some  time  in  progress.  In 
this  search,  which  covered  an  immense  area,  the  British 
cruisers  have  been  aided  by  French,  Russian,  and  Japan- 
ese vessels  working  in  harmony.  His  Majesty's  Austra- 
lian ships  Melbourne  and  Sydney  were  also  included  in 
these  movements. 

"On  Monday  morning  news  was  received  that  the 
Emden,  which  had  been  completely  lost  after  her  action 
with  the  Jemchug,  had  arrived  at  Keeling,  Cocos  Island, 
and  had  landed  an  armed  party  to  destroy  the  wireless 
station  and  cut  the  cable. 

"Here  she  was  caught  and  forced  to  fight  by  His 
Majesty's  Australian  ship  Sydney  (Captain  John  C.  T. 
Glossop,  R.N.).  A  sharp  action  took  place,  in  which  the 
Sydfiey  suffered  the  loss  of  three  killed  and  fifteen 
wounded. ; 

"The  Emden  was  driven  ashore  and  burnt.  Her  losses 
in  personnel  are  reported  as  veiy  heavy.  All  possible 
assistance  is  being  given  the  survivors  by  various  ships 
which  have  been  despatched  to  the  scene. 

"With  the  exception  of  the  German  squadron  now  off 

152 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       153 

the  coast  of  Chile,  the  whole  of  the  Pacific  and  Indian 
oceans  are  now  clear  of  the  enemy's  warships." 

The  material  news  was  that  Emden  had  been  caught 
and  sunk.  She  was  one  of  Germany's  small  fast  cruisers, 
armed  Hke  the  rest  with  4.2  guns,  and  therefore  no  very 
formidable  match  for  the  ship  that  met  and  encountered 
her.  The  work  of  her  destruction,  we  afterwards  learned, 
had  been  done  by  Captain  Glossop  of  Sydney,  with  a  rap- 
idity and  neatness  unsurpassed  in  any  naval  engagement 
of  the  war  before  or,  indeed,  since.  But  at  the  moment 
when  the  news  came,  the  method  of  the  thing  was  of  far 
less  importance  than  the  thing  itself,  for  it  is  no  exaggera- 
tion to  say  that  at  the  end  of  the  first  week  of  November 
the  spirits  of  the  nation  were  at  an  exceedingly  low  ebb. 
There  was  a  marked  uneasiness  as  to  the  naval  position. 
The  successes  of  the  Fleet  had  been  achieved  without  fight- 
ing, and  it  looked  as  if,  in  the  naval  war,  we  were  not  only 
watching,  almost  abjectly,  for  the  initiative  of  the  enemy, 
but  that  we  were  unable  to  defeat  that  initiative  when  it 
was  taken.  The  public  therefore  forgot  that  98  per  cent, 
of  our  trade  was  carrying  on  as  before,  that  our  sea  com*- 
munications  with  our  armies  were  under  no  threat,  that 
the  enemy's  battle  force  was  keeping  completely  within  the 
security  of  its  harbours.  There  had  been  but  one  active 
demonstration  of  British  naval  strength — the  aflPair  of  the 
Bight  of  HeHgoland.  But  a  dropping  fire  of  bad  news 
had  made  our  nerves  acutely  sensitive.  It  was  submar- 
ines people  feared  most.  Writing  at  the  time,  I  summar- 
ized the  general  attitude  of  the  public  as  it  appeared  to  me: 

"Long  before  the  war  began  the  public  had  been  pre- 
pared by  an  active  agitation  to  believe  that  the  submarine 
had  superseded  all  other  forms  of  naval  force,  so  that 
when  one  cruiser  after  another  was  sent  to  the  bottom. 


154        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

almost  within  hail  of  the  EngHsh  coast,  people  really  began 
to  beheve  that  no  ship  could  be  safe,  and  that  (under  a 
form  of  attack  that  was  equally  impossible  to  foresee, 
evade,  or  resist)  our  vaunted  strength  in  Dreadnoughts 
must  in  time  dwindle  altogether  away.     Then  there  were 
not  wanting  circumstances   that,   superficially   at  least, 
looked  as  if  the  Admiralty's  war  plans  and  distribution 
of  the  Fleet  were  not  adequate  to  their  purpose.     In  at 
least  one  conspicuous  instance,  the  resources  of  our  enemy 
had  been  too  great  either  for  the  means  or  the  measures 
of  our  admirals.     War  had  not  been  declared  more  than 
a  day  or  two  before  the  Goehen  and  Breslau  made  their 
way  through  the  Mediterranean  and  escaped  unengaged 
to  the  Dardanelles.     The  public  knew  that  we  had  two 
powerful  squadrons  of  ships  in  these  waters,  one  over- 
whelmingly stronger  than  the  German  force;  the  other, 
on  almost  every  conceivable  train  of  reasoning,  at  least 
a   match   for  it.*     It   seemed   utterly  humiHating  that, 
with  the  French  Fleet  as  our  allies,  and  with  Germany 
having  none,  so  important  a  unit  as  the  Goehen  should  have 
got  away  scot-free.     Then  it  was  not  long  before  we  heard 
of  the  depredations  of  the  Emden,  and  of  British  ships 
being  chased   and  threatened  in  the  North   and   South 
Atlantic  by  other  German  cruisers. 

"Against  all  these  things  could  be  set  more  cheering 
incidents.  Twice  the  North  Sea  was  swept  from  top  to 
bottom  by  the  British  Fleet,  the  first  resulting  in  the  sink- 
ing of  three,  if  not  four,  cruisers  and  one  destroyer,  and  in 
the  driving  off,  apparently  hopelessly  crippled,  of  two 
other  cruisers  and  a  great  number  of  smaller  craft.  The 
second  sweep  seemed  to  show  that  the  entire  German 


*I  should  not  say  this  now. 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       155 

Fleet  had  sought  safety  in  port.  Then  the  Carmania  sank 
the  Cap  Trafalgar,  and  the  Undaunted,  with  a  small  flotilla 
of  destroyers,  ran  down  and  sank  an  equal  flotilla  of  the 
enemy's.  But  these  were  not  sufficient  to  outweigh  the 
anxiety  which  the  German  submarine  successes  had  caused 
nor  did  they  restore  public  confidence  in  the  dispositions 
of  the  Admiralty  in  distant  seas,  where  there  were  still 
two  powerful  armed  cruisers,  a  large  number  of  light 
cruisers,  and  an  unknown  number  of  armed  merchantmen 
still  at  large. 

*'The  whole  thing  culminated  in  a  series  of  very  disturb- 
ing events.  First  it  was  announced  that  German  mines 
had  been  laid  north  of  Ireland,  and  that  the  Manchester 
Commerce  had  been  sunk  by  striking  one.  Were  any  of 
our  waters  safe  for  our  own  battle  squadrons,  if  the  enemy 
could  lay  mines  with  impunity  right  under  our  noses.'' 
This  was  swiftly  followed  by  our  hearing  that  the  Good 
Hope  and  Monmouth  had  been  sunk  by  the  Gneisenau  and 
Scharnhorst  off'  Coronel.  Then  came  the  sinking  of  the 
Hermes  and  the  Niger,  one  in  mid-Channel,  the  other  lying 
in  the  anchorage  at  Deal.  And  just  when  nervous  people 
were  wondering  whether  the  mine  and  submarine  had 
really  driven  the  English  Fleet  off"  the  sea,  only  to  find  that 
ports  were  not  safe,  there  came  the  startling  news  that  a 
German  squadron  had  appeared  off^  Yarmouth.  .  .  . 
To  many  it  looked  as  if  this  was  the  last  straw.  We  had 
sacrificed  four  cruisers  to  patrol  the  neutral  shipping  in 
these  waters,  and  when,  almost  too  late,  it  was  discovered 
that  our  methods  made  them  too  easy  targets  for  submar- 
ines, we  announced  the  closing  of  the  North  Sea.  The 
public  undoubtedly  understood  by  this  that,  if  we  closed 
the  North  Sea  to  neutrals,  we  had  closed  it  to  the  German 
Fleet  also,  and  the  appearance  of  this  squadron  so  soon 


156         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

after  the  announcement  was  made,  and  its  escape  back  to 
its  own  harbours  without  being  cut  off  and  brought  to 
action,  made  people  ask  if  the  closing  of  the  North  Sea 
had  not  really  meant  that  Great  Britain  had  resigned  its 
possession  to  the  enemy." 

It  is  difficult,  this  being  the  situation,  to  overrate  how 
cheering  was  the  news  of  Emdens  destruction. 

If  the  Canadian  naval  contingent  were  the  first  of  our 
Colonial  subjects  to  shed  their  blood  in  this  war,  then  cer- 
tainly the  Australian  ship  Sydney  was  the  first  to  assert 
Great  Britain's  command  over  distant  seas,  by  the  triump- 
hant destruction  of  a  ship  that  dared  to  dispute  it.  We 
began  our  debt  to  the  Colonies  early. 

Captain  Glossop's  despatch  was  not  published  till  Jan- 
uary I,  but  a  good  many  other  accounts  had  been  pub- 
lished before,  and  some  have  become  available  since  the 
action. 

A  very  interesting  letter  from  an  officer  of  the  Sydney 
was  printed  in  The  Times  of  December  15.  With  this 
account  was  also  published,  later  on,  a  plan  of  the  action 
which,  with  certain  corrections  which  I  have  reason  to 
believe  are  required,  is  reproduced  here.  A  second  ac- 
count, by  another  officer  in  the  Sydney,  has  been  sent  to  me 
so  that  it  is  possible  to  add  some  not  uninteresting  or 
unimportant  details  to  Captain  Glossop's  story.  But  of 
all  of  the  accounts  Captain  Glossop's  is  at  once  the  most 
interesting  and  the  most  complete,  and  I  print  it  in  full, 
because  it  is  in  every  respect  a  model  of  what  a  despatch 
should  be. 

*'H.M.A.S.  Sydney,  at  Colombo, 
"15th  November,  1914. 

*'Sir: — I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  whilst  on  escort 
duty  with  the  Convoy  under  the  charge  of  Captain  Silver, 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       157 

H.M.A.S.  Melbourne,  at  6:30  a.m.,  on  Monday,  9th  Nov- 
ember, a  wireless  message  from  Cocos  was  heard  reportmg 
that  a  foreign  warship  was  off  the  entrance.  I  was  ordered 
to  raise  steam  for  full  speed  at  7:0  a.m.  and  proceed 
thither.  I  worked  up  to  20  knots,  and  at  9:15  a.m. 
sighted  land  ahead  and  almost  immediately  the  smoke  of 
a  ship,  which  proved  to  be  H.I.G.M.S.  Emden  coming  out 
towards  me  at  a  great  rate.  At  9:40  a.m.  fire  was  opened, 
she  firing  the  first  shot.  I  kept  my  distance  as  much  as 
possible  to  obtain  the  advantage  of  my  guns.  Her  fire 
was  very  accurate  and  rapid  to  begin  with,  but  seemed  to 
slacken  very  quickly,  all  casualties  occurring  in  this  ship 
almost  immediately.  First  the  foremost  funnel  of  her 
went,  secondly  the  foremast,  and  she  was  badly  on  fire 
aft,  then  the  second  funnel  went,  and  lastly  the  third 
funnel,  and  I  saw  she  was  making  for  the  beach  of  North 
Keeling  Island,  where  she  grounded  at  1 1 :20  a.m.  I  gave 
her  two  more  broadsides  and  left  her  to  pursue  a  merchant 
ship  which  had  come  up  during  the  action. 

2.  ''Although  I  had  guns  on  this  merchant  ship  at  odd 
times  during  the  action,  I  had  not  fired,  and  as  she  was 
making  off  fast  I  pursued  and  overtook  her  at  12.10,  firing 
a  gun  across  her  bows  and  hoisting  International  Code 
Signal  to  stop,  which  she  did.  I  sent  an  armed  boat  and 
found  her  to  be  the  S.S.  Buresk,  a  captured  British  collier, 
with  18  Chinese  crew,  i  English  steward,  i  Norwegian 
cook,  and  a  German  Prize  Crew  of  3  Officers,  i  Warrant 
Officer  and  12  men.  The  ship  unfortunately  was  sinkmg, 
the  Kingston  knocked  out  and  damaged  to  prevent  re- 
pairing, so  I  took  all  on  board,  fired  4  shells  into  her  and 
returned  to  Emden,  passing  men  swimming  in  the  water, 
for  whom  I  left  two  boats  I  was  towing  from  Buresk. 

3.    "On    arriving   again    off  Emden   she   still    had    her 


158 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


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ON)                                                                                                                                                                       1 

Plan  of  Sydney  and  Emden  in  action 

colours  Up  at  mainmast  head.  I  inquired  by  signal. 
International  Code,  'Will  you  surrender?'  and  received 
a  reply  in  Morse,  'What  signal?  No  signal  books.'  I 
then  made  in  Morse  'Do  you  surrender?'  and  subsequently 
'Have  you  received  my  signal?'  to  neither  of  which  did  I 
get  an  answer.  The  German  officers  on  board  gave  me  to 
understand  that  the  Captain  would  never  surrender,  and 
therefore  though  reluctantly,  I  again  fired  at  her  at  4:30 
P.M.,  ceasing  at  4:35,  as  she  showed  white  flags  and  hauled 
down  her  ensign  by  sending  a  man  aloft. 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       159 

4.  "I  then  left  Eviden  and  returned  and  picked  up  the 
Buresk's  two  boats,  rescuing  2  sailors  (5:0  p.m.),  who  had 
been  in  the  water  all  day.  I  returned  and  sent  in  one 
boat  to  Emden,  manned  by  her  own  prize  crew  from 
Buresky  and  i  Officer,  and  stating  I  would  return  to  their 
assistance  next  morning.  This  I  had  to  do,  as  I  was 
desirous  to  find  out  the  condition  of  cables  and  Wireless 
Station  at  Direction  Island.  On  the  passage  over  I  was 
again  delayed  by  rescuing  another  sailor  (6:30  p.m.), 
and  by  the  time  I  was  again  ready  and  approaching 
Direction  Island  it  was  too  late  for  the  night. 

5.  "I  lay  on  and  off  all  night,  and  communicated  with 
Direction  Island  at  8:0  a.m.,  loth  November,  to  find  that 
the  Emden  s  party  consisting  of  3  Officers  and  40  men, 
I  launch  and  2  cutters  had  seized  and  provisioned  a  70-ton 
schooner  (the  Ayesha),  having  4  Maxims,  with  2  belts  to 
each.  They  left  the  previous  night  at  six  o'clock.  The 
Wireless  Station  was  entirely  destroyed,  i  cable  cut,  i 
damaged,  and  i  intact.  I  borrowed  a  Doctor  and  2 
Assistants,  and  proceeded  as  fast  as  possible  to  Emden  s 
assistance. 

6.  "I  sent  an  Officer  on  board  to  see  the  Captain,  and 
in  view  of  the  large  number  of  prisoners  and  wounded  and 
lack  of  accommodation,  etc.,  in  this  ship,  and  the  ab- 
solute impossibility  of  leaving  them  where  they  were, 
he  agreed  that  if  I  received  his  Officers  and  men  and  all 
wounded  'then  as  for  such  time  as  they  remained  in 
Sydney  they  would  cause  no  interference  with  ship  or 
fittings,  and  would  be  amenable  to  the  ship's  discipline.' 
I  therefore  set  to  work  at  once  to  tranship  them— a  most 
difficult  operation,  and  the  ship  being  on  the  weather  side 
of  the  Island  and  the  send  alongside  *  very  heavy.     The 

*/.  f.  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  sea. 


i6o        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

conditions  in  the  Emden  were  indescribable.  I  received 
the  last  from  her  at  5:0  p.m.,  then  had  to  go  round  to  the 
lee  side  to  pick  up  20  more  men  who  had  managed  to  get 
ashore  from  the  ship. 

7.  "Darkness  came  on  before  this  could  be  accom- 
plished, and  the  ship  again  stood  off  and  on  all  night, 
resuming  operations  at  5:0  a.m.  on  nth  November,  a 
cutter's  crew  having  to  land  with  stretchers  to  bring 
wounded  round  to  embarking  point.  A  German  Officer, 
a  Doctor,  died  ashore  the  previous  day.  The  ship  in 
the  meantime  ran  over  to  Direction  Island  to  return 
their  Doctor  and  Assistants,  send  cables,  and  was  back 
again  at  10:0  a.m.,  embarked  the  remainder  of  wounded 
and  proceeded  for  Colombo  by  10:35  a.m.,  Wednesday, 
nth  November. 

8.  "Total  casualties  in  Sydney:  killed  3,  severely  wound- 
ed (since  dead)  i,  severely  wounded  4,  wounded  4,  slightly 
wounded  4.  In  the  Emden  I  can  only  approximately 
state  the  killed  at  7  Officers  and  108  men  from  Captain's 
statement.  I  had  on  board  11  Officers,  9  Warrant 
Officers,  and  191  men,  of  whom  3  Officers  and  53  men 
were  w^ounded,  and  of  this  number  i  .Officer  and  3  men 
have  since  died  of  wounds. 

9.  "The  damage  to  Sydney's  hull  and  fittings  was 
surprisingly  small;  in  all  about  10  hits  seem  to  have  been 
made.  The  engine  and  boiler  rooms  and  funnels  escaped 
entirely. 

10.  "I  have  great  pleasure  in  stating  that  the  behaviour 
of  the  ship's  company  was  excellent  in  every  way,  and 
with  such  a  large  proportion  of  young  hands  and  people 
under  training  it  is  all  the  more  gratifying.  The  engines 
w^orked  magnificently,  and  higher  results  than  trials  were 
obtained,  and  I  cannot  speak  too  highly  of  the  Medical 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       i6i 

Staff  and  arrangements  on  subsequent  trip,  the  ship  being 
nothing  but   a   hospital  of  a   most   painful  description! 
"I  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 

*'Your  obedient  Servant, 
"John  C.  T.  Glossop, 

'^  Captain. ^^ 

The  first  point  of  interest  in  this  engagement  is  the 
rapidity  with  which  the  gunfire  on  both  sides  became 
effective.  Emden  made  no  attempt  to  get  away,  and 
opened  fire  before  Sydney  did,  and  at  a  range  of  10,500 
yards.  One  account  says  "her  first  shots  fell  well  to- 
gether for  range,  but  very  much  spread  out  for  line. 
They  were  all  within  twenty  yards  of  the  ship."  Either 
the  gun  range-finders  were  marvels  of  accuracy,  or  else 
they  had  great  luck  in  picking  up  the  range  so  quickly. 
This  account  proceeds:  "As  soon  as  her  first  salvo  had 
fallen  she  began  to  fire  very  rapidly  in  salvoes,  the  rate 
of  fire  being  as  high  as  ten  rounds  per  gun  per  minute, 
and  very  accurate  for  the  first  ten  minutes." 

I  draw  the  reader's  attention  particularly  to  this  phrase, 
because  it  reproduces  almost  verbatim  Commodore 
Tyrw^hitt's  comment  on  the  fire  of  the  German  cruisers 
in  his  third  action  of  the  Heligoland  affair.  We  find  the 
same  phenomenon  at  the  destruction  of  Koenigsberg, 
whose  guns  both  throughout  the  first  and  second  day  of 
that  affair  seem  to  have  had  the  exact  range  of  the  moni- 
tors. This  testimony  to  the  accuracy  of  the  enemy's 
fire  must  be  read  in  connection  with  Captain  GIossop's 
statement,  that  in  all  about  ten  hits  seem  to  have  been 
made.  All  accounts  agree  that  no  hits  were  made  after  the 
first  ten  minutes.  But  if  the  rate  of  Emden  s  fire  is 
correctly  given,  she  must  have  fired  500  rounds  in  this 


i62        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

phase  of  the  action.  Ten  hits  to  500  rounds  gives  2  per 
cent,  of  hits  only! 

The  explanation,  both  of  the  Rufigi  monitors  and  of 
Sydney's  comparative  immunity,  is  undoubtedly  the 
extreme  range  at  which  each  action  was  fought.  At 
such  ranges  a  gun  of  so  small  a  calibre  as  the  4.2  would 
have  to  be  raised  to  a  very  high  elevation.  The  pro- 
jectiles, therefore,  would  fall  very  steeply  towards  the 
target.  In  conditions  like  these  salvoes  may  fall  just 
short  and  just  over,  and  even  straddle  the  boat  fired  at, 
without  a  single  hit  being  made. 

But  of  the  excellence  of  the  Emden's  shooting  and  of 
her  control  of  fire — so  long  as  the  fire  was  controlled — 
there  can  be  no  shadow  of  doubt  whatever.  It  was  obvious 
that  if  the  battleships  were  equally  good,  the  German 
Fleet  would  prove  a  serious  foe.  We  must  certainly 
esteem  it  one  of  the  fortunate  chances  of  this  war  that 
when  Germany  was  building  her  Fleet,  her  naval  au- 
thorities were  convinced  that  all  fighting  would  be  at 
short  range.  Their  calculation  was  that  at  short  range 
a  rapid  and  accurate  fire  of  smaller  pieces  should  prove 
just  as  effective  as  the  slower  fire  of  larger  pieces.  Her 
cruisers  therefore  were  armed  with  4.2's  when  ours  were 
being  armed  w^ith  6-inch,  and  her  battleships  with  ii-inch 
guns  when  ours  were  being  fitted  with  12-inch  and  13.5's. 
In  the  case  of  battleships  and  battle-cruisers,  the  German 
constructors  had  their  eye  upon  a  further  advantage  in 
the  adoption  of  lighter  pieces.  The  weight  saved  could 
be  put,  and  in  fact  was  put,  into  a  more  thorough  armoured 
protection.  Von  Miiller,  the  captain  of  Emden,  when 
he  was  congratulated,  after  the  capture,  on  the  gallant 
fight  put  up,  was  at  first  seemingly  offended.  "He 
seemed  taken  aback  and  said  *No,'  and  went  away,  but 


CAPTURE  OF  H.I.G.M.S.  "EMDEN"       163 

presently  he  came  to  me  and  said,  Thank  you  very  much 
for  saying  that,  but  I  was  not  satisfied;  we  should  have 
done  better.  You  were  very  lucky  in  shooting  away  my 
voice  pipes  in  the  beginning.'  But  if  the  Germans  lost 
their  voice  pipes,  Sydney  lost  her  rangefinder  in  the  open- 
ing salvoes.  The  German  fire  control  had  not  survived 
the  derangement  of  its  communications.  It  was  not 
possible  to  extemporize  anything  to  take  their  place.  We 
do  not  hear  that  the  accuracy  of  Sydney's  fire  lost  anything 
when  the  rangefinder  went. 

Both  ships  appeared,  in  this  action,  to  have  employed, 
or  at  least  to  have  attempted  to  employ,  their  torpedoes. 
In  an  interview  with  Von  Miiller  reported  from  Colombo, 
he  is  said  to  have  explained  that  his  intention  in  closing 
Sydney  at  the  opening  of  the  engagement  was  not  to 
lessen  the  range  so  as  to  bring  the  ballistics  of  his  guns 
to  an  equality  with  ours,  but  to  get  Sydney  within  torpedo 
range.  Sydney  seems  certainly  to  have  fired  a  torpedo 
rather  less  than  half-way  through  the  action  when  the 
range  was  at  its  shortest.  But  as  in  the  Heligoland  affair, 
so  here,  the  difficulties  in  getting  a  hit  were  insuperable. 
That  Emden  did  not  fire  a  torpedo  at  the  same  time  is 
explained  by  the  fact  that  the  action  had  not  proceeded 
twenty  minutes  before  not  only  was  her  steering  gear 
wrecked,  so  that  she  had  to  steer  by  her  screws,  but  her 
submerged  torpedo  flat  also  was  put  out  of  action. 

All  accounts  of  the  action  agree  upon  the  excellent 
conduct  of  the  men  and  boys  on  board  Sydney.  A  letter 
published  in  The  Times  gives  us  many  evidences  of  this. 
"The  hottest  part  of  the  action  for  us  was  the  first  half- 
hour.  We  opened  fire  from  our  port  guns  to  begin  with. 
I  was  standing  just  behind  No.  i  port,  and  the  gun-layer 
(Atkins,  1st  class  Petty  Officer)  said,  'Shall  I  load,  sir?' 


i64        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

I  was  surprised,  but  deadly  keen  there  should  be  no  'flap,' 
so  said,  'No,  don't  load  till  you  get  the  order.'  Next  he 
said,  'Emdens  fired,  sir.'  So  I  said  'All  right,  load,  but 
don't  bring  the  gun  to  the  ready.'  I  found  out  after- 
wards that  the  order  to  load  had  been  received  by  the  other 
guns  ten  minutes  before,  and  my  anti-'flap'  precautions, 
though  they  did  not  the  slightest  harm,  were  thrown 
away  on  Atkins,  who  was  as  cool  as  a  cucumber  throughout 
the  action."  It  was  the  boys'  quarters  on  board  that 
suffered  most  from  Emdens  fire.     The  same  writer  says: 

"Our  hits  were  not  very  serious.  We  were  'hulled' 
in  about  three  places.  The  shell  that  exploded  in  the 
boys'  mess  deck,  apart  from  ruining  the  poor  little 
beggars'  clothes,  provided  a  magnificent  stock  of  trophies. 
For  two  or  three  days  they  kept  finding  fresh  pieces." 

They  were  probably  consoled  for  the  lost  wardrobe 
by  this  treasure  of  souvenirs. 

"There  are  lots  of  redeeming  points  in  the  whole  show. 
Best  of  all  was  to  see  the  gun's  crew  fighting  their  guns 
quite  unconcerned.  When  we  were  last  in  Sydney  we 
took  on  board  three  boys  from  the  training  ship  Tingira, 
who  had  volunteered.  The  captain  said,  'I  don't  really 
want  them,  but  as  they  are  keen  I'll  take  them.'  Now 
the  action  was  only  a  week  or  two  afterwards,  but  the 
two  out  of  the  three  who  were  directly  under  my  notice 
were  perfectly  splendid.  One  little  slip  of  a  boy  did  not 
turn  a  hair,  and  worked  splendidly.  The  other  boy,  a 
very  sturdy  youngster,  carried  projectiles  from  the  hoist 
to  his  gun  throughout  the  action  without  so  much  as 
thinking  of  cover.  I  do  think  for  two  boys  absolutely 
new  to  their  work  they  were  splendid."* 

*The  (slightly  modified)  plan  of  this  action  is  reproduced  by  the  kind  per- 
mission of  the  Editor  of  the  Times. 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  Career  of  Von  Spee 

At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  strategic  position  in 
the  Pacific  and  Indian  oceans  should  have  been  one  that 
could  have  caused  no  possible  naval  anxiety  to  the  Allies. 
Japan  had  at  once  thrown  in  her  lot  with  us,  and  as 
we  had  squadrons  in  the  China  Seas,  in  the  Indian  Ocean, 
and  in  Australasia  there  was,  when  the  forces  of  our 
eastern  allies  are  added  to  them,  a  total  naval  strength 
incalculably  greater  than  that  at  the  disposal  of  the  enemy. 
But  this  fact  notwithstanding,  there  was  for  some  months 
extraordinarv'  uncertainty,  and  the  arrangements  adopted 
by  the  Admiralty  permitted  a  serious  attack  to  be  made 
on  our  shipping  and  involved  a  tragic  disaster  to  a  British 
squadron.  The  facts  of  the  case  are  far  from  being 
completely  known,  but  the  main  features  of  the  original 
situation  and  its  development  make  it  possible  to  draw 
certain  broad  inferences,  which  are  probably  correct. 

In  the  summer  of  1914  the  German  sea  forces  at  Tsing- 
Tau  consisted  of  two  armoured  cruisers,  two  light  cruisers, 
certain  destroyers  and  gun-boats.  Leaving  the  destroyers 
and  gun-boats  behind.  Von  Spee  in  the  month  of  June 
abandoned  his  base  at  Tsing-Tau,  and,  after  calling  at 
Nagasaki,  made  for  the  German  possessions  in  the  Caro- 
line Islands.  His  flag  flew  in  Schar7ihorst,  and  this  ship  with 
liei  sister  vessel  Gneisenaii  constituted  his  main  strength, 
lie  had  the  two  light  cruisers,  Leipzig  and  Emden,  in  his 
company,  and  on  July  20,  when  the  situation  was  becom- 

i6s 


i66        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ing  acute,  he  ordered  Niinibergy  which  was  at  San  Fran- 
cisco, and  Dresden,  which  was  at  Vera  Cruz,  at  the  other 
side  of  the  American  continent,  to  join  him.  Nurnberg 
reached  him  in  a  couple  of  weeks;  Dresden  not  till  the  end 
of  October.  By  mid-August,  then,  his  force  consisted 
of  two  armoured  cruisers,  each  with  a  broadside  of  six 
8-inch  and  three  6-inch  guns,  and  three  light  cruisers 
armed  only  with  4-inch.  Of  the  light  cruisers  Emden 
and  Nurnberg  had  a  speed  of  between  25  and  26  knots; 
Leipzig  of  about  23  or  24.  The  fighting  value  of  the 
armoured  cruisers  was  approximately  equal  to  that  of 
Minotaur  and  Defence  and  probably  superior  to  that  of 
the  Warrior  class.  The  German  8-inch  guns  fired  a  pro- 
jectile only  slightly  lighter  than  the  British  9.2,  so  that, 
gun  for  gun,  there  should  have  been  little  to  choose 
between  them;  while  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  control 
of  fire,  the  broadside  of  six  homogeneous  guns  could 
probably  be  used  quite  as  effectively  as  a  mixed  armament 
of  four  9.2's  and  five  7.5's,  and  more  so  than  one  of  four 
9,2's  and  two  7.5's.  To  engage  such  a  squadron  with  the 
certainty  of  success,  therefore,  at  least  three  British 
armoured  cruisers  of  the  latest  type  would  have  been 
required. 

Neither  of  the  British  squadrons  in  eastern  waters 
possessed  the  combination  of  speed  and  power  that  would 
have  made  them  superior  to  Von  Spee's  force.  Vice-Ad- 
miral  Jerram,  in  the  China  station,  had  under  his  command 
Triumph,  Minotaur,  Hampshire,  Newcastle,  and  Yarmouth. 
But  Triumph  was  not  in  commission  at  the  outbreak  of 
war,  and,  though  armed  with  lo-inch  guns,  she  was  three 
knots  slower  than  the  German  cruisers.  Sir  Richard 
Peirse's  command  in  the  East  Indies  consisted  of  Szviftsure, 
a  sister  ship  of  Triumph;  Dartmouth,  a  cruiser  of  the  same 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  167 

class  as  Newcastle;  and  Fox^  a  cruiser  of  old  and  slow  type. 
Neither  squadron,  then,  could  have  sought  for  Von  Spee 
with  any  hope  of  bringing  him  to  action,  if  he  choose  to 
avoid  it,  or  with  any  certainty  of  defeating  him,  if  he  ac- 
cepted battle.  Australia  possessed  a  navy  of  her  own  of 
vastly  greater  force  than  either  of  these  outpost  forces  of 
the  mother-country.  Of  ships  finished,  commissioned, 
and  ready  for  sea,  it  consisted  of  Australia,  a  battle-cruiser 
of  the  Indefatigable  class;  two  protected  cruisers  of  the 
Dartmouth  type,  Sydney  and  Melbourne;  and  Encounter^ 
a  sister  ship  of  Challenger,  with  destroyers  and  submarines. 
A  fast  light  cruiser,  Brisbane,  and  some  destroyers  were 
building.  In  the  Japanese  Navy  the  Allies  had,  of  course, 
resources  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  enemy's  strength.  ' 
When  war  became  imminent  Admiral  von  Spee,  as  we 
have  seen,  left  his  base  for  the  Polynesian  islands.  He 
did  this  because  it  was  obvious  that  he  could  not  keep 
Tsing-Tau  open  in  face  of  the  strength  that  the  combined 
Japanese  and  British  forces  could  bring  to  bear  against 
it,  and  to  have  been  trapped  would  have  been  fatal.  The 
same  reasons  that  made  him  abandon  Tsing-Tau  forbade 
his  tr>'ing  to  keep  possession  of  Rabaud  in  the  Bismarck 
Archipelago.  He  faced  his  future,  then,  without  a  base — 
just  as  SufFren  did  in  1781.  There  were  several  elements 
peculiar  to  the  situation  that  made  this  possible.  In  the 
coast  towns  of  Chile  and  Peru  the  Germans  had  a  very 
large  number  of  commercial  houses  and  agents,  and  there 
were  German  ships  in  every  South  American  port.  Their 
trade  with  the  islands  was  considerable  and,  no  doubt 
long  before  war,  it  had  been  arranged  that,  on  receiving 
the  right  warning,  a  great  deal  of  shipping  should  be 
equipped  and  mobilized  to  supply  the  German  squadron. 
The  widely  scattered  German  outposts  afforded   also  a 


i68         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

service  hardly  less  valuable  than  coal  and  food.  They 
constituted  an  intelligence  organization  that  was  indispen- 
sable. Having  no  base,  and  no  source  of  supply  other  than 
these  German  houses  in  South  America  and  the  islands, 
it  was  inevitable  that  Von  Spee  should  look  to  the  east, 
and  not  to  the  west,  in  any  operations  that  he  undertook, 
if  those  operations  were  to  be  extended  and  made  by  a 
squadron,  and  not  by  detached  ships.  In  discussing, 
then,  the  strategy  which  the  German  Admiralty  pursued, 
these  facts  must  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

Of  warlike  policies  he  had  a  choice  of  two.  He  might 
either  keep  his  ships  together  and  embark  on  a  war  of 
squadrons,  or  he  could  scatter  his  ships  and  devote  himself 
to  commerce  destruction.  In  the  first  case,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  could  only  look  for  objectives  in  the  east.  In 
the  alternative  the  greatest  fields  of  his  operations  were 
either  north  of  the  Carolines,  where  the  Chinese  trade 
could  be  attacked;  or  northwest,  where  the  Asiatic  and 
Australian  trades  converge  to  Colombo;  or  still  farther 
to  the  west,  where  the  whole  eastern  trade  runs  into  the 
mouth  of  the  Red  Sea.  To  the  eastward  there  was  no 
focal  point  of  trade  where  great  results  could  have  been 
achieved — unless  indeed  he  took  his  ships  round  the  Horn 
to  attack  the  River  Plate  trade  or,  better  still,  the  main 
route  that  passes  Pernambuco.  It  was  an  obvious  truth 
of  the  situation  that,  according  as  the  attack  on  trade 
promised  great  results,  so  would  that  attack  encounter 
the  greatest  dangers,  for  it  seemed  to  be  a  certainty  that 
the  focal  points  would  be  the  best  protected.  The  most 
frequented  of  these,  the  approaches  to  the  Red  Sea,  were 
also  the  furthest  from  his  source  of  supply,  and  had  he  in 
fact  resolved  upon  commerce  destruction,  his  ships  would 
have  had  to  maintain  themselves,  as  did  Emde?!,  by  coal- 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  169 

ing  and  re-victualling  out  of  the  prizes  that  they  took. 
The  advantage  of  scattering  and  going  for  the  trade  ruth- 
lessly would  have  been  the  virtual  certainty  of  inflicting 
very  formidable  damage  indeed  of  an  economic  kind.  The 
advantage  of  keeping  his  squadron  together  was  the 
chance  of  some  coup  that  would  turn  the  scale — even  if 
only  for  a  time — in  his  country's  favour.  The  disadvan- 
tages of  the  first  policy  w^ere  that  there  was  the  certainty 
that  each  ship  would  ultimately  be  run  down  and  de- 
stroyed by  superior  force,  and  grave  risk  that  one  or  more 
ships  would  be  paralyzed  by 'want  of  supplies,  before  a 
sufficient  destruction  of  trade  could  justify  the  sacrifice. 
The  weakness  of  the  second  was  that,  as  a  squadron,  his 
ships  might  accomplish  nothing  at  all, 

I  have  so  far  discussed  the  German  Admiral's  alterna- 
tives as  if  they  had  been  debated  at  the  time  when  war 
became  certain.  But  it  can  be  taken  for  granted  that 
the  principles  on  which  he  acted  were  not  solely  his  own, 
but  had  determined  German  policy  in  this  matter  long 
before.  And,  in  the  main,  the  decisive  arguments  prob- 
ably arose  from  the  character  of  his  force. 

Writing  in  1905,  Admiral  Sir  Reginald  Custance  exposed 
the  whole  tissue  of  fallacies  on  which  the  policy  of  building 
armoured  cruisers  had  been  based.  The  main  duties 
of  cruising  ships  are,  first,  to  assist  in  winning  and  main- 
taining command  of  the  sea,  by  acting  as  scouts  and  con- 
necting links  between  the  battle  squadrons,  and,  secondly, 
to  exercise  command,  once  it  has  been  established  by  the 
attack  on  and  defence  of  trade.  For  the  successful  dis- 
charge of  these  functions  the  essential  element  is  that  the 
cruisers  should  be  numerous.  So  long  as  their  speed  is 
equal,  or  superior,  to  that  of  the  enemy  cruisers,  there  is 
no  reason  why  their  individual  strength  should  be  greatly 


I70        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

or  at  all  superior.  The  armoured  variety  represents, 
roughly  speaking,  the  value  of  three  cruisers  of  ordinary 
type,  and  is  manned  by  a  crew  almost  proportionately 
larger.  When  first  designed,  it  was  possible  to  build  these 
large  cruisers  of  a  speed  superior  to  that  of  the  smaller 
vessels,  and  having  this  monopoly,  the  French  invented 
the  type  in  pursuance  of  the  idea  that  a  sea  war  that  con- 
sisted chiefly  of  attacks  on  commerce,  promised  brighter 
prospects  than  one  which  could  not  succeed  unless  based 
on  battle-fleet  supremacy.  But  this  monopoly  vanished 
nearly  twenty  years  ago.  For  cruising  purposes  proper, 
then,  this  bastard  type,  while  individually  enormously 
more  powerful  than  the  light  cruiser,  was  slower  and  so 
could  not  cover  even  one-third  of  the  ground  of  its  equiva- 
lent value  in  the  smaller  vessels.  Over  nine-tenths  of  the 
field  of  cruising,  then,  it  represents  a  loss  of  between  60 
and  70  per  cent,  of  war  efficiency,  and  this  merely  from 
its  size. 

But  because  size  means  cost  and  because  cost  has  cer- 
tain definite  influences  on  the  human  appreciation  of 
values,  it  was  confidently  prophesied  that  no  one  in  com- 
mand of  a  number  of  units  of  this  value  could  fail  to  give 
an  undue  consideration  to  the  importance  of  conserving 
them.  Armoured  cruisers,  in  short,  would  never  be 
treated  as  cruisers  at  all,  but  would  be  kept  in  squadrons, 
just  as  capital  ships  are  kept,  partly  to  ensure  a  blow  of  the 
maximum  strength,  if  to  strike  came  within  the  possibili- 
ties of  the  situation,  much  more,  however,  for  the  protec- 
tive value  of  mutual  support,  for  fear  of  an  encounter  with 
superior  force.  This  protective  tendency  would  obvi- 
ously have  a  further  and  much  more  disastrous  eff'ect  upon 
the  cruising  value  of  such  vessels.  It  would  simply  mean 
that,  instead  of  each  doing  one-third  of  what  three  smaller 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  171 

cruisers  of  the  same  value  might  have  done,  they  would 
really  do  no  cruising,  properly  so  called,  at  all;  and  not 
only  this,  but  would  probably  monopoHze  the  work  of 
two  or  three  small  cruisers  to  act  as  special  scouts  of  a 
squadron  so  composed,  so  diverting  these  units  in  turn 
from  their  proper  duties.  If  any  one  will  take  the  trouble 
to  read  the  chapter  in  Barfleur's  "Naval  Policy"  dealing 
with  this  topic,  he  will  find  in  Von  Spee's  conduct  an  exact 
exemplification  of  what  that  accompHshed  and  gallant 
author  suggested  must  happen.  Von  Spee's  policy,  in 
other  words,  was  probably  settled  for  him  by  the  logic  of 
the  situation  and  the  doctrine  which  prevailed  to  create  it. 
Von  Spee  actually  did,  then,  what  it  was  fully  antici- 
pated he  would  do.  He  kept  his  ships  together  and  travel- 
led slowly  eastward,  maintaining  himself  in  absolute 
secrecy  from  the  outbreak  of  war  until  November  i. 
What  were  his  exact  hopes  in  the  policy  pursued,  and 
what  the  consideration  that  led  him  to  adopt  it?  His 
hopes  of  achieving  any  definite  strategic  result  can  only 
have  been  slender.  The  composition  of  his  force  was  so 
well  known  that  he  could  hardly  have  supposed  it  possible 
that  he  would  ever  meet  a  squadron  of  inferior  strength. 
He  cannot,  then,  primarily  have  contemplated  the  possi- 
bility of  any  sort  of  naval  victory.  Failing  this,  he  may 
have  had  various  not  very  precisely  defined  ideas  in  his 
mind.  There  was  to  begin  with  the  possibility  of  picking 
up  a  sufficient  number  of  German  reservists  off  the  South 
American  coast  to  have  made  it  possible,  not  only  to  attack 
and  seize  the  Falkland  Islands,  but  actually  to  have  oc- 
cupied them  by  an  extemporized  military  force.  This, 
as  we  know,  he  did  attempt.  He  might  further  have  con- 
templated crossing  the  South  Atlantic  to  the  Cape,  with 
a  view  to  supporting  an  insurrection  of  the  Boers,  if  that 


172        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

materialized,  or  in  any  event  of  backing  up  the  German 
colonists,  who  would  be  open  to  attack.  Or,  having 
struck  a  blow  at  the  Falkland  Islands,  he  might  have  sent 
his  ships  on  a  final  mission  in  raiding  the  Atlantic  trade. 
So  long  as  his  squadron  was  afloat,  there  were  many  possi- 
bilities—and always  a  certainty  that  it  would  force  counter 
concentration  on  his  opponents  and  thereby  embarrass 
them  in  the  task  of  searching  for  him. 

But  one  thing  was  certain.  He  could  not  comDme 
squadron  war  with  commercial  war.  Emden  he  detached 
in  August  to  attack  the  trade  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  But 
the  only  support  he  could  lend  her  was  such  immunity 
from  pursuit  as  would  result  from  the  concentration  he 
forced  upon  the  British  forces.  It  is  highly  probable 
that,  had  he  sent  all  his  ships  on  the  same  mission,  he 
would  have  had  at  least  a  month's  run  before  effective 
measures  could  be  taken,  if  only  for  the  fact,  possibly 
unknown  to  him,  that  so  large  a  part  of  the  Allied  forces 
were  being  devoted  to  convoying  the  Australian  troops. 

CORONEL 

But  whatever  the  risks  and  difficulties  of  trade  war,  the 
uncertainties  of  doing  anything  at  all  as  a  squadron  were 
really  greater,  and  the  final  fate  of  his  ships  more  certain. 
Whatever  his  hopes  of  striking  a  blow  for  his  country's 
profit  or  prestige,  he  could  hardly,  even  in  his  most  san- 
guine moments,  have  anticipated  anything  so  extraordi- 
nary as  Admiral  Cradock's  attack  on  him  on  November  i. 

The  full  story  of  this  ill-fated  British  force  is  still  to  be 
told.  Nor  can  what  we  know  be  made  fully  intelligible 
until  we  have  at  least  the  actual  words  of  Admiral  Cra- 
dock's instructions.  But  certain  inferences  from  his 
actions  show  that  whatever  those  instructions  were,  his 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  173 

own  understanding  of  them  is  not  in  doubt  at  all.  Briefly, 
the  facts  of  the  case  are  these: 

Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  war  Admiral  Cradock 
transferred  his  flag  from  Suffolk  to  Good  Hope  and  made 
his  way  round  the  Horn,  taking  Monmouth,  Glasgow,  and 
the  liner  Otranto  with  him.  The  old  battleship,  Canoptis, 
was  despatched  from  home  to  join  his  flag,  and  actually 
caught  him  up  some  time  before  the  action.  The  Canopus 
needed  time  either  for  refitting,  to  coal,  or  to  re-provision, 
and  the  Admiral,  instead  of  waiting  for  her,  pursued  his 
way  north  with  his  original  three  ships. 

Before  Ca^iopus  joined  the  flag  the  last  letters  written 
by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  squadron  were  posted,  and 
in  one  of  these  a  member  of  his  staff  stated  that  the  general 
feeling  was  that  the  ships  were  inadequate  to  the  task  set 
before  them,  and  so  far,  at  least,  as  their  mission  was  con- 
cerned, the  naval  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  was  not 
being  employed  to  any  useful  purpose. 

Certain  truths  with  regard  to  the  force  that  Cradock 
took  north,  and  of  the  force  that  he  attacked,  should  be 
borne  in  mind.  Good  Hope,  Monmouth,  and  Glasgow  were 
as  a  squadron,  markedly  faster  than  Von  Spee's  squadron. 
Whether  the  Otranto  was  capable  of  more  than  22  or  23 
knots  I  do  not  know;  but  the  three  warships  certainly  had 
the  heels  of  the  Germans.  It  is,  then,  obvious  that  if 
Admiral  Cradock's  staff"  regarded  themselves  and  their 
ships  as  inadequate  or  in  danger,  it  cannot  have  been  be- 
cause, had  the  enemy  attacked  them,  they  would  have 
been  unable  to  escape.  It  is  next  equally  obvious  that 
had  the  Admiral  kept  Canopus  with  him,  while  the  pace 
of  the  squadron  would  have  been  brought  down  from  23 
knots  to  15,  its  fighting  value,  as  measured  by  broadside 
power,   would   have  been  very  much   greater  than  Von 


174         THE  BRITISH  NAV\'  IN  BATTLE 

Spec's.  That  Von  Spec  at  least  thought  so  is  clear  from 
his  published  letters. 

Without  Canopus,  then,  Cradock  would  have  been  safe 
if  he  had  run  away.  With  Canopus  he  would  have  been 
reasonably  safe  if  he  had  awaited  the  enemy's  attack. 
The  significance  of  the  letter  which  I  have  alluded  to  is 
that  it  was  written  by  a  man  to  whom  neither  of  these 
contingencies  seemed  to  be  open.  The  superiority  in 
speed  which  would  always  have  made  it  possible  for  Cra- 
dock to  evade  Von  Spee  was  also  the  one  quality  of  his 
ships  that  gave  him  capacity  to  attack  the  Germans  if 
they  showed  any  signs  of  avoiding  action.  No  doubt, 
if  the  Germans  would  have  awaited  action  by  a  squadron 
which  included  the  Canopus  Admiral  Cradock's  chances 
might  have  been  brilliant.  But  if  he  started  out  to  look 
for  Von  Spee  with  a  15-knot  squadron,  his  chances  for 
acting  swiftly  on  any  information  that  came  his  way 
would  have  been  greatly  reduced;  and  to  have  limited  his 
advance  to  15  knots  would  have  been  handing  over  the 
initiative  in  the  matter  entirely  to  the  enemy. 

Bearing  these  elements  in  mind  and  noting  first  that 
the  British  Admiral  deliberately  left  Canopus  behind; 
next,  that  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  November  i, 
when  the  presence  of  an  enemy  was  suspected  to  the  north, 
he  at  once  ordered  all  ships  to  close  on  Good  Hope,  and 
continued  when  the  squadron  was  formed,  to  advance 
against  the  enemy,  and  that  then,  when  he  saw  him,  in 
spite  of  the  bad  weather  and  bad  Hght,  at  once  announced 
that  he  intended  to  attack  him,  the  inference  is  irresistible 
that  he  thought  it  his  duty  to  find  and  attack  the  enemy, 
and  that  he  refused  to  interpret  the  sending  of  Canopus  to 
mean  that  he  could  judge  for  himself  whether  or  not  he  was 
in  sufficient  force  to  attack.     He  acted,  that  is  to  say,  as 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  175 

no  man  would  act  unless  he  believed  his  mission  to  be  of  a 
peremptory  and  quite  unmistakable  kind. 

So  much,  I  think,  is  clear  from  the  few  known  facts  of 
the  case.  Whether  Admiral  Cradock  was  right  in  so  in- 
terpreting his  orders  is,  of  course,  another  matter.  Of 
that  no  one  can  judge  until  the  orders  themselves  are 
pubHshed,  and  then  only  those  who  are  familiar  with  the 
precise  meaning  of  the  phrases  employed.  Of  the  instruc- 
tions themselves,  then,  I  express  no  opinion.  I  am  only 
concerned  with  the  light  that  Admiral  Cradock's  actions 
throw  on  his  own  interpretation  of  them. 

Two  official  descriptions  of  the  action  have  been  pub- 
lished. Captain  Luce's,  and  the  Graf  von  Spee's  despatches. 
There  are  further  the  private  letters  of  the  German 
Admiral,  of  his  son  Otto,  and  that  of  a  lieutenant  of 
the  Glasgow.  All  of  these  are  in  substantial  agreement 
in  their  statement  of  the  facts — an  unusual  thing,  to  be 
explained  perhaps  quite  simply.  The  British  officers 
naturally  told  the  truth  about  the  fate  of  the  squadron; 
and  the  German  success  was  so  complete  that  there  was 
no  reason  for  the  Government  to  exaggerate  or  garble  the 
straightforw'ard  and  not  ungenerous  statements  of  the 
German  sailors.  It  is  to  Von  Spee's  credit  that  he  de- 
clined any  public  rejoicings  by  the  German  colony  at 
Valparaiso,  when  he  visited  that  port  directly  after  the 
action  to  secure  the  internment  of  Good  Hope^  of  whose 
fate  he  was  uncertain. 

The  story  of  the  fight  is  simple  enough.  Admiral  Cra- 
dock formed  his  ships  in  line  with  Good  Hope  leading,  then 
Alonmouthy  then  Glasgow.  Otranto  he  ordered  away  as 
soon  as  battle  became  imminent,  and  Glasgow  shortly 
afterwards.  Von  Spee  criticizes  the  British  Admiral  for 
not  attacking  the  two  armoured  cruisers  during  the  half 


176        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

hour  that  elapsed  between  the  formation  of  the  Fleet 
while  Nurnberg  and  Dresden  were  coming  up  full  speed  to 
join  the  line.  At  6:30  the  two  lines  were  on  nearly  parallel 
and  southerly  courses  at  a  distance  of  about  14,700  yards. 
Twenty  minutes  later  Von  Spee  had  closed  the  range  about 
1,200  yards,  and  he  then  altered  course  a  point  towards 
the  enemy,  and  this,  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  brought  the 
range  to  about  11,000  yards.  He  then  opened  fire  and, 
five  minutes  later,  got  his  first  hit  with  a  salvo  on  Good 
Hope.  He  had  the  best  of  the  light,  and  it  was  obvious 
to  him  that  the  British  gunnery  suffered  more  from  the 
heavy  seas  than  did  his  own.  As  in  neither  squadron 
could  any  but  the  upper-deck  guns  be  used,  the  Germans 
had  an  overwhelmingly  superior  armament  in  action — 
their  twelve  8-inch  guns  having  nothing  opposed  to  them 
except  the  two  9:2  o^  Good  Hope  and  the  upper-deck  6-inch 
guns  of  Good  Hope  and  Monmouth.  Inferior  metal  and  the 
more  difficult  conditions  soon  told  their  tale.  In  the 
quarter  of  an  hour  during  which  the  German  Admiral 
closed  the  range  from  11,000  yards  to  less  than  7,000,  he 
says  ''both  the  British  cruisers  were  practically  covered 
by  the  German  fire,  whereas  Scharnhorst  was  hit  only 
twice,  and  Gneisenau  only  four  times,"  The  German 
Admiral  now  sheered  off,  and  it  looks  as  if  Admiral  Cra- 
dock  had  then  begun  to  close.  An  English  account  sup- 
poses that  Good  Hope  was  drifting  and  not  under  control. 
Anyhow,  the  range,  in  spite  of  the  German  change  of 
course,  was  reduced  by  another  1,200  yards,  and  the  Ger- 
mans thought  that  the  British  Admiral  contemplated  a 
torpedo  attack.  About  fifty  minutes  after  the  action 
commenced  there  was  an  enormous  explosion  in  Good  Hope 
which  had  been  on  fire  some  time.  The  people  in  Glasgow 
for  a  time  thought  it  was  the  German  flagship  that  had 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  177 

gone,  so  short  had  the  range  become.  Neither  of  our 
armoured  cruisers  fired  after  this,  and  the  Germans  seem 
to  have  lost  sight  of  Good  Hope  altogether,  in  spite  of  her 
proximity.  Monmouth,  listing  badly  and  on  fire,  turned 
to  keep  bows  on  to  the  sea,  and  Von  Spee  sent  his  Hght 
cruisers  in  pursuit  of  her.  She  kept  her  flag  flying  to  the 
last  and  was  sunk,  an  hour  and  a  half  after  Good  Hope 
blew  up,  by  a  short  range  attack  by  Nilrnberg. 

Both  ships  could,  of  course,  quite  honourably  have 
saved  themselves  once  their  case  had  become  hopeless, 
had  their  officers  chosen  to  surrender.  But  it  was  with 
no  thought  of  surrendering  that  they  had  engaged,  and 
the  stoic  heroism  of  their  end  is  the  noblest  legacy  they 
could  have  left  to  their  fellow  countrymen.  Glasgow 
kept  with  Alonmouth  as  long  as  she  could;  but  her  orders 
from  the  Admiral  had  been  explicit,  and  it  was  obvious 
that  she  could  not  single-handed  engage  the  undamaged 
German  squadron,  nor  be  of  the  slightest  service  to  Mon- 
mouth had  she  attempted  to  do  so.  Captain  Luce,  quite 
rightly  therefore,  retreated  from  the  scene. 

A  private  letter,  written  a  day  after  the  action  by  the 
German  Admiral,  throvvs  an  interesting  light  on  the 
situation.  After  recounting  the  unimportant  character 
of  the  damage  suff'ered  by  his  ships,  he  adds,  "I  do  not 
know  what  adverse  circumstances  deprived  the  enemy 
of  every  measure  of  success.  ...  If  Good  Hope,''*  he  wrote 
"escaped  she  must,  in  my  opinion,  make  for  a  Chilean 
port  on  account  of  her  damages.  To  make  sure  of  this  I 
intend  going  to  Valparaiso  to-morrow  with  Gneisenau 
and  Niirnberg,  and  to  see  whether  Good  Hope  could  not 
be  disarmed  by  the  Chileans.  If  so,  I  shall  be  relieved 
of  two  powerful  opponents.  Good  Hope,  though  bigger 
than  Scharnhorsty  was  not  so  well  armed.     She  mounted 


178        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

heavy  guns,  but  only  two,  while  Monmouth  succumbed 
to  Scharnhorst's  as  she  had'only  6-mch  guns.  The  English 
have  another  ship  like  Monmouth  hereabouts  and,  in 
addition,  as  it  seems,  a  battleship  of  the  Queen  class 
carr^nng  12-inch  guns.  Against  the  latter  we  can  hardly 
do  anything.  Had  they  kept  their  force  together,  we 
should  probably  have  got  the  worst  of  it.  You  can 
hardly  imagine  the  joy  which  reigned  among  us.  We 
have  at  least  contributed  something  to  the  glory  of  our 
arms,  although  it  may  not  mean  much  on  the  whole  and 
in  view  of  the  enormous  number  of  English  ships." 

Viewing  this  action  apart  from  the  circumstances  that 
led  up  to  it  and  the  magnificent  spirit  and  self-sacrifice 
displayed,  its  technical  and  historical  interest  lies  chiefly 
in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  only  instance  in  the  war  in  which 
an  inferior  force  has  sought  action  with  one  incomparably 
Stronger.  The  weaker,  not  only  sought  battle,  but 
apparently  executed  no  defensive  manoeuvres  of  any  kind 
whatever.  We  shall  find,  for  instance,  no  parallel  in 
Coronel  to  the  tactics  of  Von  Spee  at  the  Falkland  Islands, 
or  to  those  of  Admiral  Scheer  at  Jutland.  And  it  is 
perhaps  remarkable  that  the  British  Admiral,  once  having 
determined  on  action  which  he  must  have  known  would 
be  desperate,  did  not  either  at  once  attempt  to  close  the 
enemy  at  full  speed,  so  as  to  give  his  very  inferior  artillery 
and  his  torpedoes  a  chance  of  inflicting  serious  damage 
on  the  enemy  while  daylight  lasted,  or  delay  closing 
until  bad  light  would  make  long-range  gunnery  impossible, 
in  a  melee  at  point  blank.  Anything  might  have  happened^ 
and  it  was  to  the  weaker  side's  interest  to  leave  as  much 
as  possible  to  chance. 

It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  the  total  result  of  the 
action  could  have  been  different  so  far  as  the  British 


THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SPEE  179 

squadron  is  concerned.  But  it  is  permissible  to  speculate 
as  to  whether  the  Germans  might  not  have  suffered  more, 
had  either  of  the  above  plans  been  followed.  The  reason- 
ing which  dictated  Admiral  Cradock's  tactics  can,  of 
course,  never  be  known. 

A  matter  of  considerable  technical  interest  is,  that 
though  two  armoured  cruisers  kept  firing  for  a  consider- 
able period,  it  is  quite  clear  from  Von  Spee's  despatch 
that  their  fire  was  completely  ineffective.  Everyone 
has  agreed  in  explaining  this  largely  by  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  gunnery  conditions,  but  it  is  surely  highly 
probable  that  the  chief  cause  is  to  be  found  in  the  fire 
of  the  German  ships  having,  so  far  as  the  power  of  offence 
is  concerned,  put  Good  Hope  and  Mommouth  out  of  action 
within  very  few  minutes  of  action  beginning.  All  accounts 
agree  in  the  Scharnhorsfs  salvo  having  found  Good  Hope 
within  five  minutes,  and  it  is  not  Hkely  that  Monmouth 
fared  any  better  at  the  hands  of  Gneisenau.  What  seems 
to  me  remarkable  is  the  length  of  time  the  ships  kept 
afloat  after  being  militarily  useless.  The  explosion  in 
Good  Hope  took  place  after  she  was  in  action  fifty  minutes, 
and  it  is  not  known  when  she  sank.  The  Monmouth 
survived  the  opening  salvoes  by  two  hours  and  twenty 
minutes,  and  to  the  last  seemed  to  have  her  engines  in 
perfect  working  order.  It  is  impossible,  I  think,  to  resist 
the  inference,  that  all  the  German  hitting,  except  the 
shell  that  caused  the  explosion  in  Good  Hope,  was  done  in 
the  first  few  minutes  of  action,  while  the  light  was  at  its 
best,  though  the  range  was  at  its  longest. 


CHAPTER  XII 
Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  (i) 

THE  CAREER  OF  VON  SFEE  (ll) 

The  Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  was  fought  on  De- 
cember 8th  by  a  squadron  under  Vice-Admiral  Sir  F. 
Doveton  Sturdee,  K.C.B.,  C.V.O.,  C.M.G.,  against  the 
German  China  Squadron — less  Emden^  but  strengthened 
by  the  addition  of  the  cruiser  Dresden.  Admiral  Sturdee's 
despatch  was  not  published  until  about  three  months 
after  the  action,  but  in  the  meantime  several  accounts 
appeared  in  various  newspapers,  and  smce  the  despatch 
was  published  others  have  been  printed  in  different 
magazines.  Of  no  other  action  in  the  war  have  we  such 
various  or  full  information  as  about  this.  It  will  perhaps 
be  a  convenient  way  of  dealing  with  this  extremely  in- 
structive and  important  engagement  to  reproduce  the 
Vice-Admiral's  despatch  textually,  and  to  supplement  it 
by  explanatory  notes,  and  incorporate  in  these  what  is 
most  material  of  the  additional  information  which  is 
available. 

The  despatch  begins  with  the  tabulation  of  the  sections 
into  which  the  despatch  is  divided:  ' 

A.  Preliminary  Movements. 

B.  Action  with  the  Armoured  Cruisers. 

C.  Action  with  the  Light  Cruisers. 

D.  Action  with  the  Enemy's  Transports. 

"The  squadron,   consisting  of  H.M.   ships   Invincible, 
flying    my    flag,    Flag    Captain    Percy   T.    H.    Beamish; 

180 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    i8i 

Inflexible,  Captain  Richard  F.  Phillimore;  Carnarvon 
flying  the  flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Archibald  P.  Stoddart, 
Flag  Captain  Harry  L.  d'E.  Skipwith;  Cornzually  Cap- 
tain Walter  M.  Ellerton;  Kent,  Captain  John  D.  Allen; 
Glasgozv,  Captain  John  Luce;  Bristol,  Captain  Basil  H. 
Fanshawe;  and  Macedonia,  Captain  Bertram  S.  Evans- 
arrived  at  Port  Stanley,  Falkland  Islands,  at  10:30  a.m. 
on  Monday,  the  7th  December,  191 4.  Coaling  was  com- 
menced at  once,  in  order  that  the  ships  should  be  ready 
to  resume  the  search  for  the  enemy's  squadron  the  next 
evening,  the  8th  December.'* 

T]he  account  previously  given  of  the  Graf  von  Spee*s 
movements  leading  up  to  and  subsequent  to  the  action 
off^  Coronel,  will  have  made  the  general  strategic  position 
in  the  Eastern  Pacific  and  Southern  Atlantic  more  or  less 
plain.     Of  his  ships,  however,  this  should  be  added.     The 
clear  light  and  prevalence  of  smooth  water  on  the  China 
Station  has  always  proved  an  incentive  to  good  gunnery, 
and  indeed  the  performances  of  the  Terrible,  when  Vice- 
Admiral  Sir  Percy  Scott  commanded  her  as  captain,  may 
be  regarded  as  the  starting  point  of  all  modern  gunnery 
skill.     It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  both  of  Von 
Spec's  ships  should  have  stood,  as  they  in  fact  did,  at  the 
head  of  the  German  Fleet  in  order  of  gunnery  merit.     And 
it  was  clear  from  their  performances  that  their  skill  was 
not  merely  limited  to  good  gun-laying.     Both  at  Coronel 
and  at  Falkland  Islands  they  gave  conclusive  evidence 
of  being   perfect    masters   of  such    fire   control    as   they 
possessed,   and    on   the   first    occasion   shot   superbly  in 
very    rough    weather.      They   therefore    constituted    an 
extremely    formidable    combination.     The    German    8.2 
shell  of  the  latest   type — with  which   these  ships   were 
armed — fired  a  projectile   very   nearly   as   heavy  as   did 


182 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


the  British  9.2's — ^the  actual  weights  are  320  pounds 
and  380.  The  percentage  is  roughly  8.4  to  10.  These 
two  ships  had  as  scouts  and  auxiliaries  the  Leipzig, 
Ntirnberg,  and  Dresden,  cruisers  of  similar  design;  but 
Dresden  was  considerably  faster  than  either  of  her 
consorts. 

After  the  destruction  of  the  Good  Hope  and  Monmouth, 
Von  Spee  cruised  for  a  short  time  in  the  Eastern  Pacific, 
and  then  made  his  way  in  leisurely  fashion  round  the  Horn 
with  the  intention  of  crossing  to  South  Africa.  In  a  fatal 
moment  he  decided  to  attack  the  British  Colony  at  Falk- 
land Islands  first,  and  it  was  this  that  brought  him  within 
reach  of  Admiral  Sturdee's  guns.  It  is  clear  enough  from 
his  conduct — let  alone  admissions  made  by  prisoners 
afterwards— that  he  had  no  idea  whatever  of  the  strength 
of  the  force  that  had  been  sent  out  to  attack  him.  He 
fully  expected  to  find  Canopus  at  Port  Stanley,  and  he 
thought  it  possible  that  Carnarvon  and  Glasgow  might  be 
there  also.  And  these  ships  he  was  quite  prepared  to 
engage.  It  was  quite  a  different  thing,  however,  to  take 
on  two  battle-cruisers  that  under  any  bearing  could  bring 
between  them  a  dozen  12-inch  guns  into  action  and,  on 
certain  bearings,  four  more.  As  will  be  seen  from  the 
despatch,  the  moment  he  reahzed  the  strength  against 
him,  he  adopted  what  seemed  the  only  possible  course, 
namely  flight. 

A.       PRELIMINARY      MOVEMENTS 

"At  8  A.M.  on  Tuesday,  the  8th  December;,  a  signal  was 
received  from  the  signal  station  on  shore: — 

"'  A  four-funnel  and   two-funnel  man-of-war  in  sight 
from  Sapper  Hill,  steering  northwards.* 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    183 

''At  this  time,  the  positions  of  the  various  ships  of 
the  squadron  were  as  follows: — 

''Macedonia:    At  anchor  as  look-out  ship. 
"Kent  (guardship):  At  anchor  in  Port  William. 
"Invincible   and   Inflexible:  In  Port  William. 
"Carnarvon:  In  Port  William. 
"Cornwall:  In  Port  Wilham. 
"Glasgow:  In  Port  Stanley. 
"Bristol:  In  Port  Stanley. 
"The  Kent  was  at  once  ordered  to  weigh,  and  a  general 
signal  was  made  to  raise  steam  for  full  speed. 

"At  8:20  A.M.  the  signal  station  reported  another 
column  of  smoke  in  sight  to  the  southward,  and  at  8:45 
A.M.  the  Kent  passed  down  the  harbour  and  took  up  a 
station  at  the  entrance. 

"The  Canopus,  Captain  Heathcoat  S.  Grant,  reported 
at  8:47  A.M.  that  the  first  two  ships  were  eight  miles  off, 
and  that  the  smoke  reported  at  8:20  a.m.  appeared  to  be 
the  smoke  of  two  ships  about  twenty  miles  off. 

"At  8:50  A.M.  the  signal  station  reported  a  further 
column  of  smoke  in  sight  to  the  southward. 

"The  Macedonia  was  ordered  to  weigh  anchor  on  the 
inner  side  of  the  other  ships,  and  await  orders." 

Here  the  signal,  it  will  be  observed,  says  "a  four-funnel 
and  two-funnel  man  of  war."  The  ships  were  probably 
end  on  when  they  were  seen,  and  in  the  Niirnberg  there 
was  a  considerable  gap  between  the  after-funnel  and  the 
two  forward  funnels.  Seen  from  a  point  a  little  off  the 
direct  keel  Hne,  she  would  seem  therefore  to  have  two 
funnels  only. 

Port  William  and  Port  Stanley  are  two  inlets  with  a 
tongue  of  land  between  them,  and  opposite  this  tongue 
of  land  is  the  channel  to  the  sea.     Port  Stanley  is  in  the 


i84        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

more  southerly  division  of  the  harbour,  which  is  also  the 
larger  of  the  two.  Canopus  was  anchored  to  the  eastward 
of  the  town  of  Port  Stanley,  so  that  her  guns  could  fire 
over  the  low-lying  land  between  her  and  the  sea.  The 
land  rises  to  the  north  as  it  creeps  round  towards  the 
mouth  of  the  harbour,  and  on  this  higher  land  there  was 
an  observation  station  where  arrangements  had  been  made 
by  which  the  fire  of  Canopus  could  be  directed  out  to  sea 
at  any  squadron  that  threatened  to  attack.  The  reader 
is  therefore  to  imagine  the  Macedonia  lying  in  the  outside 
mouth  of  the  harbour;  Ke7it  anchored  in  the  channel  half 
way  between  Macedonia  and  where  the  harbour  divides 
Port  Stanley  to  the  south  and  Port  William  to  the  north; 
with  Inflexible,  Invincible,  and  Carnarvon  anchored  in 
line  in  Port  WiUiam;  the  Bristol  and  Glasgow  in  the  south- 
ern bay,  with  Port  Stanley  behind  them  to  the  westward, 
and  Canopus  behind  them  to  the  east. 

The  Vice-Admiral  wasted  no  time.  As  a  fact,  all  his 
ships  were  then  coaling.  And  the  officers  not  engaged 
in  this  were  making  plans  for  a  day's  shooting  over  the 
rough  moors  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town — where 
hares  and  partridges  were  to  be  found — and  were  many 
of  them  in  mufti,  and  most  of  them  at  breakfast  when  the 
startling  and  welcome  news  of  the  advent  of  the  enemy 
came  to  them.  Everything,  of  course,  gave  way  to  the 
necessity  of  getting  out  of  harbour  with  the  utmost  speed. 
Colliers  were  cast  off.  The  furnaces  were  fed,  and  all 
hands  were  started  to  clean  first  the  ships  and  then  them- 
selves. At  eight  the  first  ships  seemed  to  be  probably 
twenty  miles  off.  Twenty  minutes  later,  a  further 
detachment  came  into  sight;  half  an  hour  later  than  that, 
the  last  of  the  Germans  were  seen  upon  the  horizon. 

Round  about  9  o'clock  Kent  was  outside  the  harbour, 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    185 

while  Gneisenau  and  Number g  were  approaching  at  about 
twenty  knots. 

3.  *'At  9:20  A.M.  the  two  leading  ships  of  the  enemy 
{Gneisenau  and  Nurnberg),  with  guns  trained  on  the  wire- 
less station,  came  within  range  of  the  Ca7iopus,  who  opened 
fire  at  them  across  the  low  land  at  a  range  of  1 1,000  yards. 
The  enemy  at  once  hoisted  their  colours  and  turned  aw^ay. 
At  this  time  the  masts  and  smoke  of  the  enemy  were  visible 
from  the  upper  bridge  of  the  Invincible  at  a  range  of 
approximately  17,000  yards  across  the  low  land  to  the 
south  of  Port  William. 

*'A  few  minutes  later  the  two  cruisers  altered  course 
to  port,  as  though  to  close  the  Kent  at  the  entrance  to  the 
harbour,  but  about  this  time  it  seems  that  the  l7ivinciblea.nd 
Inflexible  were  seen  over  the  land,  as  the  enemy  at  once 
altered  course  and  increased  speed  to  join  their  consorts. 

"The  Glasgow  weighed  and  proceeded  at  9:40  a.m. 
with  orders  to  join  the  Kent  and  observe  the  enemy's 
movements." 

The  Germans,  as  we  have  seen,  expected  possibly  to 
find  Canopus  at  the  Falkland  Islands,  but  not  that  she 
would  be  concealed  from  their  fire  behind  the  low-lying 
ground.  Their  astonishment  then  to  find  themselves 
under  the  fire  of  12-inch  guns  at  twenty  minutes  past 
nine  was  considerable.  They  therefore  turned,  not  with 
the  intention  of  running  away  but  clearly  to  throw  out 
the  fire  control  that  was  directing  the  big  guns  at  them, 
for  it  must  have  been  about  this  time  that  they  saw  the 
county  cruiser  Kent  in  the  ofiing,  and  their  first  thought 
was  to  go  in  and  finish  her  off.  But  a  very  few  moments 
after  there  opened  up  over  the  line  of  vision  the  tripod 
masts  of  the  two  battle-cruisers,  and  the  Gneisenau  and 
Nurnberg,  that  had  been  coming  due  north  for  the  attack, 


i86         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BA^ITLE 

now  turned  round  to  the  east,  and  went  full  speed  to  join 
their  approaching  consorts,  who  were  cutting  off  the 
corner  made  by  the  first  two  ships. 

Two  quite  important  questions  arise  at  this  point.  Was 
it  good  policy  on  the  part  of  Admiral  Sturdee  to  allow 
Canopus  to  open  fire  and  so  drive  the  Germans  away? 
If,  indeed,  it  was  Canopus  that  drove  them  off.  He  knew, 
of  course,  that  it  would  take  him  at  least  half  an  hour  to 
forty  minutes  before  all  his  squadron  could  be  clear  of  the 
harbour,  and  ready  to  begin  the  chase.  Would  it  have 
been  wiser  if  he  had  allowed  the  Germans  to  come  right 
up  and  so  to  have  made  sure  of  having  them  within  easy 
range  when  he  did  come  out?  The  answer  to  this  criti- 
cism is  obvious.  Gneisenau  was  a  great  deal  more  than  a 
match  for  Kent,  and  no  British  ship  could  have  got  out 
to  her  assistance  in  time  to  prevent  her  destruction  if 
Gneisenau  had  been  allowed  to  close.  The  speed  of  Ad- 
miral Sturdee's  battle-cruisers  was  such — he  had  certainly 
a  five,  if  not  a  six  knot  advantage  over  the  armoured 
cruisers — that  he  knew  he  had  it  well  within  his  power 
with  the  whole  day  before  him,  to  give  the  Germans  forty 
minutes'  start,  and  catch  them  and  finish  them  off  before 
evening.  And  it  was  his  business  to  do  this,  if  he  could, 
with  the  smallest  possible  loss  of  life  and  the  least  possible 
damage  to  his  ships.  That  is  the  first  point.  But  next, 
it  was  quite  within  the  possibihties  of  the  case  that  Can- 
opus's  guns  would  make  a  hit  either  on  Gjieisenau  or  Nurn- 
berg.  Indeed,  so  close  did  the  fourth  and  fifth  rounds  go 
that  it  was  thought  on  shore  that  there  had  been  a  hit; 
but  this  was  afterwards  proved  to  be  a  mistake.  There 
was  a  good  chance  then  of  laming  one  of  them  and 
so  making  a  quick  capture  certain.  Finally,  it  was  not  alto- 
gether the  fire  of  Canopus  but  the  sight  of  the  battle- 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    187 

cruisers'  masts  that  decided  Von  Spee,  or  rather  the  Cap- 
tain o{  Gyieisenau^  to  retreat. 

It  is  more  pertinent  to  ask  whether  it  would  not  have 
been  better  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  to  have 
got  inside  the  range  of  Canopus — for  obviously  if  she  had 
fired  over  the  hills  she  would  not  be  able  to  use  her  guns 
at  short  range — and  then  bring  the  British  squadron 
under  an  accurate  bombardment  just  when  they  were 
coming  out  of  harbour  and  unable  to  use  their  armament 
to  effect.  The  same  considerations  that  weighed  with 
Admiral  Sturdee  in  deciding  to  allow  Canopus  to  open 
fire  with  the  possible  result  of  driving  them  off,  should 
have  weighed  with  the  German  captain  and  made  him 
realize  that  once  the  battle-cruisers  were  out  of  harbour, 
there  was  no  possible  escape  either  for  his  ship  or  for  the 
flagship.  And  it  is  undoubtedly  certain  that  whether 
they  could  have  succeeded  in  sinking  and  destroying  any 
British  ships  before  being  destroyed  themselves,  they 
must  have  done  vastly  greater  damage  than  they  were, 
in  fact,  able  to  inflict  in  an  action  which,  as  we  shall  see, 
the  British  Admiral  was  able  to  light  on  his  own  conditions 
from  first  to  last.  The  main  features  of  the  final  issue — 
that  is,  the  destruction  of  the  two  armoured  cruisers — 
could  certainly  not  have  been  prevented,  but  had  they 
closed  the  range,  and  fought  the  British  ships  as  they 
came  out,  the  complete  escape  of  the  light  cruisers  could 
have  been  assured,  and  it  is  certain  that  they  could  have 
done  very  great  damage  before  being  destroyed  themselves. 

4.  "At  9:45  A.M.  the  squadron — less  the  Bristol — 
weighed,  and  proceeded  out  of  harbour  in  the  following 
order:  Carnarvon,  Inflexible,  Invincible,  and  Cornwall. 
On  passing  Cape  Pembroke  Light,  the  five  ships  of  the 
enemy  appeared  clearly  in  sight  to  the   southeast,    hull 


i88         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

down.  The  visibility  was  at  its  maximum,  the  sea  was 
calm,  with  a  bright  sun,  a  clear  sky,  and  a  light  breeze 
from  the  northwest." 

At  9:45,  when  the  squadron  got  clear  of  the  harbour 
and  was  working  up  to  full  speed,  the  Germans,  whose 
main  squadron  was  about  8|  sea  miles  off  at  9:30,  while 
Gneisenau  and  Nurnherg  were  three  miles  closer  in,  were 
probably  about  twelve  or  thirteen  miles  off.  There  was 
then  a  gap  of  five  or  six  miles  to  be  made  up  before  action 
range  could  be  reached,  and  to  make  this  good  in  three 
hours  the  British  squadron  would  have  to  produce  a  speed 
greater  by  some  two  knots. 

"At  10:20  A.M.  the  signal  for  a  general  chase  was  made. 
The  battle-cruisers  quickly  passed  ahead  of  the  Carnarvon 
and  overtook  the  Kent.  The  Glasgow  was  ordered  to 
keep  two  miles  from  the  Invincihlej  and  the  Inflexible  was 
stationed  on  the  starboard  quarter  of  the  flagship.  Speed 
was  eased  to  twenty  knots  at  11:15  a.m.  to  enable  the 
other  cruisers  to  get  into  station.  At  this  time  the  ene- 
my's funnels  and  bridges  showed  just  above  the  horizon." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  British  Admiral  was  carry- 
ing on  his  chase  on  a  wide  front  and  at  full  speed — prob- 
ably twenty-four  knots.  Only  Glasgow,  Kent,  and  the 
two  battle-cruisers  could  maintain  this,  which  meant  that 
Carnarvon  and  Cornwall  were  falling  very  much  behind. 
The  Admiral  therefore,  after  an  hour,  dropped  his  speed 
to  twenty  knots  to  enable  his  two  cruisers  to  catch  up. 
Why  did  he  do  this? 

In  the  first  place,  his  burst  at  full  speed  had  probably 
shown  him  that  instead  of  having  an  advantage  of  only 
tv/o  knots  in  speed  over  his  enemy,  he  could  beat  him  by 
at  least  five  knots  when  he  chose.  And  he  reasoned  that 
if  he  drove  at  the  five  German  ships  with  only  four  of  his 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    189 

own,,  it  was  possible  for  the  German  ships  to  scatter  and 
so  for  one  or  more  of  them  to  escape.  It  was  of  the  essence 
of  his  tactics  that  the  enemy  should  keep  his  fleet  together 
as  long  as  possible,  and  it  was  a  vital  matter  that  when  the 
dispersion  took  place  the  pursuit  of  the  light  cruisers 
should  be  undertaken  by  his  own  Hght  cruisers  with  the 
best  possible  prospects  of  bringing  all  of  them  to  action. 
As  we  shall  see  by  the  next  paragraph,  this  measure  did 
not  attain  its  desired  end. 

"The  enemy  were  still  maintaining  their  distance,  and 
I  decided  at  12:20  P.M.  to  attack  with  the  two  battle- 
cruisers  and  the  Glasgow. 

"At  12:47  P.M.  the  signal  to  'Open  fire  and  engage  the 
enemy'  was  made. 

"The  Inflexible  opened  fire  at  12:55  ^-M.  from  her  fore 
turret  at  the  right-hand  ship  of  the  enemy,  a  light  cruiser; 
a  few  minutes  later  the  Invincible  opened  fire  at  the  same 
ship. 

"The  deliberate  fire  from  a  range  of  16,500  to  15,000 
yards  at  the  right-hand  light  cruiser,  who  was  dropping 
astern,  became  too  threatening,  and  when  a  shell  fell  close 
alongside  her  at  i  :20  she  (the  Leipzig)  turned  away,  with 
the  Nilrnberg  and  Dresden,  to  the  southwest.  These  light 
cruisers  were  at  once  followed  by  the  Kent,  Glasgow,  and 
Cornwall,  in  accordance  with  my  instructions. 

"The  action  finally  developed  into  three  separate  en- 
counters besides  the  subsidiary  one  .dealing  with  the 
threatened  landing." 

It  is  plain  from  this  that  when  the  speed  was  limited 
by  that  of  its  slowest  ship,  that  is,  the  Carnarvon,  the 
squadron  was  unable  to  gain  on  the  Germans  at  all.  The 
time,  therefore,  had  come  to  force  the  enemy  to  a  decision, 
and  full  speed  was  once  more  ordered.     The  British  squad- 


190         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

ron  from  now  until  the  next  decisive  move  was  taken, 
must  be  pictured  in  this  way — the  two  battle-cruisers 
and  Glasgow  racing  along  at  twenty-six  or  twenty-seven 
knots;  Cornwall  and  Kent  follow^ing  along  at  their  best 
speed — probably  a  knot  and  a  half  or  two  knots  less — and 
Carnarvon  bringing  up  the  rear.  She  must  soon  have 
been  left  considerably  behind.  For  an  hour  then  the  two 
squadrons  had  probably  been  keeping  about  twenty-one 
knots  at  a  distance  of  about  19,000  yards.  Half  an  hour's 
chase  at  twenty-five  knots  brought  the  range  to  17,000  and 
twenty-five  minutes  later,  to  something  less  than  15,000. 

The  German  squadron  was  now  under  fire  and  Von  Spee 
made  the  signal,  **I  intend  to  fight  the  battle-cruisers  as 
long  as  I  can,  the  light  cruisers  are  to  scatter  and  to  escape 
if  possible."  The  reader  will  of  course  reahze  that  up 
to  this  moment  Leipzig^  Number gy  and  Dresden  had  been 
limiting  their  speed  by  the  speed  of  ScharnhorsL  This 
was  undoubtedly  Von  Spee's  second  mistake,  if  we  assume 
he  was  wrong  in  not  attacking  the  British  squadron  as  it 
issued  from  the  harbour.  By  keeping  his  Hght  cruisers 
with  him  until  the  British  were  within  ten  miles  of  him, 
he  brought  their  chance  of  escape  to  a  very  low  ebb  indeed. 
It  is  clear  that  Admiral  Sturdee's  drop  in  speed  at  11:20 
completely  deceived  him.  He  probably  thought  that 
none  of  the  British  cruisers  could  exceed  the  speed  the 
Vice-Admiral  then  ordered. 

We  now  have  to  treat  of  the  rest  of  the  day's  work  as 
three  separate  actions,  though  it  is  really  more  correct  to 
call  it  four,  because  the  actions  between  Kent  and  NurU' 
berg,  Cornwall  and  Glasgow  with  Leipzig  had,  after  the 
first  phase,  no  influence  one  upon  the  other.  We  will  deal 
first,  as  the  Vice-Admiral  does,  with  the  action  with  the 
armoured  cruisers. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  (II) 

B.    ACTION   WITH   THE    ARMOURED   CRUISERS 

"The  fire  of  the  battle-cruisers  was  directed  on  the  Scharn- 
horst  and  Gneisenau.  The  effect  of  this  was  quickly  seen, 
when  at  1 125  p.m,  with  the  Scharnhorst  leading,  they 
turned  about  seven  points  to  port  in  succession  into  Hne 
ahead  and  opened  fire  at  1 130  p.m.  Shortly  aftersvards 
speed  was  eased  to  twent3'^-four  knots,  and  the  battle- 
cruisers  were  ordered  to  turn  together,  bringing  them  into 
line  ahead,  with  the  Invincible  leading. 

"The  range  was  about  13,500  yards  at  the  final  turn, 
and  increased  until  at  2  p.m.  it  had  reached  16,450  yards." 

The  moment  Von  Spee  found  himself  under  the  effective 
fire  of  the  battle-cruisers,  he  took  the  only  course  open  to 
him.  To  delay  the  finish  by  sheer  flight  would  do  no  good. 
It  was  his  duty  to  inflict  some  reciprocal  injury  on  his 
opponent.  He  was  under  the  fire  of  at  least  eight  if  not 
twelve  12-inch  guns,  and  he  only  had  six  8-inch  guns  bear- 
ing on  Admiral  Sturdee.  To  do  anything  at  all  effective 
he  had  to  turn  broadside  on.  He  therefore  turned  seven- 
eighths  of  a  right  angle  to  port,  that  is,  to  the  left — his 
course  now  being  almost  at  right  angles  to  Admiral  Stur- 
dee's — and  six  minutes  afterwards,  when  both  his  ships 
were  on  a  steady  course,  he  opened  fire.  Three  minutes 
after  he  began  his  turn,  and  therefore  three  minutes  before 
he  opened  fire.  Admiral  Sturdee  turned  his  ships  to  port 
also,  but  his  turn  was  not  quite  so  big  as  the  enemy's,  and 

191 


192         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

for  about  twelve  minutes  the  range  was  steadily  closing. 
The  effect  of  these  changes  of  course  was  to  bring  the 
battle-cruisers  to  within  ii,ooo  or  12,000  yards  of  Scharn- 
horst  and  Gneisenau.  The  Germans  took  full  advantage 
of  this  opportunity,  and  before  they  had  been  firing  five 
minutes  they  had  salvo  after  salvo  straddling  the  battle- 
cruisers. 

As  we  have  seen,  both  in  the  stories  of  the  Koe^iigsherg 
and  of  the  EmdeHy  there  has  been  no  feature  of  any  gun- 
nery action  more  regularly  reproduced  than  the  rapidity 
with  which  the  Germans  find  the  range  at  the  beginning 
of  an  action,  or  the  regularity  with  which  the  projectiles 
of  every  broadside  fall  together.  It  was  strikingly  exem- 
pHfied  in  the  present  instance,  so  much  so  indeed  that 
Admiral  Sturdee  thought  it  wise  to  make  a  further  turn 
to  port,  thus  increasing  the  range,  and  as  he  says  in  this 
despatch,  by  the  time  his  total  turn  was  completed,  he 
brought  the  range  out  again  to  about  13,500  yards.  At 
this  distance  the  12-inch  guns  would  have  a  marked  ad- 
vantage over  the  8.2's.  But  for  all  that  the  German  fire 
continued  surprisingly  accurate,  and  many  hits  w^ere 
made  on  our  ships.  The  British  Admiral  held  to  his  new 
course  and  the  German  ships  theirs.  This  involved  the 
lengthening  of  the  range.  But  Von  Spee  doubtless  pre- 
ferred this  to  the  confusion  of  a  changing  rate.  He  held 
on  then  till  he  could  reach  the  British  ships  no  longer. 
The  consequence  was  that  in  twenty  minutes  the  range 
had  increased  by  a  further  2,500  yards,  which  was  far 
beyond  the  capacity  of  8.2's,  and  a  range  at  which  the 
shooting  of  even  the  12-inch  guns  might  be  irregular. 
Accordingly  at  about  2  o'clock  the  British  squadron  began 
a  gradual  turn  towards  the  enemy,  which  in  about  seven 
minutes'  time  brought  them  on  a  course  at  right  angles 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    193 

to  their  previous  course,  and  therefore  a  little  less  than 
right  angles  to  the  course  which  the  Germans  were  steering. 

"The  enemy  then  (2:10  p.m.)  turned  away  about  ten 
points  to  starboard  and  a  second  chase  ensued,  until,  at 
2:45  P.M.,  the  battle-cruisers  again  opened  fire;  this  caused 
the  enemy,  at  2:53  P.M.,  to  turn  into  line  ahead  to  port 
and  open  fire  at  2:55  P.M. 

*'The  Scharnhorst  caught  fire  forward,  but  not  seriously, 
and  her  fire  slackened  perceptibly;  the  Gneisenau  was 
badly  hit  by  the  Inflexihle."" 

In  the  seven  minutes  of  the  beginning  of  Admiral 
Sturdee's  turn  he  reduced  the  range  by  considerably  over 
1,000  yards,  and  Von  Spee  perceiving  the  change  of  course 
of  the  British  ships,  turned  about  half  a  right  angle  to 
starboard,  that  is  to  the  right,  as  if  undecided  whether 
to  go  right  across  the  bows,  and  then  a  few  minutes  after- 
wards turned  much  more  than  a  right  angle  to  the  right 
again.  This  brought  the  British  squadron  dead  astern 
of  him  and  showed  that  his  only  anxiety  at  this  moment 
was  to  escape  our  fire  as  long  as  possible.  It  appears  from 
various  accounts  that  firing  had  ceased  on  both  sides  for 
some  little  time  before  Admiral  Sturdee  began  his  turn  at 
2  o'clock,  and  Von  Spee  wished  to  make  the  lull  in  the 
fighting  as  long  as  possible.  There  were  doubtless  many 
wounded  to  carry  off,  damages  to  be  made  good,  and  so 
forth.  The  whole  of  the  first  phase  of  the  gunnery  engage- 
ment, then,  beginning  just  after  half-past  one  on  the  Ger- 
man side,  may  be  supposed  to  have  ended  round  about 
ten  minutes  to  two. 

At  ten  minutes  past  two  the  enemy  began  his  new  flight, 
necessitating  a  reproduction  by  the  British  squadron  of 
their  tactics  of  two  hours  before.  It  was  a  chase,  not  on 
the  direct  track  of  the  Germans,  but  on  a  course  parallel 


194        I^HE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

to  them  and  coming  round  on  their  port  or  left-hand  side. 
Von  Spee's  retreat  had  naturally  increased  the  range, 
carried  it  out  indeed  considerably  beyond  16,000  yards, 
but  by  a  quarter  to  three  it  had  been  reduced  once  more 
to  15,000  yards,  and  when  the  British  ships  reopened  fire, 
after  less  than  ten  minutes  of  it  the  enemy  turned  to  bring 
his  broadside  into  action,  just  as  he  had  done  at  i  :25. 

"At  3  130  P.M.  the  Scharnhorst  led  round  about  ten  points 
to  starboard;  just  previously  her  fire  had  slackened  per- 
ceptibly, and  one  shell  had  shot  away  her  third  funnel; 
some  guns  were  not  firing,  and  it  would  appear  that  the 
turn  was  dictated  by  a  desire  to  bring  her  starboard  guns 
into  action.  The  effect  of  the  fire  on  the  Scharnhorst 
became  more  and  more  apparent  in  consequence  of  smoke 
from  fires,  and  also  escaping  steam;  at  times  a  shell  would 
cause  a  large  hole  to  appear  in  her  side,  through  which 
could  be  seen  a  dull  red  glow  of  flame.  At  4:4  p.m.  the 
Scharnhorst,  whose  flag  remained  flying  to  the  last,  suddenly 
listed  heavily  to  port,  and  within  a  minute  it  became  clear 
that  she  was  a  doomed  ship;  for  the  hst  increased  veiy 
rapidly  until  she  lay  on  her  beam  ends,  and  at  4:17  p.m. 
she  disappeared." 

There  was  this  difference  between  the  enemy's  man- 
oeuvres on  this  occasion  and  that  of  an  hour  and  a  half 
before.  At  1 125  he  simply  turned  sufficiently  to  bring  his 
broadside  to  bear.  This  time  he  turned  not  less  but  much 
more  than  a  right  angle,  and  Admiral  Sturdee  was  con- 
siderably behind  him  when  he  opened  fire  at  a  quarter 
to  three.  Had  the  British  squadron  not  turned  shortly 
afterwards,  the  Germans  could  have  closed  the  range  to 
coUision  point.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  immediately  after 
the  Germans  turned.  Admiral  Sturdee  turned  too,  but  not 
so  large  an  angle,  and  the  consequence  was  that  at  3  o'clock 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    195 

the  range  had  been  reduced  to  12,000  yards,  and  at  one 
time  it  had  shortened  down  to  about  9,000.  It  was  appar- 
ently Von  Spee's  intention  at  this  stage  to  shorten  the  range 
to  an  extent  that  would  give  his  guns  the  opportunity  of 
doing  some  real  damage  to  our  ships.  This  is  of  course 
the  proper  policy  to  adopt  if  a  squadron  has  inferior  gun- 
power  and  is  unable  to  escape  by  flight. 

But  it  will  be  observed  that  Von  Spee  did  not  persist  in 
this  manoeuvre,  and  it  is  obvious  that  he  adopted  it  too 
late.  He  missed  his  first  opportunity  of  inflicting  serious 
and  possibly  decisive  injury,  when  he  failed  to  engage  the 
British  ships  as  they  were  coming  out  of  harbour.  He 
missed  the  second  when,  on  Admiral  Sturdee  turning 
away  from  him  at  i  45,  he  held  on  his  course  and  allowed 
the  range  to  be  increased.  He  missed  it  again  when  at 
2:10,  instead  of  holding  on  his  course  and  going  across 
Admiral  Sturdee's  bows,  he  began  his  second  and  necessar- 
ily futile  flight.  When  the  fourth  chance  came  it  was 
probably  too  late.  Both  ships  had  been  hit  and  Scharn- 
horst  seriously.  But  for  about  twenty  minutes  the  Ger- 
man Admiral  did  now  close  the  range  and  come  in  almost 
direct  pursuit  of  the  British.  So  much  so  that  shortly 
after  a  quarter  past  three  Admiral  Sturdee  turned  away 
from  him,  and  describing  a  kind  of  circle  with  his  ships 
from  left  to  right,  brought  his  squadron  round  so  as  to  be 
directly  behind  the  German  ships.  He  had  two  reasons 
for  making  this  turn.  His  course  was  straight  up  wind, 
so  that  gunnery  conditions  were  bad,  and  the  turn  brought 
him  to  the  most  favourable  possible  position  for  concen- 
trating fire  upon  the  enemy,  while  they  had  only  a  mini- 
mum number  of  guns  bearing.  This  position  Von  Spee 
found  intolerable.  Both  his  ships  were  suffering,  and  one 
of  the  Scharnhorst's  funnels  was  carried  away.     It  must 


196         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

have  been  evident  to  him  that  the  end  was  not  far  off  when 
he  turned  at  half  past  three.  Never  since  the  first  twenty- 
minutes  had  the  enemy's  fire  been  really  good,  and  now 
the  thing  was  assuming  the  dimensions  of  a  military 
execution.  The  second  phase  of  gunfire  between  a  quar- 
ter to  three  and  half  past  had  been  decisive  as  far  as  the 
Scharnhorst  was  concerned. 

A  curious  incident  in  this  interval  should  be  noted. 
Just  as  the  firing  began  in  this  second  phase,  a  full-rigged 
sailing  ship  was  observed  about  four  miles  off  to  the  south- 
east from  the  leading  British  ship.  She  is  not  identified  in 
any  of  the  reports  of  the  action  that  I  have  seen,  nor  has  any 
account  appeared  that  I  know  of,  of  what  those  on  board 
saw.  But  it  must  have  been  an  astonishing  experience  for 
a  peaceful  trading  saihng  vessel,  beating  down  quietly 
towards  the  Horn,  to  find  herself  suddenly  in  the  middle  of 
so  grim  a  business  as  this.  Those  on  board  saw  a  thing  at 
that  time  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the  world.  A  sea 
battle  in  which  ships  as  fast  as  the  swiftest  Atlantic  liners 
were  using  an  armament  twice  as  powerful  as  that  carried 
by  any  battleship  that  had  ever  been  used  in  war  before. 

The  last  moments  of  Scharnhorst  were  curiously  drama- 
tic. Till  now  she  had  led  G7ieisena2i  throughout  the  fight. 
Just  before  she  sank  she  turned  a  half  circle  past  Gneisenau 
in  the  reverse  direction,  and  before  anybody  in  the  British 
ships  could  guess  whether  this  was  an  intentional  man- 
oeuvre or  purely  involuntary,  she  turned  over  on  her  side, 
her  bows  plunged  downwards,  and  after  standing  upright 
for  a  second  or  two  with  her  screws  whirring  high  in  the 
air,  vanished  from  sight.  It  is  probable  that  coincident 
with  one  shot  inflicting  such  injuries  that  she  was  flooded, 
another  had  smashed  up  her  steering  gear,  and  jammed 
her  helm  hard  a-port. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    197 

"The  Gneisenau  passed  on  the  far  side  of  her  late  flag- 
ship, and  continued  a  determined  but  ineffectual  effort 
to  fight  the  two  battle  cruisers. 

"At  5:8  P.M.  the  forward  funnel  was  knocked  over  and 
remained  resting  against  the  second  funnel.  She  was 
evidently  in  serious  straits,  and  her  fire  slackened  very 
much. 

"At  5:15  P.M.  one  of  the  Gneisenau's  shells  struck  the 
Invincible;  this  was  her  last  effective  effort. 

"At  5 130  P.M.  she  turned  towards  the  flagship  with  a 
heavy  Hst  to  starboard,  and  appeared  stopped,  with  steam 
pouring  from  her  escape  pipes,  and  smoke  from  shell  and 
fires  rising  every^vhere.  About  this  time  I  ordered  the 
signal  'Cease  fire,'  but  before  it  was  hoisted  the  Gneisenau 
opened  fire  again,  and  continued  to  fire  from  time  to  time 
with  a  single  gun. 

"At  5 140  P.M.  the  three  ships  closed  in  on  the  Gneisenau^ 
and,  at  this  time,  the  flag  flying  at  her  fore  truck  was  ap- 
parently hauled  down,  but  the  flag  at  the  peak  continued 
flying. 

"At  5:50  P.M.  'Cease  fire'  was  made. 

"At  6  P.M.  the  Gneisenau  heeled  over  very  suddenly, 
showing  the  men  gathered  on  her  decks  and  then  walking 
on  her  side  as  she  lay  for  a  minute  on  her  beam  ends  before 
sinking." 

'The  Gneisenau,  at  4:17,  still  had  all  her  guns  in  action, 
and  seemed  indeed  to  have  suffered  very  little.  Had  the 
fire  of  both  battle-cruisers  hitherto  been  concentrated 
chiefly  on  the  flagship?  If  so,  the  effect  was  really  rather 
unfortunate,  for  with  one  ship  going  strong,  it  was  impos- 
sible for  the  Vice-Admiral  to  attempt  the  rescue  of  the 
people  in  Scharnhorst.  Rain  had  set  in.  There  were 
signs  of  mist  and  thick  weather.     At  any  moment  the 


198        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

light  might  fail.  The  conditions  of  the  morning  had  been 
Ideal  for  the  control  of  guns  at  long  range.  These  condi- 
tions had  long  since  vanished.  No  doubt  it  went  greatly 
against  the  grain  to  leave  the  brave  fellows  of  the  Scharn- 
horst  in  their  hopeless  struggle,  but  the  necessities  of  the 
situation  gave  no  choice.  For  that  matter,  when  the 
loss  of  life  that  took  place  in  the  Gneise?iau  is  considered, 
it  is  highly  probable  that  had  the  British  ships  stopped 
to  look  for  people  of  the  Scharnhorst  they  would  have 
found  none.  For  she  turned  over  and  sank,  not  as  Gneise- 
nau  subsequently  did,  so  slowly  that  the  people  on  board 
were  able  to  muster  on  deck  and  then  clamber  on  to  the 
ship's  sides  as  she  heeled  over,  but  with  such  fearful  rapid- 
ity that  it  is  said  that  a  salvo  which  Carnarvon  had  fired  at 
her  when  she  was  still  afloat  and  showed  no  signs  of  imme- 
diate collapse,  actually  pitched  in  the  water  where  she 
had  sunk!  If  this  story  is  true  she  must  have  turned  over 
and  vanished  from  sight  in  from  ten  to  fifteen  seconds.  In 
this  instance  there  can  have  been  few  if  any  survivors 
left  swimming  in  the  water,  and  those  must  have  perished 
before  help  could  reach  them. 

With  the  disappearance  of  Scharnhorst  Admiral  Sturdee 
made  a  double  turn  with  his  ships  to  bring  them  more  or 
less  into  the  wake  of  Gneisenau  and  adopted  a  new  dis- 
position. He  followed  Gneisenau  on  the  starboard  side 
himself,  in  Invincihle,  and  sent  Infiexihle  to  take  up  a  cor- 
responding position  on  the  port  quarter.  This  brought 
both  ships  within  a  range  of  about  12,000  yards  of  the 
Gneisenau,  who  for  the  next  forty  minutes  was  subjected 
to  a  double  attack,  one  on  each  side.  At  5:15  she  made 
her  last  effort.     She  hit  Invincible  amidships. 

It  is  curious  that  after  5  ijo,  when  every  gun  but  one  was 
out  of  action  and  the  ship  had  a  heavy  Hst,  that  she  should 


199 


200        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

still  have  been  able  to  fire  her  last  surviving  piece.  But 
such  incidents  are  common  to  all  naval  actions.  It  is 
said  that,  at  the  battle  of  Tuschima,  when  Savaroff]\3.A  not 
only  been  shot  to  pieces,  but  seemed  to  be  red  hot  from 
stem  to  stern,  one  of  the  6-inch  casemates  kept  at  work 
quite  steadily  throughout,  the  last  shot  being  fired  when 
the  ship  was  on  her  beam  ends,  in  the  act  of  sinking,  so 
that  the  shell  must  have  been  shot  straight  up  into  the  air. 

"The  prisoners  of  war  from  the  Gneisenau  report  that 
by  the  time  the  ammunition  was  expended,  some  600  men 
had  been  killed  and  wounded.  The  surviving  officers 
and  men  were  all  ordered  on  deck  and  told  to  provide 
themselves  with  hammocks  and  any  articles  that  could 
support  them  in  the  water. 

*'When  the  ship  capsized  and  sank  there  were  probably 
some  two  hundred  unwounded  survivors  in  the  water,  but 
owing  to  the  shock  of  the  cold  water,  many  were  drowned 
within  sight  of  the  boats  and  ship. 

"Every  effort  was  made  to  save  life  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble, both  by  boats  and  from  the  ships;  life-buoys  were 
thrown  and  ropes  lowered,  but  only  a  proportion  could  be 
be  rescued.  The  Invincible  alone  rescued  108  men,  four- 
teen of  whom  were  found  to  be  dead  after  being  brought 
on  board;  these  men  were  buried  at  sea  the  following  day 
with  full  military  honours." 

Some  of  the  German  prisoners  believed  that  Gneisenau 
was  not  sunk  by  gun-fire  at  all,  and  said  that  the  comman- 
der had  had  the  Kingston  valves  opened  as  soon  as  the 
ammunition  was  exhausted  and  there  was  no  possibility 
of  carrying  on  the  fight. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  (III) 

C.    ACTION   WITH   THE    LIGHT   CRUISERS 

At  ABOUT  I  p.M,  when  the  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau 
turned  to  port  to  engage  the  Invincible  and  Inflexible  the 
enemy's  light  cruisers  turned  to  starboard  to  escape;  the 
Dresden  was  leading  and  the  Nurnberg  and  Leipzig 
followed  on  each  quarter. 

*'In  accordance  with  my  instructions,  the  Glasgow^  Kent, 
and  Cornivall  at  once  went  in  chase  of  these  ships;  the 
Carnarvofi,  whose  speed  was  insufficient  to  overtake  them, 
closed  the  battle-cruisers. 

"The  Glasgow  drew  well  ahead  of  the  Cornwall  and  Kent, 
and  at  3  p.m.  shots  were  exchanged  with  the  Leipzig  at 
12,000  yards.  The  Glasgow's  object  was  to  endeavour 
to  outrange  the  Leipzig  with  her  6-inch  guns  and  thus 
cause  her  to  alter  course  and  give  the  Cornwall  and  Kent  a 
chance  of  coming  into  action. 

"At  4:17  P.M.  the  Cornwall  opened  fire,  also  on  the 
Leipzig. 

"At  7:17  P.M.  the  Leipzig  was  on  fire  fore  and  aft,  and 
the  Cornwall  and  Glasgow  ceased  fire. 

"The  Leipzig  turned  over  on  her  port  side  and  dis- 
appeared at  9  P.M.  Seven  officers  and  eleven  men  were 
saved. 

"At  3 136  P.M.  the  Cornwall  ordered  the  Kent  to  engage 
the  Ntirnbergy  the  nearest  cruiser  to  her. 

"Owing  to  the  excellent  and  strenuous  efforts  of  the 

201 


202        THE  BRITISH  NAV\'  IN  BATTLE 

engine-room  department,  the  Kent  was  able  to  get  within 
range  of  the  Number g  at  5  p.m.  At  6:35  p.m.  the  Number g 
was  on  fire  forward  and  ceased  firing.  The  Kent  zho 
ceased  firing  and  closed  to  3,300  yards;  as  the  colours 
were  still  observed  to  be  flying  in  the  Niirnberg,  the  Kent 
opened  fire  again.  Fire  was  finally  stopped  five  minutes 
later  on  the  colours  being  hauled  down,  and  every  pre- 
paration was  made  to  save  life.  The  Niirnberg  sank  at 
7:27  P.M.  and  as  she  sank  a  group  of  men  were  waving  a 
German  ensign  attached  to  a  stafi^.  Twelve  men  were 
rescued,  but  only  seven  survived. 

"The  Kent  had  four  killed  and  twelve  wounded  mostly 
caused  by  one  shell. 

"During  the  time  the  three  cruisers  were  engaged  with 
the  Niirnberg  and  Leipzig,  the  Dresden,  who  was  beyond 
her  consorts,  effected  her  escape  owing  to  her  superior 
speed.  The  Glasgow  was  the  only  cruiser  with  sufficient 
speed  to  have  had  any  chance  of  success.  However,  she 
was  fully  employed  in  engaging  the  Leipzig  for  over  an 
hour  before  either  the  Cornwall  or  Kent  could  come  up 
and  get  within  range.  During  this  time  the  Dresden  was 
able  to  increase  her  distance  and  get  out  of  sight. 

"The  weather  changed  after  4  p.m.  and  the  visibility 
was  much  reduced;  further,  the  sky  was  overcast  and 
cloudy,  thus  assisting  the  Dresden  to  get  away  unob- 
served." 

Sir  Doveton  Sturdee's  account  of  the  two  actions 
between  the  two  light  cruisers  is  almost  too  syncopated 
to  be  intelligible.  Fortunately,  however,  many  other 
records  of  these  two  encounters  are  available,  so  it  is 
possible  to  describe  what  happened  in  somewhat  greater 
detail.  From  1:20  until  about  quarter  to  four,  Glasgow, 
Kent,  and  Cornzvall  were  engaged  in  a  plain  stern  chase 


BAITLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   203 

with  the  three  enemy  cruisers.  At  that  time  the  enemy 
began  separating  out,  and  the  three  British  cruisers 
worked  into  a  Hne  abreast  following  suit.  The  Glasgow 
was  at  the  right  of  the  line  between  three  and  four  miles 
from  Cornzvall  and  about  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  ahead 
of  her.  Kent  was  to  the  left  of  Cornzvally  about  two  and 
a  half  miles  off  and  about  abreast  of  her.  Straight  ahead 
of  Cornwall  was  Leipzig,  the  centre  ship  of  the  enemy. 
She  was  about  eight  miles  from  Cornwall  and  between 
six  and  seven  from  Glasgow.  To  Leipzig's  right,  and  two 
or  three  miles  ahead  of  her,  was  Dresden,  and  to  her  left 
and  about  the  same  distance  off  was  Nilr^iherg.  There 
had  been  a  certain  exchange  of  shots  before  this  condition 
was  reached,  for  Glasgow,  very  much  the  fastest  of  the 
British  cruisers,  had  more  than  once  drawn  up  towards 
Leipzig,  and  opened  fire  on  her  in  hopes  of  turning  her 
towards  Cornwall  and  Kent.  And  each  time  her  attack 
was  met  by  resolute  and  accurate  fire  by  the  Germans. 
As  the  German  ships  began  to  separate,  Glasgow  headed 
off  to  the  right  towards  Dresden,  once  more  coming  under 
the  broadside  fire  of  Leipzig.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  Glasgow  only  had  two  6-inch  guns,  only  one  of  which — 
the  bow  gun — could  be  employed  in  these  conditions, 
and  that  the  Leipzig's  4.2's  completely  outranged  her 
4-inch.  It  appears  to  be  a  universal  practice  with  the 
Germans  to  mount  all  their  guns  from  the  largest  to  the 
smallest,  so  that  they  can  be  used  at  extreme  elevation. 
It  will  be  remembered  how  the  Koenigsberg  showed  the 
most  perfect  accuracy  of  fire  at  nearly  11,000  yards  with 
guns  of  a  calibre  that  in  pre-war  days  few  in  the  British 
Service  would  have  thought  it  possible  to  employ  at 
greater  range  than  7,000  or  8,000  yards.  These  efforts 
of  Glasgow  to  manoeuvre  Leipzig  into  contact  with  Cornwall, 


204         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BAITLE 

gave  Dresden  a  chance  she  was  not  slow  to  take.  She  was 
much  the  fastest  of  all  the  German  craft,  and  managed, 
between  four  and  five,  to  slip  completely  out  of  sight  and 
escape. 

This  escape  was  made  easier,  and  all  the  shooting 
throughout  the  two  cruiser  actions  was  made  much  more 
difficult  by  the  sudden  change  in  the  weather  that  has 
already  been  noted  as  having  begun  shortly  before  4 
o'clock.  A  drizzling  rain  had  set  in,  and  not  only  had  it 
become  practically  impossible  to  use  rangefinders  owing 
to  the  poor  light,  but  it  became  extremely  hard  to  detect 
the  fall  of  shot  and  so  correct  the  fire.  In  considering 
these  two  fights  then,  the  extremely  difficult  conditions 
that  prevailed  must  be  taken  into  account.  Let  us  deal 
first  with  the  pursuit  and  destruction  of  Nurnherg. 

"kent"  v.  "nurnberg" 

At  5  o'clock  Kent,  after  a  chase  of  nearly  four  hours, 
was  getting  within  range  of  Nurnherg.  Nurnherg  had 
crept  away  to  the  eastward  of  Leipzig,  so  that  by  the  time 
fire  was  opened,  a  considerable  distance  separated  this 
from  the  other  engagements.  In  point  of  fact,  when  the 
action  began,  the  rain  and  increasing  mist  hid  every  other 
ship  from  sight.  It  was  Nurnherg  which  was  first  to  open 
fire  and,  so  far  as  could  be  judged,  the  range  must  have 
been  about  11,000  yards  or  slightly  over.  Kent  held  her 
fire  for  another  ten  minutes,  as  if  waiting  to  see  what  the 
Nurnherg  s  guns  could  do  at  this  range.  She  could  of 
course,  only  use  her  two  guns  on  the  quarterdeck,  and 
the  after  gun  on  the  port  side.  To  the  astonishment  of 
the  Kent  all  her  first  salvoes  were  right  over.  The  range 
would  have  been  a  long  one  for  a  6-inch  gun;  it  seemed 
almost  fabulous  for  a  4.2.     Ten  minutes  later  Kent  opened 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   205 

with  her  bow  turret,  and  for  the  next  half  hour  an  active 
duel  was  maintained.  The  Kent  had  sheered  oflP  a  little 
to  the  left  so  as  to  bring  her  forward  casemate  guns  also 
to  bear.  There  was  no  doubt  about  the  Nilrnberg's 
shots  falling  over  close,  and  the  Kent's  guns  seemed  from 
the  ship  to  be  fairly  on  the  target.  But  for  a  consider- 
able time  there  was  no  evidence  that  they  were  hitting, 
and  Kent  was  certainly  not  suffering  from  Niirnhergs 
fire,  astonishingly  accurate  as  it  was.  But  suddenly, 
soon  after  half-past  five,  Kent,  who  was  keeping  up  a 
speed  of  nearly  a  knot  more  than  she  had  ever  done  before, 
began  to  gain  enormously  on  her  opponent.  The  range 
had  been  over  11,000  yards  at  5  o'clock;  by  twenty 
minutes  to  six  it  got  almost  down  to  7,000.  It  was 
obvious  that  Niirnhergs  motive  power  had  somehow 
come  to  grief.  Had  one  of  Kent's  shells  landed  in  her 
engine,  or  had  one  of  the  boilers,  under  the  strain  of  so 
many  hours'  high  pressure,  given  way? 

Whatever  the  cause,  the  results  were  exactly  what 
Captain  Allen  was  looking  for.  If  the  light  had  been  bad 
at  five  it  was  getting  worse  every  minute,  and  if  the 
business  was  to  be  finished  it  had  to  be  finished  quickly. 
With  the  shortening  range,  the  effect  of  the  British  lyddite 
was  soon  visible,  and  Niirnberg  had  no  alternative  but  to 
repeat  the  manoeuvre  of  Von  Spee  and  turn  broadside  to 
for  her  assailant.  Kent  turned  too,  and  not  this  time  to 
lengthen  the  range,  but  to  bring  her  whole  nine  broadside 
guns  to  bear.  In  point  of  fact,  she  closed  the  range  as 
rapidly  as  she  could,  consistently  with  keeping  all  her 
guns  bearing,  and  by  6  o'clock  had  reduced  it  to  3,000 
yards.  Niirnberg  was  now  a  beaten  ship.  She  had  one 
topmast  gone;  her  funnels  were  riddled;  her  speed  had 
fallen    from   twenty-four   knots   at    5   o'clock   to   about 


2o6        THE  BRITISH  NA\T  IN  BATTLE 

eighteen  at  a  quarter  to  six,  and  now  almost  to  ten.  Of 
the  five  guns  on  her  port  side  only  two  were  in  action. 
Shortly  after  this  she  turned  bows  on  to  the  Kent,  and 
was  at  once  caught  by  several  6-inch  shells  in  the  fore- 
castle, which  smashed  up  both  the  bow  guns,  shattering 
the  bridge  and  conning-tower.  Ever  since  the  turn  at  a 
quarter  to  six,  Kent  had  kept  ahead  of  her,  though  shorten- 
ing the  range,  doubtless  with  an  eye  to  the  possibilities 
of  Niirnherg  using  a  torpedo.  When,  therefore,  at  6.10 
she  was  almost  stopped  and  seemed  beaten,  Kent  passed 
her  and  pushed  on  to  about  5,000  yards  to  await  develop- 
ments. Shortly  after  six,  Niirnherg  ceased  fire  altogether, 
and  seemed  a  wreck.  But  her  colours  were  still  flying, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  fire  at  her  again.  Just  before 
seven  she  hauled  dow^n  her  colours  and  surrendered.  Both 
ships  w^re  now  at  a  dead  stop,  and  Ke^it  got  out  her  boats 
as  far  as  she  could  to  take  possession  of  the  enemy.  But, 
as  Captain  Allen  told  the  Association  of  Kentish  Men  in 
his  very  interesting  letter  about  the  action,  the  ship  had 
received  no  less  than  thirty-six  hits  during  the  short  but 
decisive  engagement,  and  though  she  had  been  singularly 
fortunate  in  losing  very  few  men — four  men  killed  and 
twelve  wounded — all  her  boats  but  two  were  in  splinters, 
and  both  of  these  needed  repairs  before  they  could  be  used. 
They  were,  however,  manned  and  lowered  as  quickly  as 
possible,  but  they  were  hardly  on  their  way  towards  the 
Niirnherg,  some  two  miles  off,  when  the  enemy  was  seen 
to  turn  slowly  on  her  side  and  sink.  As  she  went  below 
the  waves,  some  of  her  gallant  crew  were  seen  on  the  stern 
waving  the  German  ensign  defiantly.  For  an  hour  and 
a  half,  that  is  until  some  time  after  dark,  the  Kent's  two 
boats  searched  for  survivors.  Only  seven  were  saved 
alive.     Some  were   lashed   to   hammocks   and   gratings. 


207 


2o8         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

and  others  were  swimming.  But  in  the  extreme  cold 
the  great  majority  perished.  One  account  of  this  dismal 
episode  that  has  been  sent  to  me  says  that  the  albatrosses 
were  actually  attacking  the  living  as  well  as  the  dead  in 
this  last  melancholy  scene. 

^"•Cornwall"  and  "Glasgow"  v.  " Leipzig" 

We  have  seen  in  the  account  of  the  Kent  and  Nurnberg 
action  that  up  to  4  o'clock  cruisers  of  both  sides  kept 
fairly  well  together,  and  that  then  the  Germans  opened 
out.  It  was  shortly  after  this  that  they  got  out  of  sight 
of  each  other.  Ke7it  pursued  Nurnberg  in  a  more  easterly 
direction,  the  Glasgow  and  Cornwall  pursuing  Leipzig 
more  to  the  south.  In  order  to  bring  the  Leipzig  to  action 
Glasgow  was  sent  forward  on  the  CornzvalVs  left,  which 
made  Leipzig,  while  still  of  course  retreating  as  fast  as  she 
could,  turn  slightly  towards  Cornwall  and  transfer  her 
fire  to  her.  All  three  ships  were  now  firing,  but  the  shots 
were  falling  short,  until  at  about  4:20  Cornwall  made  the 
first  hit  on  the  enem}^  carrying  away  his  foremast.  This 
made  the  enemy  edge  away  to  the  right,  a  move  which  was 
followed  by  Cornwall  also.  The  range  was  now  shortening. 
When  it  was  8,000  yards  Leipzig  made  her  first  hits. 
Cornwall  thereupon  altered  course  still  more  to  starboard 
thus  bringing  about  two  effective  results.  The  whole 
broadside  of  guns  came  in  play,  and  the  change  of  course 
threw  out  Leipzig's  fire  control.  Both  ships  kept  on  these 
courses,  and  the  range  increased  again  to  nearly  10,000 
yards.  As  we  have  previously  seen,  it  was  at  this  time 
that  the  weather  began  to  get  really  thick,  and  as  a  conse- 
quence of  this  it  became  exceedingly  difficult  to  see  the  fall 
of  shot,  but  it  is  worth  remembering  that  Leipzig  was 
still   hitting   with    her   4:2's.     Shortly   after   5   o'clock, 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   209 

however,  the  range  reached  over  10,000  yards,  and  it 
became  necessary  to  close  once  more.  Between  five  and 
a  quarter  to  six  Cornwall,  that  had  now  clearly  got  the 
speed  of  Leipzig,  carried  out  precisely  the  same  tactics 
that  the  Vice-Admiral  had  adopted  in  the  case  of  the 
battle-cruisers.  Alternately,  that  is  to  say,  closing  the 
enemy  at  full  speed,  shelling  him  with  the  fo'c'sle  guns, 
and  then  turning  sharply  to  starboard  to  bring  the  whole 
broadside  to  bear.  At  about  a  quarter  to  six  Leipzig 
landed  a  shell  in  Cornwall's  paint  room,  which  shook  the 
ship  but  did  no  damage.  Captain  Ellerton  now  decided 
to  shorten  the  range  and  use  lyddite  shell.  In  the  half 
hour  between  a  quarter  to  six  and  a  quarter  past  the  range 
was  brought  down  to  about  8,500,  and  by  about  6.40  it 
was  reduced  to  7,000.  A  far  better  proportion  of  hits 
was  now  being  obtained,  and  the  effect  of  the  lyddite 
became  immediately  apparent.  First  one  and  then 
another  o{  Leipzig's  guns  ceased  firing,  and -by  ten  minutes 
to  seven  a  big  fire  started  for^vard.  A  few  minutes  before 
Cornwall  had  heard  the  news  by  wireless  of  the  sinking  of 
Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  and  officers  and  men  redoubled 
their  efforts.  The  range  was  closed  still  more,  the  hitting 
became  more  intense,  but  the  enemy  m  spite  of  his  losses 
and  damages  kept  every  gun  that  could  still  work  firing, 
and  was  actually  hitting  Cornwall  frequently  right  up 
to  five  minutes  past  seven,  but  in  another  five  minutes 
two  of  her  funnels  were  gone  and  the  ship  was  blazing 
fore  and  aft. 

Cornwall  thereupon  ceased  fire,  expecting  the  enemy  to 
strike  his  colours,  but  he  did  not  do  so.  So  Cor?izvall 
closed  about  5,000  yards  and  gave  her  a  few  more  salvoes 
of  lyddite.  At  a  quarter  to  eight  there  was  a  loud  explo- 
sion on  board  Leipzig  and  her  mainmast  went  over  the 


210        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

side.  At  8:i2,  it  was  of  course  dark  by  now,  she  sent  up 
signals  of  distress.  Both  Cornzvall  and  Glasgow  now 
lowered  boats  as  fast  as  they  could  be  repaired  and 
manned,  but  they  were  not  able  to  reach  the  enemy  until 
after  9  o'clock,  and  before  they  did  so  the  ship  turned  over 
and  sank.  Only  six  officers  and  nine  men  were  rescued 
from  the  water.  Heavy  as  the  casualties  must  have  been, 
there  were  in  all  probability  more  than  these  unwounded 
at  the  end  of  the  action,  and  all  of  those  not  killed, 
wounded  as  well  as  unwounded,  might  have  been  saved, 
for  the  ship  was  not  actually  in  a  sinking  condition  from 
Cornwall  and  Glasgow's  fire,  and  had  been  sunk  by  the 
orders  of  her  own  officers. 

Cornwall  was  hit  eighteen  times,  but  did  not  suffer  a 
single  casualty.  Glasgow  had  one  man  killed  and  five 
wounded.  One  of  the  Leipzig  s  officers  said  that  from  a 
quarter  past  six  till  seven,  that  is  when  the  range  had  been 
brought  down  to  about  7,000  yards,  some  rounds  out  of 
every  salvo  fired  hit  the  ship.  The  effect  of  the  lyddite 
appears  to  have  been  appalling.  Men  were  blown  to 
pieces  and  the  ship  was  littered  with  ghastly  fragments  and 
relics  of  humanity.  When  the  ship  could  reply  no  more, 
for  there  was  no  ammunition  left  for  such  guns  as  might  still 
have  been  worked,  the  captain  called  the  survivors  together 
and  said  any  one  who  liked  could  go  and  haul  the  flag  down, 
but  he  would  not  do  it.  Nor  did  any  one  volunteer. 
About  fifty  jumped  overboard,  and  when  the  ship  sent  up 
signals  of  distress  there  were  only  eighteen  left  alive  on 
board.     All  but  one  of  them  were  saved. 

D.  ACTION  WITH  THE  ENEMY  TRANSPORTS 

"A   report  was   received   at   11:27  a.m.   from  H.M.S. 
Bristol  that  three  ships  of  the  enemy,  probably  transports 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   211 

or  colliers,  had  appeared  off"  Port  Pleasant.  The  Bristol 
was  ordered  to  take  the  Macedonia  under  his  orders  and 
destroy  the  transports. 

"H.M.S.  Macedonia  reports  that  only  two  ships,  steam- 
ships Baden  and  Santa  Isabel,  were  present;  both  ships 
were  sunk  after  the  removal  of  the  crew." 

It  is  not  clear  from  this  what  became  of  the  third  ship. 
But  there  w^ere  persistent  rumours  in  various  South 
American  ports  that  the  Germans  had,  in  the  course  of 
the  autumn,  collected  a  very  considerable  number  of 
trained  reservists  from  the  different  South  American 
States  and  cities,  and  had  got  them  on  board  a  transport 
with  arms,  etc.,  so  as  to  be  ready  for  any  military  purpose 
the  naval  commander-in-chief  might  select.  It  is  exceed- 
ingly probable  that  the  reason  Von  Spee  did  not  appear 
off  the  Falkland  Islands  till  five  weeks  after  his  defeat  of 
Admiral  Cradock  was  that  he  had  had  to  spend  a  con- 
siderable time  in  getting  these  reservists  ready  for  action. 
It  certainly  is  quite  clear  that  on  December  8th  he  arrived 
off  the  Falkland  Islands  intending  to  attack,  and  it  is 
far  more  probable  that  he  intended  to  attack,  seize,  and 
annex  the  colony  than  merely  to  subdue  and  rob  it.  To 
seize  and  annex  he  would  have  needed  troops,  and  the 
third  transport  that  Macedonia  did  not  find  when  she  got 
Santa  Isabel  and  Badeyi  probably  contained  the  men 
destined  to  hold  the  colony.  That  the  British  Admiralty 
expected  some  attack  of  this  kind  is  shown  from  the  fact 
that  Canopus,  after  being  ordered  north,  was  told  to 
return  to  the  Falkland  Islands  and  to  do  the  best  possible 
for  the  defence  of  the  colony.  The  only  military  strength 
possessed  by  the  colony  was  three  hundred  volunteers 
who  had  had  very  little  training  and  practically  no  arms 
beyond    rifles.     Good    Hope    had    left    a    field-gun    when 


212         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

passing  at  the  beginning  of  October,  but  of  other  artillery 
there  was  none.  The  seizure  of  the  island,  then,  by  Von 
Spee's  force  of  five  ships,  supplemented  by  a  regiment  of 
reservists,  was  a  perfectly  feasible  project.  Had  it 
succeeded  and  the  island  been  left  with  an  adequate  supply 
of  machine  and  field  guns,  to  resist  a  landing,  it  would 
have  been  an  extremely  difficult  job  to  have  turned  them 
out.  For  with  guns  properly  emplaced,  the  ships'  artil- 
lery could  have  done  very  Httle  to  protect  landing  parties, 
and  Admiral  Sturdee's  ships  carried  no  sufficient  surplus 
of  men  for  it  to  have  been  practicable  to  incur  a  heavy 
sacrifice  of  life  to  regain  the  island.  So  far  as  this  adven- 
ture was  concerned  the  whole  thing  miscarried  through 
being  a  week  too  late. 


CHAPTER  XV 
Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  (iv) 

strategy — tactics — gunnery 

Von  Spee's  mistakes  we  have  seen  in  the  course  of  my 
comment  on  the  narrative.  They  were  broadly  fourfold. 
Three  arose  from  an  inability  to  realize  from  the  very 
beginning  the  true  character  of  the  situation,  the 
fourth  from  want  of  resolution  to  fight  an  unequal  action 
on  the  only  conditions  in  which  any  success  was  to  be 
gained. 

Von  Spee's  initial  blunder  was  approaching  the  Falk- 
land Islands  with  the  whole  of  his  force  instead  of  making 
a  reconnaissance  by  a  single  fast,  light  cruiser.  It  was 
obvious  that  he  could  gain  nothing  by  surprise.  For  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  the  colony  to  extemporize 
defence.  It  was  equally  obvious  that  he  stood  to  lose 
everything  if  he  was  himself  surprised.  And  however 
improbable  it  might  have  seemed  to  him  that  a  force 
superior  to  his  had  reached  the  Falkland  Islands  by  this 
date,  he  should  yet  have  realized  that  there  was  nothing 
impossible  in  such  a  force  being  there  very  much  earlier. 
For  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Falkland  Islands  is  only 
a  little  over  7,000  miles.  He  might  have  credited  the 
British  Admiralty  with  a  willingness  to  avenge  Cradock's 
defeat  and  with  ingenuity  enough  to  arrange  the  most 
secret  coaling  of  any  force  that  was  sent  out.  When  all 
allowances  were  made,  there  should  have  been  no  diffi- 
culty in  battle-cruisers  reaching  the  South  Atlantic  three 

213 


214         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATILE 

weeks  after  they  were  despatched.  Nor  was  there  any 
reason  why  the  despatch  should  be  delayed  more  than 
two  weeks  after  the  news  of  the  disaster. 

If  Gneisenau,  instead  of  turning  away  when  the  tripod 
masts  of  the  battle-cruisers  were  seen,  had  persisted  in 
the  advance  towards  Kent;  had  Scharnhorst  joined  her  at 
top  speed,  it  is  morally  certain  that  Kent  and  Macedonia 
would  have  been  destroyed  before  either  of  the  battle- 
cruisers  could  come  to  their  rescue.  It  would  not  have 
been  difficult  to  have  found  dead  ground  that  the  guns  of 
Cajiopus  could  not  reach,  and  from  such  a  point  to  have 
subjected  the  battle-cruisers  to  a  most  damaging  suc- 
cession of  salvoes,  as  they  emerged  from  the  narrow 
channel,  before  there  was  any  possibility  of  their  replying. 
It  was  indeed  possible  that  the  motive  power  of  each 
might  have  been  so  injured  that  a  pursuit  by  the  battle- 
cruisers  would  have  been  impossible.  At  the  worst,  Von 
Spee  would  have  paid  no  higher  price  than  he  ultimately 
paid,  and  he  might  have  won  an  exchange  entirely  bene- 
ficial to  German  arms.  Certainly,  an  action  fought  in 
these  conditions  would  have  given  ample  time  for  the 
light  cruisers  to  make  their  way  into  the  winding  and 
uncharted  fjords  of  Patagonia.  Here  Dresden  main- 
tained herself  for  many  weeks,  and  who  knows  but  that 
the  others  might  have  lasted  longer  still  .^  Had  it  been 
possible  for  the  three  to  keep  together  they  would  have 
been  formidable  opponents  for  any  single  cruiser  in  search 
of  them.  Had  they  scattered  and  been  able  to  maintain 
their  coal  supply,  they  could  have  held  up  British  trade 
for  a  considerable  time. 

Just  as  Von  Spee  missed  this  real  opportunity,  so,  later 
on,  he  first  of  all  kept  his  light  cruisers  with  him  far  too 
long,  and  then,  throughout  the  action,  accepted  battle 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   215 

far  too  much  on  Admiral  Stuidee's  conditions.     But  the 
initial  mistake  was  the  greatest. 

BRITISH  STRATEGY 

The  battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands  was  an  event  of 
enormous  importance  and  interest,  and  I  propose  to 
discuss  a  few  of  its  more  obvious  bearings.  Let  us  first 
consider  its  immediate  direct  and  indirect  effects  upon 
the  course  of  the  war.  The  overseas  naval  situation  at 
the  end  of  October,  while  not  in  the  larger  sense  at  all 
threatening  or  dangerous,  afforded  nevertheless  grounds  for 
very  great  anxiety.  Emden  had  made  a  series  of  sensa- 
tional captures  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  and  the  Indian  Ocean. 
Karlsruhe  was  working  havoc  with  the  British  trade  off 
the  northeast  corner  of  South  America.  The  German 
China  squadron  had  evaded  the  Japanese  and  British 
and  Allied  fleets  in  the  East,  and  Australia  and  her  con- 
sorts had  obtained  no  news  of  its  whereabouts  when 
cruising  between  the  Antipodes  and  the  German  islands. 
A  few  British  ships  had  been  taken  by  Dresden  on  her 
passage  down  to  the  Straits  of  Magellan,  and  the  public 
was  entirely  without  information  which  led  them  to 
suppose  that  either  Von  Spee  or  any  of  the  raiding  cruisers 
were  the  subject  of  any  effective  pursuit.  Though  the 
loss  of  ships  by  hostile  cruisers  was  absurdly  smaller 
than  experts  had  anticipated,  it  was  quite  large  enough 
to  disconcert  and  alarm  the  public,  who  knew,  after  all, 
ver}^  little  about  the  character  of  those  anticipations. 
Suddenly  in  the  first  week  of  November  came  two  thunder- 
claps. Admiral  Cradock,  with  a  preposterously  weak 
force,  had  been  engaged  and  been  defeated  by  the  lost 
Von  Spee.  Of  the  four  ships  composing  his  squadron, 
the  armed  liner  Otranto  and  the  light  cruiser  Glasgow  had 


2i6         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

escaped,  but  Good  Hope  and  Monmouth  had  gone  down, 
lost  with  all  hands.  Then  on  November  3rd  came  the 
bombardment  of  Lowestoft  by  certain  German  cruisers. 
It  was  the  first  attack  of  any  kind  on  the  people  of  these 
islands,  and  it  was  hastily  explained  to  us  by  the  Admi- 
ralty— and  quite  rightly — that  the  thing  was  without  a 
military  objective  or  military  importance,  and  as  if  to 
forestall  naval  criticism,  we  were  further  told  that  it  would 
not  be  allowed  to  disturb  any  previously  made  Admiralty 
plans.  We  were  asked  to  believe  that  it  was  a  mere 
piece  of  frightfulness. 

But  it  is  not  certain  that  this  was  the  only  motive  of 
the  adventure.  May  it  not  have  been  done  in  the  express 
hope  that  the  British  higher  command,  face  to  face  with 
a  shocked  and  outraged  public  opinion,  would  hesitate 
about  diminishing  those  forces  at  home  which  were  best 
calculated  to  intercept  and  bring  to  action  the  fast  vessels 
which  alone  could  be  employed  with  any  chance  of  safety 
on  these  bombarding  expeditions?  Is  it  not  more  than 
possible  that  the  German  staff,  knowing  the  prospects 
of  the  rebellion  in  South  Africa,  was  most  desperately 
anxious  to  give  Von  Spee  an  added  chance  of  crossing 
the  Atlantic  in  security  and  lending  the  tremendous 
support  of  his  squadron  to  the  German  forces  in  South- 
West  Africa,  who,  with  this  added  prestige,  could  be 
counted  upon  to  attract  all  the  disaffected  South  African 
sentiment  to  its  side?  Were  not  these  bombardments, 
in  short,  undertaken  solely  to  compel  us  to  keep  our 
stronger  units  concentrated  ? 

Whether  this  was  the  German  plan  or  not,  let  it  stand 
to  the  credit  of  the  Fisher-Churchill  regime  that  no  fear, 
either  of  public  opinion  or  as  to  the  success  of  future 
raids,  stood  in  the  way  of  dealing  promptly  with  the  Von 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS   217 

Spee  menace.  It  should  undoubtedly  have  been  dealt 
with  long  before.  It  was  a  blunder  that  Jerram's  force 
was  not  overwhelmingly  superior  to  Von  Spee's;  a  blunder 
that  he  had  not  been  instructed  to  shadow  him  from  the 
beginning.  Cradock's  mission  ought  never  to  have  been 
permitted.  But  now  that  fate  had  exposed  these  errors 
of  pohcy,  the  right  thing  at  last  was  done.  Yet  it  must 
have  taken  some  nerve  to  do  it.  The  British  forces  in 
the  North  Sea  had  certainly  been  greatly  strengthened 
since  the  outbreak  of  war.  Agincourt,  Erin,  Canada, 
Benbow,  and  certain  lighter  units  had  joined  the  Grand 
Fleet.  Tiger  was  finished  and  commissioned  as  part  of 
the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  under  Sir  David  Beatty.  This 
gave  him  four  battle-cruisers  of  a  speed  of  twenty-eight 
knots  and  armed  with  13.5  guns,  in  addition  to  the  four 
of  an  older  type — New  Zealand,  Indomitable,  Invincible^ 
Inflexible.  To  take  two  of  these  and  send  them  after 
Von  Spee  reduced  this  force  very  considerably,  but  it  was 
probably  thought  that  the  addition  of  Tiger  left  Sir  David 
strong  enough  for  the  main  purpose.  After  victory  had 
been  won  a  month  later,  rumours  were  prevalent  that  a 
third  battle-cruiser  had  been  despatched  westward  as 
well,  but  this  has  never  been  confirmed.  But  on  the 
main  point,  namely,  the  vital  importance  of  sending  an 
adequate  force  for  the  pursuit  and  capture  of  Von  Spee, 
the  strategical  decision  was  indisputably  right. 

Its  value  can  be  judged  by  the  immediate  results  of 
the  victory.  Between  November  ist  and  December 
8th  it  is  almost  true  to  say  that  British  trade  with  the 
west  coast  of  South  America  was  at  a  standstill.  On  the 
east  coast  things  were  very  little  better.  For  if  shippers 
were  still  willing  to  send  their  ships  to  sea,  it  was  only 
on  the  receipt  of  greatly  enhanced  freights.     Immediately 


218         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

after  the  victory  Valparaiso  shipping  put  to  sea  as  if  no 
war  was  in  existence,  and  all  Pacific  and  South  Atlantic 
freight  fell  immediately  to  normal.  Even  the  escape  of 
Dresden  did  not  qualify  the  universal  sense  of  relief.  The 
repercussion  in  South  Africa  was  equally  prompt.  The 
rebellion  in  the  Anglo-Dutch  colonies  had  been  put  down. 
But  to  embark  on  the  conquest  of  German  South-West 
Africa  was  a  different  thing  altogether,  and  certainly  one 
that  could  not  be  attempted  so  long  as  there  was  the  least 
suspicion  of  insecurity  in  General  Botha's  sea  com- 
munications. And  while  Von  Spee  was  at  large  this 
insecurity  was  obvious.  One  of  the  direct  results  then 
of  the  despatch  of  Admiral  Sturdee  to  the  South  Atlantic 
was  to  make  the  first  miUtary  invasion  of  German  territory 
both  possible  and  ultimately  successful. 

Apart  from  its  immediate  results  in  the  way  of  relieving 
British  trade  in  South  America  and  removing  the  last 
obstacle  to  active  British  military  policy  in  South  Africa, 
the  Falkland  Islands  engagement  was  of  enormous  value 
not  only  in  re-asserting  the  prestige  of  the  British  Navy, 
but  in  giving  fresh  heart  to  all  the  Allies  after  the  exhaust- 
ing struggles  to  defeat  the  German  advances  on  the  French 
capital  and  Calais.  It  was  especially  the  first  definite  proof 
the  AUiance  had  received  that  British  sea-power  was  no 
vague  and  shadowy  thing,  but  a  real  force  which,  rightly 
and  relentlessly  employed,  must  ensure  the  ultimate 
victory  of  AlUed  arms.     These  were  its  good  sides. 

It  had  one  lamentable  and  disastrous  consequence. 
Emden  was  captured  before  the  battle-cruisers  left  their 
English  port.  Karlsruhe  was  never  heard  of  again,  and 
the  rumours  of  her  destruction  seemed  before  December 
to  be  well  founded,  so  that  after  the  victory  of  December 
8th,  beyond  the  fugitive  Dresden  and  two  armed  liners 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    219 

unaccounted  for,  there  was  not  a  German  ship  in  the 
world  to  threaten  a  single  British  trade  or  territorial  inter- 
est. For  Koenigsberg,  if  she  had  escaped  the  guns  of  the 
two  ships  that  had  attempted  her  destruction  in  the  mouth 
of  the  Rufigi,  which  was  doubtful,  was  at  any  rate  so  closely- 
blockaded  that  her  power  for  active  mischief  Was  clearly 
at  an  end.  German  naval  force  was  then  limited  to  the 
High  Seas  Fleet,  still  of  course  intact,  but  with  apparently 
no  wish  to  attempt  an  active,  and  no  power  to  make  an 
effective,  offensive.  Of  this  force  Sir  John  Jellicoe  seemed 
to  have  taken  the  measure.  Four  months  of  activity, 
strenuous  and  anxious  beyond  description,  had  made  our 
fleet  bases  proof  against  submarine  attack,  so  that  the  only 
offensive  open  to  the  German  fleet,  that  embodied  in  the 
policy  of  attrition,  was  no  longer  a  menace.  The  submarine 
attack  on  trade  was  unexpected.  At  a  blow,  then,  White- 
hall, which  for  four  months  had  been  kept  on  tenterhooks 
by  its  unpreparedness  for  cruiser  or  submarine  warfare, 
suddenly  found  itself  without  a  naval  care  in  the  world. 

But  Mr.  Churchill  could  not  be  idle,  and  the  tempter 
planted  in  his  fertile  brain  the  crazy  conception  that  the 
unemployed  and  unemployable  fleet  should  add  to  his 
laurels,  by  repeating,  on  the  Dardanelles  forts  the  perform- 
ances of  the  German  howitzers  at  Liege,  Maubeuge,  and 
Antwerp.  The  failure  of  the  Naval  Brigade  at  Antwerp 
was  to  be  picturesquely  avenged.  In  judging  of  the  re- 
sults of  the  Falkland  Islands  battle  then,  we  must  set 
against  its  immediate  and  resounding  benefits  the  humil- 
iating tragedy  of  Gallipoli. 

THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

The  battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands,  as  we  have  seen, 
resolved  itself  into  three  separate  engagements,  and  two 


220        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

of  these  may  be  taken  as  classic  examples  of  the  tactics 
of  superior  speed  and  armament,  unconfused  by  the  long- 
distance torpedo.  It  was  this  theory  of  tactics  that  held 
the  field  in  England  from  1904  or  1905,  when  the  Dread- 
nought policy  was  definitely  adopted,  until  191 2  or  191 3 
when  the  effect  in  naval  action  of  the  new  torpedo,  was 
first  exhaustively  analyzed.  These  actions,  then,  taken 
in  conjunction  with  the  Sydney-Emden  fight,  stand  entirely 
by  themselves,  and  it  is  possible  that  very  little  naval 
fighting  will  ever  take  place  again  under  similar  conditions. 

At  the  Dogger  Bank  and  off  the  Jutland  Reef  the  tor- 
pedo was  employed  to  the  fullest  extent,  with  results  that 
we  shall  see  when  we  come  to  consider  these  actions.  We 
have  of  course,  no  direct  statement  that  no  torpedoes 
were  employed  in  the  Falkland  engagements.  Indeed  in 
a  modified  way  the  torpedoes  certainly  had  some  influence. 
But  there  is  the  whole  world  of  difference  between  tor- 
pedoes fired  singly  from  one  warship  to  another,  and  tor- 
pedoes used  both  in  great  quantities  and  by  light  craft 
which,  under  the  defensive  properties  of  their  speed,  can 
close  to  ranges  sufficiently  short  to  give  the  torpedo  a 
reasonable  chance  of  hitting,  or,  by  taking  station  ahead, 
can  add  the  target's  to  the  torpedo's  speed  to  increase  its 
range.  We  shall  be  broadly  right  then  in  treating  these 
engagements  as  aflfairs  of  gunnery  purely,  for  the  torpedo 
had  seemingly  no  influence  in  the  periods  that  were  de- 
cisive. 

Briefly  put,  what  were  the  tactics  of  Admiral  Sturdee 
with  the  battle-cruisers,  and  Captain  Ellerton  with  Corn- 
wall and  Glasgow  on  December  8th  ?  Their  business  was 
to  destroy  an  enem}^  far  weaker  than  themselves,  one  who 
had  neither  strength  enough  to  fight  victoriously  nor  speed 
enough  to  fly  successfully.     Both  followed  the  same  plan. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    221 

They  employed  their  superior  speed,  first  to  get  near 
enough  for  their  heavier  guns  to  be  used  with  some  effect, 
and  then,  whenever  the  enemy  tried  to  close,  to  get  to  a 
range  at  which  his  inferior  pieces  could  be  expected  to  get 
a  considerable  percentage  of  hits,  they  manoeuvred  to 
increase  the  range  so  as  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  permanent 
gunnery  disadvantage.  As  this  long-range  fire  gradually 
told,  the  enemy's  artillery  became  necessarily  less  and  less 
effective,  until  he  was  reduced  to  a  condition  in  which  he 
could  be  closed  and  finished  off  without  taking  any  risks 
at  all.  These  tactics  resulted  in  Gneisenau  and  Scharn- 
horst  being  destro3'ed  by  Invincible  and  Inflexible,  the 
whole  crews  of  both  German  ships  being  either  killed  or 
captured,  while  the  two  battle-cruisers  had  three  casual- 
ties only.  Invincible  was  actually  hit  by  twenty-two  shells, 
Inflexible  by  only  three,  and  it  was  the  latter  ship  who  had 
the  only  three  men  hit.  Cornwall  received  eighteen  direct 
hits  and,  like  Invincible,  had  no  casualties  at  all,  while 
Glasgow   had   one    man    killed    and    five   wounded. 

Obviously  an  action  could  not  be  fought  upon  these 
lines  unless  time  and  space  sufficed  in  which  to  bring 
about  the  desired  result.  In  point  of  fact,  when  the  dis- 
parity of  force  is  considered,  the  time  taken  was  extraor- 
dinary. Inflexible  opened  fire  on  the  German  cruisers 
at  five  minutes  to  one,  Scharnhorst  sank  at  seventeen 
minutes  past  four,  and  Gneisenau  just  after  6  o'clock.  If 
we  suppose  only  twelve  12-inch  guns  to  have  been  bearing 
throughout  the  action,  we  have  one  hundred  12-inch  gun 
hours!  There  was  time  therefore — at  a  battle-practice 
rate  of  fire — for  both  ships  to  have  fired  away  their  entire 
stocks  of  ammunition  at  least  dozens  of  times  over.  What 
they  did,  of  course,  was  to  fire  extremely  deliberately 
when  the  target  was  within  range  and  the  conditions  suit- 


222         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

able,   and   to  cease   fire  altogether  when  they  were  ma- 
noeuvring. 

In  the  Cornzv all-Glasgow-Leipzig  action,  fire  was  opened 
at  about  4  o'clock,  and  it  was  not  till  about  7:8  that  the 
enemy  was  beaten.  An  hour  afterwards  he  sent  up  signals 
of  distress  and  surrendered.  Here  there  were  eleven  6-inch 
guns  in  the  two  British  broadsides,  and  five  4-inch,  against 
a  handful  of  4.25.  The  disparity  in  force  was  perhaps 
not  quite  so  great  as  in  the  battle-cruiser  action,  but  these 
things  are  difficult  to  compare,  and  from  all  accounts  6- 
inch  lyddite,  once  the  hitting  begins,  does  not  take  long 
to  put  a  hght  cruiser  of  the  Leipzig  class  completely  out 
of  action. 

Captain  Allen's  action  against  Niirnherg  is  in  very  sharp 
contrast  to  this.  He  opened  fire  at  5  o'clock,  some  few 
minutes  after  the  enemy  had  attacked  him.  The  range 
was  about  11,000  yards,  and  for  some  time  no  apparent 
damage  was  done.  At  5:45,  however,  though  Niirnberg 
seemed  still  undamaged,  the  range  was  reduced  by  4,000 
yards,  owing  to  Niirnherg  s  sudden  loss  of  speed.  There 
then  followed  twenty  minutes  of  action  at  ranges  between 
6,000  and  3,000,  and  these  sufficed  to  finish  the  enemy 
off  altogether.  It  may  be  objected  to  Captain  Allen's 
tactics  that  he  received  twice  as  many  hits  as  the  Cornwall 
and  had  twelve  men  w^ounded  and  four  killed.  But  as 
Admiral  Sturdee  points  out  in  his  despatch  these  casualties 
were  almost  entirely  caused  by  a  single  chance  shell  that 
burst  in  a  gun  position,  right  amongst  the  crew.  No  one 
in  any  of  the  very  exposed  positions — control  tops,  range- 
finder  positions,  etc. — was  even  touched.  Too  much, 
therefore,  must  not  be  made  of  the  casualties,  for  in  this 
matter  chance  enters  too  largely  for  safe  deductions  to  be 
made.     Invincible,  for  instance,  received  twenty-two  hits 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    223 

without  a  single  casualty,  Inflexible  three  hits  and  three 
casualties.  Cornwall  and  Kent  were  sister  ships,  and  if 
the  gun  shields  of  Kent  were  unable  to  protect  one  crew, 
any  one  of  the  eighteen  shells  that  hit  Cornwall  might  have 
done  equal  damage  to  that  suffered  by  Kent.  The  value, 
as  it  seems  to  me,  of  the  Kent-Nurnherg  example  lies  in 
this,  that  for  all  practical  purposes  exactly  the  same  result 
was  obtained,  at  the  same  cost,  in  one  hour — of  which 
twenty  minutes  was  at  almost  point-blank  range — in  this 
action,  as  was  got  by  two  ships  in  three  hours  in  the  Leipzig 
action,  and  by  two  battle-cruisers  in  five  hours  in  the  battle 
cruiser  action. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  we  see  a  new  con- 
trast in  methods  in  these  engagements.  Kent  certainly  fol- 
lowed the  Nelsonian  tradition.  He  closed  with  his  enemy 
at  top  speed,  and  got  not  only  the  full  artillery  value  of 
his  attack,  by  making  hitting  easier  and  therefore  more 
certain,  but  won  what  is  hardly  less  valuable,  the  vast 
moral  advantage  of  giving  his  enemy  no  breathing  time 
at  all.  There  are  fifty  parallels  to  this,  of  which  Trafalgar 
is  in  fact  only  the  supreme  example.  Given  a  superior 
force  of  guns — obtained  by  Nelson  by  the  concentration 
of  the  whole  of  his  fleet  on  the  centre  and  rear  of  the  enemy 
— the  tactical  plan  is  to  be  found  in  the  method  of  bringing 
these  guns  to  do  their  work  in  the  shortest  possible  time. 

We  can  find  many  exact  parallels  to  Admiral  Sturdee's 
tactics  in  the  war  of  18 12,  for  the  Americans  employed 
them  against  us  with  the  utmost  success  on  several  occa- 
sions. Indeed,  it  was  these  victories  that  led  first  to  a 
practical  revival  of  gunnery  skill — brought  about  with 
such  effect  by  Broke — and  later  to  Sir  Howard  Douglas's 
effort  to  create  a  scientific  study  of  gunnery  in  the  British 
Navy.     It  is  now  nearly  a  hundred  years  since  his  historic 


224        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

work  on  naval  gunnery  was  published.  His  father  had 
been  one  of  Howe's  captains  and  had  invented  an  import- 
ant improvement  in  naval  guns.  The  son  entered  the 
Artillery,  and  his  education,  no  less  than  his  family  tradi- 
tion, made  him  both  an  interested  observer  and  a  very 
competent  critic  of  the  naval  gunnery  of  the  period.  He 
had,  in  his  own  words,  witnessed  "the  triumphant  and 
undisputed  domination  of  the  British  marine,"  after  the 
victories  of  Nelson  had  swept  continental  fleets  from 
the  sea,  and  then,  seven  years  after  Trafalgar,  he 
had  seen  this  triumphant  navy  utterly  humihated  by 
the  Americans  in  the  war  of  1812.  He  analyzed  the 
causes  both  of  the  triumph  and  the  humihation,  and  was, 
perhaps,  the  first  to  lay  down  the  most  important  of  all 
maxims  of  naval  doctrine — then  and  still  also  the  most 
neglected. 

He  pointed  out  how,  in  the  later  years  of  the  Republic, 
practical  gunnery  amongst  French  seamen  was  so  wretched 
that  strongly  manned  ships  were  seen  "employing  batter- 
ies of  twenty  or  thirty  guns  against  our  vessels  without 
more  effect  than  might  easily  have  been  produced  by  one 
or  two  well-directed  pieces.  Indeed  in  some  cases,  heavy 
frigates  used  powerful  batteries  against  our  vessels  for  a 
considerable  time  without  producing  any  effect  at  all." 
Thus,  the  victories  of  the  Nelsonian  era  were  made  possible 
because  of  the  great  disparity  between  the  two  forces  in 
gunnery  skill,  and  it  was  this  disparity  that  made  it  possi- 
ble to  adopt  the  tactics  by  which  the  victors  got  their 
great  successes.  Victory  was  won  by  superior  skill  and 
tactics  founded  upon  its  employment.  And  in  the  hour 
of  victory  we  forgot  its  conditioning  cause. 

"We  became,"  says  Douglas,  "too  confident  by  being 
feebly  opposed,  and  then  slack  in  warhke  exercises,  by  not 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    225 

being  opposed  at  all.  And,  lastly,  in  many  cases  inexpert 
for  want  of  even  drill  practice.  And  herein  consisted  the 
great  disadvantage  in  which,  without  suspecting  it,  we 
entered,  with  too  great  confidence,  into  a  war  with  a  mar- 
ine much  more  expert  than  that  of  any  of  our  European 
enemies.  Comparative  views  of  warlike  skill,  as  well  as 
of  bulk  and  force  .  .  .  are  necessary  to  correct  analysis 
of  naval  actions." 

In  the  course  of  his  work  he  made  a  very  detailed  analy- 
sis of  the  actions  between  the  Macedonian  and  the  United 
States,  the  Guerriere  and  the  Constitution,  the  Shannon  and 
the  Chesapeake,  and  the  Java  and  the  Constitution.  In  the 
three  instances  in  which  the  Americans  were  victorious, 
they  owed  success  to  no  superiority  in  the  handling  of 
their  ships,  but  to  a  combination  of  longer-range  guns  and 
a  much  higher  accomplishment  in  marksmanship  and 
tactics  designed  to  keep  outside  the  range  of  British  effec- 
tive fire.  In  none  of  the  three  cases  could  any  criticism 
be  based  upon  the  bravery  of  any  of  the  British  officers 
and  crews.  All  were,  in  fact,  honourably  acquitted  by 
court  martial.  But  it  was  obvious  in  each  case  that  had 
the  gunnery  skill  been  equal,  while  the  difference  in  arma- 
ment might  ultimately  have  been  decisive,  the  enemy 
would  have  had  to  pay  very  dearly  indeed  for  victory. 
In  each  case,  in  point  of  fact,  the  victor's  losses  were  trivial. 
Amongst  these,  the  action  between  Shannon  and  Chesa- 
peake stands  out  just  as  the  Kent  and  Niirnherg  action 
stands  out  in  the  Falkland  Islands.  Broke,  in  the  first 
very  few  minutes  of  the  engagement,  established  a  com- 
plete fire  ascendancy  over  Chesapeake,  and  had  he  chosen, 
could  have  hauled  off  and  pounded  her  into  submission 
without  risking  the  life  of  a  single  one  of  his  men.  But, 
as  in  the  first  instance,  he  had  relied  upon  close  action, 


226        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

trusting  with  perfect  confidence  to  the  skill  and  marksman- 
ship of  his  well-trained  crew,  so  after  he  had  got  Chesa- 
peake out  of  control,  he  chose  the  quickest  path  to  victory. 
He  ran  straight  alongside  and  boarded  her  without  a 
moment's  delay.  As  at  Trafalgar,  so  here  we  see  the 
British  commander  pre-occupied  with  one  thought  only — 
to  bring  the  enemy  to  action  as  soon  as  possible  and  to 
finish  the  business  quickly  and  decisively.  So  long  as 
this  is  ensured,  there  is  no  thought  of  losses  nor  any  hesita- 
tion in  risking  the  ship. 

Why  was  there  any  other  tactical  conception?  It 
arose,  as  we  have  just  seen,  in  the  war  of  1812  and  was 
spontaneously  reproduced  in  1905,  and  in  both  cases  it 
was  the  product  of  a  new  skill  in  long-range  gunnery.  In 
18 1 2  there  was  the  choice  in  armament,  long  range  and 
short  range  that  existed  in  1905,  but  with  this  striking 
difference.  The  long-range  gun  of  a  century  ago  might 
be  an  eighteen  or  twenty-four  pounder,  but  it  was  far 
heavier  for  the  weight  of  shell  it  used  than  the  short-range 
carronade.  There  was  therefore  a  distinct  temptation 
to  arm  ships  with  a  lighter  gun  that  would  be  more  effec- 
tive at  close  range,  and  the  mistake  was  not  discovered 
till  the  greater  skill  of  the  American  ships  made  it  clear 
that  the  long  gun,  in  a  ship  rightly  handled,  could  prevent 
the  short-range  gun  from  coming  into  action  at  all.  But 
in  our  own  day  the  pride  of  length  of  reach  goes  with  the 
heavier  projectile.  Not  that  the  12-inch  guns  o{  Inflexible 
and  Invincible  literally  outranged  the  8.2's  of  Von  Spec, 
for  the  Germans  have  always  mounted  their  guns,  as  we 
have  seen,  so  that  they  can  be  elevated  far  more  greatly 
than  our  own.  It  is  quite  possible  therefore,  that,  speak- 
ing literally,  Von  Spec's  8.2's,  as  they  were  mounted,  might 
have  outranged  Sir  Doveton  Sturdee's  12-inch.     But  at 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    227 

the  extreme  range  of  the  12-inch,  it  would  be  almost  impos- 
sible for  the  8.2's  to  hit  on  account  of  the  extremely  steep 
angle  at  which  the  shot  falls,  and,  consequently,  the  high 
accuracy  in  range  knowledge  required  and  the  improbabil- 
ity of  the  gun  shooting  with  perfect  precision  at  such 
extreme  distances.  But  both  in  1812  and  now,  the  basic 
idea  behind  seeking  for  a  long-range  decision  is  defensive. 
Captain  Glossop  opened  up  the  range  when  Emden  closed 
him  and  got  the  advantage  of  his  heav}^  artillery.  Ad- 
miral Sturdee  kept  the  range  as  long  as  possible  to  save 
his  ships  from  being  hit.  Captain  Ellerton  did  his  best 
to  keep  Cornwall  and  Glasgow  out  of  Leipzig  s  reach.  In 
all  these  cases  there  was  a  very  obvious  argument  in 
favour  of  defensive  tactics.  Sydney,  Glasgow  and  Corn- 
wall, Inflexible  and  Invincible  were  all  at  very  great  dis- 
tances from  dockyards  and  possibilities  of  repairs.  The 
two  battle-cruisers  wxre  a  considerable  percentage  of  our 
total  Dreadnought  force.  It  was  not  a  question  of  risking 
their  destruction;  it  might  at  any  moment  be  vital  for 
them  to  be  immediately  ready  for  action.  If  possible, 
even  the  shortest  period  devoted  to  repairs  and  docking 
should  be  avoided.  These  considerations  do  not  excuse 
defensive  tactics;  they  may  be  said  to  have  imposed  them. 
But  this  should  not  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  they  w^ere 
defensive. 

And  this  leads  to  another  interesting  question.  Von 
Miiller  in  Emden  began  the  action  by  trying  to  close 
Sydney.  Von  Spee  turned  at  right  angles  at  one  o'clock 
to  shorten  the  range.  Nurnberg  finally  turned  round  to 
bring  her  broadside  to  bear  on  Kent^  but  she  was  too  late. 
Leipzig  never  turned  at  all.  In  no  case  did  the  German 
commanders  persist  in  seeking  a  short-range  action. 
Cradock  apparently  did  nothing  to  close  Von   Spee   at 


228        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Coronel.  What  would  have  happened  if  Von  Spec  and 
Von  Miiller  had  stuck  to  their  resolution  to  close?  In 
all  these  cases,  as  we  have  seen,  the  weaker  side  accepted 
the  stronger's  conditions.  But  it  was  not  necessary  that 
it  should  have  been  so.  A  resolute  effort  to  close  at  full 
speed  would  no  doubt  throw  a  broadside  of  guns  out  of 
action,  just  as  flight  did.  But  would  the  stronger  ships 
have  run  away  had  the  weaker  persisted  in  attacking? 
If  they  had  held  their  course,  there  would  have  been  a 
very  considerable  change  of  range,  in  itself  a  defensive 
element  favouring  the  weaker  ship.  We  can  take  it  for 
granted  that  no  effort  to  close  would  ultimately  have 
saved  the  weaker  ship  in  any  case.  But — and  this  seems 
to  me  to  be  the  vital  point — would  not  his  chance  of  seri- 
ously damaging  the  stronger  have  been  far  higher?  And 
is  not  this  the  one  thing  that  should  preoccupy  the  weaker 
force  when  compelled  to  engage  ? 

Finally,  two  entirely  new  elements  in  naval  fighting  in 
our  own  time  distinguish  it  from  the  fighting  of  the  early 
days  of  last  century.  With  ships  dependent  upon  wind, 
if  the  chance  of  engaging  was  lost,  it  might  never 
recur. 

In  all  Nelson's  letters,  memoranda,  and  sayings,  he  is 
haunted  by  the  vital  importance  of  swift  decision  and 
rapid  and  resolute  action.  The  whole  spirit  behind  the 
Trafalgar  Memorandum  is  impatience  of  delay.  When 
the  Allied  Fleet  was  seen,  there  was  no  time  wasted  in 
securing  symmetrical  formations  or  order.  The  Fleet 
was  roughly  grouped  as  Nelson  intended  it  should  be,  and 
the  only  preliminary  of  action  was  not  a  race  to  get  into 
station  but  a  race  to  get  to  grips  with  the  enemy.  The 
cult  of  the  close  action  was  thus  a  direct  outcome  of  the 
haunting  uncertainty  as  to  whether  the   fighting  ship 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    229 

would  be  able  to  move  or  not.  This  has  all  been  changed 
by  steam.  Admiral  Sturdee,  for  instance,  at  10:20,  11:15, 
and  12:20  knew  perfectly  well  that  he  could  have  the  Ger- 
mans in  his  grip  and  finish  the  thing  off  in  five  minutes 
whenever  he  liked.  If  he  played  with  them  as  a  cat  plays 
with  a  mouse,  it  was  because  he  knew  that  he  had  time 
on  his  side.  But  time  will  not  always  be  on  the  side  of 
what  is  for  the  moment  the  stronger  force.  The  enemy 
may  be  heading  for  protection  or  may  be  expecting  rein- 
forcements, or  the  light  may  suddenly  fail  altogether.  In 
spite  of  steam,  therefore,  the  desirability  of  a  quick  de- 
cision is  really  as  paramount  in  modern  conditions  as  in 
the  old  days.  So  that,  had  the  problem  of  action  never 
been  complicated  by  the  long-range  torpedo,  we  ought, 
as  soon  as  we  began  the  cultivation  of  long-range  gunnery, 
to  have  realized  that  it  was  useless  to  limit  our  skill  to 
conditions  in  which  the  target  ship  and  the  firing  ship 
were  keeping  steady  courses. 

A  further  argument  against  closing  the  range  in  modern 
conditions  has  been  put  forward.  Just  as  the  change 
from  sails  to  steam  has  helped  the  tactician  of  to-day,  so 
the  altered  relation  of  the  destructive  power  of  the  weapon 
and  the  resisting  power  of  the  ship  has  operated  to  his 
disadvantage.  Lion,  for  instance,  in  the  Dogger  Bank 
affair,  was  knocked  out  by  a  chance  shot  that  killed  no 
men  and  did  no  vital  injury  to  the  ship  at  all.  But  it 
cut  the  feed  pipes  of  an  engine,  and  in  two  minutes  the 
ship  was  disabled  and  for  the  purposes  of  that  action,  use- 
less. Only  small  damage  could  be  done  to  sailing  ships 
by  a  shot  amongst  the  masts  and  rigging.  And  when  to 
a  single  shot  there  is  added  the  risk  of  a  torpedo,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  arguments  against  closing  are 
Stronger  to-day  than  they  were. 


230         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

A   POINT   IN   NAVAL    ETHICS 

The  conduct  of  Cradock  and  his  captains  at  Coronel, 
of  Von  Miiller  in  Eniden,  and  of  the  captains  of  Gneisenau, 
Leipzig,  and  Niirnherg,  raises  an  interesting  point  in  the 
ethics  of  war.  Captain  Glossop,  it  will  be  remembered, 
after  driving  Emden  on  to  the  rocks  at  Direction  Island, 
had  to  return  towards  Keeling  Island  to  look  for  the  Em- 
den's  tender.  When  he  came  back  with  certain  prisoners 
on  board,  he  appealed  to  Von  Miiller  to  surrender.  No 
reply  was  given,  and  the  prisoners  on  board  the  Sydney 
informed  Captain  Glossop  that  no  surrender  would  be 
made.  It  therefore  became  necessary  to  open  fire  again. 
This  brought  about  the  hauling  down  of  the  German  flag. 
Gneisenau  had  lost  600  killed  out  of  a  crew  of  eight  or  nine 
hundred  when,  at  8:40,  she  hauled  down  her  flag.  Leipzig 
and  Nurnherg  were  in  a  similar  case.  Bluecher  was  simi- 
larly defeated  long  before  she  was  sunk.  Both  Good  Hope 
and  Monmouth  were  apparently  out  of  action  within  five 
minutes  of  action  beginning.  Now  in  each  instance  it  is 
obvious  that  fighting  was  carried  on,  and  that  therefore 
men  were  sacrificed,  long  after  the  ship  was  hopelessly 
beaten.  But  in  many  cases  not  only  was  the  fighting 
carried  on,  so  to  speak,  gratuitously,  but  the  ship  herself 
scuttled,  thus  ensuring  the  drowning  of  several  wounded 
men  and  risking  the  drowning  of  a  very  large  number  of 
unwounded.  In  all,  taking  the  Emdefi,  G^ieisenau,  Niirn- 
berg,  Leipzig,  and  Bluecher  together,  it  is  not  improbable 
that  over  1,000  lives  were  thus  thrown  away  to  no  immedi- 
ately military  purpose.  The  alternative  was  to  surrender  the 
ship.  Why  is  it  taken  for  granted  that  no  ship,  however  fair- 
ly defeated  in  action,  however  hopeless  further  resistance, 
may  not  quite  honourably  yield  herself  a  prize  to  the  ene- 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FALKLAND  ISLANDS    231 

my?  It  is  an  entirely  new  doctrine,  unknown  in  an  age 
surely  not  inferior  in  naval  skill,  in  military  spirit,  or  in 
chivalrous  feeling.  Does  it  date  from  the  howl  of  execra- 
tion that  w^ent  up  in  Russia  when,  after  the  flower  of  the 
Russian  fleet  had  been  defeated  at  Tsushima,  NebogatofF 
surrendered  his  archaic  craft  to  the  overwhelming  force 
of  the  victors  r 

So  far  as  I  know  it  was  in  that  war  that  the  great  break 
with  the  old  tradition  was  made.  The  old  tradition,  of 
course,  was  that  a  ship  that  had  fought  till  it  could  fight 
no  longer  could  be  surrendered  to  a  victorious  enemy 
without  shame.  The  records  of  the  wars  of  a  century 
ago  abound  in  courts-martial  on  officers  who  in  these  cir- 
cumstances had  yielded  a  beaten  ship,  and  they  were  al- 
ways honourably  acquitted,  when  it  was  shown  that  all 
that  was  possible  had  been  done.  It  was  evidently 
thought  to  be  mere  inhumanity  to  condemn  a  crew  that 
had  fought  bravely  to  death  by  fire  or  drov^nlng.  Not 
that  there  are  not  grim  stories  that  tell  of  a  sterner  resolu- 
tion, like  that  of  Grenville  in  the  Revenge. 

But  on  the  whole  the  navy  that  had  done  more  fighting 
than  any  other,  and  in  the  period  of  its  existence  when  its 
fighting  was  most  continuous,  took  what  Is  at  once  a 
rational  and  a  Christian  view  of  these  situations.  Now 
it  seems  that  war  at  sea  dooms  those  who  have  fought 
unfalteringly  to  finish  the  business,  when  they  can  fight 
no  longer,  by  a  savage  self-immolation.  It  is  the  only 
alternative  to  allowing  the  enemy  the  glory  of  a  capture. 
Is  this,  after  all,  an  intolerable  humiliation.?  To  find  it 
so  is  a  break  with  the  old  tradition  and  is  not  an  innovation 
for  the  better.  It  sets  up  a  pagan  standard,  and  it  is  not 
the  paganism  of  the  stoic,  but  the  unfeeling  barbarism 
of  the  Choctaw. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Heligoland  Affair 

Towards  the  end  of  August,  1914,  the  submarines  under 
Commodore  Roger  Keyes  discovered  a  role  of  quite  un- 
expected utiHty.  Their  immediate  function  had  been  to 
watch  the  approaches  to  the  Channel,  so  as  to  stop  any 
attempt  by  the  German  Fleet  to  interfere  with  the  trans- 
port of  the  Expeditionary  Force  into  France.  In  doing 
this,  they  found  that  they  had  exceptional  opportunities 
for  observing  the  enemy's  destroyers  and  light  craft,  and, 
as  soon  as  the  safety  of  the  transports  seemed  assured, 
they  constituted  themselves  the  most  efficient  scouts  pos- 
sible. They  soon  found  themselves  in  possession  of  an 
extensive  knowledge  of  the  habits  of  the  Germans.  It 
was  this  knowledge  that  led  to  the  decision  to  sweep  the 
North  Sea  up  to  Heligoland  and  cut  off  as  many  of  the 
enemy's  light  craft,  destroyers,  and  submarines  as  possible. 
The  expedition  included  almost  every  form  of  fast  ship  at 
the  Commander-in-Chief's  disposal.  First  the  submarines 
were  told  off  to  certain  stations,  presumably  to  be  in  a 
position  to  attack  any  reinforcements  which  might  be 
sent  out  from  Wilhelmshaven  or  Cuxhaven.  Then,  in  the 
very  earliest  hours  of  the  morning,  the  two  light  cruisers 
Arethusa  and  Fearless  led  a  couple  of  flotillas  of  destroyers 
into  the  field  of  operations.  The  Arethusa  flew  the  broad 
pennant  of  Commodore  Tyrwhitt.  The  Fearless  was 
commanded  by  Captain  Blount.  The  two  flotillas,  with 
their  cruiser  leaders,  swept  round  towards  Heligoland  in 

232 


THE  HELIGOLAND  AFFAIR  233 

an  attempt  to  cut  off  the  German  cruisers  and  destroyers 
and  drive  them,  if  possible,  to  the  westward.  Some  miles 
out  to  the  west,  Rear-Admiral  Christian  had  the  squadron 
of  six  cruisers  of  the  Euryalus  and  Bacchante  classes  ready 
to  intercept  the  chase.  Commodore  Goodenough,  with  a 
squadron  of  Hght  cruisers,  attended  Vice-Admiral  Beatty, 
with  the  battle-cruisers,  at  a  prearranged  rendezvous,  ready 
to  cut  in  to  the  rescue  if  there  was  any  chance  oi  Arethusa 
and  Fearless  being  overpowered. 

The  expedition  obviously  involved  very  great  risks.  It 
took  place  within  a  very  few  miles  of  bases  in  which  the 
whole  German  Fleet  of  battleships  and  battle-cruisers  was 
lying.  It  was  plainly  possible  that  the  attempt  to  cut 
the  German  light  cruisers  off  might  end  in  luring  out  the 
whole  Fleet,  and  one  of  the  conditions  contemplated  was 
that  Admiral  Beatty,  instead  of  administering  the  quietus 
to  such  German  cruisers  as  survived  the  attentions  of  the 
two  Commodores,  might  find  himself  condemned  to  a 
rearguard  action  with  a  squadron  of  German  battleships. 
That  he  took  this  risk  cheerfully,  well  understanding  the 
kind  of  criticism  that  would  meet  him,  if  in  the  course  of 
such  an  action  he  lost  any  of  his  ships,  was  the  first  indica- 
tion we  got  of  the  fine  fighting  temper  of  this  Admiral. 

Arethusay  Fearless,  and  the  destroyers  found  themselves 
in  action  soon  after  seven  o'clock  with  destroyers  and  tor- 
pedo-boats. Just  before  eight  o'clock  two  German 
cruisers  were  drawn  into  the  affray,  and  Arethnsa  had  to 
fight  both  of  them  till  8:15,  when  one  of  them  was  drawn 
off  into  a  separate  action  by  Fearless,  which  in  the  ensuing 
fight  became  separated  from  the  flagship.  By  8:25  Are- 
thusa  had  wrecked  the  forebridge  of  one  opponent  with  a 
6-inch  projectile,  and  Fearless  had  driven  off  the  other. 
Both  were  in  full  flight  for  Heligoland,  which  was  now  in 


234        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

sight.  Commodore  Tyi-whitt  drew  off  his  flotillas  west- 
ward. He  had  suffered  heavily  in  the  fight.  Of  his  whole 
battery  only  one  6-inch  gun  remained  in  action,  while  all 
the  torpedo  tubes  were  temporarily  disabled.  Lieutenant 
Westmacott,  a  gallant  and  distinguished  young  ofl&cer, 
had  been  killed  at  the  Commodore's  side.  The  ship  had 
caught  fire,  and  injuries  had  been  received  in  the  engines. 
Fearless  seems  now  to  have  rejoined,  and  reported  that 
the  German  destroyer  Commodore's  flagship  had  been 
sunk.  By  ten  o'clock  Commodore  Roger  Keyes,  in  the 
LurcheVy  had  got  into  action  with  the  German  light  cruisers 
and  signalled  to  the  Arethusa  for  help.  Both  British 
cruisers  then  went  to  his  assistance,  but  did  not  succeed 
in  finding  him.  All  Arethusa  s  guns  except  two  had  mean- 
time been  got  back  to  working  order. 

At  eleven  o'clock  Arethusa  and  Fearless  engaged  their 
third  enemy,  this  time  a  four-funnelled  cruiser.  Arethusa^ 
it  must  be  remembered,  still  had  two  guns  out  of  action. 
The  Commodore  therefore  ordered  a  torpedo  attack, 
whereupon  the  enemy  at  once  retreated,  but  ten  minutes 
later  he  reappeared,  when  he  was  engaged  once  more  with 
guns  and  torpedoes,  but  no  torpedo  hit.  The  Commodore 
notes  an  interesting  feature  of  this  cruiser's  fire:  "We 
received  a  very  severe  and  most  accurate  fire  from  this 
cruiser.  Salvo  after  salvo  was  falling  between  twenty 
and  thirty  yards  short,  but  not  a  single  shell  struck."  We 
shall  find  this  happened  several  times  in  the  different 
engagements.  The  Commodore  continues:  "Two  tor- 
pedoes were  also  fired  at  us,  being  well  directed  but  short." 

At  this  point  the  position  was  reported  to  Admiral 
Beatty.  This  cruiser  was  finally  driven  off  by  Fearless 
and  Arethusa,  and  retreated  badly  damaged  to  Heligoland. 
Four  minutes  after,  the  Mainz  was  encountered.     Are- 


235 


236         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

thusa.  Fearless,  and  the  destroyers  engaged  her  for  five- 
and-twenty  minutes,  and  when  she  was  in  a  sinking  con- 
dition Commodore  Goodenough's  squadron  came  on  the 
scene  and  finished  her  off.  Arethusa  then  got  into  action 
with  a  large  four-funnelled  cruiser  at  long  range,  but  re- 
ceived no  hits  herself,  and  was  not  able  to  see  that  she 
made  any. 

It  was  now  12:15.  Fearless  and  the  first  flotilla  had 
already  been  ordered  home  by  the  Commodore.  The 
intervention  of  the  battle-cruisers  was  very  rapid  and 
decisive.  The  four-funnelled  cruiser  that  had  been  the 
last  to  engage  Arethusa  was  soon  cut  off  and  attacked, 
and  within  twenty  minutes  a  second  cruiser  crossed  the 
Lion's  path.  She  was  going  full  speed,  probably  twenty- 
five  knots,  and  at  right  angles  to  LioUy  who  was  steaming 
twenty-eight.  But  both  Lions  salvoes  took  effect,  a 
piece  of  shooting  which  the  Vice-Admiral  very  rightly 
calls  most  creditable  to  the  gunnery  of  his  ship.  The 
change  of  range  must  have  been  900  yards  a  minute,  I 
know  of  no  parallel  to  this  feat,  though  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  range  was  short.  Lions  course  was  now 
taking  her  towards  known  mine-fields,  and  the  Vice- 
Admiral  very  properly  judged  that  the  time  had  come 
to  withdraw.  He  proceeded  to  dispose  of  the  cruiser  he 
first  attacked — which  turned  out  to  be  Koln — before  doing 
so. 

The  expedition  had  been  a  complete  success.  Three 
German  cruisers  had  been  sunk  and  one  destroyer.  Three 
other  cruisers  had  been  gravely  damaged,  and  many  of 
the  German  destroyers  had  been  hit  also.  Our  losses  in 
men  were  small,  and  we  lost  no  ships  at  all.  Arethusa  had 
perhaps  suffered  most,  though  some  of  the  destroyers  had 
been  pretty  roughly  handled.    But  all  got  safely  home,  and 


THE  HELIGOLAND  AFFAIR  237 

none  were  so  injured  but  that  in  a  very  few  days  or  weeks 
they  were  fit  again  for  service. 

The  affair  was  in  every  respect  well  conceived  and  brilli- 
antly carried  out.  The  two  essential  matters  were  to 
begin  by  employing  a  force  sufficiently  weak  to  tempt  the 
enemy  to  come  out,  and  yet  not  so  small  nor  so  slow  a 
force  as  to  risk  being  overwhelmed.  If  something  like 
a  general  action  amongst  the  small  craft  could  be  brought 
about,  the  plan  was  to  creep  up  with  a  more  powerful, 
squadron  in  readiness  to  rescue  the  van,  if  rescue  were 
necessary,  at  any  rate  to  secure  the  final  and  immediate 
destruction  of  as  many  of  the  enemy's  ships  as  possible. 
But  there  was  no  squadron  fighting  at  all.  Goodenough's 
light  cruisers,  and  Beatty's  battle-cruisers  did,  no  doubt, 
keep  in  formation,  but  they  found  no  formed  enemy. 
There  were  no  obvious  tactical  lessons. 

Perhaps  the  most  interesting  part  of  the  business  is  to 
be  found  not  in  what  did  happen,  but  in  what  did  not. 
The  German  Commander-in-Chief  must  have  known  long 
before  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  that  fighting  was  going 
forward  within  five-and-twenty  or  thirty  miles  of  him. 
He  could  have  got  to  the  scene  with  his  whole  force  be- 
fore ten  o'clock.  But  beyond  sending  in  a  few  more  light 
cruisers  and  U-boats,  he  appears  to  have  done  nothing 
either  to  rescue  his  own  ships  or  to  attempt  to  cut  off  and 
sink  ours.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  he  suspected 
the  trap  that  was  indeed  laid  for  him.  But  the  oppor- 
tunity had  been  given  of  appearing  in  the  North  Sea  in 
force,  and  the  opportunity  was  not  taken.  It  seemed 
very  clear  to  most  observers  after  this  that  the  German 
Fleet  would  not  willingly  seek  a  general  action,  or  even 
risk  a  partial  action  in  the  North  Sea,  except  under  con- 
ditions entirely  of  their  own  choosing.     It  seemed  obvious 


238        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

that  if  such  action  was  not  sought  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war,  it  certainly  would  not  be  sought  later,  when  the  bal- 
ance of  naval  power  would  be  turning  increasingly  against 
them. 

The  battle-cruisers  in  this   action  had  some  exciting 

o 

adventures  with  submarines.  They  had,  for  instance,  to 
wait  for  some  hours  before  the  moment  came  for  their 
intervention,  and  while  at  the  rendezvous  they  were  re- 
peatedly attacked  by  them.  From  the  Vice-Admiral's 
despatch,  it  would  appear  that  this  attack  was  frustrated 
partly  by  rapid  manoeuvring,  partly  by  sending  destroyers 
to  drive  the  U-boats  off.  Later  in  the  day,  when  the 
squadron  was  engaged  in  sinking  Koln  and  Ariadne^  it 
was  once  more  attacked  by  submarines,  and  Queen  Mary 
(Captain  W.  R.  Hall)  turned  his  ship,  not  to  avoid  the  sub- 
marine, but  its  torpedo,  which  was  seen  approaching.  We 
got  very  early  warning,  therefore,  of  the  truth  of  the  pro- 
phecy that  the  first  result  of  the  employment  of  the  tor- 
pedo in  fleet  actions  would  be  compulsory  movements  of 
the  attacked  ships.  It  was  a  prompt  reminder  that  if 
manoeuvring  meant  loss  of  artillery  efficiency,  that  the 
enemy  had  it  in  his  power,  by  submarine  and  destroyer 
onslaughts,  to  extinguish  our  gunfire  from  time  to 
time. 

Alone  of  the  actions  which  have  taken  place  in  this  war, 
the  firing  was  all  within  comparatively  short  range.  Six 
thousand  yards  was  the  limit  of  visibihty.  There  are 
not  sufficient  data  to  judge  whether  the  British  gunnery 
was  greatly  superior  to  the  German.  But  Commodore 
Tyrwhitt  draws  attention  to  a  fact,  already  familiar  to  us, 
viz.  that  a  German  cruiser  can  send  salvo  after  salvo,  all 
within  a  few  yards  of  the  target,  without  securing  a  hit. 
It  proved  later  to  be  a  feature  common  to  all  engagements. 


239 


240         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

THE    NORTH    SEA 

The  engagement  off  Heligoland  had  no  successor  until 
the  spring  of  1916,  when  the  attack  on  the  island  of  Sylt 
took  place.  A  second  sweep  some  days  after  the  first  was 
made  in  the  same  waters,  but  nothing  of  the  enemy  was 
seen.  Whether  such  sweeps  were  repeatedly  made  in  191 5 
without  the  public  being  informed,  we  do  not  know.  By 
this  I  do  not  imply  that  no  incursions  into  German  waters 
were  made — I  mean  only  that  we  heard  of  none,  and  pre- 
sumably that,  if  any  were  made,  there  was  no  result. 

But  two  points  in  this  connection  may  be  borne  in 
mind.  The  affair  off  Heligoland  took  place  on  August  28, 
1914.  After  losing  three  cruisers  by  exposing  them  to  Sir 
David  Beatty's  and  Commodore  Goodenough's  forces,  the 
Germans  managed  their  affairs  very  differently.  Perhaps 
from  this  time  on  no  German  craft  ventured  into  the  North 
Sea  at  all,  except  when  the  whole  fleet  came  out  in  force. 
And  they  did  not  come  out  in  force  very  often,  nor  at  all, 
except  at  night  or  when  the  weather  was  clear  enough  for 
the  fleet's  scouts,  either  in  the  form  of  airships,  destroyers, 
or  cruisers,  to  give  long  warning  of  the  presence  of  danger. 
The  two  raiding  expeditions  and  Von  Hipper's  excursion 
of  January  28  are  undertakings  of  a  very  different  char- 
acter. 

The  Bombardments. — Whatever  the  explanation,  there 
was  no  more  fighting  in  home  waters  for  exactly  five  months, 
but  the  Germans  made  two  expeditions  in  force  right 
across  to  the  English  shores.  Early  in  November  a  squad- 
ron of  cruisers  appeared  off  Yarmouth,  fired  at  the  Halcyon, 
let  off  some  rounds,  without  doing  any  damage,  on  the 
town,  and  retreated  precipitately,  dropping  mines  as  they 
went.     A  British  submarine  unfortunately  ran  foul  of 


THE  HELIGOLAND  AFFAIR  241 

one  of  these  and  was  lost  with  all  hands  at  once.  Halcyon, 
perhaps  the  smallest  and  least  formidable  vessel  that  ever 
crept  into  the  "Navy  List",  engaged  the  enemy  imper- 
turbably  when  they  fled,  losing  one  man  from  a  fragment 
of  shell,  though  practically  unhurt  herself.  Private  letters 
speak  of  salvoes  falling  short  and  over  in  the  most  discon- 
certing manner,  and  of  the  ship  being  so  drenched  with 
water  as  to  be  in  danger  of  foundering.  The  old  story  of  the 
very  accurate,  but  ineffective,  fire  of  the  German  ships, 
was  thus  repeated.  But  no  official  or  detailed  information 
on  this  subject  has  been  given.  In  December  a  second 
and  much  more  successful  raid  was  made.  Scarborough, 
the  Hartlepools,  and  Whitby  were  bombarded  by  a  squad- 
ron, whose  composition  was  never  officially  announced. 
The  American  papers  have  printed  letters  from  Germany 
stating  that  the  Von  der  Tami  and  Moltke,  the  Torek  and 
the  Bluecher,  with  smaller  cruisers,  constituted  the  force. 
The  visitors  to  Hartlepool  experienced  the  hospitality  of 
that  flourishing  port  in  its  warmest  form.  The  garrison 
artillery  dealt  faithfully  with  Fon  der  Tann,  and  her  dis- 
appearance was  credibly  attributed  to  injuries  sustained 
in  a  collison,  which  damage  to  her  steering  gear,  eff"ected  by 
the  north  country  gunners,  had  prevented  her  evading. 
The  squadron  that  bombarded  Yarmouth  made  oflf  in  the 
thick  weather.  It  was  obvious  from  the  terms  in  which 
the  Admiralty  announced  the  fact  that  the  bombardment 
had  taken  place  that  it  was  considered  quite  certain  that 
they  could  not  escape  a  second  time.  Unfortunately, 
however,  they  did;  but  they  lost  the  Yorck  by  a  German 
mine  when  re-entering  harbour.  The  details  of  the  ar- 
rangements made  for  anticipating  them  were  quite  pro- 
perly kept  secret,  but  it  became  known  that  a  sudden  fog 
explained  why  these  arrangements  did  not  succeed. 


242        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Both  in  the  case  of  the  Yarmouth  and  the  Scarborough 
raids  the  enemy  appeared  at  dayhght.  He  had  evidently 
crossed  the  North  Sea  during  the  night.  From  Whitby 
to  the  mine-fields  off  Heligoland  is  about  275  miles,  a  dis- 
tance which  each  of  the  ships  employed  could  cover  quite 
comfortably  in  thirteen  or  fourteen  hours.  Had  the 
squadron  left  Hehgoland  an  hour  before  dark  it  could  have 
fetched  the  English  coast  by  daylight,  hardly  using  more 
than  three-quarter  power.  If  it  started  for  home  at  8:30 
it  would  have  nine  hours  of  daylight  before  it.  At 
twenty-five  knots  225  miles  could  be  covered.  This 
would  bring  them  within  fifty  or  sixty  miles  of  the  mine- 
fields, and  it  is  probable  that  at  some  greater  distance 
from  Heligoland  than  this  a  rendezvous  for  submarines 
and  destroyers  had  been  arranged. 

These  raids  were  doubtless  planned  on  the  theory  that 
the  battle-cruiser  fleet  would  be  based  on  some  point  so 
far  north  that  no  difference  in  speed  between  the  British 
and  German  ships  would  enable  the  former  to  overtake 
them  before  the  mine-fields,  or  at  least  the  waiting  sub- 
marines and  destroyers  were  met.  And  it  may  well  have 
been  hoped  that  an  exasperated  EngHsh  Admiral,  if  he 
came  up  with  them  then,  would  not  willingly  give  up  the 
hope  of  an  engagement.  It  may  have  seemed  a  very 
feasible  operation  to  draw  him  either  on  to  the  mines  them- 
selves or  within  range  of  the  submarines.  It  is,  it  seems 
to  me,  not  difl&cult  to  reconstruct  the  German  plan  for 
both  the  Yarmouth  and  the  Whitby  raids. 

It  has  often  been  pointed  out — and  with  perfect  justice 
— that  in  shelling  open  and  undefended  towns,  and  even 
a  commercial  port  like  Hartlepool  that  did  have  a  6-inch 
gun  or  two  to  defend  it,  the  Germans  were  employing 
their  fleet  to  no  immediate  military  purpose  whatever. 


THE  HELIGOLAND  AFFAIR  243 

It  has  been  suggested  that  there  might  have  been  the  very 
excellent  military  object  of  keeping  our  battle-cruisers 
in  home  waters  and  so  securing  Von  Spee  a  free  hand 
abroad.  What  has  not  been  so  often  insisted  on  is  that 
had  there  been  any  military^  centre,  fort,  or  magazine 
worth  attack,  the  fugitive  character  of  the  bombardments 
robbed  them  of  any  probable  hope  of  hitting  it. 

There  have  been  ample  experiences  during  this  war 
of  ships  bombarding  distant  objects  on  shore.  And  it  is 
finally  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  difficult  operations 
conceivable.  The  case  of  the  Koenigsherg  was  altogether 
exceptional.  And  many  as  were  the  difficulties  to  be 
faced  in  that  action,  there  was  yet  this  favourable  element 
present,  that  the  people  in  the  aeroplanes  could  not 
possibly  make  any  mistake  as  to  the  target  that  was  to  be 
bombarded,  nor  from  the  fact  that  it  was  a  small  ship 
lying  in  a  considerable  expanse  of  water  could  the  ob- 
servers, spotting  all  the  different  rounds,  fail  to  give  to 
the  fire-control  parties  on  board  very  accurate  indications 
how  to  correct  their  sights  for  the  next  round.  At  the 
Dardanelles  when  isolated  forts  were  attacked  on  a  point 
on  land,  where  one  ship  could  lie  off  nearly  at  right  angles 
to  the  line  of  fire  and  mark  the  fall  of  shot  and  the  firing 
ship  correct  the  fire  for  line,  exact  corrections  of  the  same 
character  as  at  the  Rufigi  were  made  possible.  But  when 
it  came  to  correcting  the  fire  by  captive  balloons  and  air- 
craft, when  forts  and  gun  positions  had  to  be  picked  out 
in  the  folds  of  the  hills,  and  still  more  where  forts  had  to 
be  engaged  with  no  other  corrections  than  the  men  in  the 
control  tops  of  the  firing  ship  could  supply,  it  became 
practically  impossible  to  ensure  sustained  effective  firing. 

When,  therefore,  the  German  ships  lay  off  Lowestoft, 
Hartlepool,   Whitby,   and   Scarborough   and   bombarded 


244         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

for  half  an  hour  or  so  without  any  attempt  to  select 
particular  targets,  or  if  such  were  selected,  to  adopt  any 
scientific  means  of  directing  their  fire  on  to  them,  it  became 
perfectly  clear  that  their  military  object  was  about  as 
defined  as  that  of  midnight  bombing  raids  with  Zeppelins. 
One  is  driven  to  the  conclusion,  therefore,  that  the  primary 
object  of  these  adventures  was  mere  frightfulness,  and 
that  perhaps  the  secondary  object  was  to  draw  the  pur- 
suing ships  into  some  catastrophic  trap. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

The  Action  off  the  Dogger  Bank 

The  two  bombardments  of  the  early  winter  of  1914  have 
been  variously  explained.  They  may  have  been  meant  to 
force  us  to  keep  our  main  forces  concentrated:  or  simply 
to  cheer  up  the  Germans  and  depress  our  people.  Both 
were  organized  so  that  the  German  squadron  could  start 
its  race  for  home  within  an  hour  of  daybreak. 

It  is  more  difficult,  however,  to  explain  the  events  of 
January  28.  The  precise  point  where  Sir  David  Beatty 
encountered  Admiral  von  Hipper's  fleet  has  not  been 
authoritatively  made  known,  but  it  seems  to  have  been 
on  the  northeastern  edge  of  the  Dogger  Bank.  They 
were  encountered  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Von 
Hipper's  presence  at  this  point  cannot,  then,  explain  his 
being  out  on  an  expedition  analogous  to  the  former  two. 
And  I  have  some  difficulty  in  understanding  exactly  why 
he  took  this  risk.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  the  Germans 
had  had  reports  to  the  effect  that  the  North  Sea  was  clear 
on  the  27th.  It  may  have  been  so  reported  on  several 
occasions,  and  it  is  possible  that  aircraft  had  verified  this 
fact,  when  the  weather  permitted  of  their  employment 
for  this  purpose.  The  Germans,  who  are  fond  of  jump- 
ing to  conclusions  on  very  insufficient  premises,  may 
have  exaggerated  the  effect  of  their  submarine  campaign 
on  British  dispositions.  We  know,  for  instance,  that  the 
alarm  undoubtedly  felt  by  the  public  in  September  and 
October  was  very  greatly  exaggerated  in  the  German  press. 

245 


246         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

At  any  rate,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  Falkland 
Islands  a  good  deal  of  rodomontade  appeared  about  the 
British  being  driven  from  the  North  Sea,  and  the  German 
seamen  may  have  felt  bound  to  act  as  if  this  rodomontade 
were  true.  Or  a  much  simpler  explanation  may  suffice. 
Von  Hipper  may  have  come  out  to  look  for  the  British 
ships  and  draw  them  into  prepared  positions  and  to  engage 
them  on  the  German  terms.  The  defeat  of  Von  Spee  may 
have  made  a  naval  demonstration  necessary. 

Whatever  the  explanation  of  the  Germans  being  where 
they  were,  it  was  only  by  mere  chance  that  they  escaped 
annihilation.  Had  Sir  David  Beatty — as  it  might  well 
have  happened — been  to  the  east  of  them  when  they  were 
sighted,  not  a  single  German  ship  would  ever  have  got 
home.  It  was  unlucky,  too,  that  his  squadron  was 
temporarily  deprived  of  the  services  of  the  Queen  Mary. 
A  fourth  ship  of  a  speed  superior  to  that  of  Lion,  Tiger, 
and  Princess  Royal,  and  armed  like  them  with  13.5  guns 
might  have  made  the  whole  difference  in  the  conditions 
in  which  the  fight  took  place.  Besides,  Queen  Mary  was 
much  the  best  gunnery  ship  in  the  Fleet.  Once  more, 
then,  the  Germans  had  quite  exceptional  luck  upon  their 
side. 

The  moment  Von  Hipper's  scouting  cruisers  found 
themselves  in  contact  with  Commodore  Goodenough's 
squadron  the  German  battle-cruisers  turned  and  made 
straight  for  home  at  top  speed.  They  had  a  fourteen- 
miles'  start — say,  six  miles  beyond  eJEFective  gun  range— 
of  the  British  squadron,  and  Admiral  Beatty  settled  down 
at  once  to  a  stern  chase  at  top  speed.  The  chase  began 
in  earnest  at  7:30,  the  Germans,  fourteen  miles  ahead, 
steering  S.E.,  the  British  ships  on  a  course  parallel  to 
them,  the  German  ships  bearing  about  twenty  degrees 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  247 

on  the  port  bow.  In  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  the 
range  had  been  closed  from  28,000  yards  to  20,000.  Von 
Hipper  was  evidently  regulating  the  speed  of  his  squadron 
by  that  of  the  slowest  ship,  Bluecher.  Admiral  Beatty 
disposed  of  his  fleet  in  a  hne  of  bearing,  so  that  there  should 
be  a  minimum  of  smoke  interference,  and  the  flagship 
opened  fire  with  single  shots  to  test  the  range.  In  ten 
minutes  her  first  hit  was  made  on  the  Bluecher  which  was 
the  last  in  the  German  line.  Tiger  then  opened  on  the 
Bluecher,  and  Lion  shifted  to  No.  3,  of  which  the  range 
was  18,000  yards.  At  a  quarter  past  nine  the  enemy 
opened  fire.  Soon  after  nine,  Princess  Royal  came  into 
action,  took  on  Bluecher,  while  Tiger  took  No.  3  and  Lion 
No.  I.  When  New  Zealand  came  within  range,  Bluecher 
was  passed  on  to  her.  This  was  at  about  9:35.  So  early 
as  a  quarter  to  ten  the  Bluecher  showed  signs  of  heavy 
punishment,  and  the  first  and  third  ships  of  the  enemy 
were  both  on  fire.  Lion  was  engaging  the  first  ship, 
Princess  Royal  the  third,  New  Zealand  the  Bluecher,  while 
Tiger  alternated  between  the  same  target  as  the  Lion 
and  No.  4.  For  some  reason  not  explained  the  second 
ship  in  the  German  fine  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
engaged  at  all.  Just  before  this  the  Germans  attempted 
a  diversion  by  sending  the  destroyers  to  attack.  Meteor 
(Captain  Mead),  with  a  division  of  the  British  destroyers, 
was  then  sent  ahead  to  drive  off  the  enemy,  and  this 
apparently  was  done  with  success.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  enemy  destroyers  got  between  the  battle-cruisers 
and  the  British  squadron  and  raised  huge  volumes  of 
smoke,  so  as  to  foul  the  range.  Under  cover  of  this  the 
enemy  changed  course  to  the  northward.  The  battle- 
cruisers  then  formed  a  new  line  of  bearing,  N.N.W.,  and 
were  ordered  to  proceed  at  their  utmostspeed.     A  second 


248         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

attempt  of  the  enemy's  destroyers  to  attack  the  British 
squadron  was  foiled  by  the  fire  of  Lion  and  Tiger. 

The  chase  continued  on  these  Hnes  more  or  less  for  the 
next  hour,  by  which  time  the  Bluecher  had  dropped  very 
much  astern  and  had  hauled  away  to  the  North,  She  was 
listing  heavily,  was  burning  fiercely,  and  seemed  to  be 
defeated.  Sir  David  Beatty  thereupon  ordered  Indomit- 
able to  finish  her  off,  and  one  infers  from  this,  the  first 
mention  of  Indomitable,  that  she  had  been  unable  to  keep 
pace  with  Nezv  Zealand,  Princess  Royal,  Tiger,  and  Lion, 
and  therefore  would  not  be  able  to  assist  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  battle-cruisers. 

The  range  by  this  time  must  have  been  very  much 
reduced.  If  between  7:30  and  9:30  a  gain  of  10,000  yards, 
or  5,000  yards  an  hour,  had  been  made,  between  9:30  and 
10:45  ^  further  gain  of  6,250  yards  should  have  been 
possible,  if  the  conditions  had  remained  the  same.  But 
with  Bluecher  beaten,  the  German  battle-cruisers  could 
honourably  think  of  themselves  alone.  Unless  their  speed 
had  been  reduced  by  our  fire,  while  we  ought  to  have 
gained,  we  should  hardly  have  caught  up  so  much  as  in 
the  first  hour  and  a  half.  But  there  had,  besides,  been 
two  destroyer  attacks  threatened  or  made  by  the  enemy, 
one  apparently  at  about  twenty  minutes  to  ten,  and  one 
at  some  time  between  then  and  10:40.  It  is  highly 
probable  that  each  of  these  attacks  caused  the  British 
squadron  to  change  course,  and  we  know  that  before  10:45 
the  stations  had  been  altered.  Each  of  these  three  things 
may  have  prevented  some  gain.  Still,  on  the  analogy 
of  what  had  happened  in  the  first  two  hours,  we  must 
suppose  the  range  at  this  period  to  have  been  at  most 
about  13,000  yards.  At  six  minutes  to  eleven  the  action 
had   reached  the  first  rendezvous  of  the  German  sub- 


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250        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

marines.  They  were  reported  to  and  then  seen  by  the 
Admiral  on  his  starboard  bow,  whereupon  the  squadron 
was  turned  to  port  to  avoid  them.  Very  few  minutes 
after  this  the  Lion  was  disabled. 

What  happened  from  this  point  is  not  clear.  We  know 
that  as  Sir  David  stopped  he  signalled  to  Tiger,  Princess 
Royal,  and  New  Zealand  to  close  on  and  attack  the  enemy. 
Bluecher  had  been  allotted  to  the  Indoviitahle  some  twenty 
minutes  before.  The  squadron  passed  from  Admiral 
Beatty's  command  to  that  of  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Archibald 
Moore.  In  a  very  few  minutes  it  was,  of  course,  out  of 
sight  of  the  Vice-Admiral  himself.  Sir  David  called  a 
destroyer  alongside  and  followed  at  the  best  pace  he  could 
and,  soon  after  midday,  found  the  squadron  returning 
after  breaking  off  the  pursuit  some  seventy  miles  from 
Heligoland.  Bluecher  had  been  destroyed,  but  the  three 
battle-cruisers  had  escaped.  Of  the  determining  factors 
in  these  proceedings  we  know  little.  Such  data  as  there 
are  will  be  examined  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Dogger  Bank  II 

There  are  several  matters  of  technical  and  general  in- 
terest to  be  noted  about  this  action.  In  the  two  torpedo 
attacks  by  destroyers  on  Sir  David  Beatty's  fleet,  we  see 
the  first  employment  of  this  weapon  for  purely  defensive 
purposes  in  a  fleet  action.  It  is  defensive,  not  because 
the  torpedo  is  certain  to  hit,  and  therefore  to  remove  one 
of  the  pursuing  enemy,  but  because  if  shoals  of  torpedoes 
are  fired  at  a  squadron,  it  will  almost  certainly  be  con- 
sidered so  serious  a  threat  as  to  make  a  change  of  course 
compulsory.  This  is  of  double  value  to  the  weaker  and 
retreating  force.  By  compelling  the  firing  ships  to 
manoeuvre,  the  efficiency  of  the  fire  control  of  their  guns 
may  be  seriously  upset,  and  hence  their  fire  lose  all  accu- 
racy and  eff'ect.  To  impose  a  manoeuvre,  then,  is  to 
secure  a  respite  from  the  pursuers'  fire.  But  it  does 
something  more.  By  driving  the  pursuer  off  his  course 
he  is  thrown  back  in  the  race,  and  his  guns  therefore  kept 
at  a  greater  distance.  If  the  pursuer  has  then  to  start 
finding  the  range,  and  perhaps  a  new  course  and  speed 
of  the  enemy,  all  over  again,  an  appreciable  period  of  time 
must  elapse  before  his  fire  once  more  becomes  accurate. 
And  if  he  is  prevented  closing,  the  increase  of  accuracy, 
which  shorter  range  would  give,  is  denied  him.  Apart 
altogether,  then,  from  quite  good  chances  of  a  torpedo  hit- 
ting, the  evolution  is  of  the  utmost  moment  to  the  inferior 
force.     It  was  employed  in  this  action  for  the  first  time. 

251 


252        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Again,  for  the  first  time  we  find  the  destroyers  getting 
between  the  pursuing  ships  and  the  chase,  and  creating  a 
smoke  screen  to  embarrass  the  pursuers'  aiming  and  fire 
control.  Finally,  we  find  that  Von  Hipper  has  directed 
his  flight  to  a  prearranged  point,  where  certainly  sub- 
marines had  been  gathered  and  possibly  mine-fields  had 
been  laid.  This  of  course  was  a  contingency  that  had 
always  been  foreseen.  In  an  article  published  in  the 
JVestminster  Gazette  a  week  or  two  before  the  action,  I 
dealt  with  Von  Tirpitz's  remark,  that  "the  German  Fleet 
were  perfectly  willing  to  fight  the  English,  if  England 
would  give  them  the  opportunity,"  and  interpreted 
this  to  mean,  that  the  Germans  would  be  willing  to  fight 
if  they  had  such  a  choice  of  ground  and  position  as  would 
give  them  some  equivalent  for  their  inferior  numbers. 
And  writing  at  that  time,  I  naturally  set  out  what  may 
be  called  the  general  view  of  North  Sea  strategy.  No 
good  purpose  would  have  been  served  by  questioning  It — 
even  if  such  questioning  had  been  permitted.  Nor,  In 
view  of  the  very  narrow  margin  of  superiority  that  we 
possessed  In  capital  ships,  had  I  any  wish  to  question  it. 

I  began  with  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  might 
attempt,  on  a  big  scale,  exactly  what,  on  a  much  smaller 
scale,  we  ourselves  had  attempted  In  the  Bight  of 
Heligoland  five  months  before. 

** Assuming,"  I  said,  "that  it  Is  a  professed  German 
object  to  draw  a  portion  of  the  English  Fleet  Into  a 
situation  where  it  can  be  advantageously  engaged,  what 
would  be  the  natural  course  for  them  to  pursue?  The 
first  and  perhaps  the  simplest  form  of  ruse  would  be  to 
dangle  a  squadron  before  the  English  Fleet,  so  that  our 
fastest  units  should  be  drawn  away  from  their  supports, 
and  enticed  within  reach  of  a  superior  German  force. 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  253 

If  we  suppose  the  Scarborough  raid  to  be  carried  out  by  a 
squadron  used  for  this  purpose,  we  must  look  upon  that 
episode  not  merely  as  an  example  of  Germany  practising 
its  much-loved  frightfulness,  but  as  an  exercise  in  wiliness 
as  well.  That  the  Admiralty  had  taken  every  step  it 
could  think  of  to  catch  and  destroy  this  squadron,  we  may 
safely  infer  from  the  character  of  the  communications 
made  to  us.  The  measures  adopted  were,  we  also  know, 
frustrated  by  the  thick  weather,  so  that  no  engagement 
actually  took  place.  Is  it  not  highly  probable  that  the 
Germans,  not  knowing  the  character  of  the  English 
counter-stroke,  may  have  concluded  that  our  failure  to 
bring  their  squadron  to  action  was  brought  about  quite 
as  much  by  prudence  as  by  ill-luck.?  At  any  rate,  it  is 
rather  a  curious  phenomenon  that  the  German  papers 
during  the  last  two  weeks  have  been  filled  with  the  most 
furious  articles  descanting  upon  the  pusillanimity  of  the 
British  Fleet.  To  our  eyes  such  charges,  of  course, 
seem  absurd,  nor  when  we  know  how  welcome  the  appear- 
ance of  the  German  Fleet  in  force  would  be  to  Admiral 
Jellicoe  and  his  gallant  comrades  can  we  conceive  any  sane 
man  using  such  language;  but  if  we  interpret  this  as  the 
expression  of  disappointed  hopes,  as  evidence  of  the  failure 
of  a  plan  to  catch  a  portion  of  our  Fleet,  a  reasonable 
explanation  of  what  is  otherwise  merely  nonsense  is 
afforded. 

*'The  average  layman  probably  supposes  that  a  fleet 
action  between  the  English  Grand  Fleet  and  the  German 
High  Seas  Fleet  would  be  fought  through  on  the  lines  of 
previous  engagements  in  this  war,  and  of  the  two  naval 
battles  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  They  would  expect 
the  contest  to  be  an  artillery  fight  in  which  superior 
skill  in  the  use  of  guns,  if  such  superiority  existed  on  either 


254         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

side,  would  be  decisive;  and  if  equality  of  skill  existed, 
that  victory  would  go  to  the  side  possessing  a  superior 
number  of  guns  of  superior  power.  But  other  naval 
weapons  have  advanced  enormously  in  the  last  eight 
years.  We  not  only  have  torpedoes  that  can  run  five 
and  six  miles  with  far  greater  accuracy  and  certainty 
than  the  old  torpedo  could  go  a  third  of  this  distance, 
but  we  know  that  Germany — almost  alone  amongst 
nations — has  carried  the  art  and  practice  of  sowing  mines 
to  a  point  hitherto  not  dreamt  of.  When  the  first  raid 
was  made  on  Yarmouth,  it  will  be  remembered  that  the 
German  ships  retreated  from  a  British  submarine,  and 
that  the  submarine  ran  into  and  was  blown  up  and  sunk 
by  a  mine  left  by  the  German  ship  in  its  wake.  Again, 
after  the  North-Eastern  raid,  many  ships — some  author- 
ities say  over  a  dozen — were  blown  up  by  running  into 
German  mines  left  in  the  waters  which  the  raiders  had 
been  through.  The  German  naval  leaders  are  perfectly 
aware  that  in  modern  capital  ships  they  have  an  inferiority 
of  numbers,  and  that  gun  for  gun  their  artillery  force  is 
inferior  to  ours  in  an  even  greater  degree.  It  is  certain, 
therefore,  that  in  thinking  out  the  conditions  in  which  they 
would  have  to  fight  an  English  fleet  they  are  fully  deter- 
mined to  use  all  other  means  that  can  possibly  turn  the 
scale  of  superiority  to  their  side.  Just  as  they  have  relied 
on  the  torpedo  and  the  mine  to  diminish  the  general 
strength  of  the  English  Fleet,  while  it  was  engaged  in  the 
watch  and  ward  of  the  North  Sea,  so  as  to  redress  the 
balance  before  the  time  for  a  naval  action  arrived;  so, 
too,  they  have  counted,  when  actually  in  action,  on 
crippling  and  destroying  EngHsh  ships  by  mines  and 
torpedoes,  so  that  the  artillery  preponderance  may  finally 
be  theirs.     If  we  suppose  that  the  German  admirals  have 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  255 

really  thought  out  this  problem,  and  we  must  suppose 
this,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  with  a  fast  advance 
battle-cruiser  squadron  engaged  in  mine  laying,  the 
problem  of  so  handhng  a  fleet  as  to  pursue  and  cut  ofFthis 
squadron  without  crossing  its  wake  must  be  extremely 
intricate  and  difficult.  If  further  we  imagine  that  this 
fast  squadron  has  drawn  the  hostile  squadron  towards 
it?  own  waters,  where  mine-fields  unknown  to  us  have 
been  laid,  we  have  not  only  the  problem  of  the  mines  left 
in  the  wake  of  the  enemy,  but  the  further  difficulty  of 
there  being  prepared  traps,  so  to  speak,  lying  across  the 
path  which  the  attacking  squadron  would  most  naturally 
take.  If  we  imag'ne  the  problem  still  further  comphcated 
by  an  attack  on  a  battleship  line  by  flotillas  of  fast  de- 
stroyers firing  high-speed,  long-range  torpedoes,  to  inter- 
sect the  course  that  that  squadron  is  taking,  we  have  the 
third  element  of  confusion.  It  does  not  need  much 
imagination  then  to  see  that  with  mines  actually  dropped 
during  the  manoeuvres  that  lead  up  to  or  form  part  of  the 
battle,  with  mine-fields  scattered  over  the  chosen  battle- 
field, and  with  the  possibility  of  a  battle  fleet  being 
rendered  liable  at  the  shortest  notice  to  a  massed  attack 
of  long-range  torpedo  fire,  a  naval  battle  will  be  a  totally 
different  affair  from  the  comparatively  simple  operations 
that  took  place  in  the  engagement  of  August  10,  or  at  the 
battle  of  Tsushima. 

"Such  conditions  as  these  demand  extraordinary 
sagacity  on  the  part  not  only  of  the  Commander-in-chief, 
but  of  all  the  squadron  commanders  under  him.  It 
requires  insistent  vigilance;  but  then,  for  that  matter, 
such  vigilance  is  the  daily  routine  of  the  Navy  always. 
Finally,  it  makes  demands  on  the  art  of  gunnery  of  which 
we  have  hitherto  had  no  practical  experience  at  all.     For 


256         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

reasons  that  hardly  need  discussion,  all  practice  gunnery- 
is  carried  out  in  conditions  almost  ludicrously  unlike  war, 
and  quite  absurdly  unlike  the  kind  of  naval  engagement 
that  seems  to  me  probable.  The  principal  difference 
between  the  two  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  practise  with 
the  big  guns  at  a  fast  target.  There  is  no  way  of  man- 
CEUvring  and  running  a  target  at  high  speed  unless  it  is 
propelled  by  its  own  power,  and  that  power  is  kept 
suppHed  and  is  got  by  human  agents,  and  obviously  you 
cannot  fire  at  a  ship  which  is  full  of  people.  And 
when  you  fire  at  a  towed  target  the  differences  are,  first, 
that  no  target  can  be  towed  beyond  perhaps  a  third 
of  a  battleship's  speed,  and  next,  that  it  cannot  be 
manoeuvred  as  a  ship  can.  Lastly,  the  firing  ship,  so 
far  as  I  am  aware,  is  never  called  upon  to  fire  while 
executing  the  kind  of  manoeuvres,  or  subject  to  the 
kind  of  Hmitations,  that  would  be  incident  to  a  modern 
battle. 

"To  sum  up  my  argument.  The  present  indications 
are  that  Germany,  carrying  out  its  previously  expressed 
intentions,  has  made  a  first,  and  is  now  aiming  at  getting 
the  information  for  a  second,  attempt  to  draw  the  English 
Fleet  into  fighting  on  ground  which  she  can  mine  before 
we  are  drawn  on  to  it,  and  to  fight  in  conditions  in  which 
she  can  use  a  fast  advance  squadron  to  compel  our  ships 
to  adopt  certain  manoeuvres,  and  to  turn  that  advance 
squadron  into  mine-layers,  so  as  to  limit  our  movements 
or  make  them  exceedingly  perilous.  She  will  try  to  make 
the  battlefields  as  close  as  she  can  to  her  own  ports,  both 
so  as  to  facihtate  the  prehminary  preparation  by  mines 
and  to  surprise  us  with  unexpected  torpedo  attacks.  I 
interpret  the  fulminations  of  Captain  Persius  and  others 
as  expressions  of  their  anger  at  the  failure  of  their  first 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  257 

attempt,  and  I  interpret  the  air  raids  as  attempts  to  get 
information  for  making  a  second. 

"We  can,  I  am  sure,  rely  upon  Sir  John  Jellicoe  being 
at  no  point  inferior  to  his  enemy,  either  in  wihness  or  in 
resources.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that,  so  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  much  as  we  should  hke  to  have  all  anxiety 
settled  by  hearing  of  the  definite  destruction  of  the  German 
Fleet,  its  continued  existence  is  nevertheless  perfectly 
innocuous,  so  long  as  it  is  unable  to  affect  the  transporting 
oj  our  troops  or  the  conduct  of  our  trade.^' 

The  foregoing  article,  I  think,  fairly  represents  what  the 
Spectator,  in  referring  to  it,  called  the  case  for  "naval 
patience."  But  it  did  not  mean,  nor  was  it  intended  to 
mean,  that  it  would  be  improper  in  any  circumstances  for 
a  British  ship  to  face  any  risks  from  torpedoes  and  mines, 
nor  that  to  fight  the  Germans  in  their  own  waters  was 
necessarily  the  same  thing  as  fighting  them  on  their  own 
terms.  It  is  indeed  clear  that  I  expected  the  British 
commanders  to  be  more  their  equal  to  circumventing 
the  enemy's  ingenuity.  But  no  resource  can  rob  war  of 
risk — and  if  it  were  made  a  working  principle  that  risks 
from  torpedoes  and  mines  were  never  to  be  faced,  then 
the  clearing  of  the  British  Fleet  out  of  the  North  Sea 
would  be  a  very  simple  process.  It  would  only  be  necessary 
for  the  enemy  to  send  out  a  score  or  so  of  submarines  to 
advance  in  line  abreast  when,  ex  hypothesi,  the  Fleet  would 
have  no  choice  but  incontinent  flight. 

My  object  was  first  to  show  the  public  that  the  problem 
of  the  naval  engagement  was  far  more  complicated  than 
was  generally  supposed,  and  that  the  ingenuity,  resource, 
and  vigilance  of  the  Admiral  in  command  would  be  taxed. 
It  seemed  to  me  important  that  a  sympathetic  understand- 
ing of  these  anxieties  should  be  created  in  the  public  mind. 


258         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Next,  however,  it  was  not  less  important  to  discount  any 
extravagant  expectation  in  the  matter  of  naval  gunnery. 
We  had  not  at  that  time  any  full  accounts  of  the  Battle 
of  the  Falkland  Islands;  but  it  seemed  clear  that,  in  this 
respect,  the  performance  of  the  two  battle-cruisers  had 
been  disappointing.  If  in  the  North  Sea  an  action  was 
to  be  fought  in  poor  light,  with  the  ships  made  to  man- 
oeuvre by  torpedo  attack  and  the  enemy  from  time  to 
time  veiled  in  smoke  screens,  it  seemed  quite  certain  that 
a  task  would  be  set  to  the  service  fire-control  with  which 
it  would  be  quite  unable  to  deal. 

And  if  these  were  the  weaknesses  of  our  fire-control, 
it  was  further  highly  desirable  to  keep  before  our  eyes 
the  certainty  that,  if  the  opportunity  arose  and  a  fleet 
action,  intended  to  be  decisive  and  pushed  to  a  decision, 
took  place,  we  were  almost  bound  to  lose  ships  by  tor- 
pedoes and  mines.  At  any  rate,  it  seemed  as  if  such  a 
risk  must  be  run  if  our  own  gunfire  was  to  be  made 
effective.  And  for  such  losses  the  public  should  be  pre- 
pared. 

This  being  the  situation,  it  seems  to  me  most  unfortu- 
nate that  the  Admiralty  followed  the  course  they  did  in 
communicating  their  various  accounts  of  this  action  to  us. 
For  there  were  three  accounts  given,  and  no  two  of  the 
three  agreed  as  to  the  reason  why  the  pursuit  was  broken 
off"!  For  two  days  we  were  not  told  that  Lion  was  injured, 
and  for  four  days  were  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  control 
of  the  British  Fleet  had  passed  out  of  Sir  David  Beatty's 
hands  some  time  before  the  action  was  ended.  It  was  not 
till  March  3 — that  is,  five  weeks  after  the  action — that 
we  w^ere  told  the  name  of  the  officer  on  whom  command 
had  devolved  when  Lion  fell  out  of  Hne !  This  suppression 
was  really  extraordinary^     To  be  mentioned  in  despatches 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  259 

had  always  been  an  acknowledged  honour.  To  be 
ignored  was  a  new  form  of  distinction.  How  was  the 
public  to  take  so  singular  an  omission.?  Had  it  ever 
happened  before  that  an  officer  had  been  in  command  of  a 
fleet  at  so  grave  a  crisis  and  the  fact  of  his  being  in  com- 
mand suppressed  in  announcing  the  fact  of  the  engage- 
ment.? No  one  quite  knew  how  to  take  it.  The  dis- 
crepancies in  the  communiques  are  worth  noting.  In 
the  first,  of  January  25,  was  this  curiously  worded 
paragraph: 

"A  well-contested  running  fight  ensued.  Shortly  after 
one  o'clock  Bluecher,  which  had  previously  fallen  out  of 
the  line,  capsized  and  sank.  Admiral  Beatty  reports 
that  two  other  German  battle-cruisers  w^ere  seriously 
damaged.  They  were,  however,  able  to  continue  their 
flight,  and  reached  an  area  where  dangers  from  German 
submarines  and  mines  prevented  further  pursuit." 

Did  w^hoever  drafted  this  statement  suppose  that  the 
Bluecher  was  a  battle-cruiser?  We  are  now,  however, 
more  concerned  with  the  reasons  given  for  breaking  off" 
the  action.  An  area  was  reached  where  "dangers  from 
German  submarines  and  mines  prevented  further  pursuit." 
The  communique  of  January  27  was  silent  on  this  point. 
On  the  28th  was  published  what  purported  to  be  "a 
preliminary  telegraphic  report  received  from  the  Vice- 
Admiral."  The  paragraph  dealing  with  this  matter  is  as 
follows : 

"Through  the  damage  to  Lions  feed-tank  by  an 
unfortunate  chance  shot,  we  were  undoubtedly  deprived 
of  a  greater  victor>\  The  presence  of  the  enemy's  sub- 
marines subsequently  necessitated  the  action  being  broken 
off"." 

In    this   statement   the   excuse   of  mines    is   dropped. 


26o         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

In  the  despatch  pubHshed  on  March  3  the  end  of  the  action 
is  treated  by  the  Vice-Admiral  as  follows: 

"At  II  :20  I  called  the  Attack  alongside,  shifted  my  flag 
to  her  at  about  11:35.  ^  proceeded  at  the  utmost  speed 
to  rejoin  the  squadron,  and  met  them  at  noon  retiring 
north-northwest.  I  boarded  and  hoisted  my  flag  in 
Princess  Royal  at  about  12:20,  when  Captain  Brock 
acquainted  me  with  what  had  occurred  since  Lion  fell  out 
of  line,  namely,  that  Bluecher  had  sunk,  and  that  the 
enemy  battle-cruisers  had  continued  their  course  to  east- 
ward in  a  considerably  damaged  condition." 

Here  observe  no  mention  was  made  of  submarines 
necessitating  the  action  being  broken  off,  nor  of  an  area 
being  reached  where  dangers  from  submarines  and  mines 
prevented  further  pursuit.  The  whole  incident  is  passed 
by  the  Vice-Admiral  without  comment,  unless  indeed 
the  phrase  about  the  accident  to  the  Lion,  in  the  tele- 
graphic report,  is  a  comment.  Did  the  Vice-Admiral 
imply  that  had  he  remained  in  command  he  would  have 
seen  to  it  that  his  specific  orders — viz.  that  Indomitable 
should  settle  Bluecher  and  the  other  ships  pursue  the 
battle-cruisers — were  carried  out? 

A  very  unfortunate  situation  resulted  from  these 
reticences  and  contradictions.  Naval  writers  in  America 
were  naturally  enough  amazed  by  the  statement  attributed 
to  Admiral  Beatty  in  the  telegraphic  report,  for,  if  the 
presence  of  submarines  could  stop  pursuit,  could  not 
submarines  drive  the  British  Fleet  off  the  sea?  These 
authors  naturally  expressed  extreme  astonishment  that 
an  admiral  capable  of  breaking  off  action  in  these  condi- 
tions, and  publicly  acknowledging  so  egregious  a  blunder, 
was  not  at  once  brought  to  court-martial.  No  one  in  his 
senses  could  have  supposed  that  Sir  David  Beatty,  who 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  261 

dealt  with  submarines  without  the  least  concern  in  the 
affair  of  Heligoland  and  earlier  in  the  day  on  January  28, 
could  possibly  have  accepted  the  dictum  that  the  pre- 
sence of  a  German  submarine  would  justify  pursuit  having 
been  broken  off.  It  was  then  quite  evident  that  the 
quotation  from  the  Vice-Admiral's  telegraphic  report 
could  not  have  represented  the  Vice-Admiral's  opinion  on 
a  point  of  warlike  doctrine.  What  the  actual  facts  of 
the  case  were,  we  do  not  to  this  day  know.  Rear-Admiral 
Moore  did  not  continue  long  in  Sir  David  Beatty's  squad- 
ron after  this,  but  there  was  no  court-martial  nor  any 
public  expression  of  the  Admiralty's  opinion  by  way  of 
approval  or  disapproval  of  his  proceedings.  In  a  speech 
made  a  month  after  the  action  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
Mr.  Churchill  passed  over  the  fact  that  the  action  had 
not  been  fought  out,  as  if  such  a  thing  was  of  no  excep- 
tional importance  or  interest  whatever.  Soon  afterward  it 
became  known  that  the  Rear-Admiral  in  question  had  got 
another  and  very  important  command  elsewhere,  so  that 
it  became  plain  that  his  conduct  had  not  met  with  their 
Lordships'  reprobation. 

War  in  modern  conditions  undoubtedly  makes  it 
exceedingly  important  to  keep  the  enemy  as  far  as  possible 
in  ignorance  of  a  great  many  things.  It  imposes  too  a 
continuous  strain  upon  practically  the  whole  personnel  of 
the  Navy,  and  these  two  things  taken  together  have  been 
quoted  to  explain  why  the  old  rule  of  holding  a  public  court- 
martial  on  the  captain  of  every  ship  that  was  lost,  or  on 
every  individual  officer  whose  action  in  battle  gave  rise  to 
uncertainty  or  question,  has  virtually  been  abrogated. 
But  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  Navy  has  not  lost  more  by 
the  abandonment  of  this  wholesome  practice  than  the 
enemy  could  have  gained  by  its  Spartan  application. 


262        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

This  point  came  in  for  a  good  deal  of  public  discussion 
at  the  beginning  of  191 5,  and  I  venture  to  quote  a  con- 
tribution to  it.  Looking  back  upon  this  controversy, 
it  is  easy  enough  to  see  now  wherein  lay  the  chief  dis- 
advantage of  the  suppression  of  courts-martial.  There 
was  no  general  staff  at  the  Admiralty,  representative  of 
the  best  Service  opinion,  and,  deprived  of  court-martial, 
the  Navy  had  no  means  of  expressing  a  corporate  judg- 
ment on  the  vital  issues  as  they  arose.  The  doctrine  with 
regard  to  torpedo  risk,  which  seems  to  have  been  acted  on 
at  the  close  of  this  action,  was  evidently  one  which  either 
the  Admiralty  had  laid  down,  or  at  least  accepted  as 
correct.  Could  it  have  been  referred  to  the  corporate 
judgment  of  the  Service  and  had  that  judgment  not 
endorsed  it,  the  history  of  the  war  might  have  been  alto- 
gether different. 

"Mr.  Churchill's  speech  in  the  official  reports  is  entitled 
^British  Command  of  the  Sea:  Admiralty  Organization.' 
It  would  have  been  as  well  if  this  description  had  been 
given  out  before  the  speech  was  made,  for,  as  it  happened, 
many  thought  it  was  intended  as  a  survey  of  the  first  epoch 
of  the  war  and  were  disappointed  that,  in  so  eloquent 
and  forceful  a  review,  there  was  hardly  a  word  of  tribute 
to  the  incomparable  services  of  our  officers  and  men. 
There  was  lavish  praise  of  the  generosity  of  the  House  of 
Commons;  of  the  foresight  of  Lord  Fisher;  of  the  excellence 
of  the  Admiralty's  preparedness  at  every  point;  of  the 
amazing  scale  and  success  of  the  provisioning  with  coal 
and  supplies  of  a  vast  fleet  always  at  sea;  of  the  astonishing 
perfection  of  the  work  of  the  engineering  branch.  But 
there  was  singularly  little  of  the  work  of  the  fighting  men. 
The  officers  were  dismissed  simply  as  'painstaking.'  No 
doubt  the  tribute  will  be  made  at  another  time.     Is  there 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  263 

any  time,  however,  which  is  not  the  right  time  for  ac- 
knowledging these  services?  On  Tuesday  we  learned  that 
between  300  and  400  officers  have  died  for  us — and  over 
6,000  men.  Is  it  gracious  to  postpone  their  eulogy? 
And  the  absence  of  eulogy  was  emphasized  by  the  forceful 
manner  in  which  the  First  Lord  asked  that  he  and  his 
colleagues  should  be  entrusted  with  the  most  absolute 
and  dictatorial  powers.  Indeed,  he  excused  the  departure 
from  the  Service  custom  of  holding  courts-martial  when- 
ever a  ship  was  lost  on  the  ground  that  modern  conditions 
called  for  instant  action,  with  which  courts-martial  were 
incompatible.  But  the  court-martial,  as  I  have  before 
pointed  out,  is  the  palladium  of  the  Navy's  liberties.  To 
abolish  it  is  like  suspending  the  Habeas  Corpus.  It  is  so 
extreme  a  measure  because  it  ignores  the  great  unwritten 
law  of  the  Navy,  which  is  that,  in  spite  of  the  authority 
of  Whitehall  over  the  Navy,  of  an  admiral  over  a  fleet, 
and  of  a  captain  over  a  ship's  company,  being  necessarily 
and  in  each  case  absolute,  yet  there  must  always  be  an 
appeal  from  authority  to  the  profession  itself.  If  this  is 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  subordinate  officers  and 
men  against  arbitrary  action  by  a  captain,  against  arbi- 
trary and  prejudiced  action  by  an  admiral  in  a  fleet,  how 
much  more  necessary  is  it  as  a  protection  of  naval  stand- 
ards and  traditions  against  arbitrary  action  by  the  Board? 
For  a  captain  is  at  any  rate  an  entirely  naval  authority; 
an  admiral  is  certainly  an  officer  of  large  naval  experience, 
acting  generally  with  at  least  one  other  admiral.  But 
the  Board  is  largely  a  lay  body.  Indeed,  It  Is  now  by  a 
majority  a  lay  body.  And  like  all  boards.  It  is  liable  to 
be  the  mouthpiece  of  its  strongest  personality.  If  this, 
as  sometimes  happens,  is  a  seaman,  he  may  be  a  partisan — 
I  say  It  in  no  invidious  sense — of  certain  policies  and  so 


264         THE  BRITISH  NA\^  IN  BATTLE 

prejudiced  against  brother  officers  who  differ.  If  the 
stronger  character  is  a  layman,  he  may  be  ignorant  of, 
or  see  no  danger  in  waiving,  naval  traditions  that  are 
embodied  in  no  statute  or  regulation,  but  are  not  embodied 
simply  because  their  cogency  has  never  been  questioned. 
In  other  words,  the  autocracy  of  the  Admiralty  is  a 
necessity  of  executive  administration,  but  can  only  be 
exercised  safely  if  its  enforcement  is  continuously  tested 
by  professional  opinion. 

How  many  people,  I  often  wonder,  really  appreciate 
how  singular  a  body  is  that  which  is  made  up  of  admirals, 
captains,  commanders,  and  lieutenants  of  the  Royal  Navy? 
The  accomplishments  that  make  the  seaman  confuse  the 
landsman  by  their  strangeness  and  intricacy.  Indeed, 
if  one  wishes  to  express  the  extremity  of  bewilderment, 
he  does  so  best  by  the  metaphor  which  describes  the 
sailor's  normal  environment.  When  we  say  we  are  "at 
sea,"  we  do  so  because  language  expresses  no  greater 
helplessness.  To  master  these  conditions  calls  for  forms 
of  knowledge  and  proficiency  that  are  only  acquired  by  a 
lifetime's  familiarity.  But  these  conditions  are  not  only 
baffling,  they  are  incredibly  dangerous.  If  steam  has 
done  much  to  lessen  the  perils  of  the  sea,  speed,  the  pro- 
duct of  steam,  has  added  to  them.  The  sailor  then,  even 
in  times  of  peace,  passes  his  days,  and  still  more  his  nights, 
encompassed  by  the  threat  of  irreparable  disaster.  An 
oversight  that  may  take  thirty  seconds  to  commit — and 
a  hundred  deaths,  a  wrecked  ship,  and  a  shattered  reputa- 
tion reward  thirty  years  of  constant  and  unblemished 
devotion  to  duty.  To  face  a  life  and  responsibilities  like 
these  calls  for  more  than  great  mental  and  physical  skill, 
though  nowhere  will  you  find  these  in  a  higher  degree  or 
more  widely  diffused  than  in  the  Fleet.     It  calls  for  moral 


THE  DOGGER  BANK  II  265 

and  spiritual  qualities,  for  a  development  of  character  in 
patience,  unselfishness,  and  courage  which  few  landsmen 
have  any  inducement  to  cultivate.  A  life  lived  daily 
in  the  presence  of  death  must  be  a  unique  life,  and  it  is 
not  surprising  that  men  bred  to  these  conditions — always 
as  hard  and  ascetic  as  they  are  uncertain  and  unsafe — 
grow  to  be  a  body  quite  unlike  other  men,  with  standards 
and  traditions  of  their  own,  and  a  corporate  spirit  and 
capacity  that  are  unique,  wonderful,  and  to  most  landsmen 
incomprehensible. 

Their  standards  and  traditions  can  only  be  maintained 
and  can  only  be  enforced  by  themselves.  And  the  great 
peril  that  follows  from  excluding  all  reference  to  them  of 
the  accidents  and  failures  of  war  is  that,  faihng  this 
reference,  we  have  no  security  that  naval  action  will 
be  judged  as  it  should  be,  solely  by  the  highest  naval 
standard. 

Much  was  said  in  the  House  of  Commons  about  the 
loss  of  ships.  Mr.  Churchill  assumed  that  the  only  motive 
for  asking  for  courts-martial  was  to  find  a  scapegoat. 
Lord  Charles  Beresford  only  made  clear  that  a  court- 
martial  was  as  much  for  clearing  the  character  as  for  find- 
ing criminals.  There  was  a  significant  phrase  in  Mr. 
Churchill's  speech  that  raises,  it  seems  to  me,  a  point  in 
this  connection  of  far  greater  importance.  The  battle 
of  the  Dogger  Bank,  he  said,  was  "not  fought  out  because 
the  enemy  made  good  their  escape  into  waters  infested 
by  submarines  and  mines."  The  officer  who  had  to  call 
ofF  a  fleet  in  these  circumstances  was  necessarily  faced 
by  a  grave  and  almost  terrifying  responsibility.  To  be 
too  bold  was  to  risk  everything,  to  be  too  cautious  was 
to  throw  away  a  victory.  Can  any  tribunal,  except  the 
Navy,    judge    whether    this    responsibility    was    rightly 


266        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

exercised?  When  we  remember  that  in  our  greatest  days 
hardly  a  naval  battle  took  place  that  was  not  followed  by 
courts-martial,  it  seems  to  me  a  most  perilous  thing  to 
allow  these  tremendous  issues  to  go  by  the  board  because 
unless  they  are  adjudicated  upon  by  the  profession  itself 
they  are  not  adjudicated  upon  at  all. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
The  Battle  of  Jutland 

i.  north  sea  strategies 

The  battle  off  Jutland  Bank,  which  took  place  on  May 
31,  1916,  was  the  first  and,  at  the  time  of  writing,  has  been 
the  only  meeting  between  the  main  naval  forces  of  Great 
Britain  and  Germany.  It  was  from  the  first  inevitable 
that  we  should  have  to  wait  long  for  a  sea  fight.  It  was 
inevitable,  because  the  probability  of  a  smaller  force  being 
not  only  decisively  defeated,  but  altogether  destroyed  in 
a  sea  fight,  is  far  greater  than  in  a  land  battle,  and  the 
consciousness  of  this  naturally  makes  it  chary  of  the  risk. 
Sea  war  in  this  respect  preserves  the  characteristic  of 
ancient  land  fighting,  for — as  is  luminously  explained  in 
Commandant  Colin's  incomparable  "Transformations  of 
War" — it  was  a  common  characteristic  of  the  older 
campaigns  that  the  main  armies  would  remain  almost  in 
touch  with  each  other  month  after  month  before  the 
battle  took  place.  He  sums  up  his  generalization  thus: 
"From  the  highest  antiquity,"  he  says,  "till  the  time 
of  Frederick  II,  operations  present  the  same  character; 
'not  only  Fabius  or  Turenne,  but  also  Caesar,  Conde,  and 
Frederick,  lead  their  armies  in  the  same  way.  Far  from 
the  enemy  they  force  the  pace,  but  as  soon  as  they  draw 
near  they  move  hither  and  thither  in  eveiy  direction,  take 
days,  weeks,  months  in  deciding  to  accept  or  to  force 
battle.     Whether  the  armies  are  made  up  of  hoplites  or 

267 


268         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

legionaries,  or  pikemen  or  musketeers,  they  move  as  one 
whole  and  deploy  very  slowly.  They  cannot  hurl  them- 
selves upon  the  enemy  as  soon  as  they  perceive  him, 
because  while  they  are  making  ready  for  battle  he  dis- 
appears in  another  direction. 

"In  order  to  change  this  state  of  affairs  we  must  some- 
how or  another  be  able  to  put  into  the  fight  big  divisions, 
each  deploying  on  its  own  account,  leaving  gaps  and 
irregularities  along  the  front. 

"This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  what  happened  in  the  eigh- 
teenth century. 

"Up  to  the  time  of  Frederick  II,  armies  remained 
indivisible  during  operations;  they  are  Hke  mathematical 
points  on  the  huge  theatres  of  operations  in  Central 
Europe.  It  is  not  possible  to  grasp,  to  squeeze,  or  even 
to  push  back  on  some  obstacle,  an  enemy  who  refuses 
battle,  and  retires  laterally  as  well  as  backwards.  There 
is  no  end  to  the  pursuit.  It  is  the  war  of  Caesar,  as  it  was 
that  of  Conde,  Turenne,  Montecuculi,  Villars,  Eugene, 
Maurice  de  Saxe,  and  Frederick.  It  is  the  sort  of  war 
that  all  more  or  less  regular  armies  have  made  from  the 
remotest  antiquity  down  to  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

"Battle  only  takes  place  by  mutual  consent,  when 
both  adversaries,  as  at  Rocroi,  are  equally  sure  of  victory, 
and  throw  themselves  at  one  another  in  open  countr>^  as 
if  for  a  duel;  or  when  one  of  them,  as  at  Laufeld,  cannot 
retreat  without  abandoning  the  struggle;  or  when  one  is 
surprised,  as  at  Rossbach. 

"And  certainly  to-da}^,  as  heretofore,  a  general  may 
refuse  battle;  but  he  cannot  prolong  his  retreat  for  long — 
it  is  the  only  means  that  he  has  for  escaping  the  grip  of 
the  enemy — if  the  depth  of  the  theatre  of  operations  is 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  269 

limited.  On  the  other  hand,  an  enemy  formerly  could 
retire  laterally,  and  disappear  for  months  by  perpetually 
running  to  and  fro,  always  taking  cover  behind  every 
obstacle  in  order  to  avoid  attack." 

But  at  sea  a  fleet  has  to-day  precisely  the  same  power 
of  avoiding  action  that  an  army  had  in  former  days.  It 
cannot  disappear  for  months  by  "running  to  and  fro," 
but  it  can  disappear  for  years  by  burying  itself  in  inac- 
cessible harbours.  It  can,  in  other  words,  take  itself  out 
of  the  theatre  of  war  altogether  while  yet  retaining  liberty 
at  any  moment  to  re-enter  it.  How,  in  view  of  these 
potentialities,    did    the    rival   fleets  dispose  their  forces? 

On  April  25,  1916,  some  German  cruisers  made  an  attack 
on  Lowestoft,  similar  in  character  but  far  less  considerable 
in  result  to  those  made  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  on  the 
same  small  town,  on  Scarborough,  Whitby,  and  the 
Hartlepools.  As  in  1914,  there  was  considerable  perturba- 
tion on  the  East  Coast,  and  the  Admiralty,  urged  to  take 
steps  for  the  protection  of  the  seaboard  towns,  made  a 
somewhat  startling  announcement.  While  this  was  going 
forward  in  England,  the  German  Admiralty  put  out  an 
inspired  commentary  on  the  raid,  which  dwelt  with  great 
exultation  over  the  picture  of  "the  Island  Empire,  once 
so  proud,  now  quivering  with  rage  at  its  own  impotence." 
These  two  documents,  the  First  Lord's  and  the  German 
apology,  led  to  a  good  deal  of  discussion,  which  I  dealt 
with  at  the  time  in  terms  that  I  quote  textually,  as  show- 
ing the  general  conception  of  naval  strategy  underlying 
the  dispositions  of  the  British  Fleet. 

"The  directly  military  employment  of  the  British  Fleet 
has  during  the  last  week  been  made  the  subject  of  dis- 
cussion. Mr.  Balfour  has  written  a  strange  letter  to  the 
Mayors   of  the   East   Coast   towns,   which    foreshadows 


270        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE  ' 

important  developments;  an  inspired  German  apology 
for  the  recent  raid  on  Yarmouth  and  Lowestoft  has  been 
published,  and  both  have  aroused  comment.  Mr.  Bal- 
four's letter  was  inspired  by  a  desire  to  reassure  the 
battered  victims  of  the  German  bombardment.  He 
realized  that  the  usual  commonplace  that  these  visits  had 
little  military  value  no  longer  met  the  case,  and  proceeded 
to  threaten  the  Germans  with  new  and  more  effective 
methods  of  meeting  them,  should  these  murderous 
experiments  be  repeated.  The  new  measures  were  to  take 
two  forms.  The  towns  themselves  would  be  locally 
defended  by  monitors  and  submarines,  and,  without 
disturbing  naval  preponderance  elsewhere,  new  units 
would  be  brought  farther  south,  so  that  the  interception 
of  raiders  would  be  made  more  easy.  But  for  one  con- 
sideration the  publication  of  such  a  statement  as  this 
would  be  inexphcable.  If  the  effective  destruction  of 
German  raiders  really  had  been  prepared,  the  last  thing 
the  Admiralty  would  be  expected  to  do  would  be  to 
acquaint  the  enemy  with  the  disconcerting  character  of 
its  future  reception.  Count  Reventlow  indeed  explains 
the  publication  by  the  fact  that  no  such  preparations 
have  indeed  been  made.  But  the  thing  is  susceptible  of 
a  more  probable  explanation. 

"When  Mr.  Churchill,  in  the  high  tide  of  his  optimism, 
addressed  the  House  of  Commons  at  the  beginning  of  last 
year — he  had  the  Falkland  Islands  and  the  Dogger  Bank 
battles,  the  obliteration  of  the  German  ocean  cruising 
force,  the  extinction  of  the  enemy  merchant  marine,  the 
security  of  English  communications  to  his  credit — he 
explained  the  accumulated  phenomena  of  our  sea  triumph 
by  the  splendid  perfection  of  his  pre-war  preparedness. 
The  submarine  campaign,  the  failure  of  the  Dardanelles, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  271 

the  revelation  of  the  defenceless  state  of  the  northeastern 
harbours,  these  things  have  somewhat  modified  the  picture 
that  the  ex-First  Lord  drew.  And,  not  least  of  our  dis- 
illusions, we  have  all  come  to  realize  that  in  our  neglect 
of  the  airship  we  have  allowed  the  enemy  to  develop,  for 
his  sole  benefit,  a  method  of  naval  scouting  that  is  entirely 
denied  to  us.  That  the  British  Admiralty  and  the  British 
Fleet  perfectly  realize  this  disadvantage  is  the  meaning 
of  Mr.  Balfour's  letter.  He  would  not  have  told  the 
enemy  of  our  new  North  Sea  arrangements  had  he  not 
known  that  he  could  not  be  kept  in  ignorance  of  them 
for  longer  than  a  week  or  two,  once  they  were  made.  The 
letter  is,  in  fact,  an  admission  that  our  sea  power  has  to  a 
great  extent  lost  what  was  at  one  time  its  supreme  preroga- 
tive, the  capacity  of  strategical  surprise. 

"But  this  does  not  materially  alter  the  dynamics  of  the 
North  Sea  position,  although  it  greatly  affects  tactics. 
The  German  official  apologist  will  have  it,  however,  that 
another  factor  has  altered  these  dynamics.  Admiral 
JelHcoe,  he  says,  may  be  secure  enough  with  his  vast  fleet 
in  his  'great  bay  in  the  Orkneys,'  and,  between  that  and 
the  Norwegian  coast,  hold  a  perfectly  effective  blockade 
line,  but  all  British  calculations  of  North  Sea  strategy 
have  been  upset  by  the  establishment  of  new  enemy  naval 
bases  at  Zeebrugge,  Ostend,  and  Antwerp.  He  speaks 
ghbly,  as  if  the  co-operation  of  the  forces  based  on  the 
Bight  with  those  in  the  stolen  Belgian  ports  had  altered 
the  position  fundamentally.  This,  of  course,  is  the  veriest 
rubbish.  So  far  no  captured  Belgian  port  has  been  made 
the  base  for  anything  more  important  than  submarines 
that  can  cross  the  North  Sea  under  water,  and  for  the  few 
destroyers  that  have  made  a  dash  through  in  the  darkness. 
Such  balderdash  as  this,   and  that  the  German  battle- 


272         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

cruisers  did  not  take  to  flight,  but  simply  'returned  to 
their  bases'  without  waiting  for  the  advent  of  'superior 
forces,'  imposes  on  nobody.  It  remains,  of  course, 
perfectly  manifest  that  our  surface  control  of  the  North 
Sea  is  as  absolute  as  the  character  of  modern  weapons 
and  the  present  understanding  of  their  use  make  possible. 

"The  principles  behind  our  North  Sea  Strategy  are 
simple.  One  hundred  years  ago,  had  our  main  naval 
enemy  been  based  on  Cuxhaven  and  Kiel,  we  should  have 
held  him  there  by  as  close  a  blockade  as  the  number  of 
ships  at  our  disposal,  the  weather  conditions,  and  the 
seamanship  of  our  captains  made  possible.  The  develop- 
ment of  the  steam-driven  ship  modified  the  theory  of 
close  blockade  and,  even  without  the  torpedo,  would 
have  made,  with  the  speed  now  attainable,  an  exact 
continuation  of  the  old  practice  impossible.  The  under- 
water torpedo  has  simply  emphasized  and  added  to 
difficulties  that  would,  without  it,  have  been  insuperable. 
But  it  has  undoubtedly  extended  the  range  at  which  the 
blockading  force  must  hold  itself  in  readiness.  To  re- 
produce, then,  in  modern  conditions  the  efi^ect  brought 
about  by  close  blockade  in  our  previous  wars,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  have  a  naval  base  at  a  suitable  distance  from  the 
enemy's  base.  It  must  be  one  that  is  proof  against 
under-water  or  surface  torpedo  vessel  attack,  and  it  must 
be  so  constituted  that  the  force  that  normally  maintains 
itself  there  is  capable  of  prompt  and  rapid  sortie,  and  of 
pouncing  upon  any  enemy  fleet  that  attempts  to  break 
out  of  the  harbour  in  which  it  is  intended  to  confine  it. 

'"The  great  bay  in  the  Orkneys'  may,  for  all  I  know 
to  the  contrary,  supply  at  the  present  moment  the  Grand 
Fleet's  main  base  for  such  blockade  as  we  enforce.  But 
there  are  a  great  many  other  ports,  inlets,  and  estuaries 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  273 

on  the  East  Coast  of  Scotland  and  England  which  are 
hardly  likely  to  be  entirely  neglected.  Not  all,  nor  many, 
of  these  would  be  suitable  for  fleet  units  of  the  greatest 
size  and  speed,  but  some  undoubtedly  are  suitable,  and 
all  those  that  are  could  be  made  to  satisfy  the  conditions 
of  complete  protection  against  secret  attack.  Assuming 
the  main  battle  fleet  to  be  at  an  extremely  northerly 
point,  any  more  southerly  base  which  is  kept  either  by 
battle  cruisers,  light  cruisers,  or  submarines  may  be 
regarded  as  an  advance  base,  if  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  it  is  so  many  miles  nearer  to  the  German  base.  The 
Orkneys  are  200  miles  farther  from  Lowestoft  than  Lowe- 
stoft is  from  Heligoland.  An  Orkney  concentration 
while  making  the  escape  of  the  Germans  to  the  northward 
impossible,  would  leave  them  comparatively  free  to  harry 
the  East  Coast  of  England.  If,  approaching  during  the 
night,  they  could  arrive  off"  that  coast  before  the  northern 
forces  had  news  of  their  leaving  their  harbours,  they 
would  have  many  hours'  start  in  the  race  home.  It  is 
not,  then,  a  close  blockade  that  was  maintained.  This 
freedom  had  to  be  left  the  enemy — because  no  risk  could  be 
taken  in  the  main  theatre.  It  is  assumed  on  the  one  side 
and  admitted  on  the  other,  that  Germany  could  gain  noth- 
ing and  would  risk  ever^'thing  by  attempting  to  pass  down 
the  Channel.  The  Channel  is  closed  to  the  German  Fleet 
precisely  as  the  Sound  is  closed  to  the  British.  It  is  not 
that  it  is  physically  impossible  for  either  fleet  to  get 
through,  but  that  to  force  a  passage  would  involve  an 
operation  employing  almost  every  kind  of  craft.  Mine- 
fields would  have  to  be  cleared,  and  battleships  would 
have  to  be  in  attendance  to  protect  the  mine-sweepers. 
The  battleships  in  turn  would  have  to  be  protected 
from  submarine  attack,  and  as  the  operation  of  securing 


274        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

either  channel  would  take  some  time,  there  would  be  a 
virtual  certainty  of  the  force  employed  being  attacked 
in  the  greatest  possible  strength.  In  narrow  waters  the 
fleet  trying  to  force  a  passage  would  be  compelled  to  engage 
in  the  most  disadvantageous  possible  circumstances. 
The  Channel  is  closed,  then,  for  the  Germans,  as  the 
Sound  is  closed  to  the  British,  not  by  the  under-water 
defences,  but  by  the  fact  that  to  clear  these  w^ould  involve 
an  action  in  which  the  attacking  party  would  be  at  too 
great  a  disadvantage.  The  concentration,  then,  in  the 
north  of  a  force  adequate  to  deal  with  the  whole  German 
Fleet — again  I  have  to  say  in  the  light  of  the  way  in  which 
the  use  of  modern  weapons  is  understood — remains  our 
fundamental  strategical  principle." 

I  then  went  on  to  reply  to  the  critics  who  had  said  that 
the  use  of  monitors  for  coast  defence  was  the  most  dis- 
turbing feature  of  a  very  unwise  series  of  departures  from 
true  pohcy,  and  then  passed  on  to  what  seemed  to  me  the 
more  serious  criticism,  as  follows: 

"The  attack  on  this  part  of  Mr.  Balfour's  policy  is 
vastly  more  damaging.  For  it  asserts  that  the  policy  of 
defensive  offence.  Great  Britain's  traditional  sea  strategy, 
has  now  been  reversed.  The  East  Coast  towns  may  ex- 
pect comparative  immunity,  but  only  because  the  strategic 
use  of  our  forces  has  been  altered.  It  is  a  modification 
imposed  upon  the  Admiralty  by  the  action  of  the  enemy. 
Its  weakness  lies  in  the  'substitution  of  squadrons  in  fixed 
positions  for  periodical  sweeps  in  force  through  the  length 
and  breadth  of  the  North  Sea.*  Were  this  indeed  the 
meaning  of  Mr.  Balfour's  letter  and  the  intention  of  his 
policy,  nothing  more  deplorable  could  be  imagined. 

"But  what  ground  is  there  for  thinking  that  this  is  Mr. 
Balfour's  meaning?     He  says  nothing  of  the  kind.     He 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  275 

makes  it  quite  clear  that  a  new  arrangement  is  made  pos- 
sible by  additional  units  of  the  first  importance  now  being 
ready  to  use.  The  old  provision  of  adequate  naval  pre- 
ponderance at  the  right  point  has  not  been  disturbed.  It 
is  merely  proposed  to  estabHsh  new  and  advanced  bases 
from  which  the  new  available  squadrons  can  strike.  It 
stands  to  reason  that  the  nearer  this  base  is  to  the  shortest 
line  between  Heligoland  and  the  East  Coast,  the  greater 
the  chance  of  the  force  within  it  being  able  to  fall  upon 
Germany's  cruising  or  raiding  units  if  they  venture  within 
the  radius  of  its  action.  To  estabHsh  a  new  or  more 
southerly  base,  then,  is  a  development  of,  and  not  a  de- 
parture from,  our  previous  strategy — it  shortens  the  radius 
of  German  freedom.  If  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the 
old  distribution  is  changed,  certainly  there  is  no  suggestion 
that  the  squadron  destined  for  the  new  base  w^ill  be  'fixed' 
there.  If  squadrons  now  based  on  the  north  are  there 
only  to  pounce  upon  the  emerging  German  ships,  why 
should  squadrons  based  farther  south  not  be  employed  for 
a  similar  purpose?" 

The  foregoing  will  make  it  clear  that  the  general  idea 
of  British  strategy  was  to  maintain,  to  the  extreme  north 
of  these  islands,  an  overwhelming  force  of  capital  ships. 
It  was  adopted  because  it  economized  strength  and  secured 
the  main  object — viz.  the  paralysis  of  our  enemy,  outside 
certain  narrow  limits. 

The  southern  half  of  the  North  Sea — say,  roughly  from 
Peterhead  to  the  Skagerack,  400  miles;  from  the  Skagerack 
to  Heligoland,  250;  from  Heligoland  to  Lowestoft,  300; 
and  from  Lowestoft  to  Peterhead,  350  miles — was  left 
as  a  kind  of  no  man's  land.  If  the  Germans  chose  to 
cruise  about  in  this  area,  they  took  the  chance  of  being  cut 
ofFand  engaged  by  the  British  forces,  whose  policy  it  was 


276        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

to  leave  their  bases  from  time  to  time  for  what  Sir  John 
JeUicoe  in  the  Jutland  despatch  describes  as  "periodic 
sweeps  through  the  North  Sea."  But  the  German  Fleet 
'being  supplied  with  Zeppelins,  could,  in  weather  in  which 
Zeppelins  could  scout,  get  information  so  far  afield  as  to  be 
•  able  to  choose  the  times  for  their  own  cruises  in  the  North 
Sea,  and  so  make  the  procedure  a  perfectly  safe  one,  so 
long  as  chance  encounters  with  submarines  and  straying 
into  British  mine-fields  could  be  avoided.  Thus  for  the 
old  policy  of  close  blockade  was  substituted  a  new  one, 
that  of  leaving  the  enemy  a  large  field  in  which  he  might 
be  tempted  to  manoeuvre;  and  it  had  this  value,  that 
should  he  yield  to  the  temptation,  an  opportunity  must 
sooner  or  later  be  afforded  to  the  British  Fleet  of  cutting 
him  off  and  bringing  him  to  action.  Meantime  he  was 
cut  ofF  from  any  large  adventure  far  afield.  He  would 
have  to  fight  for  freedom.  It  gave,  so  to  speak,  the  Ger- 
mans the  chance  of  playing  a  new  sort  of  "Tom  Tiddler's 
ground."  The  point  to  bear  in  mind  Is,  that  It  left  the 
Germans  precisely  the  same  freedom  to  seek  or  avoid 
action  as  the  armies  of  antiquity  possessed.  Thus  no. 
naval  battle  could  be  expected  unless — as  Colin  says — the- 
weaker  wished  to  fight,  or  was  cornered  or  surprised. 

Now,  against  surprise,  the  German  Fleet  was  seemingly 
protected  by  Zeppelins.  It  could  hardly  be  cornered 
unless,  in  weather  In  which  aerial  scouting  was  impossible. 
It  was  tempted  to  some  great  adventure — such  as  the  des- 
patch of  a  raiding  force  to  Invade — ^whlch  would  enable 
a  fast  British  division  to  get  between  this  force  and  Its 
base.  So  that  the  chance  of  a  fleet  action  really  turned 
upon  the  Germans  being  willing  to  fight  one.  And  they 
could  not  be  expected  to  be  anxious  for  this.  "A  war," 
says  Colin,  "is  always  slow  in  v.hich  we  know  that  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  277 

battle  will  be  decisive,  and  it  is  so  important  as  to  be  only 
accepted  voluntarily." 

The  state  of  relative  strength  in  May,  1916,  was  not 
such  as  to  afford  the  Germans  the  slightest  hope  of  a  de- 
cisive victory  if  it  brought  the  whole  British  Fleet  to 
action.  Nor  was  the  naval  situation  such  that  there  was 
any  stroke  that  Germany  could  execute  if  it  could  hold 
the  command  of  some  sea  passage  for  twenty-four  hours 
or  so.  There  was  nothing  it  could  expect  to  achieve  if, 
by  defeating  or  at  any  rate  standing  off  one  section  of  the 
British  Fleet,  it  could  enjoy  a  brief  local  ascendancy. 

The  argument,  indeed,  was  all  the  other  way.  The 
professed  main  naval  policy  of  Germany,  viz.,  the  blockade 
of  England  by  submarine,  though  for  the  moment  in 
abeyance,  was  being  held  in  reserve  until  the  military  and 
political  situation  made  the  stake  worth  the  candle.  Now, 
deliberately  to  risk  the  High  Seas  Fleet  in  an  action  on  the 
grand  scale,  when  the  chances  of  decisive  victory  were  re- 
mote and  the  probabihty  of  annihilation  extremely  high, 
was  to  jeopardize  not  the  fleet  alone  but  also  the  blockade. 
For,  w^ith  the  High  Seas  Fleet  once  out  of  the  way,  the 
one  stroke  against  the  submarine  which  could  alone  be 
perfectly  effective,  viz.,  the  close  under-water  blockade  by 
mines,  immediately  outside  the  German  harbours,  would 
at  once  become  feasible.  So  far,  then,  as  military  consid- 
erations went,  the  arguments  against  seeking  action  were 
far  stronger  than  those  in  its  favour. 

But  in  war  it  is  not  always  reasons  which  are  purely 
military  that  operate;  and  as  this  war  got  into  its  second 
year  there  were  many  forces,  each  of  which  contributed 
something  towards  driving  the  German  Navy  into  action. 
First,  and  in  all  probabihty  by  far  the  most  powerful, 
would  be  the  impatience  of  a  large  body  of  brave  and  skil- 


278        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

fill  seamen — in  control  of  an  enormous  sea  force — ^with 
the  role  of  idleness  and  impotence  that  had  been  imposed 
upon  them.  The  German  apologist,  when  uttering  his 
pseans  of  triumph  over  the  bombardments  of  Lowestoft, 
said,  on  May  7: 

'*It  must  not  be  assumed  that  this  adventure  was  a  mere 
question  of  bombarding  some  fortified  coast  places.  It 
would  also  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  it  was  only  an  expres- 
sion of  the  spirit  of  enterprise  in  our  young  Navy.  The 
spirit  is  indeed  just  as  fresh  as  ever,  and  is  simply  thirsting 
for  deeds,  and  when  one  sees  or  talks  to  officers  and  men 
one  reads  on  their  lips  the  desire  'If  only  we  could  get  out.' 
The  sitting  still  during  the  spring  and  winter  may  also  play 
their  part  in  this.  Only  a  well-considered  leadership 
knows  when  it  will  use  this  thirst  for  action,  and  employ 
it  in  undertakings  which  keep  the  great  whole  in  view. 
Our  Navy,  thank  God,  does  not  need  to  pursue  prestige 
policy;  the  services  which  it  has  already  rendered  us  are 
too  considerable  and  too  important  for  that." 

There  is  no  occasion  to  quarrel  with  a  word  in  this  pass- 
age. The  German  admirals  and  captains  in  command  of 
twenty-three  or  twenty-four  of  the  most  powerful  ships 
in  the  world  must  certainly  have  been  straining  at  the 
leash.  This,  then,  would  be  a  predisposing  cause  to  a 
battle  of  some  kind  being  voluntarily  sought  by  the  weaker 
force. 

And  in  May,  1916,  there  were  other  causes  as  well.  The 
German  Higher  Command,  while  ignorant  perhaps  of  the 
exact  points  at  which  the  Allies  would  attack,  must  have 
been  verv  perfectly  aware  that  attacks  of  the  most  for- 
midable character,  and  on  all  fronts,  were  impending.  It 
also  knew  that  the  resources  of  the  Central  Empires  were 
to  this  extent  relatively  exhausted,  that  all  the  Allied 


<rHE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  279 

attacks,  when  they  came,  must  result  in  a  series  of  suc- 
cesses, not  of  course  immediately  decisive,  but  such  as  no 
counter-attacks  could  balance  or  neutrahze.  Austria  and 
Germany,  in  short,  would  be  shown  to  be  on  the  defensive. 
They  would  have  to  yield  ground.  It  may  not  have 
seemed  a  situation  bound  to  lead  to  mihtary  defeat.  For 
the  superiority  of  the  Allies — at  least  so  it  may  have  ap- 
peared to  the  German  command — in  men  and  ammu- 
nition and  moral,  would  have  to  be  overwhelming  to  bring 
this  about. 

But  the  Higher  Command  had  made  the  mistake  of 
carrying  the  civil  population  with  them  in  the  declaration 
and  prosecution  of  the  war,  first  by  the  promise  and  then 
by  the  assertion  of  overwhelming  victory.  But  the  vic- 
tory that  was  claimed  did  not  materialize  in  the  way  that 
is  normal  to  great  victories.  There  was  no  submission 
of  the  enemy,  and  no  sign  of  a  wish  for  an  honourable 
peace.  What  was  worse,  the  defeated  enemy  had  shown 
an  almost  unlimited  capacity  to  starve  and  hamper  their 
conquerors.  It  was  bad  enough  that  they  should  not 
acknowledge  themselves  beaten.  It  was  worse  that  the 
flail  of  hunger  should  fall  on  those  who  should  be  fattening 
on  the  fruits  of  victory.  What  would  the  state  of  mind 
of  the  German  people  be  if,  on  the  top  of  all  this,  the  con- 
quered Allies  were  to  evince  a  capacity  for  winning  a  few 
battles  themselves  ?  It  was  manifestly  a  position  in  which, 
at  any  cost,  the  moral  of  the  German  people  should  be 
braced  for  a  new  trial.  Given  a  fleet  impatient  to  get  out 
and  a  higher  command  anxious  for  news  of  a  victory, 
these  are  surely  elements  enough  to  explain  the  events 
that  led  to  the  action  of  May  3 1 . 

But  the  most  powerful  motive  of  all  was  this :     Not  only 
was  German  moral  badly  in  need  of  refreshment,  it  was 


28o        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

especially  that  Germany's  belief  in  her  naval  power  needed 
to  be  confirmed.  For,  in  the  last  week  in  April,  the  Em- 
peror and  his  counsellors  had  been  compelled  to  submit 
to  a  peremptory  ultimatum  despatched  by  President  Wil- 
son with  the  endorsement  of  both  houses  of  Congress  be- 
hind him.  Towards  the  end  of  the  winter  191 5-16  the 
German  people  had  been  led  to  expect  a  decisive  stroke 
against  England  by  the  new  U-boats  which  the  Tirpitz 
building  programme  of  the  previous  year  was  reputed  to  be 
producing  in  large  and  punctual  numbers.  The  Grand 
Admiral  himself,  amid  the  vociferous  applause  of  the 
Jingoes  and  Junkers,  announced  that  the  campaign  would 
begin  on  a  certain  day  in  March.  The  story  how  more 
cautious  counsels  prevailed,  how  the  Grand  Admiral  was 
dismissed,  how  an  agitation  was  thereupon  organized 
throughout  Germany,  and  how,  finally,  the  campaign  was 
begun,  though  its  author  was  out  of  office,  are  well  known. 
The  point  is  that  the  sinking  of  the  passenger  ship  Sussex 
led  America  to  define  the  position  and  to  inflict  a  public 
humiliation,  not  only  on  the  German  Government  but  on 
the  German  Navy.  On  the  top  of  all  the  other  predispos- 
ing causes,  then,  here  was  a  special  reason  why  the  sea 
forces  of  the  Fatherland  should  vindicate  their  existence 
by  some  signal  act  of  daring. 

We  must  then,  I  think,  in  considering  the  Battle  of 
Jutland,  start  with  the  assumption  that  the  German  Fleet 
came  out  in  obedience  both  to  policy  and  to  its  own  desire. 
But  we  should  be  wrong  if  we  supposed  that  they  came 
out  with  any  hopes  of  achieving  final  and  decisive  victory. 
It  has  never  been  a  characteristic  of  German  military 
thought  to  build  on  the  possibihties  of  an  inferior  force 
defeating  its  superior. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  very  confident  that  it  could 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  281; 

not  be  decisively  beaten.  Being  an  inferior  force,  the 
German  Navy  has  been  driven  to  giving  the  utmost  con- 
sideration to  all  the  methods  of  fighting  that  can  add  to 
the  defensive  in  battle.  It  was  not  slow  to  realize,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  enormous  advantage  that  the  dirigible  air- 
ship offered  in  scouting,  and  from  the  first  it  has  devoted 
itself  with  special  energy  and  care  to  the  practice  and  de- 
velopment of  the  defensive  tactics  which  the  long-range 
torpedo  made  possible.  Nor  is  this  all.  For  though  the 
Germany  Navy  was  the  last  of  all  the  great  navies  to 
cultivate  long-range  gunnery,  it  very  quickly  appreciated 
the  fact  that  its  efficiency  depended  upon  the  visibility  of 
the  target,  that  it  should  be  launched  at  periods  when  the 
rate  of  change  was  constant.  It  consequently  made  it  a 
first  step  in  its  war  preparations  to  supply  itself  with  the 
finest  optical  instruments  regardless  of  cost,  so  as  to  get 
the  range  and  the  rate  with  utmost  accuracy  and  rapidity 
and  to  master  all  the  means  by  which  the  enemy's  gunfire 
could  be  made  nugatory  both  by  devices  that  would  hide 
its  own  ships  from  his  view,  and  by  imposing  sudden  man- 
oeuvres by  torpedo  attack.  We  have  already  seen,  in  the 
story  of  the  Dogger  Bank  engagement,  how  the  pursuing 
British  battle-cruisers  were  hampered  in  their  chase  and 
indeed  deflected  from  their  course  by  submarines  skilfully 
stationed  for  attack,  and  by  the  employment  in  action  of 
destroyer  flotillas.  And,  again,  how  when  Bluecher  was 
disabled,  and  two  out  of  three  battle-cruisers  were  on  fire 
and  their  batteries  useless,  they  were  shielded  in  their 
final  flight  by  the  destroyers  interposing  themselves  on 
the  British  line  of  fire  and  then  raising  huge  volumes  of 
smoke  impenetrable  to  the  eye. 

Lastly,  as  German  writers  since  the  battle  have  never 
ceased  to  remind  us,  the  German  Fleet  had  never  been 


282         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

built  with  the  idea  of  its  being  able  to  fight  and  defeat  the 
British  Fleet,  but  with  the  idea  of  creating  a  force  so  for- 
midable that  the  British  Fleet  would  not  face  the  risk  to 
itself  that  would  be  involved  in  its  destruction.  That  there 
was  some  justification  for  such  a  belief  will  become  appar- 
ent when  we  consider  the  statements  of  various  British 
naval  authorities  made  after  the  action  was  over.  I  draw 
attention  to  it  here  because  it  was  undoubtedly  reliance 
on  some  hesitation  of  this  kind  that  gave  the  Germans 
such  confidence  in  the  methods  of  evasion  which  they 
adopted  when  the  two  fleets  met. 

In  asking  ourselves  why  the  Germans  came  out  we  must 
bear  this  extremely  significant  truth  in  mind.  They  be- 
lieved that  they  could  almost  certainly  avoid  contact  with 
the  Grand  Fleet,  but  they  also  believed  that  if  contact 
were  made,  what  with  torpedo  attacks  and  smoke  screens, 
they  could  hold  off  their  enemies  long  enough  to  make 
evasion  possible.  To  the  Germans,  then,  it  was  very  far 
from  being  an  irrational  risk  to  come  into  the  North  Sea 
to  look  for  the  enemy,  with  a  view  to  fight  on  the  principle 
of  limited  liability. 


CHAPTER  XX 
The  Battle  of  Jutland — (Continued) 

II.      THE    URGENCY   OF   A   DECISION 

We  can  safely  accept  the  German  official  statement,  that 
their  objective  on  May  31  was  to  cut  off  and  chastise  that 
portion  of  our  advanced  forces  that  had  so  often  swept 
across  to  the  Schleswig  coast  in  the  previous  few  months. 
The  force  they  were  looking  for  would  naturally  be  the 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  for  it  had  been  this  force  that  had 
always  been  nearest  the  German  bases,  even  when  the 
whole  of  both  British  fleets  were  engaged  in  sweeping. 
But  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  in  every  sweep  both 
fleets  took  part.  In  coming  out,  then,  the  Germans 
would  expect  to  meet  the  battle-cruisers,  if  anything,  and 
they  would  count  either  upon  the  Grand  Fleet  not  being 
in  the  field  at  all,  or  at  any  rate  to  be  sufficiently  far  off  to 
be  of  no  immediate  danger. 

But  how  could  the  Germans  expect  to  bring  Sir  David 
Beatty  to  action?  The  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  before  the 
Battle  of  Jutland,  was  exactly  twice  as  numerous,  and  in 
gun  power  more  than  twice  as  strong,  as  the  German  fast 
division.  In  the  Battle  of  Jutland  it  was  reinforced  by 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  ships  to  which  Germany  pos- 
sessed no  counterparts  at  all.  Clearly,  then,  if  Sir  David 
Beatty's  force  was  to  be  brought  to  action  and  defeated 
it  would  be  useless  to  rely  upon  Von  Hipper  alone.  The 
whole   German    naval   forces   would    be   required.     And 

283 


284        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

according  to  enemy  accounts  sixteen  modern  battlesnips 
appeared  on  May  31.  None  of  these  had  a  greater  speed 
than  21  knots,  and,  as  they  were  said  to  be  accompanied 
by  six  pre-Dreadnoughts,  the  speed  of  the  whole  fleet  could 
not  have  exceeded  18  knots.  The  united  German  forces 
would,  of  course,  have  a  fleet  speed  of  the  slowest  squadron. 
How  can  an  i8-knot  squadron  corner  and  chastise  a  25- 
knot  squadron — for  25  knots  was  an  easy  speed  for  the 
slowest  of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  .^ 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  Von  Hipper's  fleet  would  not  te 
able  to  get  into  action  with  Sir  David  Beatty's  fleet,  unless 
the  British  Admiral  chose  to  engage.  Before  the  news  of 
the  battle  was  three  days  old,  the  suggestion  had  been 
many  times  made  that  the  loss  of  Queen  Mary,  Indefatig- 
able, and  Invincible  was  to  be  explained  by  their  having 
been  employed  in  "rash  and  impetuous  tactics,"  and  set 
to  engage  a  superior  force  by  the  "over-confidence"  of  the 
Admiral  responsible  for  their  movements.  And  one  critic 
went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  opportunity  for  the  German 
Commander-in-Chief  to  overwhelm  an  inferior  British 
force  with  greatly  superior  numbers  was  exactly  what  the 
enemy  was  looking  for.  With  the  justice  of  this  as  a 
criticism  of  Sir  David  Beatty's  tactics  I  will  deal  later. 
But  that  Admiral  Scheer  fully  expected  that  if  Sir  David 
Beatty  found  him  he  would  engage  him,  we  may  take  for 
granted.  Just  as  he  and  his  own  officers  and  men  were 
anxious  for  action,  so  must  Sir  David  and  his.  fleet  be 
burning  with  a  desire  to  get  to  grips.  He  banked,  that 
is  to  say,  on  Sir  David  attacking.  If  he  did,  the  German 
position  and  prospects  were  distinctly  good.  There  would 
be  twenty-one  ships  against  nine  or  ten,  and  if  the  fast 
battleships  were  with  the  British  Vice-Admiral,  against 
fourteen  or  fifteen.     The  preponderance  in  force  would 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  285 

certainly  be  on  the  German  side.  It  should  not  be  difficult 
to  escape  defeat.  With  luck,  serious  loss  might  be  inflicted 
on  the  British  before  it  was  compelled  to  break  off  battle 
and  retreat,  especially  if  it  sought  close  action.  It  might 
indeed  be  compelled  to  continue  the  battle,  if  some  of  its 
units  were  wounded,  for  the  Vice-Admiral  would  certainly 
hesitate  to  desert  them. 

As  to  the  danger  of  the  situation  being  reversed — by 
the  Grand  Fleet  turning  up — in  the  first  place,  Zeppehns 
might  save  him  from  that.  If  they  did  not,  he  always  had 
the  card  up  his  sleeve,  that  he  could  stand  the  British 
Fleet  off  by  torpedoes,  and  shield  himself  by  smoke  from 
the  very  long-range  gunnery  which  the  torpedo  attacks 
would  make  inevitable.  So  much  for  the  German  plan. 
Now  how  about  the  Enghsh  plan  ? 

It  is  a  little  difficult  to  say  exactly  what  the  British  plan 
was,  if  by  plan  we  mean  a  definite  understanding  existing 
between  the  Higher  Command  in  London  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief at  sea.  For  as  to  this  no  information 
whatever  has  been  given  to  the  pubhc  and  we  can  only 
arrive  at  its  tenor  by  the  fact  that  the  Admiralty  after 
the  event  expressed  itself  completely  satisfied  with  the 
Commander-in-Chief's  conduct  after  the  fight — a  matter 
to  be  gone  into  in  greater  detail  later.  For  the  moment 
the  only  indication  we  have  of  the  general  poHcy  which  has 
inspired  Whitehall,  is  that  given  by  Mr.  Churchill  in  an 
article  contributed  to  a  popular  magazine  a  few  months  after 
the  action  was  fought.  In  this  he  laid  down  the  following 
as  the  sea  doctrine  that  should  guide  our  naval  conduct: 

From  the  first  day  of  the  war,  he  said,  the  British  Navy 
had  exercised  the  full  and  unquestioned  command  of  the 
sea.  So  long  as  it  really  remained  unchallenged  and  un- 
beaten the  superior  fleet  ruled  all  the  open  waters  of  the 


286         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

world.  From  the  beginning  it  had  enjoyed  all  the  fruits 
of  a  complete  victory.  Had  Germany  never  built  a 
Dreadnought,  or  if  all  the  German  Dreadnoughts  had 
been  sunk,  the  control  and  authority  of  the  British  Navy 
could  not  have  been  more  effective.  There  had  been  no 
Trafalgar,  but  the  full  consequences  of  a  Trafalgar  had 
been  continuously  operative.  There  was  no  reason  why 
this  condition  of  affairs  should  not  continue  indefinitely. 
Without  a  battle  we  had  all  that  the  most  victorious  of 
battles  could  give  us.  This  was  the  true  starting  point 
of  any  reflections  on  the  war  by  sea.  We  were  content! 
As  for  Jutland,  there  was  no  need  for  the  British  to  seek 
that  battle  at  all.  There  was  no  strategic  cause  or  com- 
pulsion operating  to  draw  our  battle  fleet  into  Danish 
waters.  If  we  chose  to  go  there  it  was  because  of  zeal 
and  strength.  A  keen  desire  to  engage  the  enemy  impelled, 
and  a  cool  calculation  of  ample  margins  of  superiority 
justified,  a  movement  not  necessarily  required  by  any 
practical  need.  The  battle  must,  therefore,  be  regarded 
as  an  audacious  attempt  to  bring  the  enemy  to  action, 
arising  out  of  consciousness  of  overwhelming  superiority! 
A  little  consideration  will,  I  think,  convince  us  that  Mr. 
Churchill  was  altogether  wrong  in  supposing  that  a  de- 
cisive action  was  not  highly  important  to  us  at  this  time. 
For  obviously  the  German  Fleet  came  out  to  do  something, 
and  if  my  suggestion  is  right — that  its  mission  was  to  raise 
German  moral —  we  had  first  the  obvious  duty  of  prevent- 
ing the  German  Fleet  doing  anything  it  wished  to  do,  and 
next  an  insistent  duty  to  depress  German  moral,  at  least 
as  much  as  Admiral  Scheer  wished  to  raise  it.  Apart 
from  any  material  or  directly  military  results,  a  second 
Trafalgar,  had  it  really  broken  the  hearts  of  German 
civilians,  might  have  been  an  element  decisive  of  the  power 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  287 

of  the  German  people  to  endure  the  privations  that  the 
prolongation  of  war  inflicts  upon  them.  It  might  finally 
have  broken  down  the  whole  structure  of  lying  bluff  that 
the  Emperor's  government  has  maintained.  This  would 
have  been  a  military  object  of  the  first  value  and  import- 
ance. If  the  war  is  to  end  by  the  collapse,  not  of  the  Ger- 
man Army  but  of  the  German  people,  the  value  of  such 
a  victory  and  such  a  result  can  be  measured  by  the  number 
of  days  of  war  that  it  would  have  saved  at  a  cost  in  men 
and  treasure  that  it  is  hard  to  calculate. 

But  apart  altogether  from  this,  there  were  other  con- 
siderations, some  economic  and  some  military^,  so  im- 
mensely serious,  as  would  certainly  have  justified  Sir 
David  Beatty  in  risking,  not  three,  but  all  his  battle- 
cruisers,  if  by  so  doing  he  could  have  insured  the  entire 
destruction  of  the  German  Fleet  by  Sir  John  JelHcoe's 
forces.  To  realize  this  point  we  must  carrj^  our  consider- 
ation of  the  naval  strategy  of  the  two  sides  in  this  war  a 
little  further.  We  have  seen  that  our  method  of  disposing 
of  our  forces  in  the  North  Sea  gave  the  German  Fleet  a 
certain  limited  freedom  of  manoeuvre  in  the  irregular 
quadrilateral  formed  by  Peterhead,  the  Skagerack,  Heligo- 
land, and  Lowestoft.  Outside  of  this  area  there  was  not, 
after  December  8,  1914,  a  single  German  warship  afloat 
that  was  not  a  fugitive  or  in  hiding,  nor  has  any  surface 
ship  ventured  outside  this  area  since.  When  the  careers 
of  Karlsruhe  and  Emden  terminated,  the  period  of  system- 
atic capture  of  our  trading  ships  closed  also.  But  Von 
Tirpitz  was  very  far  from  being  satisfied  with  the  situation 
so  created. 

The  Grand  Admiral  was  wildly  wrong  in  the  kind  of  navy 
that  he  built  for  Germany,  and  hopelessly  at  sea  in  his 
forecast  of  the  action  England  would  take  in  the  kind  of 


288         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

war  that  Germany  intended  to  provoke.  But  when  the 
events  of  the  first  few  months  showed  that  the  war  would 
be  a  long  one,  it  is  not  certain  that  he  was  not  the  first 
European  in  authority  to  realize  to  the  full  the  role  sea- 
power  would  play.  In  a  long  war,  the  merchant  shipping 
of  the  world — and  it  was  immaterial  whether  it  was  bel- 
ligerent or  neutral — ^would  obviously  be  the  one  thing  by 
which  the  Allies,  by  importations  of  raw  material,  and  the 
manufactures  of  America,  the  British  colonies,  and  Japan, 
could  counterbalance  the  vastly  superior  organization  of 
the  Central  Powers  for  working  their  industries  and  fac- 
tories. Shipping  was  at  once  the  source  of  supply  of  the 
whole  Alliance  and  the  military  communications  of  the 
most  formidable  of  them.  The  German  submarines  had 
had  a  small  initial  success  against  British  warships.  It 
was  disappointing  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  attrition 
that  Germany  had  hoped  for.  But  it  opened  Von  Tirpitz's 
eyes  to  the  immense  possibihties  of  a  submarine  attack 
on  trading  ships.  He  saw,  then,  both  the  necessity  of 
cutting  the  Allies  off  from  the  sea,  'and  the  means  of  cut- 
ting them  off.  The  plan  was  an  outrageous  one  from  the 
point  of  view  of  morals.  But  Von  Tirpitz's  conception  of 
the  importance  of  sea  supplies  to  the  Allies  was  perfectly 
correct,  and  in  organizing  an  attack  upon  it  he  was  striking 
straight  at  the  heart  of  our  power  of  carrying  on  the  war. 

This  campaign  had  a  very  direct  bearing  upon  our 
North  Sea  strategy,  for  at  the  date  at  which  the  Battle  of 
Jutland  was  fought,  about  two  and  a  half  million  tons 
of  British,  Allied,  and  neutral  shipping  had  been  sunk  by 
submarine  and  mine.  Had  the  war  imposed  no  other 
attacks  upon  merchant  shipping,  the  percentage  lost 
would  not  have  been  very  formidable.  In  the  eighteen 
months  that  had  elapsed  since  the  first  organized  subma- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  289 

rine  attack  on  trade,  it  represented  a  rate  of  sinking  of  less 
than  a  million  and  three-quarter  tons  a  year,  a  loss  which 
the  Allies  and  neutrals  could  easily  have  counteracted  by 
more  energetic  building.  But  more  than  half  of  Great 
Britain's  ocean-going  shipping  had  been  commandeered 
for  various  war  purposes  and  already  in  1916  it  had  be- 
come obvious  that  the  remaining  stock  of  ships  could  not 
seriously  be  diminished  without  grave  embarrassment, 
either  to  civil  supply,  to  our  financial  position,  to  our  mili- 
tary power  abroad,  or  to  all  three.  What  was  much 
more  serious  was  this:  It  was  a  well-known  fact  that 
immediately  after  the  German  Government  decided  to 
blockade  by  submarine,  a  very  large  building  programme 
was  put  in  hand.  The  programme,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
begun  to  materiaHze  at  the  beginning  of  1916,  and  it  was 
Germany's  resources  in  new  ships  that  was  Tirpitz's  justi- 
fication for  risking  a  quarrel  with  America,  so  certain  did 
the  ruin  of  England  seem,  were  ruthlessness  of  method 
combined  with  the  employment  of  larger  and  larger  num- 
bers. The  Higher  Naval  Command,  then,  in  this  country 
were  fully  aware  of  the  extreme  importance  of  being  able 
to  deal  drastically  with  this  menace,  should  it  once  more 
arise  to  threaten  our  sea  communications.  They  also 
knew  that  it  was  certain  to  arise.  And,  again,  they  knew 
that  the  under-water  threat  could  only  be  completely  met 
by  an  under-water  antidote.  In  the  nature  of  things,  as 
we  have  seen,  there  could  be  no  complete  reply  to  the  sub- 
marine except  by  mines  laid  in  continuous  barrage  outside 
the  German  harbours,  and  this  in  turn  was  a  thing  that 
could  not  be  done  unless  the  German  Fleet  were  destroyed. 
Whatever  reason  there  may  have  been  in  1914  and  191 5 
for  holding  the  Churchill  doctrine  that  a  victory  was  un- 
necessary, the  brief  submarine  campaign  of  1916  must 


290        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

have  undeceived  the  blindest.  For  this  campaign  had 
not  only  shown  that  ruthlessness  could  double  the  rate 
of  sinking,  it  had  also  shown  that  our  stock  counter- 
measures  were  ineffective  to  thwart  it.  It  was,  then,  a 
matter  of  the  very  highest  military  importance  to  the 
cause  of  the  Alliance  that  the  German  Fleet  should  be  dis- 
posed of,  so  that  the  renewal  of  the  German  submarine 
campaign  should  be  virtually  impossible. 

Had  this  indeed  been  the  result,  it  is  difficult  to  calcu- 
late the  profound  influence  it  must  have  had  upon  the 
course  of  the  war,  for  within  a  year  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland 
over  five  and  a  half  million  tons  of  shipping  were  destroyed 
and  throughout  that  year  a  ver>^  high  percentage  of  British 
shipbuilding  capacity  had  necessarilv  to  be  devoted  to 
purely  military  purposes. 

The  continued  existence  of  the  German  Fleet  made  it 
impossible  to  curtail,  made  it  indeed  obligatory  to  increase 
and  accelerate,  the  building  of  war  ships  of  all  sizes.  The 
effect  of  this  on  the  capacity  to  build  merchant  ships  was 
felt  immediately.  In  pre-war  days  the  shipyards  of 
Great  Britain  had  turned  out  over  a  milHon  and  a  quarter 
tons  of  merchant  shipping  and  a  quarter  of  a  million  tons 
of  naval  shipping.  The  same  yards,  had  their  industry 
been  organized  as  a  national  activity,  could  under  the  pres- 
sure of  war  undoubtedly  have  produced  two  and  a  half 
million  tons  a  year.  The  complete  destruction  of  the 
German  Fleet  at  Jutland,  then,  would  have  made  the  dif- 
ference of  nearly  eight  million  tons  of  shipping  before  an- 
other year  was  out.  What  would  this  have  meant  in  the 
saving  of  treasure,  in  man-power,  in  ever>^  other  form  of 
military  strength  to  the  Allies?  But  apart  from  these, 
there  were  further  military  objects  of  a  very  striking  kind 
that  might  well  have  been  within  reach. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  291 

We  have  just  seen,  in  discussing  the  North  Sea  strategy, 
that  the  kind  of  blockade  we  have  maintained  over  the 
Germans  was  a  long-range  sort,  leaving  the  German 
fleets  an  area  of,  say,  60,000  square  miles  in  which  to 
manoeuvre.  If  there  had  been  no  fleet  of  German  battle- 
ships something  very  like  the  old  close  blockade  could 
have  been  maintained.  It  is  well  known  that  it  is  not 
mines  and  submarines  that  close  the  Channel  and  the 
Sound  to  the  German  and  British  fleets.  It  is  the  fact 
that  the  operation  of  clearing  these  things  away  must 
expose  the  force  doing  it  to  battleship  action.  The  con- 
verse also  holds  true.  If  there  were  no  German  battle- 
ships the  operation  of  confining  the  German  cruisers, 
destro^xrs,  as  well  as  the  German  submarines,  within 
waters  of  comparatively  narrow  limits,  by  mines,  nets, 
&c.,  might  not  have  been  impossible.  Certainly  the  open- 
ing of  the  battle  would  have  been  comparatively  simple. 
There  are  many  kinds  of  operations  in  which  it  would  be 
folly  to  risk  a  battle-fleet  so  long  as  the  enemy's  battle- 
fleet  was  in  being.  But  with  no  hostile  enemy  fleet  in 
existence  a  whole  vista  of  new  possibilities  is  opened 
up  to  naval  and  amphibious  force.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
enumerate  them. 

We  may  take  it,  then,  as  axiomatic  that,  if  any  chance 
of  bringing  the  German  Fleet  to  action  was  off"ered,  it 
was  the  first  business  of  the  British  Navy,  and  on  purely 
military  grounds,  no  less  than  those  of  economic  and  moral 
advantage,  to  force  it  to  decisive  action,  and  that  very 
heavy  losses  indeed  would  be  justified  by  complete  success. 

But  a  further  word  must  be  added.  If  every  admiral 
at  every  juncture  is  to  regulate  his  action  by  nice  calcu- 
lation of  policy  and  chance,  is  there  not  a  risk  that  the 
balancing  of  pros  and  cons  may  be  pushed  so  far  as  to 


292         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

confuse  the  main  issue  ?  It  is  not  on  these  principles  that, 
when  it  comes  to  fighting,  brave  men  with  an  instinct  for 
war  do  in  fact  act.  It  is  almost  true  to  say  that  the  ex- 
ample of  Hawke  and  Nelson,  no  less  than  those  of  the 
light  cruiser  and  destroyer  captains  in  the  battle  we  are 
about  to  consider,  prove  that  the  best  way  of  diminishing 
the  risk  of  loss  is  to  take  the  risk  as  boldly  and  as  often 
as  you  get  the  chance.  Something  seems  to  be  due  to 
fighting  for  fighting's  sake.  What  was  it  that  Nelson 
said  about  no  captain  could  go  far  wrong  who  laid  his 
ship  alongside  an  enemy's!  or  as  Napoleon  has  it,  "the 
glory  and  honour  of  arms  should  be  the  first  consideration 
of  a  general  who  gives  battle! 

In  summing  up  the  situation  on  May  31,  the  elements 
appear  to  be  as  follows:  The  German  Government  was 
in  double  need  of  a  stroke  to  restore  the  moral  of  its  people. 
A  Russian  revival  was  possible,  the  British  army  in  France 
and  Flanders  was  growing  to  formidable  dimensions,  the 
blow  at  Verdun  had  failed.  The  German  Government, 
and  particularly  the  Imperial  Navy,  had  been  humihated 
by  the  surrender  to  America,  so  that  everything  pointed 
to  a  stroke  at  sea,  if  one  could  be  planned  that  did  not 
involve  too  great  a  risk.  Admiral  Scheer  and  his  officers 
of  the  High  Seas  Fleet  were  full  of  eagerness  to  justify 
themselves  to  their  force.  They  believed  the  British 
naval  strategy  to  be  such  that  it  would  be  possible  for 
them  to  inveigle  the  fast  division  of  the  British  Fleet  into 
an  action  with  greatly  superior  numbers,  when  serious 
damage  might  be  inflicted  on  them.  They  counted,  and 
with  confidence,  on  Sir  David  Beatty's  eagerness  to  fight, 
and  they  trusted  to  being  able  to  defeat  him  before  he 
could  break  off*  action  or  could  be  supported  by  forces 
with  whom  engagement  would  be  hopeless.     They  relied 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  293 

upon  their  air  scouts  to  save  them  from  surprise,  and  had 
no  intention  of  coming  into  contact  with  Sir  John  JelHcoe 
if  it  could  possibly  be  avoided.  At  the  same  time,  how- 
ever, they  recognized  that  the  defensive  tactics  which 
smoke  screens  and  the  new  torpedo  made  possible  would 
not  only  prevent  contact  with  superior  numbers  being 
disastrous,  they  believed  here,  too,  either  that  the 
British  would  avoid  the  risk  of  torpedo  disaster,  or  that 
the  keenness  of  the  British  Fleet  for  action  must  expose 
them  to  very  formidable  losses  by  under-water  attack, 
while  their  gun-fire  could  be  rendered  harmless  by  the 
obscuration  of  the  target  and  the  manoeuvres  the  torpedo 
could  force  upon  them.  And  in  these  conditions'the  eva- 
sion of  an  artillery  fight  at  decisive  range  should  present 
no  difficulties.  Finally,  such  risks  as  were  involved  were 
well  worth  the  incalculable  enhancement  of  German 
prestige  that  would  follow  if  a  not-too-untruthful  claim 
could  be  made  to  a  naval  victory.  The  world  that  has  a 
natural  sympathy  with  the  weaker  force  would  be  inclined 
to  regard  even  the  escape  of  the  German  Fleet  as  some- 
thing very  like  a  German  success. 

It  was  the  manifest  duty  of  the  British  Fleet  first  to 
thwart  any  German  naval  design,  whatever  it  might  be, 
and,  secondly,  to  remove  from  the  theatre  of  war  the  only 
formidable  sea  force  that  the  enemy  possessed.  For  to 
do  this  would  make  a  close  investment  of  his  ports  possible, 
would  to  a  large  extent  cut  down  the  possibility  of  his  sub- 
marine successes  by  mining  them  into  their  harbours  and 
channels  instead  of  netting  them  out  of  ours,  would  open 
the  Baltic  to  British  naval  enterprise,  and  would  set  the 
whole  resources  of  the  Clyde  and  the  Tyne  free  to  pro- 
duce merchant  shipping. 


CHAPTER  XXr 
The  Battle  of  Jutland  (Continued) 

in.      THE    DISTRIBUTION   OF   FORCES 

In  the  afternoon  of  May  31  the  main  sea  forces  of  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  were  all  in  the  North  Sea.  The 
Grand  Fleet,  under  the  command  of  Sir  John  Jellicoe, 
accompanied  by  a  squadron  of  battle-cruisers,  two  of  light 
cruisers,  and  three  flotillas  of  destroyers,  were  to  the  north; 
the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet — of  two  squadrons — three  squad- 
rons of  hght  cruisers,  and  four  destroyer  flotillas,  supported 
by  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  all  under  the  command 
of  Sir  David  Beatty,  were  scouting  to  the  southward. 

The  British  Fleet  was  out  "in  pursuance  of  the  general 
pohcy  of  periodical  sweeps  through  the  North  Sea."  The 
disposition  of  the  forces  and  the  plan  of  operations  were 
the  Commander-in-Chief's  own.  Neither  was  dictated 
from  Whitehall.  The  despatches  describing  the  operation 
do  not — as  some  of  those  relating  to  the  events  off  Heligo- 
land in  August,  1914 — say  that  the  ships  were  following 
Admiralty  instructions.  The  fact  has  considerable  im- 
portance in  view  of  the  fears  expressed  earlier  in  the  spring 
that  Whitehall  was  interfering  with  the  Commander-in- 
Chief's  dispositions.  Note  also  that  the  fleet  was  here 
in  pursuit  of  the  general  policy  followed  since  the  early 
days  of  the  war.  This  hunting  for  the  enemy  is  not  de- 
scribed as  taking  place  at  regular  intervals,  but  as  "peri- 
odic."    These  searching  movements  would  be  made  at 

294 


ij(^ 


Reference 

Trac^o/ British  Battle  fleet — . 

••    "'  British  Battle  Cruiser^^— 
T  •••       Snejny's  S/iifii- 


The  official  plan  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland.  Note  that  the 
course  of  the  Grand  Fleet  is  not  shown  to  be  "astern"  of  the 
battle-cruisers,  but  parallel  to  their  track 

295 


296         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

the  times  when  there  was  a  greater  likelihood  of  there 
being  an  enemy  to  find. 

There  was  a  considerable  interval  between  the  forces — 
just  how  great  we  do  not  exactly  know.  But  at  the  point 
at  which  the  story  in  the  despatches  opens,  Sir  David 
Beatty's  force  was  steering  northward,  that  is,  toward 
the  Grand  Fleet.  At  2:20  Galatea,  the  flagship  of  Com- 
modore Alexander  Sinclair,  reported  the  presence  of 
enemy  vessels.  The  light  cruisers  were  spread  out  on  a 
line  east  and  west,  ahead  of  the  battle-cruisers.  When 
Sir  David  Beatty  got  news  that  the  enemy  had  been 
sighted  on  the  extreme  right  of  his  line  of  cruisers,  he  at 
once  altered  course  from  north  to  S.S.E.,  that  is,  rather 
more  of  a  right  angle  and  a  half,  steering  for  the  Horn 
Reefs,  so  as  to  place  his  force  between  the  enemy  and  his 
base.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Vice-Admiral  at  once 
adopted  not  the  movement  that  would  soonest  bring  the 
enemy  to  action,  but  that  which  would  compel  him  to 
action  whether  he  wished  it  or  not.  Observe  he  does  not 
wait  to  do  this  till  he  has  ascertained  the  enemy's  strength. 
A  quarter  of  an  hour  later  smoke  was  seen  to  the  eastward 
— that  would  be  on  the  port  bow — which  would  confirm 
the  Galatea's  account  that  the  enemy  was  still  to  the  north 
of  the  line  that  Sir  David  Beatty  was  steering.  The 
distance  of  the  battle-cruisers  from  the  Horn  Reefs  was 
such  that  the  enemy's  escape  from  action  would  still  be 
impossible,  even  if  he  altered  course  to  cut  him  off  sooner. 
This,  accordingly,  he  did,  steering  first  due  east  and  then 
northeast  and,  in  less  than  an  hour,  sighted  Von  Hipper's 
force  of  five  battle-cruisers,  probably  almost  straight 
ahead.  When,  at  2:20,  the  battle-cruisers  headed  for  the 
Horn  Reefs,  the  First  and  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons 
changed  their  direction  also  without  waiting  for  orders, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  297 

and  swept  to  the  eastward,  screening  the  battle-cruisers. 
The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  which  we  must  suppose 
originally  to  have  been  on  Sir  David  Beatty's  left,  was 
coming  up  behind  the  battle-cruisers  as  fast  as  possible. 
The  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  leaving  the  screening 
functions  to  the  First  and  Third,  made  full  speed  to  take 
station  ahead  of  the  battle-cruisers,  where  two  flotillas 
of  destroyers  were  already.  While  these  movements 
were  proceeding,  a  seaplane  was  sent  up  from  Engadine 
which,  having  to  fly  low  on  account  of  clouds,  pushed  to 
within  3 ,000  yards  of  the  four  light  cruisers  of  Von  Hipper's 
advance  force.  Full  and  accurate  reports  were  thus  re- 
ceived just  before  the  enemy  was  sighted  in  the  distance. 

At  2:20,  when  the  enemy's  scouting  advanced  craft 
were  first  seen  by  Galatea,  Von  Hipper  was  seemingly 
to  the  south  of  them,  and  according  to  the  German  account 
went  north  and  east  to  investigate.  While  then  Sir 
David  Beatty  was  travelling  southeast,  east,  and  then 
northeast,  we  shall  probably  be  right  in  supposing  that 
Von  Hipper  was  executing  an  approximately  parallel 
series  of  movements  out  of  sight  to  the  northeast  of  him. 
Both  advance  forces  were  increasing  their  distance  from 
their  main  forces.  At  any  rate,  neither  was  approaching 
his  main  force  when  they  came  into  sight  at  3  '.30,  Von 
Hipper  a  few  miles  north  of  Sir  David  Beatty. 

What  was  the  distance  at  this  period  that  separated 
the  battle-cruisers  of  each  side  from  their  supporting 
battle-fleets?  At  3:30  the  German  battle-cruisers  headed 
straight  for  their  main  fleet  at  full  speed,  and  met  them 
an  hour  and  a  quarter  afterward.  If  Von  Hipper's  speed 
was  26  knots  and  Admiral  Scheer's  18 — he  had  pre- 
Dreadnoughts  with  him,  and  it  was  not  likely  to  have 
been  greater — there  would  have  been  fifty-five  sea  miles 


298 


THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 


separating  the  German  forces.  According  to  the  des- 
patch, Sir  John  JelHcoe  at  3:30  headed  his  fleet  toward 
Sir  David  Beatty,  and  came  down  at  full  speed.  He 
came  into  contact  with  the  battle-cruisers  on  their  return 
from  their  excursion  to  the  south  at  5:45.     Sir  David 


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JSL 


BEATTV 


Beatty  would  by  this  time  have  returned  approximately 
to  the  same  latitude  he  was  on  at  3  :30.  Had  he  then  at 
3  '.30  closed  Sir  John  Jellicoe  at  full  speed,  he  would  have 
come  in  contact  with  him  in,  say,  fifty  minutes.  The 
British  fleets  at  3  130,  then,  may  have  been  between  forty 
and  forty-five  sea  miles  apart,  against  the  German  fifty- 
five. 


.  THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  299 

It  has  been  said  that  both  sides  fell  into  a  strategical 
error  in  dividing  their  forces.  This  criticism  has  been 
prominent  in  the  neutral  Press;  but  it  arises  from  a  con- 
fusion of  thought.  On  neither  side  were  the  battle- 
cruisers  considered  as  anything  but  scouting  forces,  which 
in  all  sea  campaigns  have  been,  because  it  is  a  necessity 
of  the  case,  maintained  at  suitable  distances  from  the 
main  force.  The  only  division  of  forces  proper  on  the 
British  side  was  the  presence  of  four  battleships  with 
Sir  David  Beatty.  But  as  we  see  from  the  despatch, 
for  some  reason  a  squadron  of  three  of  Sir  David's  battle- 
cruisers  was  with  the  main  fleet,  and  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron  seems  to  have  been  taking  its  place. 

The  only  evidences  of  a  strategical  blunder  in  the 
disposition  would  be,  first,  a  failure  of  the  chosen  plan 
to  bring  the  Germans  to  action,  next  a  failure  to  defeat 
them  when  brought  to  action,  because  of  inability  to 
concentrate  the  requisite  strength  for  the  purpose  at  the 
critical  point.  It  is  surely  a  sufficient  reply  to  say  that 
the  German  Fleet  was  brought  to  action,  and  that  any 
incompleteness  in  the  victory  arose,  not  from  there  being 
insufl&cient  forces  present,  but  owing  to  circumstances 
making  it  impossible  to  employ  them  to  the  greatest 
advantage. 

THE  action:  first  phase 

When  the  enemy  was  sighted  at  3  130,  Sir  David  formed 
his  ships  for  action  in  a  line  of  bearing,  so  that,  in  the 
northeasterly  wind,  the  smoke  of  one  ship  should  not 
interfere  with  the  fire  of  the  rest.  His  course  was  east- 
southeast,  and  he  was  converging  on  that  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  steering  rather  more  directly  south.  By  the 
time   the   Ime  was  formed   the   range  was  about  23,000 


300        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

yards,  and  at  twelve  minutes  to  four  had  been  closed  to 
18,500,  when  both  sides  opened  fire  simultaneously. 
When  the  range  had  closed  to  about  14,000  yards  or  less, 
parallel  courses  were  steered  and  kept  until  the  end  of 
this  phase  of  the  engagement.  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron, 
consisting  of  four  ships  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth  class,  under 
the  command  of  Admiral  Evan-Thomas,  at  the  time 
when  Sir  David  formed  his  battle-line,  was  about  10,000 
yards  off — not  straight  astern  of  the  battle-cruisers,  but 
bearing  about  half  a  right  angle  to  port.  The  course 
that  would  bring  them  immediately  into  the  line  of  the 
Battle  Cruiser  Fleet,  then,  was  not  parallel  to  that  steered 
by  Sir  David  Beatty,  but  a  course  converging  on  to  it. 
It  was  this  that  enabled  them,  with  their  inferior  speed, 
to  come  into  action  at  eight  minutes  past  four,  though 
only  then  at  the  very  long  range  of  20,000  yards. 

The  interval  had  been  singularly  unfortunate  for  the 
British  side.  Indefatigable  (Captain  Sowerby)  had  the 
misfortune  to  be  hit  by  a  shell  in  a  vulnerable  spot.  The 
destruction  of  the  ship  was  instantaneous,  and  almost 
the  entire  personnel,  including  the  ship's  very  gallant 
Captain,  was  lost.  An  exactly  similar  misfortune  later 
befell  Queen  Mary.  Neither  ship  had,  in  any  sense  of 
the  word,  been  overwhelmed  by  the  gunfire  of  the  enemy. 
Indeed,  when  Queen  Mary  went  down,  the  enemy's 
fire,  which  had  been  singularly  accurate  and  intense  in 
the  first  phase  of  the  action  had,  as  the  Vice-Admiral 
says  in  his  despatch,  slackened.  The  superior  skill,  due 
chiefly  to  the  wider  experience  of  the  British  fire-control 
organizations,  had  already  begun  to  tell — the  enemy's 
fire-control  being  evidently  unable  to  survive  the  damage, 
and  losses  of  action. 

Sir  David  Beatty's  main  force  was  thus  reduced  first 


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The  first  phase;  from  Von  Hippcr's  coming  into  view,  until  his  junc- 
ture with  Admiral  Schcer 


301 


302        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

by  one-sixth,  and  then  by  one-fifth  of  its  number,  so 
that  he  was  now  left  with  four  ships  against  the  German 
five.  But  three  of  these  ships  disposed  of  broadsides  of 
13.4's,  the  fourth  employing  a  gun  equal  to  the  most 
powerful  in  the  German  armament.  In  weight  and  power 
of  broadside  the  British  cruisers  still  had  the  advantage, 
and  it  is  clear  that  their  rate  of  fire  was  faster,  and  their 
aimxing  and  range-keeping  more  effective. 

Just  as  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  came  into  action  at 
ten  minutes  past  four,  a  brisk  and  dramatic  encounter 
took  place  between  the  light  craft  of  the  two  sides.  Two 
flotillas  of  destroyers  and  one  squadron  of  light  cruisers, 
it  will  be  remembered,  were  stationed  well  ahead  of  the 
British  flagship.  Eight  units  of  the  Thirteenth  Flotilla, 
together  with  two  of  the  Tenth  and  two  of  the  Ninth,  had 
been  designated  for  making  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  Hne 
as  soon  as  an  opportunity  offered.  The  opportunity  came 
at  4*.I5.  A  destroyer  attack  is  of  course  a  torpedo  attack, 
and  is  delivered  by  the  flotilla  engaged  in  steering  a  course 
converging  toward  that  of  the  enemy.  The  destroyers 
must  be  VN^ell  ahead  of  their  targets  if  the  attack  is  to  be 
effective,  so  that  the  torpedo  and  the  ship  attacked  shall 
be  steering  toward  each  other.  These  boats  proceeded 
then,  at  4:15,  to  initiate  this  mianceuvre  toward  the  enemy. 
It  was  almost  simultaneously  countered  by  an  identical 
movement  by  the  enemy,  who  had  a  considerable  pre- 
ponderance of  force— ^fifteen  destroyers  and  a  cruiser 
against  the  British  twelve  destroyers.  These  two  forces 
met  before  either  had  reached  a  position  for  effecting  its 
main  purpose,  viz.,  the  torpedo  attack  on  the  capital  ships. 
A  very  spirited  engagement  followed.  It  was  a  close- 
quarters  affair,  and  was  carried  through  by  the  British 
destroyers  in  the  most  gallant  manner  and  with  great 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  303 

determination.  Two  of  the  enemy's  destroyers  were 
sunk,  and  what  was  far  more  important,  it  was  made 
quite  impossible  for  him  to  carry  through  a  torpedo  attack. 
None  of  our  boats  went  down.  But  just  as  the  enemy's 
boats  had  been  unable  to  get  a  favourable  position  for 
attacking  our  battle-cruisers,  so,  too,  the  EngHsh  boats, 
delayed  by  this  engagement,  were  unable  to  get  the  desired 
position  on  the  enemy's  bow  for  employing  their  torpedoes 
to  the  best  advantage.  Three  of  them,  however,  though 
unable  to  attack  from  ahead,  pressed  forward  for  a  broad- 
side attack  on  Von  Hipper's  ships,  and  naturally  came 
under  a  fierce  fire  from  the  secondary  armament  of  these 
vessels.  One  of  them.  Nomad,  was  badly  hit,  and  had  to 
stop  between  the  lines.  She  was  ultimately  lost.  Nestor 
and  Nicator  held  on  between  the  lines  until  the  German 
Battle  Fleet  was  met. 

For  a  full  half  hour  these  two  boats  had  been  either 
fighting  an  almost  hand-to-hand  action  with  the  enemy's 
boats,  or  had  been  under  the  close-range  fire  of  Von  Hip- 
per's battle-cruisers.  They  now  found  themselves  faced 
by  the  German  Battle  Fleet.  But  they  were  at  last  in 
the  right  position  for  an  attack.  Both  closed,  in  spite 
of  the  fire,  to  3,cxdo  yards  and  fired  their  torpedoes.  It  is 
believed  that  one  hit  was  made.  Nicator  escaped  and 
rejoined  the  Thirteenth  Flotilla,  but  Nestor,  though  not 
sunk,  was  stopped,  and  had  to  be  numbered  amongst  the 
losses  when  the  action  was  over. 

While  this  had  been  going  forward,  the  artillery  action 
between  the  two  squadrons  of  battle-cruisers  continued 
fierce  and  resolute.  Sir  Evan-Thomas's  battleships  did 
their  best  with  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  line,  but  were  unable 
to  reduce  the  range  below  20,000  yards,  if,  indeed,  they 
were  unable  to  prevent  the  enemy  increasing  it.     At  4:18 


304         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

a  second  palpable  evidence  that  the  British  fire  was  taking 
effect  was  afforded  by  the  third  of  Von  Hipper's  ships 
bursting  into  flames.  The  first  evidence  was,  of  course, 
the  falling  off  in  the  rate  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  the  still 
more  marked  deterioration  in  its  accuracy. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Second  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron,  under  Commodore  Goodenough,  had  got  to 
its  action  station  ahead  of  Sir  David  Beatty's  hne  a  little 
while  before  the  engagement  opened  with  Von  Hipper  at 
half-past  three.  This  squadron  maintained  its  position 
well  ahead,  and  at  4:38  reported  the  advent  of  Scheer 
with  a  German  battle  squadron  from  the  south.  They 
would  then  be  from  20,000  to  24,000  yards  off.  Until 
Southampton  sent  in  her  message  at  4:38,  the  British 
Admiral  had  no  reason  for  knowing  that  the  enemy  Battle 
Fleet  was  out.  Not  that  the  knowledge  would  have 
affected  the  plan  he  actually  carried  out,  for  the  immediate 
attack  on  Von  Hipper  was  right  in  either  event.  But  it 
was  obvious  that,  with  only  four  battle-cruisers,  it  was 
out  of  the  question  continuing  the  action  as  if  the  forces 
were  equal.  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  out  of  range, 
and  the  Vice-Admiral's  first  business  was  to  concentrate 
his  force,  and  then  to  judge  how  to  impose  his  will  upon 
the  enemy  in  the  matter  of  forcing  him  up  to  action  with 
the  Grand  Fleet.  The  junction  with  Admiral  Evan- 
Thomas  could  obviously  not  be  delayed;  as  obviously 
the  manoeuvre  was  a  dangerous  one,  for  as  each  ship 
turned  it  would  be  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire  with- 
out being  able  to  reply.  Had  only  speed  of  junction  to  be 
considered,  the  battle-cruisers  could  have  been  turned 
together  when  the  rear  ship  on  the  old  course  would  have 
become  the  leading  ship  on  the  new.  The  turn  could 
probably  be  accomplished  in  less  than  three  minutes.     But 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  305 

seriously  as  the  German  fire  had  depreciated,  it  was  not 
a  thing  with  which  hberties  could  be  taken.  Sir  David 
Beatty,  therefore,  turned  his  ships  one  by  one,  thus  keep- 
ing three  in  action  while  the  first  was  turning;  two  while 
the  second  was  turning — the  first  and  second  coming  into 
action  on  a  reverse  course  as  the  third  and  fourth  turned 
from  the  old.  At  no  time,  then,  was  the  fire  of  the  British 
squadron  reduced  below  that  of  two  ships. 

No  sooner  had  Sir  David  turned  than  Von  Hipper 
followed  his  example,  and  as  the  Vice-Admiral  led  up  on 
the  new  course,  he  met  Evan-Thomas  with  his  four  battle- 
ships directing  a  fierce  fire  on  Von  Hipper.  These  two 
squadrons  were  on  opposite  courses,  and  the  change  of 
range  was  rapid.  The  conditions  for  hitting  were  ex- 
tremely difficult.  Evan-Thomas  was  not  yet  in  sight 
of  the  German  Battle  Fleet,  and  the  Vice-Admiral  told 
him  to  turn,  as  he  had  done,  and  to  form  up  behind  him. 
By  the  time  this  manceuvre  was  completed — that  is, 
v/ithin  a  quarter  of  an  hour  of  Sir  David  Beatty  having 
begun  his  own  turn — the  head  of  Admiral  Scheer's  line 
had  got  within  range,  and  a  brisk  action  opened  between 
the  leading  German  ships  and  the  rear  ships  on  the 
British  side. 

During  this  quarter  of  an  hour.  Commodore  Good- 
enough  in  Southampton  pushed  south  to  ascertain  the 
precise  numbers  and  composition  of  the  German  force. 
It  was  of  course  of  great  moment,  not  only  to  the  Vice- 
Admiral  but  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  that  the  enemy's 
strength  should  be  ascertained  as  accurately  and  as  soon 
as  possible.  But  to  do  this  the  Commodore  had  to  take 
his  squadron  under  the  massed  fire  of  the  German 
Dreadnoughts.  He  held  on  until  a  range  of  about  13,000 
yards  was  reached   and,   having  got  the  information  he 


3o6         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

wanted,  returned  to  form  up  with  the  Cruiser  Fleet  on 
its  northerly  course.  His  squadron  was  hardly  hit:  for 
though  the  fire  was  intense,  here,  too,  the  change  of  range 
was  rapid,  and  far  too  difficult  for  the  German  fire-control 
to  surmount. 


CHAPTER  XXII 
The   Battle   of  Jutland    (Continued) 

IV.  THE  SECOND  PHASE 

The  flotillas  and  light  cruiser  squadrons  were  now  re- 
grouped— some  ahead,  some  alongside  of  the  battle- 
cruiser  and  battleship  squadrons,  and  the  whole  steered 
to  the  northward,  keeping  approximately  parallel  to 
and  well  ahead  of  the  German  line.  From  the  time  when 
Scheer  came  into  action  at  4:57  until  six  o'clock,  Sir  David 
Beatty  kept  the  range  at  about  14,000  yards.  Both  sides 
must  have  had  some  anxious  moments  during  this  critical 
hour.  Sir  David  Beatty  knew  what  Admiral  Scheer  did 
not — for  the  weather  was  too  thick  for  the  Zeppelins  to 
give  him  the  much-needed  information — that  he  was 
falling  back  on  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  when  of  course  over- 
whelming force  could  be  brought  to  bear.  His  business 
was  to  keep  Admiral  Scheer  in  play,  while  exposing  his 
ships,  especially  his  battle-cruisers,  as  little  as  possible, 
consistent  with  their  maintaining  an  efficient  attack  upon 
the  enemy.  Sir  David  was  criticized  for  exposing  his 
ships  imprudently.  Is  this  criticism  well  founded  ?  Von 
Hipper's  battle-cruisers  were  at  the  head  of  the  German 
line,  but  one  had  certainly  fallen  out  of  action  by  five 
o'clock,  and  one  more  was  to  leave  the  line  in  the  course 
of  this  holding  action.  The  battle-cruisers,  however, 
did  not  affect  the  situation,  for  the  German  Fleet's  speed 
was  that  of  the  pre-Dreadnoughts  in  the  rear,  and  this 

307 


3o8        THE  BRITISH. NAVY. IN  BATTLE 

could  not  have  exceeded  i8  knots  and  was  probably 
less.  But  the  slowest  ship  in  Sir  David  Beatty's 
squadron  could  make  at  least  24.  Nothing,  therefore, 
could  have  been  simpler  than  to  have  taken  the  whole 
force  out  of  reach  of  Scheer's  guns  whenever  he  chose. 
Had  there  at  any  stage  been  the  remotest  chance  of  the 
lightly  armoured  battle-cruisers  being  exposed  to  smother- 
ing fire  from  the  German  battleships,  the  danger  could 
have  been  averted  by  the  expedient  of  putting  on  more 
speed.  Beatty's  main  preoccupation,  however,  was  not 
this.  It  was  undoubtedly  the  fear  that  Scheer  might 
retreat  before  the  Grand  Fleet  could  get  up.  He  had, 
therefore,  first  to  act  as  if  he  were  a  promising  target, 
next  to  be  ready  with  a  counter-stroke  if  the  Germans 
showed  any  sign  of  flight.  How  did  he  meet  the  first 
necessity  of  the  position  ? 

By  keeping  the  range  at  14,000  yards,  at  which  the 
heavier  projectile  guns  of  the  British  artillery  would  have 
a  distinct  advantage  over  the  German  batteries,  and  by 
keeping  so  far  ahead  that  it  was  impossible  for  Admiral 
Scheer  to  bring  the  fire  of  concentrated  broadsides  to  bear, 
not  only  was  an  absolute  inequality  of  gunnery  condi- 
tions avoided,  but  it  is  probable  that,  so  far  as  tactical 
disposition  went.  Sir  David  Beatty,  as  throughout  the 
action,  had  so  handled  his  ships  as  to  be  actually  superior 
in  fighting  power  over  the  forces  he  was  engaging.  I  say 
"so  far  as  tactical  disposition  was  concerned,"  advisedly, 
because  a  new  element  came  into  action  at  this  point 
which  favoured  first  one  and  then  the  other,  and  was 
ultimately  to  make  long-range  gunfire  altogether  nugatory. 

Already  between  a  quarter  past  four  and  half  past, 
light  mists  had  been  driving  down,  and  even  before  a 
quarter  to  five  the  outlines  of  Von  Hipper's  squadron 


T 


The  second  phase;  Beatty  engages  the  combined  German  Fleet,  and  draws 
it  toward  the  Grand  Fleet 


S09 


310         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

were  becoming  vague  and  shadowy  to  the  British  gun- 
layers.  Between  half-past  five  and  six  these  conditions 
got  very  much  worse.  It  handicapped  the  fire-control 
severely,  and  already  they  were  beginning  to  feel,  what 
the  Commander-in-Chief  says  was  a  characteristic  of  the 
whole  period  during  which  the  Grand  Fleet  was  inter- 
mittently in  action,  viz.,  the  extreme  difficulty  of  using 
rangefinders  in  the  shifting  and  indifferent  light.  How 
local  and  variable  the  mist  was  may  be  judged  from  the 
fact  that  the  British  hne  was  not  only  free  from  mist,  but 
was  outlined  sharply  against  the  setting  sun — thus  giving 
a  great  advantage  to  the  German  rangefinders.  It  was 
this  that  largely  neutralized  the  advantage  which  Sir 
David  Beatty  had  so  skilfully  derived  from  the  superior 
speed  of  his  ships.  No  ships  were  lost  on  the  British  side 
during  this  part  of  the  action.  But  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  had  the  conditions  of  visibility  been  the  same 
for  both  sides,  the  head  of  the  German  line  would  have 
suffered  more  severely  than  it  did  from  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron's  15-inch  guns.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  one  of 
the  battle-cruisers  had  to  haul  out  severely  damaged, 
and  certain  others  showed  unmistakable  evidence  of  having 
suffered  severely. 

In  this  phase  of  the  action,  as  in  the  first,  the  British 
destroyers  made  attacks  on  the  German  line,  and  it  is 
believed  that  one  ship,  seen  to  be  hopelessly  on  fire  and 
emitting  huge  clouds  of  smoke  and  steam,  owed  her  injuries 
to  a  torpedo  fired  by  Moresby. 

What  was  Admiral  Scheer's  idea  in  following  up  the 
British  squadron  as  he  did  ?  He  knew  that  he  had  not  the 
speed  which  would  enable  him  to  catch  it.  It  was  almost 
impossible — for  he  was  now  the  pursuing  squadron — to 
hope  for  any  success  from  a  destroyer  attack.     There 


THE  BArrLE  OF  JUTLAND  311 

was  a  risk  that  he  might  be  caught  and  forced  to  engage 
by  the  Grand  Fleet.  There  are,  it  seems,  two  explana- 
tions of  his  action.  In  the  first  place,  he  knew  that  Von 
Hipper  had  already  sunk  two  of  the  British  vessels.  It 
was  worth  a  considerable  effort  to  try  and  get  more,  and 
in  face  of  these  losses  Sir  David  Beatty's  movements  may 
have  looked  so  extremely  like  flight  as  to  make  him  think 
that  he  had,  to  this  extent,  the  upper  hand,  and  that  the 
British  Admiral  would  be  unlikely  to  risk  his  force  again 
by  seeking  a  close  action.  Apart  from  the  risk  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  being  out,  then,  there  seemed  to  be  every- 
thing to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  carrying  on  the  chase. 

But  is  it  quite  certain  that  his  action  was  altogether 
voluntary?  What  would  Sir  David  Beatty's  action  have 
been  had  Scheer  attempted  to  renounce  the  fight?  There 
can  be  no  hesitation  in  answering  this  question,  for  we 
only  have  to  look  at  what  Sir  David  actually  did  at  six 
o'clock,  when  the  Germans  got  news  of  the  Grand  Fleet's 
approach  and  had  to  change  tactics  immediately.  We 
shall  find  in  this  the  clue  to  what  would  have  happened 
had  Scheer  attempted  to  change  course  and  withdraw 
earher  in  the  action. 

The  governing  factors  of  the  situation  were,  first, 
Beatty's  superior  speed;  secondly,  his  superior  concen- 
tration of  gun  power,  and,  lastly,  the  greater  efficacy  of  his 
guns  at  long  range.  The  difference  between  the  speed 
of  the  slowest  ships  in  the  British  fast  division,  say  24^ 
knots,  and  that  of  the  slowest  in  the  German^main  squad- 
ron, say  18,  was  6|  knots  at  least. 

If  Scheer  had  attempted  simply  to  withdraw,  he  must 
have  reversed  the  course  of  his  fleet,  either  by  turning 
his  ships  together  or  in  succession.  In  the  first  case,  the 
simplest  of  manoeuvres  would  have  brought  the  British 


312        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Fleet  into  the  T  position  across  the  German  rear. 
And  with  a  six-knot  advantage  in  speed,  Sir  David  could 
even  have  attempted  the  final  tactics  of  Admiral  Sturdee 
at  the  Falkland  Islands,  and  pursued  the  flying  force  with 
his  four  battle-cruisers,  engaging  them  from  one  side, 
and  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  attacking  them  from  the 
other.  So  disastrous,  indeed,  must  this  manoeuvre  have 
been  to  the  Germans  that  it  need  not  be  considered  as 
thinkable.  The  alternative  was  to  lead  round  from  the 
head  of  the  line,  when  the  choice  v^ould  have  arisen  be- 
tween a  gradual  change  of  course  and  a  reverse  of  course, 
viz.,  a  sixteen-point  turn.  The  objections  to  the  sixteen- 
point  turn  were  precisely  similar  to  those  to  turning  the 
fleet  together,  with,  perhaps,  the  added  objection  that  the 
British  would  have  had  two  lines  of  ships  to  fire  into 
instead  of  only  one — an  advantage  which  would  not  have 
been  counterbalanced  by  the  enemy  keeping  one  or  two 
broadsides  bearing,  for  they  would  be  the  broadsides  of 
ships  under  full  helm,  and  it  is  highly  improbable  that 
their  fire  would  have  been  eff"ective.  When  Scheer 
actually  did  break  off  battle,  we  shall  find  that  he  turned 
his  fleet  in  succession  through  an  angle  of  135°.  There 
were  special  reasons  that  made  it  obligator^'  he  should  do 
this,  and  special  conditions  which  made  it  possible.  Until 
he  met  the  Grand  Fleet,  there  was  nothing  to  force  him 
to  turn,  and  the  counter-stroke  on  which  he  relied  to  rob 
the  turn  of  its  chief  dangers  would  not  have  been  operative 
against  the  two  squadrons  of  fast  ships  under  Sir  David 
Beatty's  command. 

Had  Scheer  attempted  such  a  turn  as  he  actually  made 
at  6:45,  or  had  he  initiated  and  continued  such  a  ma- 
noeuvre as  he  began  at  six  o'clock,  Beatty's  speed  advantage 
would   have  enabled   him  to  maintain   his   dominating 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  313 

position  ahead  of  the  German  hne.  He  could  either  have 
mancEuvred  to  get  round  between  Scheer  and  his  bases, 
with  a  view  to  heading  him  north  again,  or,  if  he  judged 
it  hopeless  to  expect  the  Grand  Fleet  to  reach  the  scene 
in  daylight,  could  himself  have  reversed  course  and 
pounded  the  weak  ships  at  the  end  of  the  German  line 
unmercifully. 

In  any  event,  while  it  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  he  had  the  whip-hand  of  the  enemy,  it  is  no  exaggera- 
tion to  say  that  his  force  was  so  formidable  and  so  fast 
as  to  make  escape  from  it  anything  but  a  safe  or  a  simple 
problem.  The  utmost  Scheer  could  have  hoped  for  would 
have  been  a  long  defensive  action  until  darkness  made 
attack  impossible,  or  winning  the  mine-fields  made  pur- 
suit too  dangerous.  * 

These  considerations  cannot  be  ignored  in  asking  why 
it  was  that  Scheer  followed  the  British  Admiral  so  obedi- 
ently in  the  hour  and  a  quarter  between  4:57  and  6  p.m. 
But  still  less  must  we  forget  that  had  Scheer  known  earlier 
that  the  Grand  Fleet  was  out,  he  would  certainly  have 
preferred  the  risk  of  a  pursuit  by  Beatty  to  the  chance  of 
having  to  take  on  the  whole  of  Sir  John  Jellicoe's  battle  fleet. 

At  twenty-five  minutes  to  six  Admiral  Scheer  began 
hauling  round  to  the  east,  changing  his  course,  that  is  to 
say,  gradually  away  from  the  British  line.  Sir  David 
supposes  that  he  had  by  this  time  received  information 
of  the  approach  of  the  Grand  Fleet.  This  information 
might  have  come  from  Zeppelins,  though  in  the  weather 
conditions  this  would  seem  to  have  been  improbable; 
or  it  might  have  come  from  some  of  his  cruisers,  which 
were  well  ahead,  and  had  made  contact  with  Hood's 
scouts.  But  is  this  quite  consistent  with  what  Admiral 
Jellicoe  says  of  Hood's  movements? 


314         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

"At  5:30  this  squadron  observed  flashes  of  gun-fire 
and  heard  [the  sound  of  guns  to  the  southwestward. 
Rear-Admiral  Hood  sent  Chester  to  investigate,  and 
this  ship  engaged  three  or  four  enemy  light  cruisers  at 
about  5 :45." 

It  is  not  stated  that  Rear-Admiral  Hood  saw  the 
German  light  cruisers,  and  it  seems  improbable,  then, 
that  they  saw  him.  Admiral  Scheer  could  not  have 
changed  course  at  5:35,  because  of  the  action  of  his  scouts 
with  Chester  at  5:45.  But  her  presence  may  have  been 
signalled  to  him  as  soon  as  she  was  seen,  and  he  may  have 
concluded  that  the  news  could  have  but  one  significance, 
viz.,  that  the  Grand  Fleet  was  coming  dov/n  from  the 
north.  But  is  it  altogether  impossible  that  Scheer  began 
his  gradual  easterly  turn  before  suspecting  that  the 
Grand  Fleet  was  out?  Was  he  not,  perhaps,  already 
aware  of  the  dangers  of  getting  too  far  afield,  and  begin- 
ning that  gradual  turn  which  might  keep  Sir  David 
Beatty's  ships  in  play  as  long  as  daylight  lasted,  without 
giving  the  openings  which  a  direct  attempt  at  flight  would 
oflFer?  Whatever  the  explanation  of  the  movements, 
the  enemy  began  this  gradual  turn  and  Sir  David  turned 
with  him,  increasing  speed,  so  as  to  maintain  his  general 
relation  to  the  head  of  the  German  line.  At  ten  minutes 
to  six  some  of  the  Grand  Fleet's  cruisers  were  observed 
ahead,  and  six  minutes  later  the  leading  battleships 
came  into  view.  The  moment  for  which  every  movement 
since  2 :20  had  been  a  preparation  had  now  arrived — the 
Grand  Fleet  and  the  German  Fleet  were  to  meet. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

The  Battle  of  Jutland  (Continued) 
V.  the  three  objectives 

The  issue  of  the  day  would  now  depend  upon  how  the 
commanders  of  the  three  separate  forces  appreciated  the 
tasks  set  to  them;  the  principles  that  governed  the  plans 
for  their  execution;  the  efficiency  of  their  command  in 
getting  those  principles  apphed;  the  resolution  and  skill 
with  which  the  several  units  executed  each  its  share  in 
the  operations.  It  was  easy  enough  to  define  the  task 
of  each  leader.  Sir  David  Beatty  had  so  far  completely 
justified  what  seemed  the  general  strategic  plan  of  the 
British  forces.  He  had  driven  the  German  fast  divisions 
back  to  their  main  fleet,  he  had  held  that  fleet  for  an  hour 
and  a  half,  and  had  brought  it  within  striking  distance  of 
the  overwhelmingly  superior  main  forces  of  his  own  side. 
He  had  lost  two  capital  ships  and  three  destroyers  to 
achieve  his  end  to  this  point.  He  had  the  sacrifice  of 
some  thousands  of  his  gallant  companions  to  justify. 
Neither  a  parade  nor  a  "gladiatorial  display,"  only  the 
utter  rout  and  destruction  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  could  pay 
that  debt.  His  task  was  not,  therefore,  complete.  He 
had  to  help  the  Grand  Fleet  to  deHver  its  blow  with  the 
concentration  and  rapidity  that  would  render  it  decisive. 
It  was  already  obvious  that  rapidity  would  be  vital. 
The  weather  conditions  had  been  growing  more  and  more 
unfavourable  to  the  gunnery  on  which  the  British  Fleet 

3^5 


3i6         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BAITLE 

would  rely  for  victory.  Ever^'thing  pointed  to  the  condi- 
tions growing  steadily  worse.  It  was  a  case  of  seizing 
victory  quickly  or  missing  it  altogether.  Had  there  been 
no  shifting  mists  there  would  have  been  two  and  a  half 
or  three  hours  of  daylight  on  which  to  count.  But  with 
lowering  clouds  and  heavy  vapours,  clear  seeing  at  lo,ooo 
or  even  5,000  yards  might  be  as  impossible  two  hours 
before  as  two  hours  after  sunset.  Everything  pointed, 
therefore,  to  this:  the  British  attack  would  have  to  be 
instant — or  it  might  not  materialize  at  all.  The  Vice- 
Admiral  commanding  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  saw 
his  duty  clearly  and  simply.  But  to  decide  exactly 
what  action  he  should  take  was  a  different  thing  alto- 
gether. 

No  less  clear  was  the  task  of  the  British  Commander- 
in-Chief.  Twelve  miles  away  from  him  was  the  whole 
naval  strength  of  the  enemy,  150  miles  from  his  mine- 
fields, more  than  200  from  his  fleet  bases.  Against 
sixteen  modern  battleships,  he  himself  commanded 
twenty-four — a  superiority  of  three  to  two.  His  gun- 
power,  measured  by  the  weight  and  striking  energy  of 
his  broadsides,  must  have  been  nearly  twice  that  of  the 
enemy;  measured  by  the  striking  energy  and  the  destruc- 
tive power  of  its  heavier  shells,  it  was  greater  still.  Op- 
posed to  the  enemy's  five  battle-cruisers,  there  were  four 
under  the  command  of  Sir  David  Beatty  and  three  led 
by  Rear-Admiral  Hood.  Against  the  six  i8-knot  pre- 
Dreadnoughts  that  formed  the  rear  of  the  German  Fleet, 
with  their  twenty-four  ii-inch  guns  firing  a  700-pound 
shell,  there  were  Rear-Admiral  Evan-Thomas's  four  25- 
knot  ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  carrying  thirty- 
two  15-inch  guns,  whose  shells  were  three  times  as  heavy 
and   must  have  been  nine  times   as  destructive.     This 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  317 

force,  vastly  superior  if  it  could  be  concentrated  for  its 
purpose,  had  to  be  deployed  for  a  blow  which,  if  simul- 
taneously delivered  at  a  range  at  which  the  guns  would 
hit,  must  be  final  in  a  very  brief  period. 

The  German  Admiral  could  never  have  had  the  least 
doubt  as  to  his  task.  His  business  was  to  save  his  fleet 
from  the  annihilation  with  which  it  was  manifestly 
menaced.  So  far  fortune  had  been  kind.  The  British 
Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  had  done  what  the  Germans  had 
expected  it  to  do.  It  had  engaged  promptly  and  de- 
terminedly and  its  losses,  surprisingly  enough,  had  been 
suffered,  not  while  it  was  holding  a  force  greatly  superior 
to  itself,  but  while  engaging  Von  Hipper,  whose  ships 
were  less  numerous  and  more  hghtly  armed.  Though 
Scheer  did  not  expect  an  encounter  with  the  Grand  Fleet, 
he  was  very  far  from  being  unprepared,  should  it  come. 
Accordingly,  when  at  six  o'clock  he  realized  that  the 
supreme  moment  had  arrived,  he  was  probably  as  little 
in  doubt  as  to  his  method  of  executing  his  task,  as  to  the 
character  of  the  task  itself. 

THE  TACTICAL  PLANS 

Admiral  Scheer's  tactics 

The  tactics  of  Admiral  Scheer  were  a  development 
and  an  extension  of  those  of  Von  Hipper  on  January  24 
of  the  previous  year.  If  his  task  was  to  break  off  action 
as  soon  as  possible  and  to  keep  out  of  action  until  darkness 
made  fleet  fighting  impossible,  means  must  be  found  of 
thwarting  or  neutralizing  the  attack  of  the  British  Fleet 
while  it  lasted,  of  evading  that  attack  at  the  earliest 
moment,  and  of  preventing  its  resumption.  He  could 
onlv  neutralize  the  attack  in  so  far  as  he  could  thwart 


3i8         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

the  fire-control  and  aiming  of  the  enemy  by  the  constant 
or  intermittent  concealment  of  his  ships  by  smoke.  He 
could  only  evade  attack  by  preventing  the  overwhelming 
force  against  him  being  brought  within  striking  distance. 
Recall  for  a  moment  the  lessons  of  the  Dogger  Bank. 
In  his  retreat  Von  Hipper  had  put  his  flotillas  to  a  double 
task.  For  the  first  two  hours  of  that  engagement  he  had 
checked  the  speed  of  his  battle  cruisers  to  cover  Bluecher. 
When  the  British  Fleet  had  so  gained  on  him  that  its 
artillery  became  eflPective,  he  realized  that  the  case  of 
Bluecher  was  hopeless  and  that,  unless  prompt  measures 
were  taken,  the  case  of  the  battle  cruiser  would  be  little 
better.  Bluecher  was,  therefore,  abandoned  to  her  fate 
and  Derfflinger,  Seydlitz,  and  Moltke  concealed  by  smoke. 
Simultaneously,  or  almost  simultaneously,  a  veritable 
shoal  of  torpedoes  was  launched  across  the  path  on  which 
Lw7i  and  her  consorts  were  advancing.  The  smoke 
baffled  the  gun-layers,  the  changed  course  forced  on  the 
battle-cruisers  baffled  the  fire-control.  The  Germans 
gained  immunity  from  gunfire  and,  in  the  pause,  changed 
course  and  got  a  new  start  in  the  race  for  home.  Then 
the  first  of  a  succession  of  rendezvous  for  submarines 
placed  on  the  pre-arranged  fine  of  the  German  retreat, 
repeated  this  tactic  of  diversion  just  before  Lion  was 
disabled.  The  intervention — an  hour  later — of  a  second 
protecting  picket  of  submarines  was  decisive,  for,  on 
realizing  their  presence,  the  officer  who  had  succeeded 
Sir  David  in  command  broke  off  pursuit.  It  was  on 
these  tactics  on  a  greatly  extended  scale  and  developed 
no  doubt  by  assiduous  study  and  repeated  rehearsal, 
that  Scheer  now  had  to  rely. 

The  circumstances  of  the  moment  were  exceptionally 
favourable    for   their   employment.     The    conditions   of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  319 

atmosphere  that  made  long-range  gunnery  difficult,  made 
the  establishment  of  smoke  screens  to  render  it  more  diffi- 
cult still,  exceptionally  easy.  The  wind  had  dropped, 
the  air  was  heavy  and  vaporous,  the  ships  were  running 
from  one  bank  of  light  fog  into  another.  It  was  a  day  on 
which  smoke  would  stay  where  it  was  made,  clinging  to 
the  surface  of  the  sea,  mingHng  with  and  permeating 
the  water-laden  atmosphere.  Further,  these  were  just 
the  conditions  in  which,  were  a  torpedo  attack  delivered 
at  a  fleet  by  the  fast  destroyer  flotillas,  the  threat  would 
have  an  element  of  surprise  that  would  be  lacking  in  clear 
vision.  Such  menaces,  then,  should  they  have  any 
deterrent  eff"ect  on  the  enemy's  closing,  would  be  likely 
to  have  a  maximum  eff"ect.  The  respite  from  gunfire, 
the  delay  in  the  re-formation  of  the  fleet  for  pursuit, 
each  could  be  the  longest  possible. 

Two  considerations  must  have  caused  Scheer  the 
gravest  possible  anxiety.  In  the  first  place,  smoke  screens 
would  not  protect  the  van  of  his  fleet.  What  if  the  British 
used  their  speed  to  concentrate  ships  there  and  crush  it? 
Secondly,  as  destroyer  attacks  could  only  be  delivered 
from  a  point  in  advance  of  the  course  of  the  squadrons  it 
was  hoped  to  injure  or  divert,  the  method  on  which  he 
relied,  first  for  breaking  off  from,  and  then  evading,  action 
could  not  be  used  until  he  had  the  British  Fleet  on  his 
quarter  or  astern.  Now  at  six  o'clock  the  British  Fleet 
was  dead  ahead  of  him.  Its  fleet's  speed  must  have  been 
three,  and  may  have  been  four,  knots  greater  than  his  own. 
He  had  four  powerful  ships,  six  or  seven  knots  faster  still, 
on  his  port  bow  at  a  range  of  only  14,000  yards,  supported 
by  a  25-knot  squadron  only  three  knots  slower  and  of 
enormous  gun  power.  How  was  he  to  turn  a  line  of 
twenty-one  ships  to  get  the  whole  of  this  force  behind 


320         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

him,  without  some  portion  of  it  being  overwhelmed  in 
the  process?  For  to  turn  in  succession  would  be  to  leave 
first  the  centre  and  the  rear,  and  then  the  rear  entirely 
unsupported  as  the  leading  ships  escaped.  As  we  have 
seen  in  a  previous  chapter,  until  the  enemy's  artillery  was 
neutralized,  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  do  anything  but 
to  turn  on  a  flat  arc,  so  that  so  long  as  it  was  necessary  or 
possible,  all  the  ships  should  act  in  mutual  support.  The 
crux  of  the  situation  was  this;  The  Grand  Fleet  was 
but  twelve  miles  off,  a  distance  that  could  be  shortened 
to  easy  gun  range  in  ten  or  twelve  minutes.  What  if  the 
whole  of  this  force  were  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour  brought 
parallel  to,  and  well  ahead  of,  his  own."*  To  engage  it 
defensively  by  gun  power  would  be  useless  for  the  odds 
were  hopeless.  To  turn  the  head  of  the  line  sharply 
would  be  to  purchase  a  precarious  safety  for  the  van  by  the 
certain  immolation  of  the  centre  and  the  rear.  Scheer 
must  have  seen  that,  were  things  to  develop  along  this 
line,  he  would  have  no  choice  but  to  turn  his  whole  fleet 
together,  a  dangerous  and  desperate  manoeuvre,  but 
permissible  because  the  time  would  have  come  for  a 
sauve  qui  pent. 

But  while  these  considerations  may  have  caused  him 
some  anxiety,  there  were  other  elements  to  reassure  him. 
Years  before  the  war,  the  Germans  had  discovered  and 
grasped  what  seemed  the  fundamental  strategic  idea  that 
had  shaped  British  naval  strategy.  It  was  that  the  role 
of  our  main  sea  forces  in  war  was  to  be  primarily  defensive. 
Our  fleet  was  to  consist  of  units  individually  more  power- 
ful than  those  of  competing  navies.  As  to  numbers, 
we  were  aiming  at  possessing  these  on  an  equality  with 
the  two  next  largest  Powers  combined.  It  was  a  policy 
that  permitted  of  an  overwhelming  concentration  against 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  321 

the  most  powerful  of  our  competitors,  the  Germans,  while 
still  maintaining  substantial  forces  the  world  over.  It  was 
a  presumption  of  this  poHcy  that  the  use  of  the  sea  would 
in  war  be  ceded  to  us  by  our  enemies,  and  would  remain 
virtually  undisturbed  until  our  main  forces  were  not  only 
attacked  but  defeated.  Numbers  and  individual  power 
made  an  attack  by  inferior  forces  seem  the  most  remote 
of  all  contingencies,  and  defeat  impossible. 

From  this  theory  the  Germans  derived  a  corollary. 
It  was  that,  as  the  British  ideal  was  concerned  not  pri- 
marily with  victor>%  but  in  avoiding  defeat,  we  should 
probably  not  face  great  risks  to  destroy  an  enemy — and 
obviously  no  enemy  could  be  destroyed  without  great 
risks — but  rather  would  be  chiefly  preoccupied  with 
averting  the  destruction,  not  only  of  our  whole  fleet,  but 
even  of  such  a  proportion  of  it  as  would  deprive  us  of  that 
pre-eminence  in  numbers  on  which  we  seemed  chiefly  to 
rely.  Hence,  in  the  preamble  of  the  last  Navy  Bill  which 
the  Government  got  the  Reichstag  to  accept  before  the 
war,  it  w^as  plainly  stated  that  the  naval  policy  of  the 
German  Higher  Command  did  not  aim  at  possessing  a 
fleet  capable  of  defeating  the  strongest  fleet  in  the  world, 
but  w^ould  be  satisfied  with  a  force  that  the  strongest  fleet 
could  not  defeat,  except  at  a  cost  that  would  bring  it  so 
low  that  its  world  supremacy  would  be  gone.  The  under- 
lying military  conception  was  that  the  group  then  con- 
trolling the  British  Navy  would  not  fight,  and  the  under- 
lying political  conception  that,  should  this  group  be  re- 
placed by  leaders  of  a  more  aggressive  complexion,  the 
price  we  should  pay  for  a  sea  victory  would  be  a  combina- 
tion of  the  world's  other  sea  forces  against  us,  they  being 
prompted  to  this  by  their  long-felt  jealousy  of  Great 
Britain's  navalism. 


322        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

In  May,  1916,  the  bottom  had  fallen  out  of  the  political 
argument.     There  was  no  naval  Power  that  was  the  least 
jealous  of  Great  Britain.     The  submarine  campaign  had 
disgusted  all  with  Germany's  sea  ethics,  and  the  whole 
world  would  have  rejoiced  had  sea  victory,  which  was 
necessary  before  the  submarine  could  be  finally  defeated, 
been  won.     But  on  the  military  argument  the  Germans 
were   on   surer   ground.     They   had    certain   substantial 
reasons   for   believing  that  they   had   not   misread   the 
psychology  of  our  Higher  Naval  Command.     Indeed,  if 
Jutland  left  them  or  the  world  in  any  doubt  about  the 
matter,  their  interpretation  was  to  receive  the  most  striking 
of  all  confirmations  by  a  statesman  who  had  not  only 
been  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  but  had  personally 
selected  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  this  eventful  day, 
and  had  no  doubt  been  a  party  to.  If  he  had  not  Inspired, 
the  strategy  which  the  Grand  Fleet  was  to  observe.     Mr. 
Churchill  left  the  world  in  no  uncertainty  at  all  that,  in 
his  opinion — which,  presumably,  was  that  not  only  of  the 
Boards  over  which  he  had  presided,  but  of  those  from 
whom  it  had  been  inherited — the  British  Fleet,  without  a 
victorious  battle,   enjoyed   all  the   advantages  that  the 
most  crushing  of  victories  could  give  us,  and  that  it  was 
for  the  Germans  and  not  for  us  to  attempt  any  alteration 
in  the  position   at  sea.     Beyond  this,   however,   Scheer 
not  only  had  it  in  his  favour  that  the  British  Commander- 
in-Chief  might,   under  such   inspiration,   hesitate   about 
the  risks  inseparable  from  seeking  a  rapid  decision   at 
short  range;  he  seemed  to  have  a  definite  and  ofl&clal 
confirmation  of  a  further  theory,  viz.,  that  to  avoid   a 
certain  form  of  risk  was  almost  an  axiom  of  official  British 
doctrine.     Von   Hipper's    escape    at   the    Dogger   Bank, 
unexplained  it  is  true  in  Sir  David  Beatty's  despatch, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND      323 

had  been  complacently  attributed  by  the  British  Admir- 
alty to  the  unexpected  presence  of  enemy  submarines. 
The  immediate  abandonment  of  the  field  in  the  presence 
of  this  form  of  attack,  so  far  from  being  made  the  subject 
of  Admiralty  disapproval,  seems  to  have  been  endorsed 
by  the  continuous  employment  of  the  officer  responsible. 
Scheer  could  then  look  forward  to  his  torpedo  attack  not 
only  as  holding  a  menace  over  the  British  Fleet  that  might 
endanger  its  numerical  superiority.  It  seemed  to  be  a 
menace  specifically  accepted  as  one  not  in  any  circum- 
stances to  be  encountered. 

Still,  for  all  that,  there  was  uncertainty  in  the  matter. 
The  sport  of  bull-fighting  owes  its  continuance  solely  to 
the  fact  that  the  instincts  of  each  brute  playmate  in 
that  cruel  game  are  exactly  identical  with  those  of  every 
other.  However  busy  any  bull  may  be  with  a  tossed 
and  disembowelled  horse,  it  is  a  matter  of  mathematical 
certainty  that  a  red  cloak  dangled  before  his  eyes  will 
divert  him  from  goring  the  rider.  The  animal's  reactions 
to  each  well-known  pin-prick  or  provocation  are  inevita- 
ble. The  safety  of  every  toreador,  piccador,  and  matador 
depends  not  on  their  power  of  meeting  the  unexpected, 
but  upon  the  rapidity,  deftness,  and  agility  with  which 
they  can  first  time  the  movements  which  long  experience 
has  taught  them  to  expect,  and  then  execute  the  counter- 
stroke  or  evasion  which  an  old-established  art  has  pre- 
scribed. Scheer,  it  seems  to  me,  showed  something  more 
than  rashness  in  relying  on  a  German  analysis  of  our  naval 
mentality,  and  upon  a  single  instance — and  endorsement — 
of  that  mentality  in  action,  as  if  it  established  a  rule  of 
conduct  as  irrevocable  as  instinct.  But,  then,  it  must  be 
understood,  he  had  no  choice. 


324         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Sir  David  Beatty's  Tactics 

At  six  the  Grand  Fleet  was  five  miles  to  the  north, 
approximately  twelve  miles  from  the  enemy.  It  could 
not  come  into  action  in  less  than  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 
The  speed  of  Lio7i,  Tiger,  Princess  Royal,  and  Nezv  Zea- 
land was  twenty-seven  knots,  at  least  eight,  possibly 
nine  or  even  ten  knots  faster  than  that  of  the  enemy. 
The  head  of  the  enemy's  line  bore  southeast  from  the 
flagship.  Scheer,  already  aware  of  Sir  John  Jelhcoe's 
approach,  was  beginning  his  eastward  turn.  Beatty 
realized  that  at  full  speed  he  could  head  the  German  Fleet, 
so  that  by  the  time  the  Grand  Fleet's  deployment  was 
complete,  he  would  be  in  a  commanding  position  on  the 
bow  of  the  enemy's  van.  It  would  probably  not  be 
possible  for  Evan-Thomas  to  gain  this  position,  too.  But 
there  was  no  reason  why  he  should.  Assuming  Sir 
David's  purpose  to  be  the  realization  of  the  most  ele- 
mentary of  tactical  axioms,  viz.  to  strike  as  nearly  as 
possible  simultaneously  with  all  the  forces  in  the  field, 
Evan-Thomas  would  be  just  as  useful  at  one  end  of  the 
line  as  the  other.  The  twenty-four  ships  of  the  Grand 
Fleet,  led  by  the  battle  cruisers  and  with  the  four  Queen 
Elizabeths  as  a  rear  squadron,  would  outflank  the  enemy 
at  both  ends  of  his  line. 

The  realization  of  the  plan  would  depend  entirely  upon 
the  pace  of  the  Grand  Fleet  in  getting  into  action.  Had 
all  the  divisions  of  the  Grand  Fleet  kept  their  course  at 
full  speed  until  reaching  the  track  of  Sir  David  Beatty's 
squadron,  the  starboard  division  would  have  cut  that 
line  in  about  ten  minutes  and  the  port  division  in  about 
twelve  and  a  half  to  thirteen.  There  would  have  been 
an  interval  of  five  miles  between  the  leading  ships.     Even 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  325 

at  twenty-seven  knots  the  four  battle-cruisers  led  by  Lion 
could  hardly  have  got  clear  of  the  port  division  and,  to 
avoid  collision,  all  would  have  had  to  ease  their  speed 
slightly.  But  undoubtedly  at  6:15  or,  at  least,  6:20, 
a  line  might  have  been  formed  exactly  in  Sir  David 
Beatty's  track.  Had  this  line  followed  him  as  he  closed 
down  after  Hood  at  6:25  the  enemy  would  have  been 
completely  outflanked  at  both  ends  of  his  line  and  even 
surrounded  at  its  head.  There  would  have  been  half 
an  hour  between  the  Grand  Fleet  getting  into  action  and 
the  failure  of  the  light.  It  is  difficult  to  suppose  that,  at 
ranges  of  from  1 1 ,000  yards  to  8,000,  the  guns  of  the  Grand 
Fleet  could  not  have  beaten  the  High  Seas  Fleet  decisively. 
Scheer  could  not  have  turned.  His  choice  would  have 
been  between  annihilation  and  a  flight  pele-mele. 

Not  only  does  it  seem  that  some  such  deployment  as 
this  was  manifestly  possible;  it  looks  as  if  it  was  exactly 
this  deployment  that  Admiral  Beatty  had  expected.  On 
any  other  supposition  his  manoeuvre  in  throwing  first 
his  own  and  then  Hood's  battle  cruisers  into  a  short-range 
fight  with  the  Germans  was  to  run  the  gravest  risks  of 
disaster,  without  any  high  probability  of  justifying  it  by 
a  final  defeat  of  the  enemy.  If  he  expected  the  Grand 
Fleet  to  deploy  on  to  his  course  and  so  come  into  action 
with  its  entire  strength,  possibly  within  fifteen,  certainly 
within  twenty  minutes  of  the  enemy  being  sighted, 
then  to  have  incurred  the  loss,  not  of  one  but  of  half  of 
his  and  Hood's  ships  would  have  been  amply  justified. 

The  manoeuvre  he  executed — judged  not  as  a  self- 
contained  evolution  but  as  part  of  a  large  plan — was,  of 
course,  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  original  in  the  history 
of  the  naval  war.  For  the  first  time  for  more  than  two 
thousand  years  two  fleets  met  of  which  a  section  of  one 


326        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

had  nearly  a  50  per  cent,  superiority  in  speed  over  the 
other.  This  fast  squadron  was  sent  at  top  speed  to  hold 
and  envelop  the  enemy's  van.  It  was  calculated  to,  and 
it  did,  arrest  that  van  by  sinking  the  leading  ship  and 
throwing  the  remainder  into  confusion.  It  was  not  a 
movement  that  interfered  with  the  deployment  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  in  the  least  degree.  It  was  one,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  would  have  covered  it  most  effectively,  and 
to  a  great  extent  must  have  concealed  its  character  from 
the  enemy.  But,  further,  being  carried  through  at  a 
speed  which  probably  exceeded  that  which  any  enemy 
flotilla  could  maintain  in  the  open  sea,  the  manoeuvre 
must  have  made  it  impossible  for  Scheer  to  get  his  des- 
troyers into  the  right  position  for  a  torpedo  attack,  either 
upon  the  deploying  ships  or  upon  the  Grand  Fleet  once 
deployed.  For  to  attack  to  advantage,  the  flotillas 
must  have  been  brought  up  ahead  of  the  British  battle- 
cruisers,  a  manifest  impossibility.  Had  the  Grand 
Fleet  as  a  whole,  then,  been  in  action  in  Sir  David  Beatty's 
wake  from  6:20  on,  it  is  almost  certain  that,  with  all  his 
fleet  in  action  at  short  range,  against  guns  almost  twice 
as  numerous  as  his  own  and  more  than  three  times 
as  powerful  Scheer  could  not  have  ventured  upon 
changing  the  course  of  his  fleet  at  all.  He  could  not 
have  done  so,  that  is  to  say,  while  attempting  to  keep 
his  ships  in  line.  He  might,  as  we  have  seen,  have  turned 
all  his  ships  together  in  undisguised  flight,  he  could  not 
have  kept  them  in  fighting  formation  while  withdrawing 
from  a  fight  in  these  circumstances. 

Sir  John  Jellicoe's  Tactics 

Before  speculating  as  to  the  plans  or  discussing  the 
tactics  of  the  British  Commander-in-Chief,  two  factors 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  327 

which  influenced  the  situation  must  be  kept  in  mind. 
The  first  is,  that  the  positions  of  the  two  fleets  and  of  the 
enemy  had  been  the  subject  of  a  forecast  by  dead  reckon- 
ing in  both  flagships.  It  is  to  be  supposed  that  Sir 
David  Beatty  kept  Admiral  JeUicoe  informed  from  time 
to  time  of  the  position,  speed,  and  course  of  his  fleet  and 
of  the  enemy,  and  that  from  these  data  the  hnes  of  ap- 
proach had  been  calculated.  Each  flagship  made  its 
own  calculations  and,  being  made  by  dead  reckoning, 
there  was  a  discrepancy  between  the  two,  which  the 
Commander-in-Chief  describes  as  inevitable.  It  resulted 
from  this  that  both  were  equally  surprised  when,  at  four 
minutes  to  six,  Lion  and  Marlborough  came  within  sight 
of  each  other.  Whatever  plan  of  action  was  adopted 
could  not,  if  it  was  intended  to  meet  the  situation  of  the 
moment,  have  been  the  subject  of  long  forethought  or 
preparation. 

The  second  factor  was  the  difficulty  of  seeing  any- 
thing at  long  range.  This,  in  the  first  place,  had  pre- 
vented any  rectification  of  the  misunderstanding  as  to 
positions,  such  as  might  easily  have  been  done  had  the 
scouting  cruisers  of  the  two  fleets  come  into  sight  earlier. 
It  followed,  next,  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Grand  fleet  did  not  probably  see  a  single  ship  in  the 
enemy's  line  until  ten  or  twelve  minutes  after  seeing  the 
leading  ship  of  the  British  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet.  His 
plan  of  deployment,  then,  orders  for  which  must  have 
been  given  some  minutes  before  the  deployment  was 
complete,  could  not  have  been  based  upon  his  ozv7i  judg- 
ment of  the  situation  after  seeing  the  enemy,  but  must 
have  been  dictated,  either  by  some  general  principle  of 
tactics  applied  to  the  informatio?i  as  to  the  enemy's  position, 
speed,  and  course,  as  given  by  the  Vice-Admiral,  or  it  must 


328         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATIXE 

have  been  part  of  a  flan  suggested  by  the  Vice-Admiral. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  despatch  to  say  whether  Sir  David 
Beatty  communicated  anything  more  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  than  the  bearing  and  distance,  first,  of  the 
enemy's  battle  cruisers,  then  of  his  battleships.  But 
it  seems  irrational  to  suppose  that  Sir  David  did  not 
announce  what  he  intended  to  do  or  failed  to  suggest 
how  best  he  could  be  supported. 

If  the  despatches  are  silent  as  to  the  nature  of  Sir 
David  Beatty 's  plan,  they  are  equally  silent  about  the 
Commander-in-Chief's.  We  are  told  simply  that  he 
formed  his  six  divisions  into  a  line  of  battle  and  are  left 
to  infer  the  character  and  the  direction  of  the  deployment 
from  internal  evidence.  The  facts,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
gathered  from  the  despatch  seem  to  be  as  follows: 

The  Grand  Fleet  came  upon  the  scene  in  six  divisions 
on  a  S.E.-by-S.  course.  This  means  that  the  six  divisions 
were  parallel  with  the  leading  ships  in  line-abreast,  with 
an  interval  of  approximately  a  mile  between  each  division, 
A  line  drawn  through  the  leading  ships  and  continued 
to  the  west  would  have  cut  the  line  of  Sir  David  Beatty's 
course  after  six  o'clock,  if  that  also  had  been  similarly 
continued,  making  an  angle  of  about  33  degrees.  The 
division  on  the  extreme  right,  led  by  Marlborough,  flag- 
ship of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Cecil  Burney,  sighted  Sir  David 
Beatty's  squadron  at  six  o'clock.  At  the  same  time  Sir 
David  reported  the  position  of  the  enemy's  battle-cruisers, 
three  of  which  were  still  at  the  head  of  the  German  line. 
The  speed  of  the  Grand  Fleet  was  probably  at  least 
twenty  knots,  if  not  twenty-one.  The  six  divisions  seem 
to  have  continued  their  former  course  for  ten  or  twelve 
minutes,  when  all  the  leading  ships  turned  eight  points — 
or  a   right   angle — together  to  port,   the   second,   third, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  329 

and  fourth  ships  in  each  division  following  their  leaders 
in  succession,  so  that,  very  few  minutes  after  the  leading 
ship  had  turned,  the  fleet  would  be  on  a  line  at  right  angles 
to  its  former  course,  and  steering  N.E.  by  E.  If  the  lead- 
ing ship  continued  on  the  new  course,  the  fleet  would  then 
be  heading  at  an  angle  of  56  degrees  azvay  from  the  enemy. 
A  fleet  so  deployed  would  now  be  brought  into  action  by 
the  leading  ship  turning  again,  either  to  a  course  parallel 
with  the  enemy  or  converging  towards  it. 

It  seems  probable  that  it  was  some  such  mancEuvre  as 
this  that  took  place,  from  the  fact  that  the  starboard 
(or  right  hand)  division,  which  became  the  rear  division 
after  deployment,  got  into  action  so  early  as  6:17,  at  a 
range  of  11,000  yards,  that  is,  a  thousand  yards  nearer 
to  the  enemy  than  Sir  David  Beatty's  track,  while  the 
port  division,  now  the  leading,  did  not  open  fire  till  some 
time  after  6:30,  when,  as  we  learn  from  the  despatch,  the 
British  fleet  was  on  the  bow  of  the  enemy.  This  means 
that  the  courses  were  parallel,  but  that  the  leading  British 
divisions  were  well  ahead  of  the  enemy.  Both  fleets,  in 
other  words,  were  still  steering  to  the  east.  The  track  of 
the  Grand  Fleet  was,  therefore,  parallel,  not  only  to  that 
of  the  enemy,  but  to  that  of  Sir  David  Beatty  up  to  6:25, 
but  by  some  considerable  amount,  probably  2,000  yards 
farther  from  the  High  Seas  Fleet.  At  6:50  the  leading 
battle  squadron  was  6,000  yards  N.N.W.  from  Lion.  The 
Grand  Fleet  had  not  formed  up  astern  of  the  Battle- 
Cruiser  Fleet.  It  had  not  come  into  action  as  a  unit 
simultaneously.  It  had  not  deployed  either  on  the 
enemy  or  on  the  British  fast  division. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
*The  Battle  of  Jutland  (Continued) 

VL    the  course  of  the  action 

What  in  fact  happened  was  this.  Beatty,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  led  due  east  at  six  o'clock,  closing  the  enemy 
from  14,000  yards  to  12,000  yards,  and  was  overhauling 
the  head  of  his  line  rapidly.  At  6:20  Hood,  in  Invincible, 
with  Inflexible  and  Indomitable,  was  seen  ahead  returning 
from  a  fruitless  search  for  the  Germans,  which  he  had 
made  to  the  southwest  an  hour  before.  Hood  was  one 
of  Beatty's  admirals  with  the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  tem- 
porarily attached  to  the  Grand  Fleet.  When,  therefore, 
his  old  Commander-in-Chief  ordered  him  to  take  station 
ahead,  he  had  not  the  slightest  difficulty  in  divining  his 
leader's  intentions.  It  was  characteristic  of  this  force 
that  the  rear-admirals  and  commodores  in  command  of 
the  unit  squadrons  acted  without  orders  throughout  the 
day.  Hood  formed  before  the  Lion  and  led  down  straight 
on  the  German  line.  By  6:25  he  had  closed  the  range 
to  8,000  yards  and  had  Ltitzow,  Von  Hipper's  flagship, 
under  so  hot  a  fire  that  she  was  disabled  and  abandoned 
almost  immediately.  By  an  unfortunate  chance  his  own 
flagship.  Invincible,  was  destroyed  by  the  first  and  almost 
the  only  shell  that  hit  her,  the  Rear-Admiral  and  nearly 
all  his  gallant  companions  being  sent  to  instant  death. 
But  their  work  was  done  and  the  van  of  the  German  fleet 
was  crumpled  up. 

*For  diagrams  illustrating  this  chapter,  see  end  of  book. 

330 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  331 

Scheer  by  this  time  had  had  his  fleet  on  an  easterly 
course  for  five  and  thirty  minutes,  waiting  for  the  op- 
portunity to  turn  a  right  angle  or  more,  so  as  to  retreat 
under  the  cover  of  his  torpedo  attacks.  Up  to  this  time 
the  main  body  of  his  fleet  had  only  been  under  fire  for  a 
brief  interval,  during  which  the  rear  division  of  the  Grand 
Fleet  had  been  in  action.  Scheer  had,  no  doubt,  watched 
tTie  deployment  of  the  Grand  Fleet  and  had  realized  that 
the  method  chosen  had  not  only  given  him  already  a 
quarter-of-an-hour's  respite,  but  had  suppUed  him  with 
that  opportunity  for  counter-attack  and  the  evasion  it 
might  make  possible,  which  he  had  been  looking  for. 
The  battle  cruisers  were  well  away  to  the  east.  The  van 
and  centre  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  though  well  on  his  bows, 
were  only  just  beginning  to  open  fire. 

It  is  probable  that  the  van  was  now  converging  towards 
him  and  shortening  the  range.  Scheer  was  trying  to 
make  the  gunnery  as  difficult  as  possible  by  his  smoke 
screens,  but  probably  soon  reaHzed  that,  if  the  range  was 
closed  much  more,  his  fleet  would  soon  be  in  a  hopeless 
situation.  At  about  a  quarter  to  seven,  therefore,  he 
launched  the  first  of  his  torpedo  attacks.  This  had  the 
desired  eff'ect.  "The  enemy,"  says  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  "constantly  turned  away  and  opened  the  range 
under  the  cover  of  destroyer  attacks  and  smoke  screens 
as  the  effect  of  British  fire  was  felt."  "Opening  the 
range"  means  that  the  object  of  the  torpedo  attacks  had 
been  attained.  For  a  quarter  of  an  hour  or  more  the 
closing  movement  of  the  Grand  Fleet  was  converted 
into  an  opening  movement.  Scheer  had  prevented  the 
close  action  that  he  dreaded.  He  had  gained  the  time 
needed  to  turn  his  whole  force  from  an  easterly  to  a  south- 
westerly course. 


332        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

Sir  David  Beatty's  account  of  his  movements  up  to  now 
is  singularly  brief.  "At  six  o'clock,"  he  says,  'T  altered 
course  to  east  and  proceeded  at  utmost  speed.  .  .  At 
6:20  the  Third  Battle  Squadron  bore  ahead  steaming 
south  towards  the  enemy's  van.  I  ordered  them  to  take 
station  ahead.     ...     At  6:25  I  altered  course  to  E.S.E. 


^^^5lr  x.       lSnandan£reef 


a£€l 


at6-l7 


3 


Gerzmm.  *\ 
\cma£6-3o\ 


JGermaal&n 


A.  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet;  B.  Grand  Fleet;  C.  German  Fleet 

Sketch  plan  of  the  action  from  6  p.m.  when  the  Grand  Fleet  prepared  to 

deploy,  till  6:50  when  Admiral   Scheer  delivered  his  first  massed  torpedo 

attack 


in  support  of  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  who  were 
at  this  time  only  8,000  yards  from  the  enemy's  leading 
ship."  Nothing  is  said  of  his  movements  in  the  next 
twenty  minutes.  "By  6:50,"  he  continues,  "the  battle- 
cruisers  were  clear  of  our  leading  Battle  Squadron,  then 
bearing  N.N.W.  three  miles  from  Lion."     {Lion  was  now 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  333 

third  ship  in  the  Hne).  "I  ordered  the  Third  Battle 
Cruiser  Squadron  to  prolong  the  hne  astern  and  reduced 
to  eighteen  knots"  There  was  nothing  now  to  hurry  for. 
The  dayhght  action  was,  in  fact,  over.  For  that  matter 
good  visibihty  was  at  an  end.  From  6:0  to  6:50,  though 
never  perfect,  it  had  been  more  favourable  to  us  than  to 
the  enemy.  Could  the  British  forces  have  been  concen- 
trated for  united  effort  during  this  period,  what  might 
not  have  resulted?  But  from  6:0  to  6:17  Scheer  had  been 
engaged  by  Sir  David  Beatty's  four  battle-cruisers  only. 
For  a  short  period  after  6:17  it  was  engaged  by  some  ships 
of  the  rear  division  as  well.  From  6:30  till  the  torpedo 
attacks  broke  up  the  Grand  Fleet's  gunnery,  it  was  en- 
gaged intermittently  and  at  longer  range  by  all  three  of 
the  main  squadrons.  But  by  this  time  Sir  David  Beatty 
had  passed  ahead,  and  the  survivors  of  the  enemy's  van 
had  begun  their  turn. 

THE    GERMAN    RETREAT 

The  next  phase  of  the  action  was  a  fruitless  chase  of  the 
enemy  from  seven  o'clock  until  8:20.  "At  7:6,"  says 
Sir  David  Beatty,  "I  received  a  signal  that  the  course  of 
the  fleet  was  south.  ...  We  hauled  round  gradually 
to  S.W.  by  S.  to  regain  touch  with  the  enemy  (who  were 
lost  to  sight  at  about  6:50),  and  at  7:14  again  sighted  them 
at  a  range  of  about  1 5,000  yards.  .  .  .  We  re-engaged 
at  7:17  and  increased  speed  to  twenty-two  knots.  At 
7:32  my  course  was  S.W.  speed  eighteen  knots,  the  leading 
enemy  battleship  bearing  N.W.  by  West.  ...  At 
7:45  P.M.  we  lost  sight  of  them." 

The  two  quotations  I  have  made  from  Sir  David 
Beatty's  despatch  divide  themselves  naturally  in  this 
way.     The  first  deals  with  the  plan  he  had  attempted  to 


334        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

make  possible  and  to  share,  the  second  describes  his  course 
after  that  plan  had  proved  abortive.     Between  them  they 
make  it  clear  that  Sir  David  kept  an  easterly  course  at 
full  speed  from  six  o'clock  till  6:25.     He  then  turned  a 
quarter  of  a  right  angle  to  the  south,  that  is,  to  his  right, 
and  held  this  course  for  twenty-five  minutes  when,  having 
lost  sight  of  the  enemy  and,  the  Grand  Fleet  being  still 
three  miles  from  him,  he  dropped  his  speed  from    say 
twenty-seven  or  twenty-eight  knots  and  awaited  develop- 
ments.    As  soon  as  he  heard  that  the  Grand  Fleet,  after 
recovering  from  the  first  torpedo  attack,  had  turned  south 
in  pursuit  of  the  Germans,  he  increased  his  speed  by  four 
knots,   hauled   round  to  the  southwest,   found    and    re- 
engaged the  enemy  at  7:14.     By  this  time,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  enemy's  whole  line  would  be  following  the  lead- 
ing ships  on  a  southwesterly  course,  so  that  Sir  David 
Beatty's  movements  between  6:0  and  7:14  were  approx- 
imately parallel  to  those  of  the  enemy.     He  had  been  able 
to  keep  parallel  by  avaihng  himself  of  his  ten  or  eleven 
knots'  superiority  between  6:0  and  6:50  and  by  his  four 
or  five  knots'  superiority  between  7:0  and  7:14. 

On  hearing  that  at  last  he  was  to  be  supported.  Sir 
David  Beatty  raised  his  battle-cruiser  speed  to  twenty- 
two  knots  and  made  a  last  effort  to  get  in  touch  with  the 
retiring  enemy.  He  soon  found  and  engaged  him  at  a 
range  of  15,000  yards  and  contact  coincided  with  a  sudden 
improvement  in  the  seeing  conditions.  Four  ships  only, 
two  battle-cruisers  and  two  battleships,  evidently  the  van 
of  the  enemy's  hne,  were  visible,  and  these  were  at  once 
brought  under  a  hot  fire,  which  caused  the  enemy  to 
resort  to  smoke-screen  protection,  and,  under  cover  of  this 
he  turned  away  to  the  west.  At  7 145  the  mist  came  down 
again  and  the  enemy  was  lost  to  sight.     The  First  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  335 

Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons  were  then  spread  out. 
They  swept  to  the  westward  and  located  the  head  of  the 
enemy's  line  again,  and  at  8:20  the  battle-cruisers — whose 
course  had  been  southwest  up  to  now — changed  course 
to  west  and  got  into  action  apparently  with  the  same 
four  ships  as  before,  at  the  short  range  of  10,000  yards. 
The  leading  ship  soon  turned  away  emitting  high  flames 
and  with  a  heavy  list  to  port.  She  had  been  brought 
under  the  fire  of  Lion.  Princess  Royal  set  fire  to  one  of 
the  two  battleships.  Indomitable  and  New  Zealand 
engaged  a  third  and  sent  her  out  of  the  line,  heeling  over 
and  burning  also.  Then  the  mist  came  dow^n  once  more 
and  the  enemy  was  last  seen  by  Falmouth  at  twenty-two 
minutes   to   nine. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  is  far  less  explicit  as  to  the 
occasions  on  which  his  ships  got  into  action.  The  action 
between  the  battle  fleets,  he  said,  lasted  intermittently 
from  6:17  to  8:20.  At  6:17  we  know  that  Burney's  divi- 
sion got  into  action,  and  at  6:30  until  some  time  up  to 
7:20  the  other  divisions  also.  But  no  details  of  any  kind 
of  encounters  later  than  that  are  mentioned.  It  is  clear 
that  after  6:50  the  weather  made  any  continuous  engaging 
quite  impossible.  There  was  a  second  torpedo  attack 
during  the  stern  chase — and  once  more  the  enemy  "opened 
the  range." 

THE    NIGHT   ACTIONS   AND   THE    EVENTS    OF  JUNE    I 

The  form  that  the  deployment  actually  took,  and  the 
fifteen  minutes'  respite  from  attack  won  by  the  torpedo 
attack  at  7:40  which  enabled  Scheer  to  get  his  whole 
fleet  on  to  a  southeasterly  from  an  easterly  course  were, 
tactically  speaking,  the  explanation  of  the  German  escape 
on  the  31st.     It  is  more  difficult  to  understand  exactly 


336        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

why  they  were  not  brought  to  action  on  the  following  day. 
Very  httle  is  actually  known  of  what  happened  in  the 
course  of  the  night,  and  the  despatches  throw  little  light 
on  it  because,  though  many  incidents  are  mentioned, 
very  few  have  any  definite  hour  assigned  to  them.  The 
facts,  so  far  as  they  can  be  gathered,  are  as  follows : 

The  Grand  Fleet  seems  to  have  lost  sight  of  the  Ger- 
mans altogether  after  8:20  and  Sir  David  Beatty's  scouts 
saw  the  last  of  their  enemy  at  8:38.  The  Vice-Admiral 
continued  searching  for  forty  minutes  longer  and  then  fell 
back  east  and  to  the  line  which  was  the  course  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  when  he  was  last  in  touch  v/ith  it  by  wireless. 
Both  fleets  seem  to  have  proceeded  some  distance  south 
and  to  have  waited  for  the  night  in  the  proximity  of  a 
point  about  equi-distant — eighty  miles — from  the  Horn 
Reef  and  Heligoland.  One  destroyer  flotilla,  the  Thir- 
teenth, and  one  light  cruiser  squadron  were  retained  with 
the  capital  ships  for  their  protection.  The  rest  were 
disposed,  as  the  Commander-in-Chief  says,"in  a  position 
in  which  they  could  afford  protection  to  the  fleet  and  at 
the  same  time  be  favourably  situated  for  attacking  the 
enemy's  heavy  ships."  They  must  have  been  placed 
north  of  the  British  forces.  No  British  battle  or  battle- 
cruiser  squadron  was  attacked  during  the  night,  but  the 
Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  which  was  disposed  in 
the  rear  of  the  battle  hne,  got  into  action  at  10:20  with  five 
enemy  cruisers,  and  at  1 1 130  Birmingham  sighted  several 
heavy  ships  steering  south  or  west-southwest.  The 
Thirteenth  Flotilla,  which  seems  to  have  been  associated 
with  the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  astern  of  the 
battle  fleet,  reported  a  large  vessel  half  an  hour  after  mid- 
night, which  opened  fire  on  three  of  the  flotilla,  disabling 
Turbulent.    At    2:35    another,    Moresby,    sighted    four 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  337 

pre-Dreadnoughts  and  had  a  shot  at  them  with  a  torpedo.- 
We  are  not  told  the  course  they  were  steering. 

The  destroyers  sent  out  to  attack  the  enemy  got  several 
opportunities  for  using  their  torpedoes,  three  of  which 
were  probably  successful,  and  a  fourth  attack  resulted  in 
the  blowing  up  of  a  ship.  The  despatch  does  not  say, 
however,  whether  the  destroyers  were  able  to  keep  in 
wireless  communication  with  the  main  fleet,  whether  any 
were  instructed  to  keep  contact  with  the  enemy  and  just 
hang  on  to  him  till  daylight;  whether,  in  fact,  either  the 
Commander-in-Chief  or  Sir  David  Beatty  had  any  authen- 
tic information  at  daylight  as  to  the  enemy's  formation 
or  movements.  Champion  s  encounter  with  four  de- 
stroyers at  3  :30  is  the  only  occurrence  we  hear  of  after 
daybreak,  until  the  engagement  of  a  Zeppelin  at  4:0  a.m. 
All  we  are  told  is  to  be  gathered  from  these  words  of 
Lord  JeUicoe's: 

"At  daylight,  June  i,  the  Battle  Fleet,  being  then  to  the 
southward  and  westward  of  the  Horn  Reef,  turned  to  the 
northward  in  search  of  enemy  vessels  and  for  the  purpose 
of  collecting  our  own  cruisers  and  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 
.  .  .  The  visibility  early  on  June  i  (three  to  four  miles) 
was  less  than  on  May  31,  and  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers, 
being  out  of  visual  touch,  did  not  rejoin  until  9  a.m.  The 
British  Fleet  remained  in  the  proximity  of  the  battlefield 
and  near  the  line  of  approach  to  German  ports  until  il 
A.M.  on  June  i,  in  spite  of  the  disadvantage  of  long  dis- 
tances from  fleet  bases  and  the  danger  incurred  in  waters 
adjacent  to  enemy  coasts  from  submarines  and  torpedo 
craft.  The  enemy,  however,  made  no  sign,  and  I  was  re- 
luctantly compelled  to  the  conclusion  that  the  High  Sea 
Fleet  had  returned  into  port.  Subsequent  events  proved 
this  assumption  to  have  been  correct.     Our  ■position  must 


338        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

have  heen  known  to  the  enemy,  as  at  4  a.m.  the  fleet  engaged 
a  Zeppelin  for  about  five  minutes,  during  which  time  she 
had  ample  time  to  note  and  subsequently  report  the  posi- 
tion and  course  of  the  British  Fleet.  The  waters  from  the 
latitude  of  the  Horn  Reef  to  the  scene  of  the  action  were 
thoroughly  searched.  ...  A  large  amount  of  wreck- 
age was  seen,  but  no  enemy  ships,  and  at  i  :i5  p.m.,  it  being 
evident  that  the  German  Fleet  had  succeeded  in  return- 
ing to  port,  course  was  shaped  for  our  bases,  which  were 
reached  without  further  incident  on  Friday,  June  2." 

At  this  time  of  year  and  in  this  latitude,  it  will  be  day- 
light some  time  before  3  130.  The  fleet,  therefore,  made 
for  the  scene  of  the  action  at  this  hour — principally,  it 
would  seem,  to  pick  up  the  cruisers  and  destroyers — and 
remained  in  its  proximity  until  11  a.m.,  when  the  waters 
between  the  Battle  Fleet  and  the  Horn  Reef  were  searched. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  does  not  tell  us  of  any  search 
made  for  the  enemy  at  all.  But  from  the  fact  that  he  had 
gone  northward  to  look  for  his  own  destroyers  and  cruisers, 
it  is  evident  that,  whatever  information  he  had  got  during 
the  night,  pointed  to  the  probability  of  the  enemy  having 
retreated  from  the  battlefield  not  south  or  west,  but  east 
and  northwards.  At  8 140  on  the  previous  evening  he  was 
last  reported  at  a  point  120  miles  from  the  Horn  Reef 
lightship,  bearing  almost  exactly  northwest  from  it.  It 
is  highly  probable  that  at  least  ten  of  the  German  ships 
had  been  struck  by  torpedoes,  in  addition  to  the  one  sunk. 
And  though  Lutzozv  was  the  only  ship  sunk  by  gunfire, 
many  others  had  suffered  very  severely.  If  the  fleet's 
maximum  speed  before  the  action  was  eighteen  knots,  it 
is  highly  Improbable  that  after  the  action  It  exceeded 
fifteen.  At  fifteen  knots  it  would  have  taken  the  Germans 
eight  hours  to   reach    the    Horn    Reef   lightship,    had 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  339 

they  started  for  that  point  directly  after  contact  with  the 
British  main  squadrons  was  lost.  Having  suffered  so 
severely  and  escaped  so  miraculously,  it  was  not  only 
obvious  that  Scheer's  one  idea  on  June  i  would  be  to  make 
the  most  of  his  luck  and  get  safely  home,  it  was  also  to  the 
last  degree  probable  that  he  would  shape  a  course  for 
home  which  would  bring  him  soonest  under  the  protection 
of  whatever  defences  the  German  coast  could  offer.  He 
would  not,  that  is  to  say,  attempt  to  regain  Heligoland 
by  trying  to  get  round  the  British  Fleet  to  the  south  and 
west,  and  then  turn  sharply  east  to  Heligoland;  he  would 
probably  try  to  creep  down  the  Danish  and  Schleswig 
coasts,  where  wounded  ships  might,  if  necessary,  be 
beached,  and  the  islands  might  supply  some  form  of  refuge 
if  the  situation  became  desperate.  It  was  on  this  route 
also  that  the  submarines  sent  out  to  cover  the  retreat 
could  be  stationed.  The  best  chance  of  bringing  the  Ger- 
mans once  more  to  action  on  the  morning  of  June  i  would 
then  appear  to  have  been  a  sweeping  movement  towards 
the  Horn  Reef.  The  German  fleet  could  not  possibly 
have  reached  this  point  before  half-past  four,  and  prob- 
ably not  before  half-past  six.  The  fast,  light  forces  and 
the  battle-cruisers  could  have  got  across  to  the  Schleswig 
coast  in  two  and  a  half  hours  and  the  battleships  before 
seven  o'clock. 

If  the  despatch  tells  us  all  that  was  done,  one  is  rather 
driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Commander-in-Chief 
assumed  that  it  was  not  our  business,  but  the  Germans' 
business,  to  resume  the  action.  Why  else  should  he  say 
that  "the  enemy  made  no  sign"?  or  exult  in  the  fact  that 
he  knew  from  his  Zeppelin  at  four  o'clock  where  theBritish 
fleet  was  if  he  liked  to  look  for  it  ?  Why  should  the  enemy 
make  a  sign  ?     Was  it  not  obvious  after  the  events  of  the 


340        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

preceding  day  that  he  could  have  but  one  idea  and  that 
was  safety?  Scheer  and  Von  Hipper  had  certainly  done 
enough  for  honour.  They  had  inflicted  heavier  losses 
than  they  had  suffered.  If  they  could  get  home  they  had 
anything  but  a  discreditable  story  to  tell.  If  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief really  thought  it  was  not  his  first  duty 
to  find  and  bring  the  enemy  to  action  again;  if  the  risk  of 
approaching  the  Jutland  coast  seemed  too  great;  if  the 
frustration  of  any  ulterior  object  the  enemy  might  have 
contemplated  the  day  before  seemed  cheaply  purchased 
by  the  losses  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet  had  suffered,  so 
long  as  our  main  strength  at  sea  was  not  impaired,  then  the 
proceedings  on  June  i,  as  communicated  to  us,  are  per- 
fectly intelligible. 

Yet  there  must  have  been  many  among  his  officers  and 
under  his  command  who  took  a  diametrically  different 
view.  After  engaging  for  the  last  time  at  8  .-40  on  the  pre- 
vious evening,  Sir  David  Beatty  says:  *Tn  view  of  the 
gathering  darkness,  and  of  the  jact  that  our  strategical 
position  was  such  as  to  make  it  appear  certain  that  we  should 
locate  the  enemy  at  daylight  under  most  favourable  circum- 
stances, I  did  not  consider  it  desirable  or  proper  to  close 
the  enemy  battle  fleet  during  the  dark  hours.  I  there- 
fore concluded  that  I  should  be  carrying  out  your  wishes 
by  turning  to  the  course  of  the  fleet,  reporting  to  you  that 
I  had  done  so." 

On  the  events  of  June  i  Sir  David  Beatty*s  despatch 
is  silent,  but  it  is  obvious  that  it  was  not  his  opinion  over- 
night that  the  morrow  should  be  spent  in  waiting  for  the 
enemy  to  give  a  sign,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  was 
certain  that  he  could  and  should  be  found  and  brought 
to  action. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

Zeebrugge  and  Ostend 

In  the  course  of  the  night  April  22-23,  ^n  attack  was  made 
on  the  two  Flemish  bases,  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge,  with  a 
view  to  blocking  the  entrances  of  both  by  the  familiar 
method  of  sinking  old  cement-filled  ships  in  the  narrow 
fairway.  At  Ostend  the  block-ships  were  grounded 
slightly  ofF  their  course,  and  a  few  days  later  a  second 
attempt  was  made.  The  Zeebrugge  block-ships  got  into 
their  chosen  billets  and  are  safely  grounded  there.  The 
latter  port,  in  spite  of  official  denials,  was  for  many  months 
made  almost  useless  to  the  enemy,  and  it  is  probably  safe 
to  assume  that  the  value  of  Ostend,  where  Fhidtctive 
lies  across  the  fairway,  is  considerably  diminished. 
Material  results,  therefore,  of  high  importance  were 
achieved  by  this  enterprise. 

The  operations  are  worth  examining  on  three  quite 
independent  grounds.  First,  what  is  the  strategical 
value  of  their  objective?  How,  that  is  to  say,  would  the 
naval  activities  of  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  gain  by 
Zeebrugge  and  Ostend  being,  for  some  months  at  least 
out  of  action?  And,  conversely,  what  would  the  enemy 
lose?  Unless  we  are  satisfied  that  the  gain  must  be 
substantial — apart  altogether  from  the  moral  effect — we 
should  obviously  have  a  difficulty  in  justifying,  not  the 
losses  in  ships  incurred,  which  were  trivial  and  easily 
replaced,  but  the  losses  in  picked  men,  which  were  irrepar- 
able.    Secondly,  the  incident  is  clearly  worth  examining 

341 


342        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

for  its  tactical  interest.  What  were  the  difficulties  the 
vice-admiral  in  command  had  to  overcome?  By  what 
weapons,  devices,  and  manoeuvres  did  he  attempt  to  effect 
his  purpose?     Third,  what  was  the  moral  effect? 

STRATEGICAL  OBJECT 

There  is  now  only  one  theatre  of  the  war,  and  in  this 
the  issue  of  civihzation  or  barbarism  must  be  decided  by 
military  action.  The  event  depends  upon  the  capacity 
of  the  sea  power  of  the  Allies  to  deliver  in  France  all  the 
fighting  men  and  all  the  war  material  that  Allied  ships 
can  draw  from  Asia,  from  Australia,  from  South  America, 
from  the  United  States,  and  from  Canada,  and  then  deliver 
either  directly  into  France,  or  first  into  British  ports, 
and  then  from  Britain  into  France.  To  beat  the  German 
Army  is  ultimately  a  problem  in  sea  communications. 
The  whole  of  these  have  to  pass  through  the  bottle-neck 
of  the  Western  end  of  the  Atlantic  lanes.  Into  an  area 
south  of  Ireland  and  north  of  Ushant,  a  hundred  miles 
square,  every  ship  that  comes  from  the  Mediterranean, 
from  the  Cape,  from  Buenos  Ayres,  Rio,  the  West  Indies, 
or  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  of 
America,  must  come. 

Secondary  only  to  this  are  the  areas  that  feed  ships 
into  it,  or  into  which  the  ships  that  pass  through  it  are 
dissipated  on  their  way  to  the  several  ports — the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  Bay  of  Biscay,  the  English  Channel,  St. 
George's  Channel,  the  Irish  Sea.  It  is  in  these,  when  it  is 
driven  from  the  main  funnel  point  of  traffic,  that  the 
submarine  must  do  its  work.  The  defeat  of  the  sub- 
marine, when  at  large,  turns  upon  three  factors:  (i)  the 
underwater  offensive — that  is,  mine-fields,  that  will  tend 
to  keep  it  within  certain  areas;  (2)  the  efficiency  with 


ZEEBRiJGGE  AND  OSTEND  343 

which  ships  liable  to  attack  are  protected  by  convoy; 
and  (3)  the  skill  and  persistence  with  which  submarines, 
once  on  their  hunting  grounds,  are  in  turn  hunted.  To 
maintain  a  cross-Channel  barrage,  the  enemy  surface 
craft  must  be  handicapped  in  every  possible  way.  The 
second  and  third  factors  of  anti-submarine  war  make 
heavy  demands  on  material,  on  personnel,  and  on  skill, 
judgment,  and  organization.  Here  the  decisive  material 
factor  is  the  number  of  destroyers  available  for  both 
forms  of  work.  When  it  comes  to  a  close-quarters  fight, 
no  craft  that  has  a  speed  of  less  than  thirty  knots,  that 
cannot  maintain  itself  in  any  weather,  that  does  not 
possess  a  large  cruising  radius,  can  be  of  the  first  ejfficiency. 
The  larger  petrol-driven  submarine-chasers  and  the  many 
special  craft  which  are  built  for  various  purposes  in  con- 
nection with  the  defensive  campaign,  all  have  their  field 
of  utility.  But  for  the  final  power  to  rush  swiftly  on  to 
a  submarine  if  it  is  momentarily  seen  afloat,  and  for 
covering  the  area  into  which  it  can  submerge  itself,  while 
the  destroyer  approaches  with  depth  bombs,  the  destroyer, 
if  only  from  its  superior  speed,  stands  supreme  as  the 
enemy  of  the  U-boat.  From  the  very  earliest  days  of 
the  submarine  work  it  has,  then,  been  axiomatic  that 
every  measure  which  will  put  a  larger  number  of  destroyers 
at  our  disposal  should  be  taken  at  almost  any  cost.  How 
does  the  work  at  Zeebriigge  and  Ostend  help  us,  both 
in  this  respect  and  in  a  mining  policy? 

At  these  two  ports  our  enemy  was  able  to  maintain  a 
very  considerable  destroyer  force.  Its  activit  es  were 
necessarily  mainly  confined  to  work  in  darkness  or  in 
thick  weather.  But  in  such  conditions  its  efficiency  was 
of  a  ver>'  high  order.  The  public  only  heard  of  its  activi- 
ties when  it  shelled  some  point  of  the  coast  of  Kent,  or 


344         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

raided  our  trawlers  or  other  patrols,  and,  in  all  conscience, 
it  heard  of  these  activities  often  enough.  Yet  we  were 
inclined  to  suppose  them  unimportant  because  their 
material  results  were  insignificant.  The  news  that  a 
cross-Channel  barrage  was  in  course  of  estabhshment 
gave  them  a  new  value.  But  their  value  to  the  enemy 
should  not  be  measured  by  the  casualties  they  inflicted 
on  our  light  craft,  nor  by  their  occasional  excursions 
into  the  murder  of  civilians  on  shore.  It  lay  in  the  fact 
that  the  enemy's  force  permanently  withdrew  from  the 
anti-submarine  campaign  numerous  destroyer  leaders 
and  destroyers  which  had  to  be  maintained  at  Dover  to 
cope  with  it.  From  Zeebriigge  to  Emden — the  nearest 
German  port — is,  roughly,  three  hundred  miles  by  sea, 
and  it  does  not  need  elaborate  argument  to  show  that 
if  Zeebriigge  and  Ostend  are  permanently  out  of  action 
the  problem  of  deahng  with  enemy  craft  in  the  narrow 
seas  is  totally  and  entirely  changed.  With  these  gone, 
the  East  Coast  ports  became  the  natural  centres  from 
which  to  command  the  waters  between  Great  Britain  and 
Holland.  They  are  fifty  miles  nearer  Emden  than  is 
Dunkirk.  If  any  German  destroyers  got  west  and  south 
of  Dunkirk,  and  the  news  of  their  presence  were  cabled 
to  an  East  Coast  base,  destroyers  could  get  between  the 
enemy  and  his  ports  without  difficulty.  Thus,  enemy 
surface  craft,  based  upon  German  ports,  would  practically 
be  denied  access  to  Flemish  waters  altogether,  and  this 
by  the  East  Coast  and  not  by  the  Dover  forces.  In 
other  words,  the  Dover  patrol  forces  would,  by  the  closing 
of  Ostend  and  Zeebriigge,  be  set  free  for  the  highly 
important  work  of  aiding  in  the  anti-submarine  campaign 
— and  there  is  certainly  no  naval  need  that  is  greater. 
The   strategical   objective,   therefore,   which   Admiral 


2EEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  345 

Keyes  put  before  himself  in  his  expedition  was,  so  far 
as  he  could,  to  set  back  the  enemy's  naval  bases  by  no  less 
than  three  hundred  miles.  Its  importance  as  setting 
free  new  forces,  both  for  the  direct  attack  on  submarines, 
and  for  saving  the  mine-layers  from  attack,  cannot  be 
exaggerated,  for  it  was  a  step — and  a  great  step — forward 
in  making  sure  of  the  sea  communications  on  which  all 
depends.  It  must  be  conceded,  then  that  the  results 
Admiral  Keyes  had  in  view  amply  justify  a  very  con- 
siderable expenditure  both  of  material  and  men.  Let  us 
next  ask  ourselves  what  kind  of  material  he  chose,  and 
how  he  proposed  to  use  his  forces  with  utmost  economy 
and  maximum  tactical  effect. 

SIR  ROGER  KEYES'S  TACTICS 

The  purposes  of  the  expedition,  as  we  have  seen,  were 
to  block  the  exit  of  the  canal  at  Zeebriigge  and  the  entrance 
of  the  small,  narrow  harbour  at  Ostend  with  old  cruisers 
filled  with  cement,  the  removal  of  which  would  be  an 
operation  of  a  lengthy  and  tedious  kind.  Incidentally, 
the  plan  was  to  effect  the  maximum  destruction  of  war 
stores  and  equipment  at  Zeebriigge  and  to  sink  as 
many  as  possible  of  the  enemy  vessels  found  in  either 
port,  and  finally,  to  inflict  on  the  enemy  the  maximum 
possible  losses  of  personnel.  By  blocking  the  canal  the 
value  of  Zeebriigge  was  reduced  from  being  an  equipped 
base  to  being  a  mere  refuge.  As  there  were  two  points 
of  attack,  the  expedition  naturally  resolved  itself  into 
two  distinct,  but  simultaneous,  undertakings.  The 
simpler,  the  less  dangerous,  the  less  ambitious,  but,  as 
the  event  showed,  the  more  difficult  operation  of  the 
two,  was  the  attempt  tg  block  Ostend.  The  larger,  more 
complex,  and  infinitely  more  perilous  undertaking,  but 


346        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

because  of  its  very  complications,  ultimately  easier,  was 
the  attempt  at  Zeebriigge.  In  its  broad  outlines,  the 
scheme  was  to  get  the  ships  as  near  as  possible  without 
detection,  and  then  to  trust  to  a  final  rush  to  gain  the 
desired  position.  Concealment  up  to  the  last  moment 
was  to  be  secured  by  smoke  screens.  At  Ostend  the  pro- 
blem was  simply  to  run  two  or  three  ships  into  the  entrance 
— that  is,  to  get  them  into  position  before  the  enemy's 
artillery  made  it  impossible  to  manoeuvre.  If  the  Ostend 
attempt  failed,  it  was  largely  because  a  sudden  change 
in  the  weather  conditions  robbed  the  smoke  screens,  which 
were  to  hide  the  ships,  of  their  value,  so  that  the  opera- 
tion of  placing  the  blockships  accurately  was  made  almost 
impossible.  The  operation  of  blocking  such  entrances 
has,  of  course,  long  been  familiar.  The  exploit  of  Lieu- 
tenant Hobson  in  the  Spanish-American  War,  is  fresh 
in  the  memories  of  all  sailors.  This  failed  through  the 
steering  gear  of  the  blocking-ship  being  destroyed  by 
gunfire  at  the  critical  moment.  The  Japanese  attempted 
the  same  thing  on  a  large  scale  at  Port  Arthur  but  with 
anything  but  complete  success.  If  the  first  Ostend  efl^ort, 
then,  fell  short  of  finality,  we  have  the  experience  of  these 
earlier  precedents  to  explain  and  account  for  it. 

I  have  dealt  with  Ostend  first  because,  after  the  pre- 
liminary bombardment,  nothing  more  could  have  been 
attempted  than  to  force  the  ships  into  the  harbour 
entrance  and  sink  them  there.  But  at  Zeebriigge  a  far 
more  intricate  operation  was  possible.  Zeebriigge  is  not 
a  town.  It  is  just  the  sea  exit  of  the  Bruges  Canal,  with 
its  railway  connections,  round  which  a  few  streets  of 
houses  have  clustered.  The  actual  entrance  to  the  canal 
is  flanked  by  two  short  sea  walls,  at  the  end  of  each  of 
which  are  guide  lights.     From  these  lights  up  the  canal 


ZEEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  347 

to  the  lock  gates  is  about  half  a  mile.  A  large  mole 
protects  the  sea  channel  to  the  canal  from  being  blocked 
by  silted  sand.  The  mole  is  connected  to  the  mainland 
by  five  hundred  yards  of  pile  viaduct.  The  mole  is  nearly 
a  mile  long,  built  in  a  curve,  a  segment  amounting  to, 
perhaps,  one-sixth  of  a  circle,  the  centre  of  which  would 
be  a  quarter  of  a  mile  east  of  the  canal  entrance,  while 
its  radius  would  be  three-quarters  of  a  mile.  It  is  a  large 
and  substantial  stone  structure,  on  which  are  railway 
lines  and  a  railway  station,  and  has  been  turned  to  capital 
military  account  by  the  enemy,  who  erected  on  it  aircraft 
sheds  and  miHtary  estabhshments  of  many  kinds. 

The  general  plan  was  to  bombard  the  place  for  an  hour 
by  monitors  and,  under  cover  of  this  fire,  for  the  attacking 
squadron  to  advance  to  the  harbour  mouth.  Then,  when 
the  bombardment  ceased.  Vindictive  was  to  run  alongside 
the  mole,  disembark  her  own  landing  party  and  those 
from  Iris  and  Daffodil,  who  were  to  overpower  the  enemy 
protecting  the  guns  and  stores  while  the  old  submarines 
w^ere  run  into  the  pile  viaduct  to  cut  the  mole  off  from  the 
miainland,  thus  isolating  it.  Meanwhile,  other  forces 
were  to  engage  any  enemy  destroyers  or  submarines 
that  might  be  in  the  port.  Finally,  the  block-ships 
were  to  be  pushed  right  up  into  the  canal  mouth  and  there 
sunk.  The  success  of  the  latter  part  of  these  operations 
turned  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  enemy  could  be  made 
to  believe  that  the  attack  on  the  mole  was  the  chief 
objective. 

To  ensure  success  against  the  mole,  several  very 
ingenious  devices  were  brought  into  play.  The  mam 
landing  parties  were  placed  in  Vindictive.  This  cruiser — 
which  displaced  about  5,600  tons,  and  had  a  broadside 
of  six  6-inch  guns — was  fitted,  on  the  port  side,  with 


348        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

"brows,"  or  landing  gangways,  that  could  be  lowered 
on  the  mole  the  moment  she  came  alongside.  All  the 
vessels  of  the  squadron  were  equipped  with  fog-  or  smoke- 
making  material,  which  would  veil  the  force  from  the 
enemy  until  he  sent  up  his  star  shells  and,  in  the  artificial 
light,  would  conceal  the  character,  numbers,  and  com- 
position of  the  force  as  completely  as  possible.  It  seems 
that  a  shift  of  wind  at  the  critical  moment — here,  as  at 
Ostend — robbed  this  plan  of  some  of  its  anticipated  effi- 
ciency. At  some  point  of  the  approach,  then,  ap- 
parently just  before  Vindictive  rounded  and  got  abreast 
of  the  lighthouse,  the  presence  of  the  invaders  was  de- 
tected, and  they  were  saluted  first  by  salvoes  of  star  shells 
and  next  by  as  hot  a  gunfire  as  can  be  conceived.  Vindic- 
tive lost  no  time  in  replying.  Her  six  6-inch  guns — and 
no  doubt  her  12-pounders  as  well — swept  the  mole  as 
long  as  they  could  be  fired,  and,  once  alongside,  the 
"brows" — only  two  out  of  eighteen  seem  to  have  survived 
the  heavy  gunfire — were  lowered,  and  officers  and  men 
"boarded"  the  mole. 

The  earlier  accounts  stated  that  this  landing  was 
effected  in  spite  of  the  stoutest  sort  of  hand-to-hand  fight- 
ing, that  the  enemy  was  overcome  and  driven  back,  and 
that  the  landing  party  then  proceeded  to  the  destruction 
of  the  sheds  and  stores,  f  The  plans  had  included  the 
blowing-up  of  the  pile  viaduct,  which  connects  the  stone 
mole  with  the  mainland — by  means  of  one  or  two  old  sub- 
marines charged  with  explosives,  and  so  virtually  con- 
verted into  giant  torpedoes.  These  did  their  work  most 
effectively,  and  had  the  enemy  been  in  occupation  of  the 
mole,  his  force  would  have  been  isolated.  But,  as  a  fact, 
the  mole  was  not  occupied,  and  the  enemy  relied 
upon  machine-  and  gun-fire  organized  from  the  shore  end 


ZEEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  349 

of  the  mole  for  making  the  landing  impossible.  In  spite 
of  a  withering  fusillade,  a  considerable  landing  party  of 
marines  and  bluejackets  got  ashore,  though  Colonel 
Elliott  and  Commander  Halahan  and  great  numbers  of 
their  men  were  killed  in  the  attempt.  Those  that  got 
on  the  mole  proceeded  to  destroy,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
sheds,  stores,  and  guns,  and  then  turned  their  attention 
to  the  destroyers  moored  against  its  inner  side. 

Meantime,  the  only  enemy  destroyer  that  seems  to  have 
had  steam  up  tried  to  escape  from  harbour,  and  was  either 
rammed  or  torpedoed  and  instantly  sunk.  Others,  less 
well  prepared,  were  either  boarded,  after  the  resistance 
of  their  crews  had  been  overcome,  and,  it  must  be  pre- 
sumed, sunk  also.  Others,  again,  were  attacked  by  motor 
launches,  which  preceded  and  helped  clear  a  way  for  the 
block-ships.  Whether  an  attempt  on  the  lock  gates  was 
made  or  even  contemplated,  we  have  not  been  told;  but 
the  main  purpose  of  the  expedition,  the  sinking  of  at 
least  two  out  of  the  three  old  J  polios  in  the  right  place, 
was  achieved  with  precision.  The  moment  the  block- 
ships  were  in  place,  the  purpose  for  which  the  mole  was 
occupied  was  gained,  and  the  order  was  rightly  given  for 
an  immediate  retreat.  The  work  had  been  done,  and 
there  was  no  knowing  what  new  resources  the  enemy 
could  have  brought  to  bear  had  time  been  wasted.  Many 
of  the  vessels,  including  Vindictive^  had  been  holed  by 
ii-inch  shells.  But  Vindictive'' s  damages  were  not  of  a 
serious  kind,  and  the  whole  force  was  able  to  withdraw 
in  safety,  with  the  exception  of  one  destroyer  and  two 
motor  launches.  The  destroyer  is  known  to  have  been 
sunk  by  gunfire.  The  successful  withdrawal  of  the 
expedition  is  conclusive  evidence  that  the  enemy  was 
demoralized. 


350        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

For  such  close-quarters  work  Admiral  Keyes,  naturally 
enough,  armed  his  forces  as  for  trench  fighting.  Vindic- 
tive carried  howitzers  on  her  forward  and  after  decks,  and 
her  boarding  parties  v/ere  liberally  armed  with  grenades 
and  flame-throwers  as  well  as  with  rifles,  bayonets,  and 
truncheons.  Machine  guns  also  seem  to  have  been 
landed,  so  that  hand-to-hand  fighting  was  prepared  for 
in  the  full  light  of  the  most  recent  war  experience.  The 
plan,  it  should  be  noted,  was  to  have  included  aeroplane 
co-operation  to  supplement,  if  not  to  assist,  the  work  of 
the  monitors;  but  the  change  in  the  weather  appears  to 
have  interfered  with  this  part  of  the  programme,  and 
may  quite  easily  have  made  any  accurate  work  by  the 
monitors  impossible  also. 

It  is,  first  of  all,  patent  that  the  expedition  was 
thoroughly  thought  out  in.  all  its  details,  and  therefore 
closely  planned.  An  accurate  study  of  the  enemy's 
defences  had  been  made,  and  suitable  means  of  avoiding 
his  attack  or  overcoming  his  defences  had  been  elaborately 
worked  out.  It  is  equally  clear  that  almost  to  the  moment 
when  the  attack  was  made,  the  weather  conditions  were 
those  which  the  plan  contemplated  as  necessary  to  success, 
and  that  it  was  only  the  sudden,  unexpected  change  in  the 
wind  that  threatened  the  Ostend  part  of  the  operations 
with  partial  failure  and  made  the  Zeebriigge  operations 
more  costly  in  life  than  they  should  otherwise  have  been. 
When  it  is  remembered  that  the  approaches  to  Ostend 
and  Zeebriigge  are  commanded  by  very  formidable 
batteries,  armed  with  no  less  than  120  guns  of  the  largest 
calibre,  and  that  the  mole  and  the  sides  of  the  canal 
bristled  with  quick-firing  i2-pounders  and  larger  pieces, 
it  will  be  realized  that,  to  the  enemy,  any  attempt  actually 
to  bring  an  unarmoured  vessel,  v,  ith  her  cement-laden  con- 


ZEEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  351 

sorts,  right  up  either  to  the  mole  or  to  the  actual  mouth 
of  the  canal  must  have  appeared  an  undertaking  too 
absurdly  hare-brained  for  any  one  but  a  lunatic  to  have 
attempted.  It  was  just  because  Sir  Roger  Keyes  had 
evaluated  the  enemy's  defences  with  exactitude  and  had 
thought  out  and  adopted,  first,  methods  of  evading  his 
vigilance  and,  next,  manoeuvres  that  would  for  the  neces- 
sary period  make  his  weapons  useless,  that  it  was  possible 
not  only  to  make  the  attempt,  but  to  realize  the  very 
high  degree  of  success  that  has  apparently  been  won. 

The  essence  of  the  matter,  of  course,  was  to  take  the 
enemy  by  surprise.  At  first  sight,  it  may  appear  a 
curious  way  of  putting  him  off  his  guard,  that  he  should 
for  an  hour  be  bombarded  by  monitors  and  aeroplanes. 
But  the  Vice-Admiral  probably  reasoned  that  this  would 
lead,  as  it  often  does,  to  the  crews  of  the  big  guns  taking 
shelter  underground  until  the  attack  is  over.  If  the 
monitors  were  placed  at  their  usual  great  distance  from 
ports,  and  were  concealed  by  smoke  or  fog  screens,  the 
enemy  gunners  would  know  that  it  was  merely  idle  to 
attempt  to  reply  to  their  fire.  If  nothing  was  to  be 
possible  in  the  way  of  response  until  daylight,  the  gun- 
layers  were  just  as  well  in  their  shell-proofs  as  anywhere. 
Under  cover,  then,  of  this  long-range  bombardment, 
and  concealing  his  squadron  by  the  ingenious  fog  methods 
invented  by  the  late  Commander  Brock,  Sir  Roger  Keyes 
made  his  way  within  a  very  short  distance  of  the  veiled 
lights  at  the  end  of  the  mole.  It  was  at  this  point  that 
the  wind  shifted  and  the  presence  of  the  squadron  was 
revealed  to  the  enemy.  There  was  a  brief  interval  before 
the  big  guns  could  be  manned,  and  it  was  doubtless  owing 
to  this  that  Vindictive  got  alongside  before  more  than  one 
ll-inch  shell  had  struck  her.     Once  under  the  shelter  of 


352         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

the  mole,  she  was  safe  from  the  larger  pieces,  and  only 
her  upper  works  could  be  raked  by  the  smaller  natures. 

ATTACK  ON  THE  MOLE 

The  policy  of  attacking  the  mole  and  making  that 
appear  to  the  enemy  the  central  affair,  was  a  fine  piece  of 
tactics.  The  engagement  which  developed  there  was 
in  fact,  a  containing  action,  which  left  the  execution  of 
the  main  objective  to  the  other  forces,  and  its  purpose  was 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  interfering  too  much  with 
them.  Nelson,  it  will  be  remembered,  cut  out  a  block  of 
ships  in  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  line  at  Trafalgar,  occupy- 
ing them  so  that  their  hands  were  full,  and  preventing 
both  them  and  the  van  from  coming  to  the  succour 
of  the  rear.  The  main  operation  was  the  destruction  of 
the  rear  by  Collingwood.  Here  it  was  Fifidictive,  her 
landing-party,  that  played  the  Nelson  role  while  the  Vice- 
Admiral,  in  Warwick,  himself  directed  the  crucial  opera- 
tion, namely,  the  navigation  of  the  block-ships  to  their 
billets.  The  moment  they  were  blown  up  and  sunk  the 
purpose  of  the  expedition  was  fulfilled,  and  Vindictive'' s 
siren  recalled  all  those  from  the  mole  who  could  get  back 
to  the  ship.  The  actual  fortunes  of  the  fight  on  the  mole 
itself,  while  of  thrilling  human  interest  owing  to  the 
extraordinary  circumstances  in  which  it  was  undertaken, 
were  of  quite  subsidiary  importance.  The  primary  object, 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  was  not  the  destruction  of  the 
mole  forts,  or  of  the  aeroplane  shed,  or  of  whatever 
mihtary  equipment  was  there,  or  even  of  killing  or  captur- 
ing its  garrison.  These  were  only  important  in  so  far  as 
their  partial  realization  was  necessary  to  relieving  the 
block-ships  from  the  danger  of  premature  sinking. 

This  is  a  matter  of  real  capital  Importance  and  of  very 


ZEEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  353 

great  interest,  for  it  is,  I  think,  not  difficult  to  realize  that, 
had  similar  circumstances  existed  at  Ostend — had  it  been 
possible,  that  is  to  say,  to  occupy  the  defenders  and 
distract  their  attention  on  some  perfectly  irrelevant 
engagement — the  requisite  time  would  have  been  given 
to  those  in  command  of  the  block-ships  to  make  sure  of 
getting  them  into  the  right  position.  As  things  were, 
they  were  threatened  by  the  fate  which  made  Hobson's 
attempt  at  Santiago  a  failure.  With  the  whole  gun- 
power  of  Ostend  concentrated  upon  the  blocking-ships, 
there  was  not  a  minute  to  be  wasted.  But  with  the 
enemy's  fire  drawn  there  would  have  been  the  leisure 
which  alone  could  make  precision  possible. 

MORAL  EFFECT 

The  attack  on  Zeebriigge  and  the  two  successive  attacks 
on  Ostend,  carefully  planned  and  boldly  and  resolutely 
carried  out,  achieved  a  very  high  measure  of  success.  It 
was  natural  enough,  on  the  first  receipt  of  the  news,  that 
we  should  all  have  been  carried  away  by  our  wonder  and 
admiration  at  the  astonishing  heroism  that  made  it 
possible  to  carry  through  so  intricate  a  series  of  opera- 
tions, when  every  soul  engaged  was  seemingly  aware  of 
the  desperate  character  of  the  enterprise,  when  no  one 
could  have  expected  to  return  alive,  when  the  enemy's 
means  seemed  ample,  not  only  for  the  killing  of  eveny'one 
engaged,  but  for  the  immediate  frustration  of  every  object 
that  they  had  in  view,  and  so  made  most  of  the  astounding 
gallantry  and  daring  of  all  concerned.  For  over  four 
years  now  we  have  had  a  constant  recurrence  of  such  feats 
of  courage,  and  repetition  does  not  lessen  their  power  to 
intoxicate  us  with  an  overwhelming  admiration  of  those 
who  are  the  heroes  of  these  great  adventures.     But  we 


354        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

should  be  misconceiving  the  significance  of  these  events 
if  we  were  to  measure  their  importance  either  by  the 
ordered  daring  of  those  engaged,  or  by  their  successful 
execution,  or  by  their  immediate  military  results,  great 
and  far-reaching  as  these  were. 

The  thing  was  more  important  as  affording  conclusive 
evidence  that  the  British  Navy,  as  inspired  and  directed 
from  headquarters,  had  now  abandoned  the  purely 
defensive  role  assigned  to  it  by  ten  years  of  pre-war,  and 
three  and  a  half  years  of  war,  administration.  It  meant 
that  the  Fleet  had  escaped  from  those  counsels  of  timor- 
ous— because  unimaginative  and  ignorant — caution,  which 
had  checked  its  ardour  and  limited  its  activities  since 
August,  1914.  The  effect  may  be  incalculable.  The 
doctrine  that  every  operation  which  involved  the  risk  of 
losing  men  or  ships  must  necessarily  be  too  hazardous 
to  undertake,  was  thus  shown  to  be  no  longer  the  loadstone 
of  Whitehall's  policy.  The  Navy  was  at  last  set  free  to 
act  on  an  older  and  a  better  tradition. 

It  is  indeed  on  this  tradition  that  on  almost  every 
occasion  the  Navy  has,  in  fact,  acted  when  it  got  a  chance. 
When  Swift  and  Broke  tackled  three  times  their  number 
of  enemy  last  year,  and  Botha  and  Morris  six  times  their 
number  this  year,  the  gallant  captains  of  these  gallant 
vessels  did  not  wait  to  ask  if  the  position  of  their  ships 
was  ''critical"  or  otherwise;  but,  with  an  insight  into  the 
true  defensive  value  of  attack — which,  seemingly,  it  is 
the  privilege  only  of  the  most  valorous  to  possess — 
went  straight  for  their  enemies,  fought  overwhelming 
odds  at  close  quarters,  and  came  out  as  victorious  as 
a  rightly  reasoned  calculation  would  have  shown  to  be 
probable. 

Similarly,  on  May  31,  1916,  Sir  David  Beatty,  when 


ZEEBRiJGGE  AND  OSTEND  355 

his  force  of  battle-cruisers,  by  the  loss  of  Indefatigable 
and  Queen  Mary^  had  been  reduced  below  that  of  the 
enemy,  persisted  in  his  attack  upon  Von  Hipper  and,  by 
demoralizing  the  enemy's  fire,  provided  most  effectively 
for  the  safety  of  his  own  ships.  Losses  did  not  make  him 
retreat  then,  nor,  when  Scheer  came  upon  the  scene  with 
the  whole  High  Seas  Fleet,  did  he  withdraw  from  the 
action — his  speed  would  have  made  this  easy — though 
the  odds  were  heavy  against  him.  He  kept,  on  the 
contrary,  the  whole  German  Fleet  in  play,  drawing 
them  dexterously  to  the  north,  where  contact  with  the 
Grand  Fleet  would  be  inevitable.  And,  when  the  contact 
was  made,  his  last  effort  to  break  up  the  German  Hne  was 
to  close  from  the  14,000  yards,  a  range  he  had  prudently 
maintained  during  the  previous  two  hours,  to  8,000, 
where  his  guns  would  be  more  certainly  effective,  realizing 
perfectly  that  no  loss  of  ships  in  his  own  squadron  would 
signify,  if  only  the  entire  destruction  of  the  German  Fleet 
were  made  possible  by  such  a  sacrifice.  It  would  not  be 
difficult  to  give  scores  of  incidents  in  which  individual 
admirals  and  captains  have  shown  the  old  spirit  under 
new  conditions. 

But,  save  only  for  the  crazy  attack  on  the  Dardanelles 
forts — and  this  is  hardly  a  precedent  we  should  rejoice 
to  see  followed — we  have  looked  in  vain  for  any  sign  of 
naval  initiative  from  Whitehall.  The  explanation  lies 
in  the  fact  that  we  had  no  staff  for  planning  operations, 
nor  the  right  men  in  power  for  judging  whether  any  pro- 
posed undertaking  was  based  on  a  right  calculation  of 
the  value  of  the  available  means  of  offence  and  defence. 
The  events,  therefore  of  the  night  of  the  22nd  and  the 
early  hours  of  the  23rd  were  of  quite  extraordinary 
importance,    for   they    marked    an    undertaking   needing 


356         THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

long  and  elaborate  preparation,  and  one  which  could  not 
have  been  brought  to  a  successful  issue  had  it  not  enjoyed 
from  Its  first  inception  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the 
Admiralty.  But  this  is  not  all.  Not  only  was  this  an 
Admiralty-supported  undertaking,  it  was  one  that, 
unlike  the  Gallipoli  adventure,  was  carried  through  on 
right  staff  principles.  There  was  a  definite,  well-thought- 
out  plan — careful  preparation  for  every  step  in  the  right 
selection  of  men  and  means  for  its  execution. 

I  think  it  is  right  to  put  this  forward  as  the  most 
important  aspect  of  a  significant,  stirring,  and  successful 
enterprise.  It  is  the  most  important  because  the  news 
meant  so  very  much  more  than  that  Zeebriigge  was  blocked, 
that  Ostend  was  crippled,  and  that  an  expedition — at 
first  sight  perilous  beyond  conception — had  been  carried 
through  with  losses  altogether  disproportionate,  either 
to  its  dangers  or  to  the  results  achieved.  The  news 
meant  that  a  new  direction  either  had  been,  or  certainly 
can,  and  therefore  must,  now  be  given  to  our  naval 
policy.  In  the  spring  of  1917  sceptics  were  asking  if  the 
Army  could  win  the  war  before  the  Navy  lost  it.  Why, 
they  said,  if  our  land  forces  can  force  a  way  through  what 
we  were  told  were  impregnable  fortifications,  should  the 
greatest  sea  force  in  the  world  be  impotent  against  an 
enemy  who  slinks  behind  his  forts  with  his  surface  craft, 
while  devastating  our  sea  communications  with  his  sub- 
marines? Is  naval  ingenuity,  they  asked,  so  crippled 
that  we  can  neither  protect  our  trade  against  the  sub- 
marine at  sea,  nor  block  the  enemy's  ports  so  that  the 
submarine  can  never  get  to  sea.^'  The  critics  repHed  that 
all  was  well  with  the  Navy,  but  that  all  was  sadly  wrong 
with  its  official  chiefs.  The  reorganization  of  the  Admi- 
ralty was  immediately  followed  by  the  adoption  of  the 


ZEEBRUGGE  AND  OSTEND  357 

convoy  principle — and  submarine  losses  were  reduced 
to  half.  This  long-advocated  measure,  the  recently 
inaugurated  barrage  at  Dover,  and  now  the  events  of  the 
morning  of  April  23,  have  justified  the  critics  and  the 
changes  in  method  and  men  which  they  urged.  Zee- 
briigge  had  been  in  the  enemy's  hands  since  September, 
1914,  and  it  took  us  three  and  a  half  years,  not  to  discover 
a  man  capable  of  attacking  it,  but  in  developing  an 
Admiralty  capable  of  picking  the  man  and  giving  him  the 
right  support  before  the  attack  could  be  made.  If  a 
similar  spirit  had  actuated  a  properly  constituted  Admi- 
ralty all  these  years,  what  might  not  the  Navy  have 
accomplished? 

In  the  previous  year  the  emancipation  of  the  Navy  had 
gone  forward  apace.  And  not  the  least  significant  of  the 
stages  in  the  process  were  first  the  appointment  of  Admi- 
ral Sir  Roger  Keyes  to  be  head  of  the  Planning  Division 
at  the  Admiralty,  next  his  removal  from  the  Admiralty 
to  Dover,  next  the  inauguration  of  the  Channel  barrage, 
and  finally  his  surprising  and  masterly  stroke  at  the 
Flemish  ports.  The  enumeration  of  these  stages  is 
worth  making,  for  they  mark  the  genesis  of  the  plan  we 
have  seen  achieved.  It  was,  if  I  am  correctly  informed, 
quite  understood  when  Admiral  Keyes  went  to  Dover 
that  his  mission  was  temporary.  If  he  was  sent  to  do  the 
things  which  he  has  done,  and  now  that  he  has  done  them 
is  taken  back  to  Whitehall,  then  it  might  seem  as  if  we 
might  look  forward  to  an  aggressive  policy  at  sea  more 
worthy  of  the  superb  force  which  we  possess,  and  more 
consonant  with  its  glorious  heritage  than  anything  which 
we  have  witnessed  in  the  past.  And  if  Sir  Roger  cannot 
be  spared  from  his  new  command,  so  auspiciously  in- 
iaugurated,  then  we  must  trust  that  some  other  of  equal 


358        THE  BRITISH  NAVY  IN  BATTLE 

brains  and  spirit  has  already  taken  or  will  take  his  place. 
Zeebriigge  and  Ostend,  then,  will  figure  in  naval  history, 
not  only  as  the  names  of  achievements  unique  and 
splendid  in  themselves,  but  more  famous  as  the  harbingers 
of  still  greater  things  to  come. 


END 


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